M. TULLI CICERONIS |
|
|
| ☺…☺ = lepos, facetiæ, jocus <…> = lacuna in textu = (linea subter verbum ducta) verborum interjectio in textu † … † = textus forsitan corruptus |
Liber Primus
| [I] [1] Cogitanti mihi sæpenumero, et memoria vetera repetenti, perbeati fuisse, Quinte frater, illi videri solent, qui in optima republica, quum et honoribus et rerum gestarum gloria florerent, eum vitæ cursum tenere potuerunt, ut vel in negotio sine periculo vel in otio cum dignitate esse possent ; ac fuit quum mihi quoque initium requiescendi atque animum ad utriusque nostrum præclara studia referendi fore justum et prope ab omnibus concessum arbitrarer, si infinitus forensium rerum labor et ambitionis occupatio decursu honorum, etiam ætatis flexu constitisset. [2] Quam spem cogitationum et consiliorum meorum quum graves communium temporum tum varii nostri casus fefellerunt. Nam qui locus quietis et tranquillitatis plenissimus fore videbatur, in eo maximæ moles molestiarum et turbulentissimæ tempestates exstiterunt ; neque vero nobis cupientibus atque optantibus fructus otii datus est ad eas artes, quibus a pueris dediti fuimus, celebrandas inter nosque recolendas. [3] Nam prima ætate incidimus in ipsam perturbationem disciplinæ veteris ; et consulatu devenimus in medium rerum omnium certamen atque discrimen ; et hoc tempus omne post consulatum objecimus eis fluctibus qui, per nos a communi peste depulsi, in nosmet ipsos redundarent. Sed tamen in his vel asperitatibus rerum vel angustiis temporis obsequar studiis nostris ; et quantum mihi vel fraus inimicorum, vel causæ amicorum, vel respublica tribuet otii, ad scribendum potissimum conferam ; [4] tibi vero, frater, neque hortanti deero, neque roganti, nam neque auctoritate quisquam apud me plus valere te potest, neque voluntate. | I. [1] As I frequently contemplate and call to mind the times of old, those in general seem to me, brother Quintus, to have been supremely happy, who, while they were distinguished with honors and the glory of their actions in the best days of the republic, were enabled to pursue such a course of life, that they could continue either in employment without danger, or in retirement with dignity. To myself, also, there was a time1 when I thought that a season for relaxation, and for turning my thoughts again to the noble studies once pursued by both of us, would be fairly allowable, and be conceded by almost every one; if the infinite labor of forensic business and the occupations of ambition should be brought to a stand, either by the completion of my course of honors,2 or by the decline of age. [2] Such expectations, with regard to my studies and designs, not only the severe calamities resulting from public occurrences, but a variety of our own private troubles,3 have disappointed. For in that period,4 which seemed likely to offer most quiet and tranquillity, the greatest pressures of trouble and the most turbulent storms arose. Nor to our wishes and earnest desires has the enjoyment of leisure been granted, to cultivate and revive between ourselves those studies to which we have from early youth been addicted. [3] For at our first entrance into life we fell amidst the perturbation5 of all ancient order; in my consulship we were involved in struggles and the hazard of everything;6 and all the time since that consulship we have had to make opposition to those waves which, prevented by my efforts from causing a genera, destruction, have abundantly recoiled upon myself. Yet amidst the difficulties of affairs, and the straitness of time. I shall endeavour to gratify my love of literature; and whatever leisure the malice of enemies, the causes of friends, or the public service will allow me, I shall chiefly devote to writing. [4] As to you, brother, I shall not fail to obey your exhortations and entreaties; for no person can have more influence with me than you have both by authority and affection. |
| [II] Ac mihi repetenda est veteris cujusdam memoriæ — non, sane, satis explicata recordatio sed, ut arbitror, apta ad id quod requiris: ut cognoscas quæ viri omnium eloquentissimi clarissimique senserint de omni ratione dicendi. [5] Vis enim — (ut mihi sæpe dixisti) quoniam quæ pueris (aut adulescentulis) nobis ex commentariolis nostris incohata ac rudia exciderunt, sunt vix hac ætate digna et hoc usu quem, ex causis quas diximus, tot tantisque consecuti sumus — aliquid eisdem de rebus politius a nobis perfectiusque proferri. Solesque nonnunquam hac de re a me in disputationibus nostris dissentire, quod ego eruditissimorum hominum artibus eloquentiam contineri statuam, tu autem illam ab elegantia doctrinæ segregandam putes et in quodam ingenii atque exercitationis genere ponendam. [6] Ac mihi quidem sæpenumero in summos homines ac summis ingeniis præditos intuenti quærendum esse visum est quid esset, cur plures in omnibus rebus quam in dicendo admirabiles exstitissent. Nam, quocunque te animo et cogitatione converteris, permultos excellentes in quoque genere videbis — non mediocrium artium, sed prope maximarum. [7] ¿Quis enim est qui, si clarorum hominum scientiam rerum gestarum vel utilitate vel magnitudine metiri velit, non anteponat oratori imperatorem? ¿Quis autem dubitet, quin belli duces ex hac una civitate præstantissimos pæne innumerabiles, in dicendo autem excellentes vix paucos proferre possimus? [8] Jam vero consilio ac sapientia qui regere ac gubernare rempublicam possint, multi nostra, plures patrum memoria atque etiam majorum exstiterunt, quum boni perdiu nulli, vix autem singulis ætatibus singuli tolerabiles oratores invenirentur. Ac ne quis forte cum aliis studiis quæ reconditis in artibus atque in quadam varietate litterarum versentur, magis hanc dicendi rationem, quam cum imperatoris laude aut cum boni senatoris prudentia, comparandam putet, convertat animum ad ea ipsa artium genera, circumspiciatque, qui in eis floruerint, quamque multi sint : sic facillime, quanta oratorum sit — et semper fuerit — paucitas, judicabit. | II. Here the recollection of an old tradition must be revived in my mind, a recollection not indeed sufficiently distinct, but adapted, I think, so far to reply to what you ask, that you may understand what opinions the most famous and eloquent men entertained respecting the whole art of oratory. [5] For you wish, as you have often said to me. (since what went abroad rough and incomplete7 from our own notebooks, when we were boys or young men, is scarcely worthy of my present standing in life, and that experience which I have gained from so many and such important causes as I have pleaded,) that something more polished and complete should be offered by me on the same subjects; and you are at times inclined to dissent from me in our disputations on this matter; inasmuch as I consider eloquence to be the offspring of the accomplishments of the most learned men;8 but you think it must be regarded as independent of elegant learning, and attributable to a peculiar kind of talent and practice. [6] Often, indeed, as I review in thought the greatest of mankind, and those endowed with the highest abilities, it has appeared to me worthy of inquiry what was the cause that a greater number of persons have been admirable in every other pursuit than in speaking. For which way soever you direct your view in thought and contemplation, you will see numbers excellent in every species, not only of the humble, but even of the highest arts. [7] Who, indeed, is there, that, if he would measure the qualifications of illustrious men, either by the usefulness or magnitude of their actions, would not prefer a general to an orator? Yet who doubts that we can produce, from this city alone, almost innumerable excellent commanders, while we can number scarcely a few eminent in speaking? [8] There have been many also in our own memory, and more in that of our fathers, and even of our forefathers, who had abilities to rule and govern affairs of state by their counsel and wisdom; while for a long period no tolerable orators were found, or scarcely one in every age. But lest any one should think that the art of speaking may more justly be compared with other pursuits, which depend upon abstruse studies, and a varied field of learning, than with the merits of a general, or the wisdom of a prudent senator, let him turn his thoughts to those particular sciences themselves, and contemplate who and how many have flourished in them, as he will thus be best enabled to judge how great a scarcity of orators there is and has ever been. |
| [III] [9] Neque enim te fugit laudandarum artium omnium procreatricem quandam et quasi parentem eam quam φιλοσοφίαν Græci vocant ab hominibus doctissimis judicari ; in qua difficile est enumerare quot viri, quanta scientia, quantaque in suis studiis varietate et copia fuerint, qui non una aliqua in re separatim elaborarint, sed omnia quæcunque essent, vel scientiæ pervestigatione vel disserendi ratione, comprehenderint. [10] ¿Quis ignorat, ii, qui mathematici vocantur, quanta in obscuritate rerum et quam recondita in arte et multiplici subtilique versentur? Quo tamen in genere ita multi perfecti homines exstiterunt, ut nemo fere studuisse ei scientiæ vehementius videatur, quin quod voluerit consecutus sit. ¿Quis musicis, quis huic studio litterarum quod profitentur ii qui grammatici vocantur, penitus se dedidit, quin omnem illarum artium pæne infinitam vim et materiem scientia et cognitione comprehenderit? [11] Vere mihi hoc videor esse dicturus : ex omnibus eis qui in harum artium liberalissimis studiis sint doctrinisque versati, minimam copiam poëtarum et oratorum egregiorum exstitisse ; atque in hoc ipso numero, in quo perraro exoritur aliquis excellens, si diligenter et ex nostrorum et ex Græcorum copia comparare voles, multo tamen pauciores oratores quam poëtæ boni reperientur. [12] Quod hoc etiam mirabilius debet videri, quia ceterarum artium studia fere reconditis atque abditis e fontibus hauriuntur, dicendi autem omnis ratio, in medio posita, communi quodam in usu atque in hominum ore et sermone versatur : ut in ceteris id maxime excellat quod longissime sit ab imperitorum intellegentia sensuque disjunctum ; in dicendo autem vitium vel maximum sit a vulgari genere orationis, atque a consuetudine communis sensus, abhorrere. | III. [9] It does not escape your observation that what the Greeks call PHILOSOPHY, is esteemed by the most learned men, the originator, as it were, and parent of all the arts which merit praise; philosophy, I say, in which it is difficult to enumerate how many distinguished men there have been, and of how great knowledge, variety, and comprehensiveness in their studies, men who have not confined their labors to one province separately, but have embraced whatever they could master either by scientific investigations, or by processes of reasoning. [10] Who is ignorant in how great obscurity of matter, in how abstruse, manifold, and subtle an art they who are called mathematicians are engaged? Yet in that pursuit so many men have arrived at excellence, that not one seems to have applied himself to the science in earnest without attaining in it whatever he desired. Who has ever devoted himself wholly to music; who has ever given himself up to the learning which they profess who are called grammarians, without compassing, in knowledge and understanding, the whole substance and matter of those sciences, though almost boundless? [11] Of all those who have engaged in the most liberal pursuits and departments of such sciences, I think I may truly say that a smaller number of eminent poets have arisen than of men distinguished in any other branch of literature; and in the whole multitude of the learned, among whom there rarely appears one of the highest excellence, there will be found, if you will but make a careful review of our own list and that of the Greeks, far fewer good orators than good poets. [12] This ought to seem the more wonderful, as attainments in other sciences are drawn from recluse and hidden springs; but the whole art of speaking lies before us, and is concerned with common usage and the custom and language of all men; co that while in other things that is most excellent which is most remote from the knowledge and understanding of the illiterate, it is in speaking even the greatest of faults to vary from the ordinary kind of language, and the practice sanctioned by universal reason. |
| [IV] [13] Ac ne illud quidem vere dici potest, aut plures ceteris inservire, aut majore delectatione, aut spe uberiore, aut præmiis ad perdiscendum amplioribus commoveri. Atque ut omittam Græciam quæ semper eloquentiæ princeps esse voluit — atque illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas in quibus summa dicendi vis et inventa est et perfecta —, in hac ipsa civitate profecto nulla unquam vehementius quam eloquentiæ studia viguerunt. [14] Nam posteaquam, imperio omnium gentium constituto, diuturnitas pacis otium confirmavit, nemo fere laudis cupidus adulescens non sibi ad dicendum studio omni enitendum putavit. Ac primo quidem totius rationis ignari, qui neque exercitationis ullam viam, neque aliquod præceptum artis esse arbitrarentur, tantum, quantum ingenio et cogitatione poterant, consequebantur. Post autem, auditis oratoribus Græcis, cognitisque eorum litteris, adhibitisque doctoribus, incredibili quodam nostri homines discendi studio flagraverunt. [15] Excitabat eos magnitudo, varietas multitudoque in omni genere causarum, ut ad eam doctrinam, quam suo quisque studio assecutus esset, adjungeretur usus frequens, qui omnium magistrorum præcepta superaret. Erant autem huic studio maxima (quæ nunc quoque sunt) exposita præmia vel ad gratiam, vel ad opes, vel ad dignitatem. Ingenia vero (ut multis rebus possumus judicare) nostrorum hominum multum ceteris hominibus omnium gentium præstiterunt. [16] Quibus de causis, ¿quis non jure miretur, ex omni memoria ætatum, temporum, civitatum, tam exiguum oratorum numerum inveniri? Sed nimirum, majus est hoc quiddam quam homines opinantur, et pluribus ex artibus studiisque collectum. | IV. [13] Yet it cannot be said with truth, either that more are devoted to the other arts, or that they are excited by greater pleasure, more abundant hope, or more ample rewards; for to say nothing of Greece, which was always desirous to hold the first place in eloquence, and Athens, that inventress of all literature, in which the utmost power of oratory was both discovered and brought to perfection, in this very city of ours, assuredly, no studies were ever pursued with more earnestness than those tending to the acquisition of eloquence. [14] For when our empire over all nations was established, and after a period of peace had secured tranquillity, there was scarcely a youth ambitious of praise who did not think that he must strive, with all his endeavours, to attain the art of speaking. For a time, indeed, as being ignorant of all method, and as thinking there was no course of exercise for them, or any precepts of art, they attained what they could by the single force of genius and thought. But afterwards, having heard the Greek orators, and gained an acquaintance with Greek literature, and procured instructors, our countrymen were inflamed with an incredible passion for eloquence. [15] The magnitude, the variety, the multitude of all kind of causes, excited them to such a degree, that to that learning which each had acquired by his individual study, frequent practice, which was superior to the precepts of all masters, was at once added. There were then, as there are also now, the highest inducements offered for the cultivation of this study, in regard to public favor, wealth, and dignity. The abilities of our countrymen (as we may judge from many particulars,) far excelled those of the men of every other nation. [16] For which reasons, who would not justly wonder that in the records of all ages, times, and states, so small a number of orators should be found ? But the art of eloquence is something greater, and collected from more sciences and studies, than people imagine. |
| [V] ¿Quis enim aliud, in maxima discentium multitudine, summa magistrorum copia, præstantissimis hominum ingeniis, infinita causarum varietate, amplissimis eloquentiæ propositis præmiis, esse causæ putet, nisi rei quandam incredibilem magnitudinem ac difficultatem? [17] Est enim et scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum, sine qua verborum volubilitas inanis atque irridenda est ; et ipsa oratio conformanda, non solum electione, sed etiam constructione verborum ; et omnes animorum motus quos hominum generi rerum natura tribuit, penitus pernoscendi ; quod omnis vis ratioque dicendi in eorum qui audiunt mentibus aut sedandis aut excitandis expromenda est. Accedat eodem oportet lepos quidam facetiæque, et eruditio libero digna, celeritasque et brevitas et respondendi et lacessendi, subtili venustate atque urbanitate conjuncta. [18] Tenenda præterea est omnis antiquitas, exemplorumque vis ; neque legum ac juris civilis scientia neglegenda est. ¿Nam quid ego de actione ipsa plura dicam? quæ motu corporis, quæ gestu, quæ vultu, quæ vocis conformatione ac varietate moderanda est ; quæ sola per se ipsa quanta sit, histrionum levis ars et scæna declarat ; in qua, quum omnes in oris et vocis et motus moderatione laborent, ¿quis ignorat quam pauci sint fuerintque quos animo æquo spectare possimus? ¿Quid dicam de thesauro rerum omnium, memoria?, quæ nisi custos inventis cogitatisque rebus et verbis adhibeatur, intellegimus omnia — etiamsi præclarissima fuerint in oratore — peritura. [19] Quamobrem mirari desinamus, quæ causa sit eloquentium paucitatis, quum ex eis rebus universis eloquentia constet quibus in singulis elaborare permagnum est ; hortemurque potius liberos nostros, ceterosque, quorum gloria nobis et dignitas cara est, ut animo rei magnitudinem complectantur, neque eis aut præceptis, aut magistris, aut exercitationibus quibus utuntur omnes, sed aliis quibusdam se id quod expetunt consequi posse confidant. | V. For who can suppose that, amid the greatest multitude of students, the utmost abundance of masters, the most eminent geniuses among men, the infinite variety of causes, the most ample rewards offered to eloquence, there is any other reason to be found for the small number of orators than the incredible magnitude and difficulty of the art? [17] A knowledge of a vast number of things is necessary, without, which volubility of words is empty and ridiculous; speech itself is to be formed, not merely by choice, but by careful construction of words; and all the emotions of the mind, which nature has given to man, must be intimately known; for all the force and art of speaking must be employed in allaying or exciting the feelings of those who listen. To this must be added a certain portion of grace and wit, learning worthy of a well-bred man, and quickness and brevity in replying as well as attacking, accompanied with a refined decorum and urbanity. [18] Besides, the whole of antiquity and a multitude of examples is to be kept in the memory; nor is the knowledge of laws in general, or of the civil law in particular, to be neglected. And why need I add any remarks on delivery itself, which is to be ordered by action of body, by gesture, by look, and by modulation and variation of the voice, the great power of which, alone and in itself, the comparatively trivial art of actors and the stage proves, on which though all bestow their utmost labor to form their look, voice, and gesture, who knows not how few there are, and have ever been, to whom we can attend with, patience 1 What can I say of that repository for all things, the memory, which, unless it be made the keeper of the matter and words that are the fruits of thought and invention, all the talents of the orator, we see, though they be of the highest degree of excellence, will be of no avail? [19] Let us then cease to wonder what is the cause of the scarcity of good speakers, since eloquence results from all those qualifications, in each of which singly it is a great merit to labor successfully; and let us rather exhort our children, and others whose glory and honor is dear to us, to contemplate in their minds the full magnitude of the object, and not to trust that they can reach the height at which they aim, by the aid of the precepts, masters, and exercises, that they are all now following, but to understand that they must adopt others of a different character. |
| [VI] [20] Ac mea quidem sententia, nemo poterit esse omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus. Etenim ex rerum cognitione efflorescat et redundet oportet oratio ; quæ, nisi subest res ab oratore percepta et cognita, inanem quandam habet elocutionem et pæne puerilem. [21] Neque vero ego hoc tantum oneris imponam nostris præsertim oratoribus, in hac tanta occupatione urbis ac vitæ, nihil ut eis putem licere nescire ; quanquam vis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi, hoc suscipere ac polliceri videtur, ut omni de re, quæcunque sit proposita, ab eo ornate copioseque dicatur. [22] Sed quia non dubito quin hoc plerisque immensum infinitumque videatur, et quod Græcos (homines non solum ingenio et doctrina, sed etiam otio studioque abundantes) partitionem jam quandam artium fecisse video, neque in universo genere singulos elaborasse, sed seposuisse a ceteris dictionibus eam partem dicendi quæ in forensibus disceptationibus judiciorum, aut deliberationum versaretur, et id unum genus oratori reliquisse ; non complectar in his libris amplius quam quod huic generi, — re quæsita et multum disputata — summorum hominum prope consensu, est tributum ; [23] repetamque, non ab incunabulis nostræ veteris puerilisque doctrinæ quendam ordinem præceptorum, sed ea quæ quondam accepi (in nostrorum hominum eloquentissimorum et omni dignitate principum disputatione) esse versata, non quod illa contemnam quæ Græci, dicendi artifices et doctores, reliquerunt ; sed, quum illa pateant, in promptuque sint omnibus, neque ea interpretatione mea aut ornatius explicari aut planius exprimi possint. Dabis hanc veniam, mi frater, ut opinor, ut eorum quibus summa dicendi laus a nostris hominibus concessa est auctoritatem Græcis anteponam. | VI. [20] In my opinion, indeed, no man can be an orator possessed of every praiseworthy accomplishment, unless he has attained the knowledge of everything important, and of all liberal arts, for his language must be ornate and copious from knowledge, since, unless there be beneath the surface matter understood and felt by the speaker, oratory becomes an empty and almost puerile flow of words. [21] Yet I will not lay so great a burden upon orators, especially our own, amid so many occupations of public and private life, as to think it allowable for them to be ignorant of nothing; although the qualifications of an orator, and his very profession of speaking well, seem to undertake and promise that he can discourse gracefully and copiously on whatever subject is proposed to him. [22] But because this, I doubt not, will appear to most people an immense and infinite undertaking, and because I see that the Greeks, men amply endowed not only with genius and learning, but also with leisure and application, have made a kind of partition of the arts, and have not singly labored in the whole circle of oratory, but have separated from the other parts of rhetoric that department of eloquence which is used in the forum on trials or in deliberations, and have left this species only to the orator; I shall not embrace in these books more than has been attributed to this kind of speaking9 by the almost unanimous consent of the greatest men, after much examination and discussion of the subject; [23] and I shall repeat, not a series of precepts drawn from the infancy of our old and boyish learning, but matters which I have heard were formerly argued in a discussion among some of our countrymen who were of the highest eloquence, and of the first rank in every kind of dignity. Not that I contemn the instructions which the Greek rhetoricians and teachers have left as, but, as they are already public, and within the reach of all, and can neither be set forth more elegantly, nor explained more clearly by my interpretation, you will, I think, excuse me,. my brother, if I prefer to the Greeks the authority of those to whom the utmost merit in eloquence has been allowed by our own countrymen. |
| [VII] [24] Quum igitur vehementius inveheretur in causam principum Consul Philippus, Drusique tribunatus pro Senatus auctoritate susceptus infringi jam debilitarique videretur ; dici mihi memini, ludorum Romanorum diebus, L. Crassum, quasi colligendi sui causa, se in Tusculanum contulisse ; venisse eodem, socer ejus qui fuerat, Q. Mucius dicebatur, et M. Antonius, homo et consiliorum in republica socius, et summa cum Crasso familiaritate conjunctus. [25] Exierant autem cum ipso Crasso adulescentes duo, Drusi maxime familiares, et in quibus magnam tum spem majores natu dignitatis suæ collocarant : C. Cotta qui tum tribunatum Plebis petebat, et P. Sulpicius qui deinceps eum magistratum petiturus putabatur. [26] Hi primo die de temporibus illis, deque universa republica — quam ob causam venerant — multum inter se usque ad extremum tempus diei collocuti sunt. Quo quidem in sermone, multa ita divinitus a tribus illis consularibus Cotta deplorata et commemorata narrabat ; ut nihil incidisset postea civitati mali quod non impendere illi tanto ante vidissent. [27] Eo autem omni sermone confecto, tantam in Crasso humanitatem fuisse, ut, quum lauti accubuissent, tolleretur omnis illa superioris tristitia sermonis ; eaque esset in homine jucunditas, et tantus in loquendo lepos, ut dies inter eos Curiæ fuisse videretur, convivium Tusculani. [28] Postero autem die, quum illi majores natu satis quiessent, in ambulationem ventum esse dicebat tum Scævolam duobus spatiis tribusve factis dixisse : “¿Cur non imitamur, Crasse, Socratem illum qui est in Phædro Platonis? Nam me hæc tua platanus admonuit quæ non minus ad opacandum hunc locum patulis est diffusa ramis, quam illa cujus umbram secutus est Socrates quæ mihi videtur non tam ‘ipsa aquula’ quæ describitur, quam Platonis oratione crevisse, sed quod ille durissimis pedibus fecit ut se abjiceret in herbam, atque ita illa quæ philosophi divinitus ferunt esse dicta, loqueretur, id meis pedibus certe concedi est æquius.” [29] Tum Crassum : “Immo vero commodius etiam” ; pulvinosque poposcisse et omnes in eis sedibus quæ erant sub platano, consedisse dicebat. | VII. [24] At the time, then, when the consul Philippus was vehemently inveighing against the cause of the nobility, and the tribuneship of Drusus, undertaken to support the authority of the senate, seemed to be shaken and weakened, I was told, I remember, that Lucius Crassus, as if for the purpose of collecting his thoughts, betook himself, during the days of the Roman games, to his Tusculan country-seat, whither also Quintus Mucius, who had been his father-in-law, is said to have come at the same time, as well as Marcus Antonius, a sharer in all the political proceedings of Crassus, and united in the closest friendship with him. [25] There went out with Crassus himself two young men besides, great friends of Drusus, youths of whom our ancestors then entertained sanguine hopes that they would maintain the dignity of their order; Caius Cotta, who was then a candidate for the tribuneship of the people, and Publius Sulpicius, who was thought likely to stand for that office in due course. [26] These, on the first day, conferred much together until very late in the evening, concerning the condition of those times, and the whole commonwealth, for which purpose they had met. Cotta repeated to me many things then prophetically lamented and noticed by the three of consular dignity in that conversation; so that no misfortune afterwards happened to the state which they had not perceived to be hanging over it so long before; [27] and he said that, when this conversation was finished, there was such politeness shown by Crassus, that after they had bathed and sat down to table, all the seriousness of the former discourse was banished; and there appeared so much pleasantry in him, and so much agreeableness in his humor that though the early part of the day might seem to have been passed by them in the senate-house, the banquet showed all the delights of the Tusculan villa. [28] But on the next day, when the older part of the company had taken sufficient repose, and were come to their walk, he told me that Scaevola, after taking two or three turns, said, “Why should not we, Crassus, imitate Socrates in the Phaedrus of Plato?10 for this plane-tree of yours has put me in mind of it, which diffuses its spreading boughs to overshade this place, not less widely than that did whose covert Socrates sought, and which seems to me to have grown not so much from the rivulet which is described, as from the language of Plato: and what Socrates, with the hardest of feet, used to do, that is, to throw himself on the grass, while he delivered those sentiments which philosophers say were uttered divinely, may surely, with more justice, be allowed to my feet.” [29] Then Crassus rejoined, “Nay, we will yet further consult your convenience;” and called for cushions; when they all, said Cotta, sat down on the seats that were under the plane-tree. |
| [VIII] Ibi, ut ex pristino sermone relaxarentur animi omnium, solebat Cotta narrare Crassum sermonem quendam de studio dicendi intulisse. [30] Qui quum ita esset exorsus, non sibi cohortandum Sulpicium et Cottam, sed magis utrumque collaudandum videri, quod tantam jam essent facultatem adepti, ut non æqualibus suis solum anteponerentur, sed cum majoribus natu compararentur. “Neque vero mihi quicquam,” inquit, “præstabilius videtur, quam posse dicendo tenere hominum mentes, allicere voluntates, impellere quo velit, unde autem velit, deducere. Hæc una res in omni libero populo, maximeque in pacatis tranquillisque civitatibus, præcipue semper floruit, semperque dominata est. [31] ¿Quid enim est aut tam admirabile, quam ex infinita multitudine hominum exsistere unum qui id quod omnibus natura sit datum, vel solus vel cum paucis facere possit? ¿Aut tam jucundum cognitu atque auditu, quam sapientibus sententiis gravibusque verbis ornata oratio et polita? ¿Aut tam potens tamque magnificum, quam populi motus, judicum religiones, Senatus gravitatem, unius oratione converti? [32] ¿Quid tam, porro, regium, tam liberale, tam munificum, quam opem ferre supplicibus, excitare afflictos, dare salutem, liberare periculis, retinere homines in civitate? ¿Quid autem tam necessarium, quam tenere semper arma quibus vel tectus ipse esse possis vel provocare improbos, vel te ulcisci lacessitus? Age vero (ne semper forum, subsellia, rostra, Curiamque meditere), ¿quid esse potest in otio aut jucundius aut magis proprium humanitatis, quam sermo facetus ac nulla in re rudis? Hoc enim uno præstamus vel maxime feris, quod colloquimur inter nos, et quod exprimere dicendo sensa possumus. [33] Quamobrem, ¿quis hoc non jure miretur, summeque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur ut, quo uno homines maxime bestiis præstent, in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat? Ut vero jam ad illa summa veniamus : ¿quæ vis alia potuit aut dispersos homines unum in locum congregare, aut a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilemque deducere, aut — jam constitutis civitatibus —, leges, judicia, jura describere? [34] Ac, ne plura — quæ sunt pæne innumerabilia — consecter, comprehendam brevi : sic enim statuo, perfecti oratoris moderatione et sapientia non solum ipsius dignitatem, sed et privatorum plurimorum et universæ reipublicæ salutem maxime contineri. Quamobrem pergite ut facitis, adulescentes, atque in id studium in quo estis incumbite, ut et vobis honori, et amicis utilitati, et reipublicæ emolumento esse possitis.” | VIII. There, (as Cotta used to relate,) in order that the minds of them all might have some relaxation from their former discourse, Crassus introduced a conversation on the study of oratory. [30] After he had commenced in this manner, That indeed Sulpicius and Cotta did not seem to need his exhortations, but rather both to deserve his praise, as they had already attained such powers as not only to excel their equals in age, but to be admitted to a comparison with their seniors; “Nor does anything seem to me,” he added, “more noble than to be able to fix the attention of assemblies of men by speaking, to fascinate their minds, to direct their passions to whatever object the orator pleases, and to dissuade them from whatsoever he desires. This particular art has constantly flourished above all others in every free state, and especially in those which have enjoyed peace and tranquillity, and has ever exercised great power. [31] For what is so admirable as that, out of an infinite multitude of men, there should arise a single individual, who can alone, or with only a few others, exert effectually that power which nature has granted to all ? Or what is so pleasant to be heard and understood as an oration adorned and polished with wise thoughts and weighty expressions? Or what is so striking, so astonishing, as that the tumults of the people, the religious feelings of judges, the gravity of the senate, should be swayed by the speech of one man? [32] Or what, moreover, is so kingly, so liberal, so munificent, as to give assistance to the suppliant, to raise the afflicted, to bestow security, to deliver from dangers, to maintain men in the rights of citizenship? What, also, is so necessary as to keep arms always ready, with which you may either be protected yourself, or defy the malicious, or avenge yourself when provoked? Or consider, (that you may not always contemplate the forum, the benches, the rostra, and the senate,) what can be more delightful in leisure, or more suited to social intercourse, than elegant conversation, betraying no want of intelligence on any subject? For it is by this one gift that we are most distinguished from brute animals, that we converse together, and can express our thoughts by speech. [33] Who therefore would not justly make this an object of admiration, and think it worthy of his utmost exertions, to surpass mankind themselves in that single excellence by which they claim their superiority over brutes? But, that we may notice the most important point of all, what other power could either have assembled mankind, when dispersed, into one place, or have brought them from wild and savage life to the present humane and civilized state of society; or, when cities were established, have described for them laws, judicial institutions, and rights? [34] And that I may not mention more examples, which are almost without number, I will conclude the subject in one short sentence: for I consider, that by the judgment and wisdom of the perfect orator, not only his own honor, but that of many other individuals, and the welfare of the whole state, are principally upheld. Go on, therefore, as you are doing, young men, and apply earnestly to the study in which you are engaged, that you may be an honor to yourselves, an advantage to your friends, and a benefit to the republic.” |
| [IX] [35] Tum Scævola comiter, ut solebat : “Cetera,” inquit, “assentior Crasso, ne aut de C. Lælii, soceri mei, aut de hujus, generi, aut arte aut gloria detraham ; sed illa duo, Crasse, vereor ut tibi possim concedere : unum, quod ab oratoribus civitates et initio constitutas et sæpe conservatas esse dixisti ; alterum, quod, remoto foro, contione, judiciis, Senatu, statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis esse perfectum. [36] ¿Quis enim tibi hoc concesserit, aut, initio, genus hominum in montibus ac silvis dissipatum, non prudentium consiliis compulsum potius quam disertorum oratione delenitum, se oppidis mœnibusque sæpsisse? ¿Aut vero reliquas utilitates, aut in constituendis aut in conservandis civitatibus, non a sapientibus et fortibus viris, sed a disertis ornateque dicentibus esse constitutas? [37] ¿An vero tibi Romulus ille aut pastores et convenas congregasse aut Sabinorum connubia conjunxisse aut finitimorum vim repressisse eloquentia videtur, non consilio et sapientia singulari? ¿Quid enim? ¿In Numa Pompilio, quid? ¿In Servio Tullio, quid? In ceteris regibus quorum multa sunt eximia ad constituendam rempublicam, ¿num quod eloquentiæ vestigium apparet? ¿Quid? Exactis regibus (tametsi ipsam exactionem mente, non lingua, perfectam L. Bruti esse cernimus), sed deinceps omnia, ¿nonne plena consiliorum, inania verborum videmus? [38] Ego vero si velim et nostræ civitatis exemplis uti, et aliarum, plura proferre possim detrimenta publicis rebus quam adjumenta per homines eloquentissimos importata. Sed, ut reliqua prætermittam, omnium mihi videor — exceptis, Crasse, vobis duobus — eloquentissimos audisse Tib. et C. Sempronios — quorum pater, homo prudens et gravis, haudquaquam eloquens, et sæpe alias et maxime Censor saluti reipublicæ fuit. Atque is non accurata quadam orationis copia, sed nutu atque verbo libertinos in urbanas tribus transtulit ; quod nisi fecisset, rempublicam, quam nunc vix tenemus, jamdiu nullam haberemus. At vero ejus filii diserti, et omnibus vel naturæ vel doctrinæ præsidiis ad dicendum parati, quum civitatem vel paterno consilio vel avitis armis florentissimam accepissent, ista præclara gubernatrice (ut ais) civitatum — eloquentia — rempublicam dissipaverunt. | IX. [35] Scaevola then observed with courtesy, as was always his manner, “I agree with Crassus as to other points (that I may not detract from the art or glory of Laelius, my father-in-law, or of my son-in-law here),11 but I am afraid, Crassus, that I cannot grant you these two points; one, that states were, as you said, originally established, and have often been preserved, by orators; the other, that, setting aside the forum, the assemblies of the people, the courts of judicature, and the senate-house, the orator is, as you pronounced, accomplished in every subject of conversation and learning. [36] For who will concede to you, either that mankind, dispersed originally in mountains and woods, enclosed themselves in towns and walls, not so much from being convinced by the counsels of the wise, as from being charmed by the speeches of the eloquent? Or that other advantages, arising either from the establishment or preservation of states, were settled, not by wise and brave men, but by fluent and elegant speakers? [37] Does Romulus seem to you to have assembled the shepherds, and those that flocked to him from all parts, or to have formed marriages with the Sabines, or to have repelled the power of the neighbouring people, by eloquence, and not by counsel and eminent wisdom ? Is there any trace of eloquence apparent in Numa Pompilius, in Servius Tullius, or in the rest of our kings, from whom we have many excellent regulations for maintaining our government? After the kings were expelled (though we see that their expulsion was effected by the mind of Lucius Brutus, and not by his tongue), we not perceive that all the subsequent transactions are full of wise counsel, but destitute of all mixture of eloquence? [38] But if I should be inclined to adduce examples from our own and other states, I could cite more instances of mischief than of benefit done to public affairs by men of eminent eloquence; but, to omit others, I think, Crassus, that the most eloquent men I ever heard, except you two,12 were the Sempronii, Tiberius and Caius, whose father, a prudent and grave man, but by no means eloquent, on several other occasions, but especially when censor, was of the utmost service to the republic; and he, not by any faultless flow of speech, but by a word and a nod, transferred the freedmen into the city tribes;13 and, if he had not done so, we should now have no republic, which we still maintain with difficulty; but his sons, who were eloquent, and qualified for speaking by all the helps of nature and of learning, having found the state in a most flourishing condition, both through the counsels of their father, and the arms of their ancestors, brought their country, by means of their oratory, that most excellent ruler of states as you call it, to the verge of ruin. |
| [X] [39] ¿Quid leges veteres, moresque majorum? ¿Quid auspicia quibus ego et tu, Crasse, cum magna reipublicæ salute præsumus? ¿Quid religiones et cærimoniæ? ¿Quid hæc jura civilia?, quæ jampridem in nostra familia sine ulla eloquentiæ laude versantur ; ¿num aut inventa sunt aut cognita aut omnino ab oratorum genere tractata? [40] Equidem et Ser. Galbam memoria teneo — divinum hominem in dicendo — et M. Æmilium Porcinam, et C. ipsum Carbonem quem tu adulescentulus perculisti, ignarum legum, hæsitantem in majorum institutis, rudem in jure civili ; et hæc ætas nostra, præter te, Crasse (qui tuo magis studio quam proprio munere aliquo disertorum, jus a nobis civile didicisti), — quod interdum pudeat — juris ignara est. [41] Quod vero in extrema oratione quasi tuo jure sumpsisti — oratorem in omnis sermonis disputatione copiosissime posse versari —, id, nisi hic in tuo regno essemus, non tulissem ; multisque præessem qui aut interdicto tecum contenderent aut te ex jure manum consertum vocarent, quod in alienas possessiones tam temere irruisses. [42] Agerent enim tecum lege primum Pythagorei omnes, atque Democritici, ceterique jure suo physici vindicarent, ornati homines in dicendo et graves, quibuscum tibi justo sacramento contendere non liceret. Urgerent præterea philosophorum greges jam ab illo fonte et capite, Socrate ; nihil te de bonis rebus in vita, nihil de malis, nihil de animi permotionibus, nihil de hominum moribus, nihil de ratione vitæ didicisse, nihil omnino quæsisse, nihil scire convincerent ; et, quum universi in te impetum fecissent, tum singulæ familiæ litem tibi intenderent. [43] Instaret Academia quæ, quicquid dixisses, id te ipsum negare cogeret. Stoici vero nostri disputationum suarum atque interrogationum laqueis te irretitum tenerent. Peripatetici autem etiam hæc ipsa quæ propria oratorum putas esse adjumenta, atque ornamenta dicendi, a se peti vincerent oportere ; ac non solum meliora sed etiam multo plura Aristotelem Theophrastumque de istis rebus, quam omnes dicendi magistros scripsisse ostenderent. [44] Missos facio mathematicos, grammaticos, musicos, quorum artibus vestra ista dicendi vis ne minima quidem societate conjungitur. Quamobrem ista tanta, tamque multa profitenda, Crasse, non censeo. Satis id est magnum quod potes præstare : ut in judiciis ea causa quamcunque tu dicis, melior et probabilior esse videatur ; ut in contionibus et sententiis dicendis ad persuadendum tua plurimum valeat oratio ; denique ut prudentibus diserte, stultis etiam vere videare dicere. Hoc amplius si quid poteris, non id mihi videbitur orator, sed Crassus — sua quadam propria, non communi oratorum facultate, posse.". | X. [39] “Were our ancient laws, and the customs of our ancestors; were the auspices, over which you, Crassus, and I preside with great security to the republic; were the religious rites and ceremonies; were the civil laws, the know- ledge of which has long prevailed in our family, (and without any praise for eloquence,) either invented, or understood, or in any way ordered by the tribe of orators? [40] I can remember that Servius Galba, a man of godlike power in speaking, as well as Marcus Aemilius Porcina, and Cneius Carbo himself, whom you defeated when you were but a youth,14 was ignorant of the laws, at a loss in the practices of our ancestors, and unlearned in civil jurisprudence; and, except you, Crassus, who, rather from your own inclination to study, than because it was any peculiar business of an orator, have learned the civil law from us, as I am sometimes ashamed to say, this generation of ours is ignorant of law. [41] “But what you assumed, as by a law of your own, in the last part of your speech, that an orator is able to speak fluently on any subject, I would not, if I were not here in your own domain, tolerate for a moment, but would head a party who should either oppose you by an interdict,15 or summon you to contend with them at law, for having so unceremoniously invaded the possessions of others. [42] In the first place, all the Pythagoreans, and the followers of Democritus, would institute a suit against you, with the rest of the natural philosophers, each in his own department, men who are elegant and powerful speakers, with whom you could not contend on equal terms.16 Whole troops of other philosophers would assail you besides, even down from Socrates their origin and head, and would convince you that you had learned nothing about good and evil in life, nothing about the passions of the mind, nothing about the moral conduct of mankind, nothing about the proper course of life; they would show you that you have made no due inquiry after knowledge, and that you know nothing; and, when they had made an attack upon you altogether, then every sect would bring its separate action against you. [43] The Academy would press you, and, whatever you asserted, force you to deny it. Our friends the Stoics would hold you entangled in the snares of their disputatious and questions. The Peripatetics would prove that those very aids and ornaments to speaking, which you consider the peculiar property of the orators, must be sought from themselves; and they would show you that Aristotle and Theophrastus have written not only better, but also far more copiously, on these subjects, than all the masters of the art of speaking. [44] I say nothing of the mathematicians, the grammarians, the musicians, with whose sciences this art of speaking of yours is not connected by the least affinity. I think, therefore, Crassus, that such great and numerous professions ought not to be made. What you can effect is sufficiently great; namely, that in judicial matters the cause which you plead shall seem the better and more probable; that in public assemblies, and in delivering opinions, your oratory shall have the most power to persuade; that, finally, you shall seem to the wise to speak with eloquence, and even to the simple to speak with truth. If you can do more than this, it will appear to me that it is not the orator, but Crassus himself that effects it by the force of talents peculiar to himself, and not common to other orators.” |
| [XI] [45] Tum ille “non sum,” inquit, “nescius, Scævola, ista inter Græcos dici et disceptari solere. Audivi enim summos homines, quum quæstor ex Macedonia venissem Athenas, florente Academia — ut temporibus illis ferebatur —, quod eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Æschines obtinebant. Erat etiam Metrodorus, qui cum illis una ipsum illum Carneadem diligenter audierat, hominem omnium in dicendo (ut ferebant) acerrimum et copiosissimum. Vigebatque auditor Panætii illius tui Mnesarchus ; et Peripatetici Critolai Diodorus. [46] Multi erant præterea clari in philosophia et nobiles, a quibus omnibus una pæne voce repelli oratorem a gubernaculis civitatum, excludi ab omni doctrina rerumque majorum scientia, ac tantum in judicia et contiunculas, tanquam in aliquod pistrinum, detrudi et compingi videbam. [47] Sed ego neque illis assentiebar, neque harum disputationum inventori et principi longe omnium in dicendo gravissimo et eloquentissimo — Platoni — cujus tum Athenis cum Charmada diligentius legi Gorgiam ; quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur. Verbi enim controversia jamdiu torquet Græculos homines — contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis. [48] Nam si quis hunc statuit esse oratorem qui tantummodo in jure, aut in judiciis possit, aut apud populum, aut in Senatu copiose loqui, tamen huic ipsi multa tribuat et concedat necesse est ; neque enim sine multa pertractatione omnium rerum publicarum, neque sine legum, morum, juris scientia, neque natura hominum incognita, ac moribus, in his ipsis rebus satis callide versari et perite potest. Qui autem hæc cognoverit sine quibus ne illa quidem minima in causis quisquam recte tueri potest, ¿quid huic abesse poterit de maximarum rerum scientia? Sin oratoris nihil vis esse nisi composite, ornate, copiose loqui, quæro : ¿id ipsum qui possit assequi sine ea scientia quam ei non conceditis? Dicendi enim virtus, nisi ei qui dicit, ea quæ dicit, percepta sint, exstare non potest. [49] Quamobrem, si ornate locutus est — sicut fertur et mihi videtur — physicus ille Democritus, materies illa fuit physici de qua dixit ; ornatus vero ipse verborum, oratoris putandus est. Et, si Plato de rebus ab civilibus controversiis remotissimis divinitus est locutus — quod ego concedo ; si item Aristoteles, si Theophrastus, si Carneades in rebus eis, de quibus disputaverunt, eloquentes, et in dicendo suaves, atque ornati fuerunt : sint hæ res de quibus disputant, in aliis quibusdam studiis ; oratio quidem ipsa, propria est hujus unius rationis de qua loquimur et quærimus. [50] Etenim videmus, eisdem de rebus jejune quosdam et exiliter, ut eum quem acutissimum ferunt — Chrysippum — disputavisse, neque ob eam rem philosophiæ non satisfecisse, quod non habuerit in hac dicendi arte aliena facultatem. | XI. [45] Crassus then replied, “I am not ignorant, Scaevola, that things of this sort are commonly asserted and maintained among the Greeks; for I was an auditor of their greatest men, when I came to Athens as quaestor from Macedonia,17 and when the Academy was in a flourishing state, as it was represented in those days, for Charmadas, and Clitomachus, and Aeschines were in possession of it. There was also Metrodorus, who, with the others, had been a diligent hearer of the famous Carneades himself, a man beyond all others, as they told me, a most spirited and copious speaker. Mnesarchus, too, was in great esteem, a hearer of your friend Panaetius, and Diodorus, a scholar of Critolaus the Peripatetic; [46] and there were many other famous men besides, highly distinguished in philosophy, by all of whom, with one voice as it were, I observed that the orator was repelled from the government of states, excluded from all learning and knowledge of great affairs, and degraded and thrust down into the courts of justice and petty assemblies, as into a workshop. [47] But I neither assented to those men, nor to the originator of these disputations, and by far the most eloquent of them all, the eminently grave and oratorical Plato; whose Gorgias I then diligently read over at Athens with Charmadas; from which book I conceived the highest admiration of Plato, as he seemed to me to prove himself an eminent orator, even in ridiculing orators. A controversy indeed on the word ORATOR has long disturbed the minute Grecians, who are fonder of argument than of truth. [48] For if any one pronounces him to be an orator who can speak fluently only on law in general, or on judicial questions, or before the people, or in the senate, he must yet necessarily grant and allow him a variety of talents; for he cannot treat even of these matters with sufficient skill and accuracy without great attention to all public affairs, nor without a knowledge of laws, customs, and equity, nor without understanding the nature and manners of mankind; and to him who knows these things, without which no one can maintain even the most minute points in judicial pleadings, how much is wanting of the knowledge even of the most important affairs? But if you allow nothing to belong to the orator but to speak aptly, ornately, and copiously, how can he even attain these qualities without that knowledge which you do not allow him? for there can be no true merit in speaking, unless what is said is thoroughly understood by him who says it. [49] If, therefore, the natural philosopher Democritus spoke with elegance, as he is reported to have spoken, and as it appears to me that he did speak, the matter on which he spoke belonged to the philosopher, but the graceful array of words is to be ascribed to the orator. And if Plato spoke divinely upon subjects most remote from civil controversies, as I grant that he did; if also Aristotle, and Theophrastus, and Carneades, were eloquent, and spoke with sweetness and grace on those matters which they discussed; let the subjects on which they spoke belong to other studies, but their speech itself, surely, is the peculiar offspring of that art of which we are now discoursing and inquiring. [50] For we see that some have reasoned on the same subjects jejunely and drily, as Chrysippus, whom they celebrate as the acutest of philosophers; nor is he on this account to be thought to have been deficient in philosophy, because he did not gain the talent of speaking from an art which is foreign to philosophy. |
| [XII] ¿Quid ergo interest? ¿Aut qui discernes eorum quos nominavi in dicendo ubertatem et copiam ab eorum exilitate qui hac dicendi varietate et elegantia non utuntur? Unum erit profecto, quod ii qui bene dicunt afferunt proprium : compositam orationem et ornatam, et artificio quodam et expolitione distinctam. Hæc autem oratio, si res non subest ab oratore percepta et cognita, aut nulla sit necesse est, aut omnium irrisione ludatur. [51] ¿Quid est enim tam furiosum quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis, nulla subjecta sententia nec scientia? Quicquid erit igitur quacunque ex arte, quocunque de genere, orator id, si, tanquam clientis causam didicerit, dicet melius et ornatius, quam ipse ille ejus rei inventor atque artifex. [52] Nam si quis erit qui hoc dicat, esse quasdam oratorum proprias ‘sententias atque causas, et certarum rerum forensibus cancellis circumscriptam scientiam’, fatebor equidem in illis magis assidue versari hanc nostram dictionem ; sed, tamen, in illis ipsis rebus permulta sunt quæ ipsi magistri qui ‘rhetorici’ vocantur nec tradunt nec tenent. [53] ¿Quis enim nescit maximam vim exsistere oratoris in hominum mentibus vel ad iram aut ad odium aut ad dolorem incitandis, vel ab hisce eisdem permotionibus ad lenitatem misericordiamque revocandis? Quare, nisi qui naturas hominum vimque omnem humanitatis, causasque eas quibus mentes aut incitantur aut reflectuntur penitus perspexerit, dicendo quod volet perficere non poterit. [54] Atqui totus hic locus philosophorum proprius putatur ; neque orator, me auctore, unquam repugnabit. Sed, quum illis cognitionem rerum concesserit (quod in ea solum, illi voluerint elaborare), tractationem orationis (quæ sine illa scientia, nulla est) sibi assumet. Hoc enim est proprium oratoris (quod sæpe jam dixi) : oratio gravis et ornata, et hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata. | XII. “Where then lies the difference18 Or by what term will you discriminate the fertility and copiousness of speech in those whom I have named, from the barrenness of those who use not this variety and elegance of phrase? One thing there will certainly be, which those who speak well will exhibit as their own; a graceful and elegant style, distinguished by a peculiar artifice and polish. But this kind of diction, if there be not matter beneath it clear and intelligible to the speaker, must either amount to nothing, or be received with ridicule by all who hear it. [51] For what savours so much of madness, as the empty sound of words, even the choicest and most elegant, when there is no sense or knowledge contained in them? Whatever be the subject of a speech, therefore, in whatever art or branch of science, the orator, if he has made himself master of it, as of his client’s cause, will speak on it better and more elegantly than even the very originator and author of it can. [52] If indeed any one shall say that there are certain trains of thought and reasoning properly belonging to orators, and a knowledge of certain things circumscribed within the limits of the forum, I will confess that our common speech is employed about these matters chiefly; but yet there are many things, in these very topics, which those masters of rhetoric, as they are called, neither teach nor understand. [53] For who is ignorant that the highest power of an orator consists in exciting the minds of men to anger, or to hatred, or to grief, or in recalling them from these more violent emotions to gentleness and compassion? which power will never be able to effect its object by eloquence, unless in him who has obtained a thorough insight into the nature of mankind, and all the passions of humanity, and those causes by which our minds are either impelled or restrained. [54] But all these are thought to belong to the philosophers, nor will the orator, at least with my consent, ever deny that such is the case; but when he has conceded to them the knowledge of things, since they are willing to exhaust their labors on that alone, he will assume to himself the treatment of oratory, which without that knowledge is nothing. For the proper concern of an orator, as I have already often said, is language of power and elegance accommodated to the feelings and understandings of mankind. |
| [XIII] [55] Quibus de rebus Aristotelem et Theophrastum scripsisse fateor. Sed vide ne hoc, Scævola, totum sit a me : nam ego quæ sunt oratori cum illis communia non mutuor ab illis ; isti quæ de his rebus disputant, oratorum esse concedunt ; itaque ceteros libros artis isti suæ nomine, hos ‘Rhetoricos’ et inscribunt et appellant. [56] Etenim, quum illi in dicendo inciderint loci (quod persæpe evenit) — ut de dis immortalibus, de pietate, de concordia, de amicitia, de communi civium, de hominum, de gentium jure, de æquitate, de temperantia, de magnitudine animi, de omni virtutis genere sit dicendum —, clamabunt, credo, omnia gymnasia atque omnes philosophorum scholæ, sua hæc esse omnia propria, nihil omnino ad oratorem pertinere,. [57] Quibus ego — ut his de rebus in angulis (consumendi otii causa) disserant — quum concessero, illud tamen oratori tribuam et dabo, ut eadem de quibus illi tenui quodam exsanguique sermone disputant, hic cum omni gravitate et jucunditate explicet. Hæc ego cum ipsis philosophis tum Athenis disserebam, cogebat enim me M. Marcellus hic noster, qui nunc ædilis curulis est ; et profecto, nisi ludos nunc faceret, huic nostro sermoni interesset ; ac jam tum erat adulescentulus his studiis mirifice deditus. [58] Jam vero de legibus instituendis, de bello, de pace, de sociis, de vectigalibus, de jure civium generatim in ordines ætatesque descripto dicant vel Græci, si volunt, Lycurgum et Solonem (quanquam illos quidem censemus in numero eloquentium reponendos) scisse melius quam Hyperidem aut Demosthenem — perfectos jam homines in dicendo, et perpolitos ; vel nostri decemviros qui Duodecim Tabulas perscripserunt (quos necesse est fuisse prudentes) anteponant in hoc genere et Ser. Galbæ et socero tuo C. Lælio — quos constat dicendi gloria præstitisse. [59] Nunquam enim negabo esse quasdam artes proprias eorum qui in his cognoscendis atque tractandis studium suum omne posuerunt. Sed oratorem plenum atque perfectum esse eum dicam qui de omnibus rebus possit copiose varieque dicere. | XIII. [55] “On these matters I confess that Aristotle and Theophrastus have written.19 But consider, Scaevola, whether this is not wholly in my favor. For I do not borrow from them what the orator possesses in common with them; but they allow that what they say on these subjects belongs to oratory. Their other treatises, accordingly, they distinguish by the name of the science on which each is written; their treatises on oratory they entitle and designate as books of rhetoric. [56] For when, in their discussions, (as often happens,) such topics present themselves as require them to speak of the immortal gods, of piety, of concord, of friendship, of the common rights of their fellow-citizens, or those of all mankind, of the law of nations, of equity, of temperance, of greatness of mind, of every kind of virtue, all the academies and schools of philosophy, I imagine, will cry out that all these subjects are their property, and that no particle of them belongs to the orator. [57] But when I have given them liberty to reason on all these subjects in corners to amuse their leisure, I shall give and assign to the orator his part, which is, to set forth with full power and attraction the very same topics which they discuss in such tame and bloodless phraseology. These points I then discussed with the philosophers in person at Athens, for Marcus Marcellus, our countryman, who is now curule aedile, obliged me to do so, and he would certainly have taken part in our present conversation, were he not now celebrating the public games; for he was then a youth marvellously given to these studies. [58] “Of the institution of laws, of war, of peace, of alliances, of tributes, of the civil law as relating to various ranks and ages respectively,20 let the Greeks say, if they will, that Lycurgus or Solon (although I think that these should be enrolled in the number of the eloquent) had more knowledge than Hypereides or Demosthenes, men of the highest accomplishments and refinement in oratory; or let our countrymen prefer, in this sort of knowledge, the Decemviri who wrote the Twelve Tables, and who must have been wise men, to Servius Galba, and your father-in-law Laelius, who are allowed to have excelled in the glorious art of speaking. [59] I, indeed, shall never deny that there are some sciences peculiarly well understood by those who have applied their whole study to the knowledge and consideration of them; but the accomplished and complete orator I shall call him who can speak on all subjects with variety and copiousness. |
[XIV] Etenim sæpe in eis causis quas omnes proprias esse oratorum confitentur est aliquid quod non ex usu forensi (quem solum oratoribus conceditis), sed ex obscuriore aliqua scientia sit promendum et assumendum.
|
XIV. For often in those causes which all acknowledge properly to belong to orators, there is something to be drawn forth and adopted, not from the routine of the Forum, which is the only knowledge that you grant to the orator, but from some of the more obscure sciences. [60] I ask whether a speech can be made for or against a general, without an acquaintance with military affairs, or often without a knowledge of certain inland and maritime countries ? whether a speech can be made to the people about passing or rejecting laws, or in the senate on any kind of public transactions, without the greatest knowledge and judgment in political matters? whether a speech can be adapted to excite or calm the thoughts and passions (which alone is a great business of the orator) without a most diligent examination of all those doctrines which are set forth on the nature and manners of men by the philosophers? [61] I do not know whether I may not be less successful in maintaining what I am going to say; but I shall not hesitate to speak that which I think. Physics, and mathematics, and those other things which you just now decided to belong to other sciences, belong to the peculiar knowledge of those who profess them; but if any one would illustrate those arts by eloquence, he must have recourse to the power of oratory. [62] Nor, if, as is said, Philo,21 the famous architect, who built an arsenal for the Athenians, gave that people an eloquent account of his work, is it to be imagined that his eloquence proceeded from the art of the architect, but from that of the orator. Or, if our friend Marcus Antonius had had to speak for Hermodorus22 on the subject of dock- building, he would have spoken, when he had learned the case from Hermodorus, with elegance and copiousness, drawn, from an art quite unconnected with dock-building. And Asclepiades,23 whom we knew as a physician and a friend, did not, when he excelled others of his profession in eloquence, employ, in his graceful elocution, the art of physic, but that of oratory. [63] What Socrates used to say, that all men are sufficiently eloquent in that which they understand, is very plausible, but not true. It would have been nearer truth to say, that no man can be eloquent on a subject that he doers not understand; and that, if he understands a subject ever so well, but is ignorant how to form and polish his speech, he cannot express himself eloquently even about what he does understand. |
| [XV] [64] Quamobrem, si quis universam et propriam ‘oratoris’ vim definire complectique vult, is orator erit, mea sententia, hoc tam gravi dignus nomine qui, quæcunque res inciderit quæ sit dictione explicanda, prudenter et composite et ornate et memoriter dicet cum quadam actionis etiam dignitate. [65] Sin cuipiam nimis infinitum videtur, quod ita posui “quæcunque de re,” licet hinc quantum cuique videbitur circumcidat atque amputet ; tamen illud tenebo, si, quæ ceteris in artibus atque studiis sita sunt orator ignoret, tantumque ea teneat quæ sint in disceptationibus atque usu forensi ; tamen his de rebus ipsis si sit ei dicendum, quum cognoverit ab eis qui tenent quæ sint in quaque re, multo oratorem melius, quam ipsos illos quorum eæ sunt artes, esse dicturum. [66] Ita si de re militari dicendum huic erit Sulpicio, quæret a C. Mario affini nostro et, quum acceperit, ita pronuntiabit ut ipsi C. Mario pæne hic melius quam ipse illa scire videatur ; sin de jure civili, tecum communicabit, teque hominem prudentissimum et peritissimum in eis ipsis rebus quas abs te didicerit, dicendi arte superabit. [67] Sin quæ res inciderit in qua de natura, de vitiis hominum, de cupiditatibus, de modo, de continentia, de dolore, de morte dicendum sit, forsitan, si ei sit visum, — etsi hæc quidem nosse debet orator —, cum Sex. Pompejo, erudito homine in philosophia, communicarit ; hoc profecto efficiet ut, quamcunque rem a quoquo cognorit, de ea multo dicat ornatius quam ille ipse, unde cognorit. [68] Sed si me audies, quoniam philosophia in tres partes est tributa — in naturæ obscuritatem, in disserendi subtilitatem, in vitam atque mores —, duo illa relinquamus, idque largiamur inertiæ nostræ. Tertium vero, quod semper oratoris fuit, nisi tenebimus, nihil oratori in quo magnus esse possit relinquemus. [69] Quare hic locus — de vita et moribus — totus est oratori perdiscendus ; cetera si non didicerit, tamen poterit, si quando opus erit, ornare dicendo, si modo ad eum erunt delata et tradita. | XV. [64] “If, therefore, any one desires to define and comprehend the whole and peculiar power of an orator, that man, in my opinion, will be an orator, worthy of so great a name, who, whatever subject comes before him, and requires rhetorical elucidation, can speak on it judiciously, in set form, elegantly, and from memory, and with a certain dignity of action. [65] But if the phrase which I have used, ‘on whatever subject,’ is thought by any one too comprehensive, let him retrench and curtail as much of it as he pleases; but this I will maintain, that though the orator be ignorant of what belongs to other arts and pursuits, and understands only what concerns the discussions and practice of the Forum, yet if he has to speak on those arts, he will, when he has learned what pertains to any of them from persons who understand them, discourse upon them much better than the very persona of whom those arts form the peculiar province. [66] Thus, if our friend Sulpicius have to speak on military affairs, he will inquire about them of my kinsman Caius Marius,24 and when he has received information, will speak upon them in such a manner, that he shall seem to Marius to understand them better than himself. Or if he has to speak on the civil law, he will consult with you, and will excel you, though eminently wise and learned in it, in speaking on those very points which he shall have learned from yourself. [67] Or if any subject presents itself, requiring him to speak on the nature and vices of men, on desire, on moderation, on continence, on grief, on death, perhaps, if he thinks proper, (though the orator ought to have a knowledge of these things.) he will consult with Sextus Pompeius,25 a man learned in philosophy. But this he will certainly accomplish, that, of whatever matter he gains a knowledge, or from whomsoever, he will speak upon it much more elegantly than the very person from whom he gained the knowledge. [68] But, since philosophy is distinguished into three parts, inquiries into the obscurities of physics, the subtilties of logic, and the knowledge of life and manners, let us, if Sulpicius will listen to me, leave the two former, and consult our ease; but unless we have a knowledge of the third, which has always been the province of the orator, we shall, leave him nothing in which he can distinguish himself. [69] The part of philosophy, therefore, regarding life and manners, must be thoroughly mastered by the orator; other subjects, even if he has not learned them, he will be able, whenever there is occasion, to adorn by his eloquence, if they are brought before him and made known to him. |
| [XVI] Etenim si constat inter doctos hominem ignarum astrologiæ, Aratum, ornatissimis atque optimis versibus de cælo stellisque dixisse ; si de rebus rusticis hominem ab agro remotissimum, Nicandrum Colophonium, poëtica quadam facultate, non rustica, scripsisse præclare, ¿quid est cur non orator de rebus eis eloquentissime dicat quas ad certam causam tempusque cognorit? [70] Est enim finitimus oratori poëta, numeris astrictior paulo, verborum autem licentia liberior, multis vero ornandi generibus socius ac pæne par ; in hoc quidem certe prope idem, nullis ut terminis circumscribat aut definiat jus suum, quominus ei liceat eadem illa facultate et copia vagari qua velit. [71] Nam quod illud, Scævola, negasti te fuisse laturum, nisi in meo regno esses, quod in omni genere sermonis, in omni parte humanitatis dixerim oratorem perfectum esse debere, nunquam, mehercule, hoc dicerem, si eum quem fingo me ipsum esse arbitrarer. [72] Sed, ut solebat C. Lucilius sæpe dicere, homo tibi subiratus, mihi propter eam ipsam causam minus quam volebat familiaris, sed tamen et doctus et perurbanus, sic sentio neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum qui non sit omnibus eis artibus quæ sunt libero dignæ perpolitus ; quibus ipsis si in dicendo non utimur, tamen apparet atque exstat, utrum simus earum rudes an didicerimus. [73] Ut, qui pila ludunt, non utuntur in ipsa lusione artificio proprio palæstræ, sed indicat ipse motus didicerintne palæstram an nesciant ; et qui aliquid fingunt, etsi tum pictura nihil utuntur, tamen, utrum sciant pingere an nesciant, non obscurum est ; sic in orationibus hisce ipsis judiciorum, contionum, Senatus, etiamsi proprie ceteræ non adhibeantur artes, tamen facile declaratur utrum is, qui dicat, tantummodo in hoc declamatorio sit opere jactatus an ad dicendum omnibus ingenuis artibus instructus accesserit.” | XVI. “For if it is allowed amongst the learned that Aratus. a man ignorant of astronomy, has treated of heaven and the constellations in extremely polished and excellent verses; if Nicander,26 of Colophon, a man totally unconnected with the country, has written well on rural affairs, with the aid of poetical talent, and not from understanding husbandry, what reason is there why an orator should not speak most eloquently on those matters of .which he shall have gained a knowledge for a certain purpose and occasion? [70] For the poet is nearly allied to the orator; being somewhat more restricted in numbers, but less restrained in the choice of words, yet in many kinds of embellishment his rival and almost equal; in one respect, assuredly, nearly the same, that he circumscribes or bounds his jurisdiction by no limits, but reserves to himself full right to range wherever he pleases with the same ease and liberty. [71] For why did you say, Scaevola,27 that you would not endure, unless you were in my domain, my assertion, that the orator ought to be accomplished in every style of speaking, and in every part of polite learning? I should certainly not have said this if I had thought myself to be the orator whom I conceive in my imagination. [72] But, as Caius Lucilius used frequently to say (a man not very friendly to you,28 and on that account less familiar with me than he could wish, but a man of learning and good breeding), I am of this opinion, that no one is to be numbered among orators who is not thoroughly accomplished in all branches of knowledge requisite for a man of good breeding; and though we may not put forward such knowledge in conversation, yet it is apparent, and indeed evident, whether we are destitute of it, or have acquired it; [73] as those who play at tennis do not exhibit, in playing, the gestures of the palaestra, but their movements indicate whether they have learned those exercises or are unacquainted with them; and as those who shape out anything, though they do not then exercise the art of painting, yet make it clear whether they can paint or not; so in orations to courts of justice, before the people, and in the senate, although other sciences have no peculiar place in them, yet is it easily proved whether he who speaks has only been exercised in the parade of declamation, or has devoted himself to oratory after having been instructed in all liberal knowledge.” |
| [XVII] [74] Tum ridens Scævola : “Non luctabor tecum,” inquit, “Crasse, amplius. Id enim ipsum quod contra me locutus es, artificio quodam es consecutus, ut et mihi, quæ ego vellem non esse oratoris, concederes ; et ea ipsa, nescio quomodo, rursus detorqueres, atque oratori propria traderes. [75] Hæc, quum ego prætor Rhodum venissem et cum summo doctore istius disciplinæ, Apollonio, ea quæ a Panætio acceperam contulissem, irrisit ille quidem, ut solebat, philosophiam, atque contempsit, multaque non tam graviter dixit quam facete ; tua autem fuit oratio ejusmodi, non ut ullam artem doctrinamve contemneres, sed ut omnes comites ac ministras oratoris esse diceres. [76] Quas ego, si quis sit unus complexus omnes, idemque si ad eas facultatem istam ornatissimæ orationis adjunxerit, non possum dicere eum non egregium quendam hominem atque admirandum fore, sed is, si qui esset, aut si etiam unquam fuisset, aut vero si esse posset, tu esses unus profecto ; qui et meo judicio, et omnium, vix ullam ceteris oratoribus (pace horum dixerim) laudem reliquisti. [77] Verum si tibi ipsi nihil deest quod in forensibus rebus civilibusque versatur quin scias, neque eam tamen scientiam quam adjungis oratori, complexus es, videamus ne plus ei tribuamus quam res et veritas ipsa concedat.” [78] Hic Crassus : “Memento,” inquit, “me non de mea, sed de oratoris facultate dixisse. ¿Quid enim nos aut didicimus, aut scire potuimus, qui ante ad agendum quam ad cognoscendum venimus — quos in foro, quos in ambitione, quos in republica, quos in amicorum negotiis res ipsa ante confecit quam possemus aliquid de rebus tantis suspicari? [79] Quod si tibi tantum in nobis videtur esse quibus etiamsi ingenium, ut tu putas, non maxime defuit, doctrina certe et otium et, hercule, etiam studium illud discendi acerrimum defuit, ¿quid censes — si, ad alicujus ingenium vel majus, illa quæ ego non attigi accesserint — qualem illum et quantum oratorem futurum?” | XVII. [74] Then Scaevola, smiling, said: “I will not struggle with you any longer, Crassus; for you have, by some artifice, made good what you asserted against me, so as to grant me whatever I refused to allow to the orator, and yet so as to wrest from me those very things again I know not how, and to transfer them to the orator as his property.29 [75] When I went as praetor to Rhodes, and communicated to Apollonius, that famous instructor in this profession, what I had learned from Panaetius, Apollonius, as was his manner, ridiculed these matters,30 threw contempt upon philosophy, and made many other observations with less wisdom than wit; but your remarks were of such a kind as not to express contempt for any arts or sciences, but to admit that they are all attendants and handmaids of the orator; [76] and if ever any one should comprehend them all, and the same person should add to that knowledge the powers of supremely elegant oratory, I cannot but say that he would be a man of high distinction and worthy of the greatest admiration. But if there should be such a one, or indeed has ever been, or can possibly be, you alone would be the person; who, not only in my judgment, but in that of all men, have hardly left to other orators (I speak it with deference to this company) any glory to be acquired. [77] If, however, there is in yourself no deficiency of knowledge pertaining to judicial and political affairs, and yet you have not mastered all that additional learning which you assign to the complete orator, let us consider whether you do not attribute to him more than possibility and truth itself will allow.” [78] Here Crassus rejoined: “Remember that I have not been speaking of my own talents, but of those of the true orator. For what have I either learned or had a possibility of knowing, who entered upon pleading before I had any instruction; whom the pressure of business overtasked amidst the occupations of the forum, of canvassing, of public affairs, and the management of the causes of friends, before I could form any true notion of the importance of such great employments? [79] But if there seem to you to be so much in me, to whom, though capacity, as you think, may not greatly have been wanting, yet to whom learning, leisure, and that keen application to study which is so necessary, have certainly been wanting, what do you think would be the case if those acquirements, which I have not gained, should be united to some greater genius than mine? How able, how great an orator, do you think, would he prove?” |
| [XVIII] [80] Tum Antonius “probas mihi,” inquit, “ista, Crasse, quæ dicis ; nec dubito quin multo locupletior in dicendo futurus sit, si quis omnium rerum atque artium rationem naturamque comprehenderit. [81] Sed primum, id difficile est factu — præsertim in hac nostra vita nostrisque occupationibus ; deinde, illud etiam verendum est ne abstrahamur ab hac exercitatione et consuetudine dicendi populari et forensi. Aliud enim mihi quoddam orationis genus esse videtur eorum hominum de quibus paulo ante dixisti, quamvis illi ornate et graviter, aut de natura rerum, aut de humanis rebus loquantur : nitidum quoddam genus est verborum et lætum, sed palæstræ magis et olei quam hujus civilis turbæ ac fori. [82] Namque egomet, qui sero ac leviter Græcas litteras attigissem, tamen quum pro consule in Ciliciam proficiscens venissem Athenas, complures tum ibi dies sum propter navigandi difficultatem commoratus ; sed, quum quotidie mecum haberem homines doctissimos — eos fere ipsos, qui abs te modo sunt nominati —, quumque hoc nescio quomodo apud eos increbruisset, me in causis majoribus, sicuti te, solere versari, pro se quisque ut poterat de officio et de ratione oratoris disputabat. [83] Horum alii, sicuti iste ipse Mnesarchus, hos quos nos oratores vocaremus nihil esse dicebat, nisi quosdam operarios lingua celeri et exercitata ; oratorem autem, nisi qui sapiens esset, esse neminem, atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia constaret, unam quandam esse virtutem — et qui unam virtutem haberet, omnes habere, easque esse inter se æquales et pares. Ita, qui esset eloquens, eum virtutes omnes habere atque esse sapientem. Sed hæc erat spinosa quædam et exilis oratio, longeque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat. [84] Charmadas vero multo uberius eisdem de rebus loquebatur, non quo aperiret sententiam suam — hic enim mos erat patrius Academiæ adversari semper omnibus in disputando —, sed quum maxime tamen hoc significabat, eos qui rhetores nominarentur et qui dicendi præcepta traderent, nihil plane tenere, neque posse quemquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum inventa didicisset. | XVIII. [80] Antonius then observed: “You prove to me, Crassus, what you advance; nor do I doubt that he will have a far greater fund of eloquence who shall have learned the reason and nature of everything and of all sciences. [81] But, in the first place, this is difficult to be achieved, especially in such a life as ours and such occupations; and next, it is to be feared that we may, by such studies, be drawn away from our exercise and practice of speaking before the people and in the forum. The eloquence of those men whom you mentioned a little before, seems to me to be of a quite different sort, though they speak with grace and dignity, as well on the nature of things as on human life. Theirs is a neat and florid kind of language, but more adapted for parade and exercise in the schools, than for these tumults of the city and forum. [82] For when I, who late in life, and then but lightly, touched upon Greek learning, was going as proconsul into Cilicia, and had arrived at Athens, I waited there several days on account of the difficulty of sailing; and as I had every day with me the most learned men, nearly the same that you have just now named, and a report, I know not how, had spread amongst them that I, like you, was versed in causes of great importance, every one, according to his abilities, took occasion to discourse upon the office and art of in orator. [83] Some of them, as Mnesarchus himself, said, that those whom we call orators were nothing but a set of mechanics with glib and well-practised tongues, but that no one could be an orator but a man of true wisdom; and that eloquence itself, as it consisted in the art of speaking well, was a kind of virtue,31 and that he who possessed one virtue possessed all, and that virtues were in themselves equal and alike; and thus he who was eloquent possessed all virtues, and was a man of true wisdom. But their phraseology was intricate and dry, and quite unsuited to my taste. [84] Charmadas indeed spoke much more diffusely on those topics; not that he delivered his own opinion (for it is the hereditary custom of every one in the Academy to take the part of opponents to all in their disputations), but what he chiefly signified was, that those who were called rhetoricians, and laid down rules for the art of speaking, understood nothing; and that no man could attain any command of eloquence who had not mastered the doctrines of the philosophers. |
| [XIX] [85] Disputabant contra diserti homines Athenienses et in republica causisque versati, in quibus erat etiam is, qui nuper Romæ fuit, Menedemus, hospes meus ; qui, quum diceret esse quandam prudentiam quæ versaretur in perspiciendis rationibus constituendarum et regendarum rerum publicarum, excitabatur homo promptus atque omni abundans doctrina et quadam incredibili varietate rerum atque copia : omnes enim partes illius ipsius prudentiæ petendas esse a philosophia dicebat, neque ea quæ statuerentur in republica de diis immortalibus, de disciplina juventutis, de justitia, de patientia, de temperantia, de modo rerum omnium, ceteraque sine quibus civitates aut esse aut bene moratæ esse non possent, usquam in eorum inveniri libellis. [86] Quod si tantam vim rerum maximarum arte sua rhetorici illi doctores complecterentur, quærebat, ¿cur de proœmiis et de epilogis et de hujusmodi nugis (sic enim appellabat) referti essent eorum libri? — ¿de civitatibus instituendis, de scribendis legibus, de æquitate, de justitia, de fide, de frangendis cupiditatibus, de confirmandis hominum moribus, littera in eorum libris nulla inveniretur? [87] Ipsa vero præcepta sic illudere solebat, ut ostenderet non modo eos expertes esse illius prudentiæ quam sibi asciscerent, sed ne hanc quidem ipsam dicendi rationem ac viam nosse. Caput enim esse arbitrabatur oratoris, ut et ipsis apud quos ageret, talis qualem se esse optaret videretur ; id fieri vitæ dignitate de qua nihil rhetorici isti doctores in præceptis suis reliquissent ; et uti eorum qui audirent sic afficerentur animi, ut eos affici vellet orator ; quod item fieri nullo modo posse, nisi cognosset is qui diceret quot modis hominum mentes, et quibus rebus, et quo genere orationis in quamque partem moverentur ; hæc autem esse penitus in media philosophia retrusa atque abdita ; quæ isti rhetores ne primoribus quidem labris attigissent. [88] Ea Menedemus exemplis magis quam argumentis conabatur refellere ; memoriter enim multa ex orationibus Demosthenis præclare scripta pronuntians, docebat illum in animis vel judicum vel populi in omnem partem dicendo permovendis non fuisse ignarum quibus ea rebus consequeretur — quæ negaret ille sine philosophia quemquam nosse posse. | XIX. [85] “Certain men of eloquence at Athens, versed in public affairs and judicial pleadings, disputed on the other side; among whom was Menedemus, lately my guest at Rome; but when he had observed that there is a sort of wisdom which is employed in inquiring into the methods of settling and managing governments, he, though a ready speaker, was promptly attacked by the other,32 a man of abundant learning, and of an almost incredible variety and copiousness of argument; who maintained that every portion of such wisdom must be derived from philosophy, and that whatever was established in a state concerning the immortal gods, the discipline of youth, justice, patience, temperance, moderation in everything, and other matters, without which states would either not subsist at all, or be corrupt in morals, was nowhere to be found in the petty treatises of the rhetoricians. [86] For if those teachers of rhetoric included in their art such a multitude of the most important subjects, why, he asked, were their books crammed with rules about proems and perorations, and such trifles (for so he called them), while about the modelling of states, the composition of laws, about equity, justice, integrity, about mastering the appetites, and forming the morals of mankind, not one single syllable was to be found in their pages? [87] Their precepts he ridiculed in such a manner, as to show that the teachers were not only destitute of the knowledge which they arrogated to themselves, but that they did not even know the proper art and method of speaking; for he thought that the principal business of an orator was, that he might appear to those to whom he spoke to be such as he would wish to appear (that this was to be attained by a life of good reputation, on which those teachers of rhetoric had laid down nothing in their precepts); and that the minds of the audience should be affected in such a manner as the orator would have them to be affected, an object, also, which could by no means be attained, unless the speaker understood by what methods, by what arguments, and by what sort of language the minds of men are moved in any particular direction; but that these matters were involved and concealed in the profoundest doctrines of philosophy, which these rhetoricians had not touched even with the extremity of their lips. [88] These assertions Menedemus endeavoured to refute, but rather by authorities than by arguments; for, repeating from memory many noble passage? from the orations of Demosthenes, he showed that that orator, while he swayed the minds of judges or of the people by his eloquence, was not ignorant by what means he attained his end, which Charmadas denied that any one could know without philosophy. |
[XX] [89] Huic respondebat non se negare Demosthenem summam prudentiam summamque vim habuisse dicendi ; sed sive ille hoc ingenio potuisset, sive — id quod constaret — Platonis studiosus audiendi fuisset, non quid ille potuisset, sed quid isti docerent, esse quærendum. [90] Sæpe etiam in eam partem ferebatur oratione, ut omnino disputaret nullam artem esse dicendi. Idque cum argumentis docuerat, quod ita nati essemus, ut
|
XX. [89] “To this Charmadas replied, that he did not deny that Demosthenes was possessed of consummate ability and the utmost energy of eloquence; but whether he had these powers from natural genius, or because he was, as was acknowledged, a diligent hearer of Plato, it was not what Demosthenes could do, but what the rhetoricians taught, that was the subject of inquiry. [90] Sometimes too he was carried so far by the drift of his discourse, as to maintain that there was no art at all in speaking; and having shown by various arguments that we are so formed by nature as to be able to flatter, and to insinuate ourselves, as suppliants, into the favor of those from whom we wish to obtain anything, as well as to terrify our enemies by menaces, to relate matters of fact, to confirm what we assert, to refute what is said against us, and, finally, to use entreaty or lamentation; particulars in which the whole faculties of the orator are employed; and that practice and exercise sharpened the understanding, and produced fluency of speech, he rested hia cause, in conclusion, on a multitude of examples that he adduced; [91] for first, as if stating an indisputable fact,33 he affirmed that no writer on the art of rhetoric was ever even moderately eloquent, going back as far as I know not what Corax and Tisias,34 who, he said, appeared to be the inventors and first authors of rhetorical science; and then named a vast number of the most eloquent men who had neither learned, nor cared to understand the rules of art, and amongst whom, (whether in jest, or because he thought, or had heard something to that effect,) he instanced me as one who had received none of their instructions, and yet, as he said, had some abilities as a speaker; of which two observations I readily granted the truth of one, that I had never been instructed, but thought that in the other he was either joking with me, or was under some mistake. [92] But he denied there was any art, except such as lay in things that were known and thoroughly understood, things tending to the same object, and never misleading; but that everything treated by the orators was doubtful and uncertain; as it was uttered by those who did not fully understand it, and was heard by them to whom knowledge was not meant to be communicated, but merely false, or at least obscure notions, intended to live in their minds only for a short time. [93] In short, he seemed bent on convincing me that there was no art of speaking, and that no one could speak skilfully, or so as fully to illustrate a subject, but one who had attained that knowledge which is delivered by the most learned of the philosophers. On which occasions Charmadas used to say, with a passionate admiration of your genius, Crassus, that I appeared to him very easy in listening, and you most pertinacious in disputation. |
| [XXI] [94] Tumque ego, hac eadem opinione adductus, scripsi etiam illud quodam in libello qui me imprudente et invito excidit, et pervenit in manus hominum, disertos cognosse me nonnullos, eloquentem adhuc neminem : quod eum statuebam disertum qui posset satis acute, atque dilucide, apud mediocres homines ex communi quadam opinione hominum dicere ; eloquentem vero, qui mirabilius et magnificentius augere posset atque ornare quæ vellet, omnesque omnium rerum quæ ad dicendum pertinerent fontes animo ac memoria contineret. Id si est difficile nobis, quod antequam ad discendum ingressi sumus obruimur ambitione et foro, sit tamen in re positum atque natura. [95] Ego enim, quantum auguror conjectura, quantaque ingenia in nostris hominibus esse video, non despero fore aliquem aliquando qui et studio acriore quam nos sumus atque fuimus, et otio ac facultate discendi majore ac maturiore, et labore atque industria superiore, quum se ad audiendum, legendum, scribendumque majore opere dederit, exsistat talis orator qualem quærimus ; qui jure non solum disertus, sed etiam eloquens dici possit ; qui tamen, mea sententia, aut hic est jam Crassus, aut, si quis pari fuerit ingenio, pluraque quam hic et audierit et lectitarit et scripserit, paulum aliquid huc poterit addere.” | XXI. [94] “Then it was that I, swayed by this opinion, remarked in a little treatise35 which got abroad, and into people’s hands, without my knowledge and against my will, that I had known many good speakers, but never yet any one that was truly eloquent; for I accounted him a good speaker, who could express his thoughts with accuracy and perspicuity, according to the ordinary judgment of mankind, before an audience of moderate capacity; but I considered him alone eloquent, who could in a more admirable and noble manner amplify and adorn whatever subjects he chose, and who embraced in thought and memory all the principles of everything relating to oratory. This, though it may be difficult to us, who, before we begin to speak in public, are overwhelmed by canvassings for office and by the business of the forum, is yet within the range of possibility and the powers of nature. [95] For I, as far as I can divine by conjecture, and as far as I can estimate the abilities of our countrymen, do not despair that there may arise at some time or other a person, who, when, with a keener devotion to study than we feel, or have ever felt, with more leisure, with better and more mature talent for learning, and with superior labor and industry, he shall have given himself up to hearing, reading, and writing, may become such an orator as we desire to see, one who may justly be called not only a good speaker, but truly eloquent; and such a character, in my opinion, is our friend Crassus, or some one, if such ever was, of equal genius, who, having heard, read, and written more than Crassus, shall be able to make some little addition to it.” |
| [96] Hoc loco Sulpicius : “Insperanti mihi,” inquit, “et Cottæ, sed valde optanti utrique nostrum, cecidit ut in istum sermonem, Crasse, delaberemini. Nobis enim huc venientibus satis jucundum fore videbatur, si, quum vos de rebus aliis loqueremini, tamen nos aliquid ex sermone vestro memoria dignum excipere possemus ; ut vero penitus in eam ipsam totius hujus vel studii, vel artificii, vel facultatis disputationem pæne intimam veniretis, vix optandum nobis videbatur. [97] Ego enim qui ab ineunte ætate incensus essem studio utriusque vestrum, Crassi vero etiam amore, quum ab eo nusquam discederem, verbum ex eo nunquam elicere potui de vi ac ratione dicendi, quum et per memet ipsum egissem, et per Drusum sæpe temptassem ; quo in genere tu, Antoni (vere loquar) nunquam mihi percontanti, aut quærenti aliquid, defuisti et persæpe me, quæ soleres in dicendo observare, docuisti. [98] Nunc, quoniam uterque vestrum patefecit earum ipsarum rerum aditum quas quærimus, et quoniam princeps Crassus ejus sermonis ordiendi fuit, date nobis hanc veniam, ut ea quæ sentitis de omni genere dicendi subtiliter persequamini. Quod quidem si erit a vobis impetratum, magnam habebo, Crasse, huic palæstræ et Tusculano tuo gratiam, et longe Academiæ illi ac Lyceo tuum hoc suburbanum gymnasium anteponam.” | [96] Here Sulpicius observed: “That has happened by accident, Crassus, which neither Cotta nor I expected, but which we both earnestly desired, I mean, that you should insensibly glide into a discourse of this kind. For, as we were coming hither, we thought it would be a pleasure, if, while you were talking on other matters, we might gather something worthy to be remembered from your conversation; but that you should go into a deep and full discussion on this very study, or art, or faculty, and penetrate into the heart of it, was what we could scarcely venture to hope. [97] For I, who from my early youth, have felt a strong affection for yon both, and even a love for Crassus, having never left his company, could never yet elicit a word from him on the method and art of speaking, though I not only solicited him myself, but endeavoured to move him by the agency of Drusus; on which subject you, Antonius, (I speak but the truth,) never failed to answer my requests and interrogatories, and have very often told me what you used to notice in speaking. [98] And since each of you has opened a way to these subjects of our research, and since Crassus was the first to commence this discourse, do us the favor to acquaint us fully and exactly what you think about the various kinds of eloquence. If we, obtain this indulgence from you, I shall feel the greatest obligation to this school of yours, Crassus, and to your Tusculan villa, and shall prefer your suburban place of study to the famous Academy and Lyceum.” |
|
[XXII] [99] Tum ille, “Immo vero,” inquit, “Sulpici, rogemus Antonium — qui et potest facere id quod requiris, et consuevit — ut te audio dicere. Nam me quidem fateor semper a genere hoc toto sermonis refugisse, et tibi cupienti atque instanti sæpissime negasse, ut tute paulo ante dixisti. Quod ego non superbia, neque inhumanitate faciebam, neque quod tuo studio rectissimo atque optimo non obsequi vellem (præsertim quum te unum ex omnibus ad dicendum maxime natum, aptumque cognossem), sed, mehercule, istius disputationis insolentia atque earum rerum quæ quasi in arte traduntur inscientia.”
[100] Tum Cotta: “Quoniam id quod difficillimum nobis videbatur — ut omnino de his rebus, Crasse, loquerere — assecuti sumus, de reliquo jam nostra culpa fuerit, si te, nisi omnia quæ percontati erimus explicaris, dimiserimus.” [101] “De eis, credo, rebus,” inquit Crassus, “ut in cretionibus scribi solet, ‘QUIBUS SCIAM POTEROQUE’.” Tum ille: “Namque quod tu non poteris aut nescies, ¿quis nostrum tam impudens est qui se scire aut posse postulet?” “Jam vero — ista condicione, dum etiam mihi liceat negare posse quod non potero, et fateri nescire quod nesciam. Licet,” inquit Crassus, “vestro arbitratu percontemini.” [102] “Atque,” inquit Sulpicius, “hoc primum ex te, de quo modo Antonius exposuit, quid sentias, quærimus : ¿existimesne artem aliquam esse dicendi?” “¿Quid? ¿mihi vos nunc,” inquit Crassus, “tamquam alicui Græculo otioso et loquaci, et fortasse docto atque erudito, quæstiunculam, de qua meo arbitratu loquar, ponitis? ¿Quando enim me ista curasse aut cogitasse arbitramini, et non semper irrisisse potius eorum hominum impudentiam qui, quum in schola assedissent, ex magna hominum frequentia dicere juberent si quis quid quæreret? [103] Quod primum ferunt Leontinum fecisse Gorgiam, qui permagnum quiddam suscipere ac profiteri videbatur, quum se ad omnia de quibus quisque audire vellet, esse paratum denuntiaret. Postea vero vulgo hoc facere cœperunt hodieque faciunt — ut nulla sit res, neque tanta, neque tam improvisa, neque tam nova, de qua se non omnia quæ dici possint profiteantur esse dicturos. [104] Quod si te, Cotta, arbitrarer, aut te, Sulpici, de eis rebus audire velle, adduxissem huc Græcum aliquem qui nos istiusmodi disputationibus delectaret — quod ne nunc quidem difficile factu est. Est enim apud M. Pisonem adulescentem jam huic studio deditum, summo hominem ingenio nostrique cupidissimum, Peripateticus Staseas, homo nobis sane familiaris et, ut inter homines peritos constare video, in illo suo genere omnium princeps.” |
XXII. [99] “Nay rather, Sulpicius,” rejoined Crassus, “let us ask Antonius, who is both capable of doing what you desire, and, as I hear you say, has been accustomed to do so. As to myself, I acknowledge that I have ever avoided all such kind of discourse, and have often declined to comply with your requests and solicitations, as you just now observed. This I did, not from pride or want of politeness, nor because I was unwilling to aid your just and commendable aspirations, especially as I knew you to be eminently and above others formed and qualified by nature to become a speaker, but, in truth, from being unaccustomed to such kind of discussions, and from being ignorant of those principles which are laid down as institutes of the art.” [100] “Then,” said Cotta, “since we have got over what we thought the greatest difficulty, to induce you, Crassus, to speak at all upon these subjects, for the rest, it will be our own fault if we let you go before you have explained all that we have to ask.” [101] “I believe I must answer,” says Crassus, “as is usually written in the formulae for entering on inheritances,36 concerning such points AS I KNOW AND SHALL BE ABLE.” [102] “And which of us,” rejoined Cotta, “can be so presuming as to desire to know or to be able to do anything that you do not know or cannot do?’’ “Well, then,” returned Crassus, “on condition that I may say that I cannot do what I cannot do, and that I may own that I do not know what I do not know, you may put questions to me at your pleasure.” “We shall, then, first ask of you,” said Suipicius, “what you think of what Antonius has advanced; whether you think that there is any art in speaking?” “What!” exclaimed Crassus, “do you put a trifling question to me, as to some idle and talkative, though perhaps studious and learned Greek, on which I may speak according to my humor? When do you. imagine that I have ever regarded or thought upon such matters, or have not always rather ridiculed the impudence of those men who, seated in the schools, would demand if any one, in a numerous assembly of persons, wished to ask any question, and desire him to speak? [103] This Gorgias the Leontine is said to have first done, who was thought to undertake and promise something vast, in pronouncing himself prepared to speak on all subjects on which any one should be inclined to hear him. But afterwards those men made it a common practice, and continue it to this day; so that there is no topic of such importance, or so unexpected, or so new, on which they do not profess that they will say all that can be said. [104] But if I had thought that you, Cotta, or you, Sulpicius, were desirous to hear such matters, I would have brought hither some Greek to amuse you with their manner of disputation; for there is with M. Piso,37 (a youth already addicted to this intellectual exercise, and one of superior talents, and of great affection for me,) the peripatetic Staseas, a man with whom I am well acquainted, and who, as I perceive is agreed amongst the learned, is of the first eminence in his profession.” |
|
[XXIII] [105] “¿¡Quem tu mihi,” inquit Mucius, “Staseam, quem Peripateticum narras!? Gerendus est tibi mos adulescentibus, Crasse, qui non Græci alicujus quotidianam loquacitatem sine usu, neque ex scholis cantilenam requirunt, sed ex homine omnium sapientissimo atque eloquentissimo atque ex eo qui non in libellis, sed in maximis causis et in hoc domicilio imperii et gloriæ, sit consilio linguaque princeps. Cujus vestigia persequi cupiunt, ejus sententiam sciscitantur. [106] Equidem te, quum in dicendo semper putavi deum, tum vero tibi nunquam eloquentiæ majorem tribui laudem quam humanitatis ; qua nunc te uti vel maxime decet, neque defugere eam disputationem ad quam te duo excellentes ingeniis adulescentes cupiunt accedere.”
[107] “Ego vero,” inquit, “istis obsequi studeo, neque gravabor breviter meo more quid quaque de re sentiam dicere. Ac primum illud (quoniam auctoritatem tuam neglegere, Scævola, fas mihi esse non puto) respondeo, mihi dicendi aut nullam artem aut pertenuem videri, sed omnem esse contentionem inter homines doctos in verbi controversia positam. [108] Nam si ars ita definitur ut paulo ante exposuit Antonius — ex rebus penitus perspectis planeque cognitis, atque ab opinionis arbitrio sejunctis scientiaque comprehensis —, non mihi videtur ars oratoris esse ulla. Sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera hujus forensis nostræ dictionis. [109] Sin autem ea quæ observata sunt in usu ac tractatione dicendi, hæc ab hominibus callidis ac peritis animadversa ac notata, verbis definita, generibus illustrata, partibus distributa sunt — id quod video potuisse fieri —, non intellego quamobrem non, si minus illa subtili definitione, at hac vulgari opinione, ars esse videatur. Sed sive est ars sive artis quædam similitudo, non est quidem ea neglegenda. Verum intellegendum est alia quædam, ad consequendam eloquentiam, esse majora.” |
XXIII. [105] “Why do you speak to me,” says Scaevola, “of this Staseas, this peripatetic 1 You must comply with the wishes of these young gentlemen, Crassus, who do not want the common, profitless talk of any Greek, or any empty declamation of the schools, but desire to know the opinions of a man in whose footsteps they long to tread, one who is the wisest and most eloquent of all men, who is not distinguished by petty books of precepts, but is the first, both in judgment and oratory, in causes of the greatest consequence, and in this seat of empire and glory. [106] For my part, as I always thought you a god in eloquence, so I have never attributed to you greater praises for oratory than for politeness; which you ought to show on this occasion especially, and not to decline a discussion on which two young men of such excellent ability invite you to enter.” [107] “I am certainly,” replied Crassus, “desirous to oblige them, nor shall I think it any trouble to speak briefly, as is my manner, what I think upon any point of the subject. And to their first question, (because I do not think it right for me to neglect your admonition, Scaevola,) I answer, that I think there is either no art of speaking at all, or but very little; but that all the disputation about it amongst the learned arises from a difference of opinion about the word. [108] For if art is to be defined according to what Antonius just now asserted,38 as lying in things thoroughly understood and fully known, such as are abstracted from the caprice of opinion and comprehended in the limits of science, there seems to me to be no art at all in oratory; since all the species of our forensic diction are various, and suited to the common understanding of the people. [109] Yet if those things which have been observed in the practice and method of speaking, have been noted and chronicled by ingenious and skilful men, have been set forth in words, illustrated in their several kinds, and distributed into parts, (as I think may possibly be done,) I do not understand why speaking may not be deemed an art, if not according to the exact definition of Antonius, at least according to common opinion. But whether it be an art, or merely the resemblance of an art, it is not, indeed, to be neglected; yet we must understand that there are other things of more consequence for the attainment of eloquence.” |
|
[XXIV] [110] Tum Antonius vehementer se assentiri Crasso dixit, quod neque ita amplecteretur artem ut ii solerent qui omnem vim dicendi in arte ponerent, neque rursus eam totam, sicut plerique philosophi facerent, repudiaret. “Sed existimo,” inquit, “gratum te his, Crasse, facturum, si ista exposueris quæ putas ad dicendum plus quam ipsam artem, posse prodesse.”
[111] “Dicam equidem, quoniam institui, petamque a vobis,” inquit, “ne has meas ineptias efferatis ; quanquam moderabor ipse, ne ut quidam magister atque artifex, sed quasi unus ex togatorum numero, atque ex forensi usu homo mediocris, neque omnino rudis videar — non ipse a me aliquid prompsisse, sed fortuito in sermonem vestrum incidisse. [112] Equidem, quum peterem magistratus, solebam in prensando dimittere a me Scævolam, quum ita ei dicerem me velle esse ineptum — id erat, petere blandius — quod, nisi inepte fieret, bene non posset fieri. Hunc autem esse unum hominem ex omnibus, quo præsente ego ineptus esse minime vellem — quem quidem nunc mearum ineptiarum testem et spectatorem fortuna constituit. ¿Nam quid est ineptius quam de dicendo dicere, quum id ipsum dicere nunquam sit non ineptum, nisi quum est necessarium?” [113] “Perge vero, Crasse,” inquit Mucius. “Istam enim culpam, quam vereris, ego præstabo.” |
XXIV. [110] Antonius then observed, that he was very strongly of opinion with Crassus; for he neither adopted such a definition of art as those preferred who attributed all the powers of eloquence to art, nor did he repudiate it entirely, as most of the philosophers had done. “But I imagine, Crassus,” added he, “that you will gratify these two young men, if you will specify those particulars which you think may be more conducive to oratory than art itself.” [111] “I will indeed mention them,” said he, “since I have engaged to do so, but must beg you not to publish my trifling remarks; though I will keep myself under such restraint as not to seem to speak like a master, or artist, but like one of the number of private citizens, moderately versed in the practice of the forum, and not altogether ignorant; not to have offered anything from myself, but to have accidentally fallen in with the course of your conversation. [112] Indeed, when I was a candidate for office, I used, at the time of canvassing, to send away Scaevola from me, telling him I wanted to be foolish, that is, to solicit with flattery, a thing that cannot be done to any purpose unless it be done foolishly; and that he was the only man in the world in whose presence I should least like to play the fool; and yet fortune has appointed him to be a witness and spectator of my folly. 1 For what is more foolish than to speak about speaking, when speaking itself is never otherwise than foolish, except it is absolutely necessary”39 [113] “Proceed, however, Crassus,” said Scaevola; “for I will take upon myself the blame which you fear.” |
| [XXV] “Sic igitur,” inquit Crassus, “sentio naturam primum atque ingenium ad dicendum vim afferre maximam ; neque vero istis, de quibus paulo ante dixit Antonius, scriptoribus artis rationem dicendi et viam, sed naturam defuisse ; nam et animi atque ingenii celeres quidam motus esse debent, qui et ad excogitandum acuti, et ad explicandum ornandumque sint uberes, et ad memoriam firmi atque diuturni. [114] Et si quis est qui hæc putet arte accipi posse (quod falsum est — præclare enim res se habeat, si hæc accendi aut commoveri arte possint ; inseri quidem et donari ab Arte non possunt omnia ; sunt enim illa dona naturæ), ¿quid de illis dicet, quæ certe cum ipso homine nascuntur: linguæ solutio, vocis sonus, latera, vires, conformatio quædam et figura totius oris et corporis? [115] Neque hæc ita dico, ut ars aliquid limare non possit — neque enim ignoro, et quæ bona sint, fieri meliora posse doctrina, et quæ non optima, aliquo modo acui tamen et corrigi posse —, sed sunt quidam aut ita lingua hæsitantes, aut ita voce absoni, aut ita vultu motuque corporis vasti atque agrestes ut, etiamsi ingeniis atque arte valeant, tamen in oratorum numerum venire non possint. Sunt autem quidam ita in eisdem rebus habiles, ita naturæ munibus ornati, ut non nati, sed ab aliquo deo ficti esse videantur. [116] Magnum quoddam est, onus atque munus suscipere, atque profiteri se esse — omnibus silentibus — unum maximis de rebus, magno in conventu hominum, audiendum. Adest enim fere nemo, quin acutius atque acrius vitia in dicente quam recta videat ; ita, quicquid est in quo offenditur, id etiam illa quæ laudanda sunt obruit. [117] Neque hæc in eam sententiam disputo ut homines adulescentes, si quid naturale forte non habeant, omnino a dicendi studio deterream. ¿Quis enim non videt C. Cœlio, æquali meo, magno honori fuisse — homini novo — illam ipsam, quamcunque assequi potuerit, in dicendo mediocritatem? ¿Quis vestrum æqualem, Q. Varium, vastum hominem atque fœdum, non intellegit illa ipsa facultate, quamcunque habuit, magnam esse in civitate gratiam consecutum? | XXV. “I am, then, of opinion,” said Crassus, “that nature and genius in the first place contribute most aid to speaking; and that to those writers on the art, to whom Antonius just now alluded, it was not skill and method in speaking, but natural talent that was wanting; for there ought to be certain lively powers in the mind40 and understanding, which may be acute to invent, fertile to explain and adorn, and strong and retentive to remember; [114] and if any one imagines that these powers may be acquired by art, (which is false, for it is very well if they can be animated and excited by art; but they certainly cannot by art be ingrafted or instilled, since they are all the gifts of nature,) what will he say of those qualities which are certainly born with the man himself, volubility of tongue, tone of voice, strength of lungs, and a peculiar conformation and aspect of the whole countenance and body ? [115] I do not say, that art cannot improve in these particulars, (for am not ignorant that what is good may be made better by education, and what is not very good may be in some degree polished and amended;) but there are some persons so hesitating in their speech, so inharmonious in their tone of voice, or so unwieldy and rude in the air and movements of their bodies, that, whatever power they possess either from genius or art, they can never be reckoned in the number of accomplished speakers; while there are others so happily qualified in these respects, so eminently adorned with the gifts of nature, that they seem not to have been born like other men, but moulded by some divinity. [116] It is, indeed, a great task and enterprise for a person to undertake and profess, that while every one else is silent, he alone must be heard on the most important subjects, and in a large assembly of men; for there is scarcely any one present who is not sharper and quicker to discover defects in the speaker than merits; and thus whatever offends the hearer effaces the recollection of what is worthy of praise. [117] I do not make these observations for the purpose of altogether deterring young men from the study of oratory, even if they be deficient in some natural endowments. For who does not perceive that to C. Caelius, my contemporary, a new man, the mere mediocrity in speaking, which he was enabled to attain, was a great honor ? Who does not know that Q. Varius, your equal in age, a clumsy, uncouth man, has obtained his great popularity by the cultivation of such faculties as he has ? |
[XXVI] [118] Sed quia ‘de Oratore’ quærimus, fingendus est nobis oratione nostra, detractis omnibus vitiis, orator — atque omni laude cumulatus. Neque enim, si multitudo litium, si varietas causarum, si hæc turba et barbaria forensis dat locum vel vitiosissimis oratoribus, idcirco nos hoc quod quærimus omittemus. Itaque in eis artibus in quibus non utilitas quæritur necessaria, sed animi libera quædam oblectatio, ¡quam diligenter et quam prope fastidiose judicamus! Nullæ enim lites neque controversiæ sunt quæ cogant homines, sicut in foro non bonos oratores, item in theatro actores malos perpeti. [119] Est igitur oratori diligenter providendum, non ut illis satisfaciat quibus necesse est, sed ut his ipsis admirabilis esse videatur quibus libere liceat judicare. Ac, si quæritis, plane quid sentiam enuntiabo apud homines familiarissimos quod adhuc semper tacui et tacendum putavi :
[122] Hic omnes assensi, significare inter sese et colloqui cœperunt. Fuit enim mirificus quidam in Crasso pudor qui tamen non modo non obesset ejus orationi, sed etiam probitatis commendatione prodesset. |
XXVI. [118] “But as our inquiry regards the COMPLETE ORATOR, we must imagine, in our discussion, an orator from whom every kind of fault is abstracted, and who is adorned with every kind of merit. For if the multitude of suits, if tha variety of causes, if the rabble and barbarism of the forum, afford room for even the most wretched speakers, we must not, for that reason, take our eyes from the object of out inquiry. In those arts, in which it is not indispensable usefulness that is sought, but liberal amusement for the mind, how nicely, how almost fastidiously, do we judge! For there are no suits or controversies which can force men, though they may tolerate indifferent orators in the forum, to endure also bad actors upon the stage. [119] The orator therefore must take the most studious precaution not merely to satisfy those whom he necessarily must satisfy, but to seem worthy of admiration to those who are at liberty to judge disinterestedly. If you would know what I myself think, I will express to you, my intimate friends, what I have hitherto never mentioned, and thought that I never should mention. To me, those who speak best, and speak with the utmost ease and grace, appear, if they do not commence their speeches with some timidity, and show some confusion in the exordium, to have almost lost the sense of shame, though it is impossible that such should not be the case;41 [120] for the better qualified a man is to speak, the more he fears the difficulties of speaking, the uncertain success of a speech, and the expectation of the audience. But he who can produce and deliver nothing worthy of his subject, nothing worthy of the name of an orator, nothing worthy the attention of his audience, seems to me, though he be ever so confused while he is speaking, to be downright shameless; for we ought to avoid a character for shamelessness, not by testifying shame, but by not doing that which does not become us. [121] But the speaker who has no shame (as I see to be the case with many) I regard as deserving, not only of rebuke, but of personal castigation. Indeed, what I often observe in you I very frequently experience in myself, that I turn pale in the outset of my speech, and feel a tremor through my whole thoughts, as it were, and limbs. When I was a young man, I was on one occasion so timid in commencing an accusation, that I owed to Q. Maximus42 the greatest of obligations for immediately dismissing the assembly, as soon as he saw me absolutely disheartened and incapacitated through fear.” [122] Here they all signified assent, looked significantly at one another, and began to talk together; for there was a wonderful modesty in Crassus, which however was not only no disadvantage to his oratory, but even an assistance to it, by giving it the recommendation of probity, |
| [XXVII] Tum Antonius, “Sæpe, ut dicis,” inquit, “animadverti, Crasse, et te et ceteros summos oratores (quanquam tibi par, mea sententia, nemo unquam fuit) in dicendi exordio permoveri. [123] Cujus quidem rei quum causam quærerem, quidnam esset cur, ut in quoque oratore plurimum esset, ita maxime is pertimesceret, has causas inveniebam duas : unam, quod intellegerent ii quos usus ac natura docuisset nonnunquam summis oratoribus non satis ex sententia eventum dicendi procedere ; ita non injuria, quotiescunque dicerent, id quod aliquando posset accidere, ne tum accideret timere ; [124] altera est hæc de qua queri sæpe soleo : quod ceterarum homines artium spectati et probati — si quando aliquid minus bene fecerunt quam solent — aut noluisse aut valetudine impediti non potuisse consequi id quod scirent putantur. “Noluit,” inquiunt, “hodie agere Roscius.” Aut, “Crudior fuit.” Oratoris peccatum, si quod est animadversum, stultitiæ peccatum videtur. [125] Stultitia autem excusationem non habet, quia nemo videtur aut quia crudus fuerit aut quod ita maluerit stultus fuisse. Quo etiam gravius judicium in dicendo subimus. Quoties enim dicimus, toties de nobis judicatur. Et qui semel in gestu peccavit, non continuo existimatur nescire gestum ; qui autem in dicendo quid reprehensus est, aut æterna in eo aut certe diuturna valet opinio tarditatis. | XXVII. Antonius soon after said, “I have often observed, as you mention, Crassus, that both you and other most accomplished orators, although in my opinion none was ever equal to you, have felt some agitation in entering upon their speeches. When I inquired into the reason of this, and considered why a speaker, the more ability he possessed, felt the greater fear in speaking, I found that there were two causes of such timidity: one, that those whom experience [123] and nature had formed for speaking, well knew that the event of a speech did not always satisfy expectation even in the greatest orators; and thus, as often as they spoke, they feared, not without reason, that what sometimes happened might happen then; [124] the other (of which I am often in the habit of complaining) is, that men, tried and approved in other arts, if they ever do anything with less success than usual, are thought either to have wanted inclination for it, or to have failed in performing what they knew how to perform from ill health. ‘ Roscius,’ they say, ‘ would not act today,’ or, ‘ he was indisposed.’ But if any deficiency is seen in the orator, it is thought to proceed from want of sense; [125] and want of sense admits of no excuse, because nobody is supposed to have wanted sense because he ‘ was indisposed,’ or because ‘such was his inclination.’ Thus we undergo a severer judgment in oratory, and judgment is pronounced upon us as often as we speak; if an actor is once mistaken in an attitude, he is not immediately considered to be ignorant of attitude in general; but if any fault is found in a speaker, there prevails for ever, or at least for a very long time, a notion of his stupidity. |
|
[XXVIII] [126] Illud vero quod a te dictum est — esse permulta quæ orator a natura nisi haberet, non multum a magistro adjuvaretur — valde tibi assentior. Inque eo vel maxime probavi summum illum doctorem, Alabandensem Apollonium, qui, quum mercede doceret, tamen non patiebatur eos, quos judicabat non posse oratores evadere, operam apud sese perdere, dimittebatque, et ad quam quemque artem putabat esse aptum, ad eam impellere atque hortari solebat. [127] Satis est enim in ceteris artificiis percipiendis tantummodo similem esse hominis ; et id quod tradatur (vel etiam inculcetur, si quis forte sit tardior) posse percipere animo et memoria custodire. Non quæritur mobilitas linguæ, non celeritas verborum, non denique ea quæ nobis non possumus fingere : facies, vultus, sonus. [128] In oratore autem acumen dialecticorum, sententiæ philosophorum, verba prope poëtarum, memoria jurisconsultorum, vox tragœdorum, gestus pæne summorum actorum est requirendus. Quamobrem nihil in hominum genere rarius perfecto oratore inveniri potest. Quæ enim, singularum rerum artifices, singula si mediocriter adepti sunt, probantur ; ea nisi omnia sunt in oratore summa, probari non potest.
[129] Tum Crassus, “Atqui vide,” inquit, “in artificio perquam tenui et levi, quanto plus adhibeatur diligentiæ, quam in hac re quam constat esse maximam. Sæpe enim soleo audire Roscium quum ita dicat se adhuc reperire discipulum — quem quidem probaret — potuisse neminem : non quo non essent quidam probabiles, sed quia, si aliquid modo esset vitii, id ferre ipse non posset. Nihil est enim tam insigne nec tam ad diuturnitatem memoriæ stabile quam id in quo aliquid offenderis. [130] Itaque, ut ad hanc similitudinem hujus histrionis oratoriam laudem dirigamus, ¿videtisne quam nihil ab eo nisi perfecte, nihil nisi cum summa venustate fiat, nihil nisi ita ut deceat, et uti omnes moveat atque delectet? Itaque hoc jamdiu est consecutus ut, in quo quisque artificio excelleret, is in suo genere Roscius diceretur. Hanc ego absolutionem perfectionemque in oratore desiderans, a qua ipse longe absum, facio impudenter ; mihi enim volo ignosci, ceteris ipse non ignosco. Nam qui non potest, qui vitiose facit, quem denique non decet, hunc — ut Apollonius jubebat — ad id, quod facere possit, detrudendum puto.” |
XXVIII. [126] “But in what you observed, as to there being many things in which, unless the orator has a full supply of them from nature, he cannot be much assisted by a master I agree with you entirely; and, in regard to that point, I have always expressed the highest approbation of that eminent teacher, Apollonius of Alabanda,43 who, though he taught for pay, would not suffer such as he judged could never become orators, to lose their labor with him; and he sent them away with exhortations and encouragements to each of them to pursue that peculiar art for which he thought him naturally qualified. [127] To the acquirement of other arts it is sufficient for a person to resemble a man, and to be able to comprehend in his mind, and retain in his memory, what is instilled, or, if he is very dull, inculcated into him; no volubility of tongue is requisite, no quickness of utterance; none of those things which we cannot form for ourselves, aspect, countenance, look, voice. [128] But in an orator, the acuteness of the logicians, the wisdom of the philosophers, the language almost of poetry, the memory of lawyers, the voice of tragedians, the gesture almost of the best actors, is required. Nothing therefore is more rarely found among mankind than a consummate orator; for qualifications which professors of other arts are commended for acquiring in a moderate degree, each in his respective pursuit, will not be praised in the orator, unless they are all combined in him in the highest possible excellence.” [129] “Yet observe,” said Crassus, “how much more diligence as used in one of the light and trivial arts than in this, which is acknowledged to be of the greatest importance; for I often hear Roscius say, that ‘ he could never yet find a scholar that he was thoroughly satisfied with; not that some of them were not worthy of approbation, but because, if they had any fault, he himself could not endure it.’ Nothing indeed is so much noticed, or makes an impression of such lasting continuance on the memory, as that in which you give any sort of offence. [130] To judge therefore of the accomplishments of the orator by comparison with this stage-player, do you not observe how everything is done by him unexceptionably; everything with the utmost grace; everything in such a way as is becoming, and as moves and delights all? He has accordingly long attained such distinction, that in whatever pursuit a man excels, he is called a Roscius in his art. For my own part, while I desire this finish and perfection in an orator, of which I fall so far short myself, I act audaciously; for I wish indulgence to be granted to myself, while I grant none to others; for I think that he who has not abilities, who is faulty in action, who, in short, wants a graceful manner, should be sent off, as Apollonius advised, to that for which he has a capacity.” |
|
[XXIX] [131] “¿Num tu igitur,” inquit Sulpicius, “me aut hunc Cottam, jus civile aut rem militarem jubes discere? ¿Nam quis ad ista summa atque in omni genere perfecta potest pervenire?”
Tum ille “Ego vero,” inquit, “quod in vobis egregiam quandam ac præclaram indolem ad dicendum esse cognovi, idcirco hæc exposui omnia ; nec magis ad eos deterrendos qui non possent, quam ad vos qui possetis, exacuendos accommodavi orationem meam ; et quanquam in utroque vestrum summum esse ingenium studiumque perspexi, tamen hæc quæ sunt in specie posita — de quibus plura fortasse dixi quam solent Græci dicere — in te, Sulpici, divina sunt. [132] Ego enim neminem nec motu corporis neque ipso habitu atque forma aptiorem, nec voce pleniorem aut suaviorem mihi videor audisse ; quæ quibus a natura minora data sunt, tamen illud assequi possunt, ut eis quæ habent, modice et scienter utantur, et ut ne dedeceat. Id enim est maxime vitandum et de hoc uno minime est facile præcipere, non mihi modo, qui sicut unus paterfamilias his de rebus loquor, sed etiam ipsi illi Roscio quem sæpe audio dicere caput esse artis decere quod facias, quod tamen unum id esse quod tradi arte non possit. [133] Sed, si placet, sermonem alio transferamus et nostro more aliquando, non rhetorico, loquamur.” “Minime vero,” inquit Cotta ; “nunc enim te jam exoremus necesse est, quoniam retines nos in hoc studio, nec ad aliam dimittis artem, ut nobis explices, quicquid est istud quod tu in dicendo potes. Neque enim sumus nimis avidi ; ista tua ‘mediocri eloquentia’ contenti sumus. Idque ex te quærimus (ut ne plus nos assequamur quam quantulum tu in dicendo assecutus es) — quoniam, quæ a natura expetenda sunt, ea dicis non nimis deesse nobis — quid præterea esse assumendum putes.” |
XXIX. [131] “Would you then,” said Sulpicius, “desire me, or our friend Cotta, to learn the civil law, or the military art?44 for who can ever possibly arrive at that perfection of yours, that high excellence in every accomplishment?” “It was,” replied Crassus, “because I knew that there was in both of you excellent and noble talents for oratory, that I have expressed myself fully on these matters; nor have I adapted my remarks more to deter those who had not abilities, than to encourage you who had; and though I perceive in you both consummate capacity and industry, yet I may say that the advantage of personal appearance, on which I have perhaps said more than the Greeks are wont to say, are in you, Sulpicius, even godlike. [132] For any person better qualified for this profession by gracefulness of motion, by his very carriage and figure, or by the fulness and sweetness of his voice, I think that I have never heard speak; endowments which those, to whom they are granted by nature in an inferior degree, may yet succeed in managing, in such measure as they possess them, with judgment and skill, and in such a manner as not to be unbecoming; for that is what is chiefly to be avoided, and concerning which it is most difficult to give any rules for instruction, not only for me, who talk of these matters like a private citizen, but even for Roscius himself, whom I often hear say, ‘that the most essential part of art is to be becoming? which yet is the only thing that cannot be taught by art. [133] But, if it is agreeable, let us change the subject of conversation, and talk like ourselves a little, not like rhetoricians.” “By no means,” said Cotta, “for we must now intreat you (since you retain us in this study, and do not dismiss us to any other pursuit) to tell us something of your own abilities, whatever they are, in speaking; for we are not inordinately ambitious; we are satisfied with that mediocrity of eloquence of yours; and what we inquire of you is (that we may not attain more than that humble degree of oratory at which you have arrived)45 what you think, since you say that the endowments to be derived from nature are not very deficient in us, we ought to endeavour to acquire in addition.” |
|
[XXX] [134] Tum Crassus arridens, “¿Quid censes,” inquit, “Cotta, nisi studium et ardorem quendam amoris? sine quo, quum in vita nihil quisquam egregium, tum certe hoc quod tu expetis, nemo unquam assequetur. Neque vero vos ad eam rem video esse cohortandos quos, quum mihi quoque sitis molesti, nimis etiam flagrare intellego cupiditate. [135] Sed profecto studia nihil prosunt perveniendi aliquo, nisi illud quod eo, quo intendas, ferat deducatque, cognoris. Quare, quoniam mihi levius quoddam onus imponitis, neque ex me de oratoris arte, sed de hac mea — quantulacunque est — facultate quæritis, exponam vobis quandam — non aut perreconditam, aut valde difficilem, aut magnificam, aut gravem — rationem consuetudinis meæ, qua quondam solitus sum uti, quum mihi in isto studio versari adulescenti licebat.”
[136] Tum Sulpicius, “¡O diem, Cotta, nobis,” inquit, “optatum! Quod enim neque precibus unquam, nec insidiando nec speculando assequi potui, ut, quid Crassus ageret, meditandi aut dicendi causa, non, modo, videre mihi, sed ex ejus scriptore et lectore Diphilo suspicari liceret ; id spero nos esse adeptos, omniaque jam ex ipso quæ diu cupimus, cognituros.” |
XXX. [134] Crassus, smiling, replied, “What do you think is wanting to you, Cotta, but a passionate inclination, and a sort of ardour like that of love, without which no man will ever attain anything great in life, and especially such distinction as you desire? Yet I do not see that you need any encouragement to this pursuit; indeed, as you press rather hard even upon me, I consider that you burn with an extraordinarily fervent affection for it. [135] But I am aware that a desire to reach any point avails nothing, unless you know what will lead and bring you to the mark at which you aim. Since therefore you lay but a light burden upon me, and do not question me about the whole art of the orator, but about my own ability, little as it is, I will set before you a course, not very obscure, or very difficult, or grand, or imposing, the course of my own practice, which I was accustomed to pursue when I had opportunity, in my youth, to apply to such studies.” [136] “O day much wished for by us, Cotta! “ exclaimed Sulpicius; “for what I could never obtain, either by entreaty, or stratagem, or scrutiny, (so that I was unable, not only to see what Crassus did, with a view to meditation or composition, but even to gain a notion of it from his secretary and reader, Diphilus,) I hope we have now secured, and that we shall learn from himself all that we have long desired to know.” |
[XXXI] [137] Tum Crassus, “Atqui arbitror, Sulpici, quum audieris, non tam te hæc admiraturum quæ dixero, quam existimaturum tum, quum ea audire cupiebas, causam cur cuperes non fuisse. Nihil enim dicam reconditum, nihil exspectatione vestra dignum, nihil aut inauditum vobis aut cuiquam novum. Nam principio, illud quod est homine ingenuo liberaliterque educato dignum, non negabo me ista omnium communia et contrita præcepta didicisse :
|
XXXI. [137] “I conceive, however,” proceeded Crassus, “that when you have heard me, you will not so much admire what I have said, as think that, when you desired to hear, there was no good reason for your desire; for I shall say nothing abstruse, nothing to answer your expectation, nothing either previously unheard by you, or new to any one. In the first place, I will not deny that, as becomes a man well born and liberally educated, I learned those trite and common precepts of teachers in general; [138] first, that it is the business of an orator to speak in a manner adapted to persuade; next, that every speech is either upon a question concerning a matter in general, without specification of persons or times, or concerning a matter referring to certain persons and times. [139] But that, in either case, whatever falls under controversy, the question with regard to it is usually, whether such a thing has been done, or, if it has been done, of what nature it is, or by what name it should be called; or, as some add, whether it seems to have been done rightly or not. [140] That controversies arise also on the interpretation of writing, in which anything has been expressed ambiguously, or contradictorily, or so that what is written is at variance with the writer’s evident intention; and that there are certain lines of argument adapted to all these cases. [141] But that of such subjects as are distinct from general questions, part come under the head of judicial proceedings, part under that of deliberations; and that there is a third kind which is employed in praising or censuring particular persons. That there are also certain common places on which we may insist in judicial proceedings, in which equity is the object; others, which we may adopt in deliberations, all which are to be directed to the advantage of those to whom we give counsel; others in panegyric, in which all must be referred to the dignity of the persons commended. [142] That since all the business and art of an orator is divided into five parts,46 he ought first to find out what he should say; next, to dispose and arrange his matter, not only in a certain order, but with a sort of power and judgment; then to clothe and deck his thoughts with language; then to secure them in his memory; and lastly, to deliver them with dignity and grace. [143] I had learned and understood also, that before we enter upon the main subject, the minds of the audience should be conciliated by an exordium; next, that the case should be clearly stated; then, that the point in controversy should be established; then, that what we maintain should be supported by proof, and that whatever was said on the other side should be refuted; and that, in the conclusion of our speech, whatever was in our favor should be amplified and enforced, and whatever made for our adversaries should be weakened and invalidated. |
[XXXII] [144] Audieram etiam, quæ de orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur, in qua præcipitur
[148] “Hanc ipsam,” inquit Sulpicius, “nosse volumus. Ac tamen ista quæ abs te breviter de arte decursa sunt audire cupimus, quanquam sunt nobis quoque non inaudita ; verum illa mox ; nunc de ipsa exercitatione quid sentias quærimus.” |
XXXII. [144] “I had heard also what is taught about the costume of a speech; in regard to which it is first directed that we should speak correctly and in pure Latin; next, intelligibly and with perspicuity; then gracefully; then suitably to the dignity of the subject, and as it were becomingly; and I had made myself acquainted with the rules relating to every particular. [145] Moreover, I had seen art applied to those things which are properly endowments of nature; for I had gone over some precepts concerning action, and some concerning artificial memory, which were short indeed, but requiring much exercise; matters on which almost all the learning of those artificial orators is employed; and if I should say that it is of no assistance, I should say what is not true; for it conveys some hints to admonish the orator, as it were, to what he should refer each part of his speech, and to what points he may direct his view, so as not to wander from the object which he has proposed to himself. [146] But I consider that with regard to all precepts the case is this, not that orators by adhering to them have obtained distinction in eloquence; but that certain persons have noticed what men of eloquence practised of their own accord, and formed rules accordingly;47 so that eloquence has not sprung from art, but art from eloquence; not that, as I said before, I entirely reject art, for it is, though not essentially necessary to oratory, yet proper for a man of liberal education to learn. [147] And by you, my young friends, some preliminary exercise must be undergone; though indeed you are already on the course; but those48 who are to enter upon a race, and those who are preparing for what is to be done in the forum, as their field of battle, may alike previously learn, and try their powers, by practising in sport.” [148] “That sort of exercise,” said Sulpicius, “is just what we wanted to understand; but we desire to hear more at large what you have briefly and cursorily delivered concerning art; though such matters are not strange even to us. Of that subject, however, we shall inquire hereafter; at present we wish to know your sentiments on exercise.” |
| [XXXIII] [149] “Equidem probo ista,” Crassus inquit, “quæ vos facere soletis, ut, causa aliqua posita consimili causarum earum quæ in forum deferuntur, dicatis quam maxime ad veritatem accommodate. Sed plerique in hoc, vocem modo — neque eam scienter — et vires exercent suas, et linguæ celeritatem incitant, verborumque frequentia delectantur. In quo fallit eos quod audierunt “dicendo homines” (ut dicant) “efficere” solere. [150] Vere enim etiam illud dicitur : “perverse dicere, homines perverse dicendo facillime consequi”. Quamobrem in istis ipsis exercitationibus, etsi utile est etiam subito sæpe dicere, tamen illud utilius, sumpto spatio ad cogitandum, paratius atque accuratius dicere. Caput autem est, quod — ut vere dicam — minime facimus (est enim magni laboris quem plerique fugimus), quam plurimum scribere. Stilus optimus et præstantissimus dicendi effector ac magister — neque injuria. Nam si subitam et fortuitam orationem commentatio et cogitatio facile vincit, hanc ipsam profecto assidua ac diligens scriptura superabit. [151] Omnes enim, sive artis sunt loci sive ingenii cujusdam ac prudentiæ, qui modo insunt in ea re de qua scribimus, anquirentibus nobis omnique acie ingenii contemplantibus ostendunt se et occurrunt ; omnesque sententiæ, verbaque omnia quæ sunt cujusque generis maxime illustria, sub acumen stili subeant et succedant necesse est ; tum ipsa collocatio conformatioque verborum perficitur in scribendo — non poëtico, sed quodam oratorio numero et modo. [152] Hæc sunt quæ clamores et admirationes in bonis oratoribus efficiunt ; neque ea quisquam, nisi diu multumque scriptitarit, etiamsi vehementissime se in his subitis dictionibus exercuerit, consequetur ; et qui a scribendi consuetudine ad dicendum venit, hanc affert facultatem, ut — etiam subito si dicat — tamen illa quæ dicantur similia scriptorum esse videantur ; atque etiam, si quando in dicendo scriptum attulerit aliquid, quum ab eo discesserit, reliqua similis oratio consequetur. [153] Ut concitato navigio, quum remiges inhibuerunt, retinet tamen ipsa navis motum et cursum suum, intermisso impetu pulsuque remorum, sic in oratione perpetua, quum scripta deficiunt, parem tamen obtinet oratio reliqua cursum, scriptorum similitudine et vi concitata. | XXXIII. [149] “I like that method,” replied Crassus, “which you are accustomed to practise, namely, to lay down a case similar to those which are brought on in the forum, and to speak upon it, as nearly as possible, as if it were a real case.49 But in such efforts the generality of students exercise only their voice (and not even that skilfully), and try their strength of lungs, and volubility of tongue, and please them- selves with a torrent of their own words; in which exercise what they have heard deceives them, that men by speaking succeed in becoming speakers. [150] For it is truly said also, That men by speaking badly make sure of becoming bad speakers. In those exercises, therefore, although it be useful even frequently to speak on the sudden, yet it is mere advantageous, after taking time to consider, to speak with greater preparation and accuracy. But the chief point of all is that which (to say the truth) we hardly ever practise (for it requires great labor, which most of us avoid); I mean, to write as much as possible. Writing is said to be the best and most excellent modeller and teacher of oratory; and not without reason; for if what is meditated and considered easily surpasses sudden and extemporary speech, a constant and diligent habit of writing will surely be of more effect than meditation and consideration itself; [151] since all the arguments relating to the subject on which we write, whether they are suggested by art, or by a certain power of genius and understanding, will present themselves, and occur to us, while we examine and contemplate it in the full light of our intellect; and all the thoughts and words, which are the most expressive of their kind, must of necessity come under and submit to the keenness of our judgment while writing; and a fair arrangement and collocation of the words is effected by writing, in a certain rhythm and measure, not poetical, but oratorical. [152] Such are the qualities which bring applause and admiration to good orators; nor will any man ever attain them, unless after long and great practice in writing, however resolutely he may have exercised himself in extemporary speeches; and he who comes to speak after practice in writing brings this advantage with him, that though he speak at the call of the moment, yet what he says will bear a resemblance to something written; and if ever, when he comes to speak, he brings anything with him in writing, the rest of his speech, when he departs from what is written, will flow on in a similar strain. [153] As, when a boat has once been impelled forward, though the rowers suspend their efforts, the vessel herself still keeps her motion and course during the intermission of the impulse and force of the oars; so, in a continued stream of oratory, when written matter fails, the rest of the speech maintains a similar flow, being impelled by the resemblance and force acquired from what was written. |
|
[XXXIV] [154] In quotidianis autem commentationibus equidem mihi adulescentulus proponere solebam illam exercitationem maxime qua C. Carbonem, nostrum illum inimicum, solitum esse uti sciebam : ut aut versibus propositis quam maxime gravibus, aut oratione aliqua lecta ad eum finem quem memoria possem comprehendere, eam rem ipsam quam legissem, verbis aliis quam maxime possem lectis, pronuntiarem. Sed post animadverti hoc esse in hoc vitii, quod ea verba quæ maxime cujusque rei propria, quæque essent ornatissima atque optima, occupasset aut Ennius, si ad ejus versus me exercerem, aut Gracchus, si ejus orationem mihi forte proposuissem. Ita, si eisdem verbis uterer, nihil prodesse. Si aliis, etiam obesse, quum minus idoneis uti consuescerem. [155] Postea mihi placuit, eoque sum usus adulescens, ut summorum oratorum Græcas orationes explicarem. Quibus lectis hoc assequebar ut, quum ea quæ legeram Græce, Latine redderem, non solum optimis verbis uterer, et tamen usitatis, sed etiam exprimerem quædam verba imitando quæ nova nostris essent, dummodo essent idonea. [156] Jam vocis, et spiritus, et totius corporis, et ipsius linguæ motus et exercitationes, non tam artis indigent quam laboris ; quibus in rebus habenda est ratio diligenter, quos imitemur, quorum similes velimus esse. Intuendi nobis sunt non solum oratores, sed etiam actores, ne mala consuetudine ad aliquam deformitatem pravitatemque veniamus. [157] Exercenda est etiam memoria, ediscendis ad verbum quam plurimis et nostris scriptis et alienis. Atque in ea exercitatione non sane mihi displicet adhibere, si consueris, etiam istam locorum simulacrorumque rationem quæ in arte traditur. Educenda deinde dictio est ex hac domestica exercitatione et umbratili medium in agmen, in pulverem, in clamorem, in castra atque in aciem forensem ; subeundus visus omnium, et periclitandæ vires ingenii, et illa commentatio inclusa in veritatis lucem proferenda est. [158] Legendi etiam poëtæ, cognoscenda historia, omnium bonarum artium scriptores ac doctores eligendi et pervolutandi et exercitationis causa laudandi, interpretandi, corrigendi, vituperandi, refellendi ; disputandumque de omni re in contrarias partes et, quicquid erit in quaque re, quod probabile videri possit, eliciendum atque dicendum ; [159] perdiscendum jus civile, cognoscendæ leges, percipienda omnis antiquitas, senatoria consuetudo, disciplina reipublicæ, jura sociorum, fœdera, pactiones, causa imperii cognoscenda est ; libandus est etiam ex omni genere urbanitatis facetiarum quidam lepos quo tanquam sale perspergatur omnis oratio.
Effudi vobis omnia quæ sentiebam, quæ fortasse, quemcunque patremfamilias arripuissetis ex aliquo circulo, eadem vobis percontantibus respondisset.” |
XXXIV. [154] “But in my daily exercises I used, when a youth, to adopt chiefly that method which I knew that Caius Carbo, my adversary,50 generally practised; which was, that, having selected some nervous piece of poetry, or read over such a portion of a speech as I could retain in my memory, I used to declaim upon what I had been reading in other words, chosen with all the judgment that I possessed. But at length I perceived that in that method there was this inconvenience, that Ennius, if I exercised myself on his verses, or Gracchus, if I laid one of his orations before me, had forestalled such words as were peculiarly appropriate to the subject, and such as were the most elegant and altogether the best; so that, if I used the same words, it profited nothing; if others, it was even prejudicial to me, as I habituated myself to use such as were less eligible. [155] Afterwards I thought proper, and continued the practice at a rather more advanced age,51 to translate the orations of the best Greek orators;52 by fixing upon which I gained this advantage, that while I rendered into Latin what I had read in Greek, I not only used the best words, and yet such as were of common occurrence, but also formed some words by imitation, which would be new to our countrymen, taking care, however, that they were unobjectionable. [156] “As to the exertion and exercise of the voice, of the breath, of the whole body, and of the tongue itself; they do not so much require art as labor; but in those matters we ought to be particularly careful whom we imitate and whom we would wish to resemble. Not only orators are to be observed by us, but even actors, lest by vicious habits we contract any awkwardness or ungracefulness. [157] The memory is also to be exercised, by learning accurately by heart as many of our own writings, and those of others, as we can. In exercising the memory, too, I shall not object if you accustom yourself to adopt that plan of referring to places and figures which is taught in treatises on the art. 1 Your language must then be brought forth from this domestic and retired exercise, into the midst of the field, into the dust and clamour, into the camp and military array of the forum; you must acquire practice in everything; you must try the strength of your understanding; and your retired lucubrations must be exposed to the light of reality. [158] The poets must also be studied; an acquaintance must be formed with history; the writers and teachers in all the liberal arts and sciences must be read, and turned over, and must, for the sake of exercise, be praised, interpreted, corrected, censured, refuted; you must dispute on both sides of every question; and whatever may seem maintainable on any point, must be brought forward and illustrated. [159] The civil law must be thoroughly studied; laws in general must be understood; all antiquity must be known; the usages of the senate, the nature of our government, the rights of our allies, our treaties and convention?, and whatever concerns the interests of the state, must be learned. A certain intellectual grace must also be extracted from every kind of refinement, with which, as with salt, every oration must be seasoned. I have poured forth to you all I had to say, and perhaps any citizen whom you had laid hold of in any company whatever, would have replied to your inquiries on these subjects equally well.’53 |
|
[XXXV] [160] Hæc quum Crassus dixisset, silentium est consecutum, sed quanquam satis eis qui aderant ad id quod erat propositum, dictum videbatur, tamen sentiebant celerius esse multo, quam ipsi vellent, ab eo peroratum.
Tum Scævola, “¿Quid est, Cotta?" inquit, “¿Quid tacetis? ¿Nihilne vobis in mentem venit quod præterea a Crasso requiratis?” [161] “Immo id, mehercule,” inquit, “ipsum attendo. Tantus enim cursus verborum fuit, et sic evolavit oratio, ut ejus vim et incitationem aspexerim, vestigia ingressumque vix viderim, et tanquam in aliquam locupletem ac refertam domum venerim, non explicata veste neque proposito argento neque tabulis et signis propalam collocatis, sed his omnibus multis magnificisque rebus constructis ac reconditis ; sic modo in oratione Crassi divitias atque ornamenta ejus ingenii per quædam involucra atque integumenta perspexi ; sed ea quum contemplari cuperem, vix aspiciendi potestas fuit. Itaque neque hoc possum dicere, me omnino ignorare quid possideat, neque plane nosse atque vidisse.” [162] “¿Quin tu igitur facis idem,” inquit Scævola, ”quod faceres, si in aliquam domum plenam ornamentorum villamve venisses? Si ea seposita, ut dicis, essent, tu valde spectandi cupidus esses, non dubitares rogare dominum, ut proferri juberet, præsertim si esses familiaris. Similiter nunc petes a Crasso ut illam copiam ornamentorum suorum quam constructam uno in loco, quasi per transennam prætereuntes strictim aspeximus, in lucem proferat, et suo quidque in loco collocet.” [163] “Ego vero” inquit Cotta “a te peto, Scævola — me enim, et hunc Sulpicium impedit pudor ab homine omnium gravissimo qui genus hujusmodi disputationis semper contempserit, hæc quæ isti forsitan puerorum elementa videantur, exquirere —, sed tu hoc nobis da, Scævola, et perfice ut Crassus hæc quæ coartavit et peranguste refersit in oratione sua dilatet nobis atque explicet.” [164] “Ego, mehercule,” inquit Mucius, “antea vestra magis hoc causa volebam, quam mea ; neque enim tantopere hanc a Crasso disputationem desiderabam, quantopere ejus in causis oratione delector. Nunc vero, Crasse, mea quoque etiam causa rogo ut, quoniam tantum habemus otii quantum jamdiu nobis non contigit, ne graveris exædificare id opus quod instituisti. Formam enim totius negotii, opinione majorem melioremque video — quam vehementer probo.” |
XXXV. [160] When Crassus had uttered these words a silence ensued. But though enough seemed to have been said in the opinion of the company present, in reference to what had been proposed, yet they thought that he had concluded his speech more abruptly than they could have wished. Scaevola then said, “What is the matter, Cotta? why are you silent ? Does nothing more occur to you which you would wish to ask Crassus?” [161] “Nay,” rejoined he, “that is the very thing of which I am thinking; for the rapidity of his words was such, and his oration was winged with such speed, that though I perceived its force and energy I could scarcely see its track and course; and, as if I had come into some rich and well-furnished house, where the furniture54 was not un- packed, nor the plate set out, nor the pictures and statues placed in view, but a multitude of all these magnificent things laid up and heaped together; so just now, in the speech of Crassus, I saw his opulence and the riches of his genius, through veils and curtains as it were; but when I desired to take a nearer view, there was scarcely opportunity for taking a glance at them; I can therefore neither say that I am wholly ignorant of what he possesses, nor that I have plainly ascertained and beheld it.” [162] “Then,” said Scaevola, “why do you not act in the same way as you would do, if you had really come into a house or villa full of rich furniture? If everything was put by as you describe, and you had a great curiosity to see it, you would not hesitate to ask the master to order it to be brought out, especially if he was your friend; in like manner you will now surely ask Crassus to bring forth into the light that profusion of splendid objects which are his property, (and of which, piled together in one place, we have caught a glimpse, as it were through a lattice,55 as we passed by,) and set everything in its proper situation.” [163] “I rather ask you, Scaevola,” says Cotta, “to do that for me; (for modesty forbids Sulpicius and myself to ask of one of the most eminent of mankind, who has ever held in contempt this kind of disputation, such things as he perhaps regards only as rudiments for children;) but do you oblige us in this, Scaevola, and prevail on Crassus to unfold and enlarge upon those matters which he has crowded together, and crammed into so small a space in his speech.” [164] “Indeed,” said Scaevola, “I desired that before, more upon your account than my own; nor did I feel so much longing for this discussion from Crassus, as I experience pleasure from his orations in pleading But now, Crassus, I ask you also on my own account, that since we have so much more leisure than has been allowed us for long time, you would not think it troublesome to complete the edifice which you have commenced; for I see a finer and better plan of the whole work than I could have imagined, and one of which I strongly approve.” |
|
[XXXVI] [165] “Enimvero,” inquit Crassus,” mirari satis non queo, etiam te hæc, Scævola, desiderare, quæ neque ego ita teneo uti ii qui docent ; neque sunt ejus generis ut, si optime tenerem, digna essent ista sapientia ac tuis auribus.” “¿Ain tu?,” inquit ille : “Si de istis communibus et pervagatis vix huic ætati audiendum putas, ¿etiamne illa neglegere possumus quæ tu oratori cognoscenda esse dixisti, de naturis hominum, de moribus, de rationibus eis quibus hominum mentes et incitarentur et reprimerentur, de historia, de antiquitate, de administratione reipublicæ, denique de nostro ipso jure civili? Hanc enim ego omnem scientiam et copiam rerum in tua prudentia sciebam inesse ; in oratoris vero instrumento tam lautam supellectilem nunquam videram.”
[166] “¿Potes igitur,” inquit Crassus, “— ut alia omittam innumerabilia et immensa, et ut ad ipsum tuum jus civile veniam — oratores putare eos quos multas horas exspectavit, quum in Campum properaret — et ridens et stomachans — P. Scævola, quum Hypsæus, maxima voce, plurimis verbis a M. Crasso prætore contenderet ut ei quem defendebat causa cadere liceret, Cn. autem Octavius, homo consularis, non minus longa oratione recusaret, ne adversarius causa caderet ac ne is pro quo ipse diceret, turpi tutelæ judicio atque omni molestia, stultitia adversarii liberaretur?” [167] “Ego vero istos,” inquit, “(memini enim mihi narrare Mucium) non modo oratoris nomine sed ne foro quidem dignos vix putarim.” “Atqui non defuit illis patronis” inquit Crassus “eloquentia, neque dicendi ratio aut copia, sed juris civilis scientia : quod alter plus, lege agendo, petebat quam quantum lex in Duodecim Tabulis permiserat — quod quum impetrasset, causa caderet ; alter iniquum putabat plus secum agi quam quod erat in actione — neque intellegebat, si ita esset actum, litem adversarium perditurum. |
XXXVI. [165] “I cannot sufficiently wonder,” says Crassus, “that even you, Scaevola, should require of me that which I do not understand like those who teach it, and which is of such a nature, that if I understood it ever so well, it would be unworthy of your wisdom and attention.” “Say you so?” replied Scaevola. “If you think it scarcely worthy of my age to listen to those ordinary precepts, commonly known everywhere, can we possibly neglect those other matters which you said must be known by the orator, respecting the dispositions and manners of mankind, the means by which the minds of men are excited or calmed, history, antiquity, the administration of the republic, and finally of our own civil law itself? For I knew that all this science, this abundance of knowledge, was within the compass of your understanding, but had never seen such rich furniture among the equipments of the orator.” [166] “Can you then,” says Crassus, “(to omit other things in- numerable and without limit, and come to your study, the civil law,) can you account them orators, for whom Scaevola,56 though in haste to go to the Campus Martius, waited several hours, sometimes laughing and sometimes angry, while Hypsaeus, in the loudest voice, and with a multitude of words, was trying to obtain of Marcus Crassus, the praetor, that the party whom he defended might be allowed to lose his suit; and Cneius Octavius, a man of consular dignity, in a speech of equal length, refused to consent that his adversary should lose his cause, and that the party for whom he was speaking should be released from the ignominious charge of having been unfaithful in his guardianship, and from all trouble, through the folly of his antagonist?”57 [167] “I should have thought such men,” replied Scaevola, “(for I remember Mucius58 told me the story,) not only unworthy of the name of orators, but unworthy even to appear to plead in the forum.” “Yet,” rejoined Crassus, “those advocates neither wanted eloquence, nor method, nor abundance of words, but a knowledge of the civil law: for in this case one, in bringing his suit, sought to recover more damages than the law of the Twelve Tables allowed, and, if he had gained those damages, would have lost his cause: the other thought it unjust that he himself should be proceeded against for more than was allowed in that sort of action, and did not understand that his adversary, if he proceeded in that manner, would lose his suit. |
|
[XXXVII] [168] ¿Quid? ¿His paucis diebus, nonne, nobis in tribunali Q. Pompeji, prætoris urbani, familiaris nostri, sedentibus, homo ex numero ‘disertorum’ postulabat ut illi, unde peteretur, vetus atque usitata exceptio daretur ‘CUJUS PECUNIÆ DIES FUISSET’? Quod petitoris causa comparatum esse non intellegebat, ut, si ille infitiator probasset judici ante petitam esse pecuniam quam esset cœpta deberi, petitor, rursus quum peteret, ne exceptione excluderetur ‘QUOD EA RES IN JUDICIUM ANTE VENISSET’.
[169] ¿Quid ergo hoc fieri turpius, aut dici potest, quam eum qui hanc personam susceperit ut amicorum controversias causasque tueatur, laborantibus succurrat, ægris medeatur, afflictos excitet, hunc in minimis tenuissimisque rebus ita labi ut aliis miserandus, aliis irridendus esse videatur? [170] Equidem propinquum nostrum, P. Crassum, illum Divitem, quum multis aliis rebus elegantem hominem et ornatum, tum præcipue in hoc efferendum et laudandum puto quod, quum P. Scævolæ frater esset, solitus est ei persæpe dicere, neque illum in jure civili satis illi arti facere posse, nisi dicendi copiam assumpsisset (quod quidem hic qui mecum consul fuit — filius ejus — est consecutus), neque se ante causas amicorum tractare atque agere cœpisse quam jus civile didicisset. [171] ¿Quid vero? ¿Ille M. Cato nonne et eloquentia tanta fuit, quantam illa tempora atque illa ætas in hac civitate ferre maximam potuit, et juris civilis omnium peritissimus? Verecundius hac de re jamdudum loquor, quod adest vir in dicendo summus quem ego unum oratorem maxime admiror ; sed tamen idem hoc semper jus civile contempsit. [172] Verum, quoniam sententiæ atque opinionis meæ voluistis esse participes, nihil occultabo ; et, quoad potero, vobis exponam quid de quaque re sentiam. |
XXXVII. [168] “Within these few days,59 while we were sitting at the tribunal of our friend Quintus Pompeius, the city praetor, did not a man who is ranked among the eloquent pray that the benefit of the ancient and usual exception, of which sum there is time for payment, might be allowed to a party from whom a sum of money was demanded; an exception which he did not understand to be made for the benefit of the creditor; so that if the defendant60 had proved to the judge that the action was brought for the money before it became due, the plaintiff,61 on bringing a fresh action, would be precluded by the exception, that the matter had before come into judgment. [169] What more disgraceful therefore can possibly be said or done, than that he who has assumed the character of an advocate, ostensibly to defend the causes and interests of his friends, to assist the distressed, to relieve such as are sick at heart, and to cheer the afflicted, should so err in the slightest and most trivial matters, as to seem an object of pity to some, and of ridicule to others? [170] I consider my relation, Publius Crassus, him who from his wealth had the surname of Dives,62 to have been, in many other respects, a man of taste and elegance, but especially worthy of praise and commendation on this account, that (as he was the brother of Publius Scaevola)63 he was accustomed to observe to him, that neither could he64 have satisfied the claims of the civil law if he had not added the power of speaking (which his son here, who was my colleague in the consulate, has fully attained); nor had he himself65 begun to practise, and plead the causes oj his friends, before he had gained a knowledge of the civil law. [171] What sort of character was the illustrious Marcus Cato? Was he not possessed of as great a share of eloquence as those times and that age66 would admit in this city, and at the same time the most learned of all men in the civil law? I have been speaking for some time the more timidly on this point, because there is with us a man67 eminent in speaking, whom I admire as an orator beyond all others; but who has ever held the civil law in contempt. [172] But, as you desired to learn my sentiments and opinions, I will conceal nothing from you, but, as far as I am able, will communicate to you my thoughts upon every subject. |
| [XXXVIII] Antonii incredibilis quædam et prope singularis et divina vis ingenii videtur, etiamsi hac scientia juris nudata sit, posse se facile ceteris armis prudentiæ tueri atque defendere — quamobrem hic nobis sit exceptus ; ceteros vero non dubitabo, primum, inertiæ condemnare sententia mea, post, etiam impudentiæ ; [173] nam volitare in foro, hærere in jure ac prætorum tribunalibus, judicia privata magnarum rerum obire, in quibus sæpe non de facto, sed de æquitate ac jure certetur, jactare se in causis centumviralibus, in quibus usucapionum, tutelarum, gentilitatum, agnationum, alluvionum, circumluvionum, nexorum, mancipiorum, parietum, luminum, stillicidiorum, testamentorum ruptorum aut ratorum, ceterarumque rerum innumerabilium jura versentur, quum omnino, quid suum, quid alienum, qua re denique civis aut peregrinus, servus aut liber quispiam sit, ignoret, insignis est impudentiæ. [174] Illa vero deridenda arrogantia est, in minoribus navigiis rudem esse se confiteri, quinqueremis autem aut etiam majores gubernare didicisse. Tu mihi, quum, in circulo, decipiare adversarii stipulatiuncula, et quum obsignes tabellas clientis tui — quibus in tabellis id sit scriptum, quo ille capiatur —, ¿ego tibi ullam causam majorem committendam putem? Citius hercule is, qui duorum scalmorum naviculam in portu everterit, in Euxino ponto Argonautarum navem gubernarit. [175] ¿Quid? Si ne parvæ quidem causæ sunt, sed sæpe maximæ in quibus certatur de jure civili, ¿quod tandem os est ejus patroni qui ad eas causas sine ulla scientia juris audet accedere? ¿Quæ potuit igitur esse causa major quam illius militis de cujus morte, quum domum falsus ab exercitu nuntius venisset, et pater ejus, re credita, testamentum mutasset, et quem ei visum esset, fecisset heredem, essetque ipse mortuus? Res delata est ad centumviros, quum miles domum revenisset, egissetque lege in hereditatem paternam, testamento exheres filius. Nempe in ea causa quæsitum est de jure civili, possetne paternorum bonorum exheres esse filius, quem pater testamento neque heredem neque exheredem scripsisset nominatim. | XXXVIII. “The almost incredible, unparalleled, and divine power of genius in Antonius, appears to me, although wanting in legal knowledge, to be able easily to sustain and defend itself with the aid of other weapons of reason; let him there- fore be an exception; but I shall not hesitate to condemn others, by my sentence, of want of industry in the first place, and of want of modesty in the next. [173] For to flutter about the forum, to loiter in courts of justice and at the tribunals of the praetors, to undertake private suits in matters of the greatest concern, in which the question is often not about fact, but about equity and law, to swagger in causes heard before the centumviri,68 in which the laws of prescriptive rights, of guardianship, of kindred,69 of agnation,70 of alluvions, circumluvions,71 of bonds, of transferring property, of party walls, lights, stillicidia,72 of wills, transgressed or established, and innumerable other matters are debated, when a man is utterly ignorant what is properly his own, and what his neighbour’s, why any person is considered a citizen or a foreigner, a slave or a freeman, is a proof of extraordinary impudence. [174] It is ridiculous arrogance for a man to confess himself unskilful in navigating smaller vessels, and yet say that he has learned to pilot galleys with five banks of oars, or even larger ships. You who are deceived by a quibble of your adversary in a private company, you who set your seal to a deed for your client, in which that is written by which he is overreached; can I think that any cause of greater consequence ought to be entrusted to you? Sooner assuredly shall he who oversets a two-oared boat in the harbour steer the vessel of the Argonauts in the Euxine Sea. [175] “But what if the causes are not trivial, but often of the utmost importance, in which disputes arise concerning points of civil law ? What front must that advocate have who dares to appear in causes of such a nature without any knowledge of that law? What cause, for instance, could be of more consequence than that of the soldier, of whose death a false report having been brought home from the army, and his father, through giving credit to that report, having altered his will, and appointed another person, whom he thought proper, to be his heir, and having then died himself, the affair, when the soldier returned home, and instituted a suit for his paternal inheritance, came on to be heard before the centumviri? The point assuredly in that case was a question of civil law, whether a son could be disinherited of his father’s possessions, whom the father neither appointed his heir by will, nor disinherited by name?73 |
| [XXXIX] [176] ¿Quid? Qua de re inter Marcellos et Claudios patricios centumviri judicarunt, quum Marcelli ab liberti filio stirpe, Claudii patricii ejusdem hominis hereditatem gente ad se redisse dicerent, ¿nonne in ea causa fuit oratoribus de toto stirpis et gentilitatis jure dicendum? [177] ¿Quid? Quod item in centumvirali judicio certatum esse accepimus, quum Romam in exilium venisset, cui Romæ exulare jus esset, si se ad aliquem quasi patronum applicavisset, intestatoque esset mortuus — ¿nonne in ea causa jus applicationis obscurum sane et ignotum patefactum in judicio atque illustratum est a patrono? [178] ¿Quid? Nuper, quum ego C. Sergii Oratæ contra hunc nostrum Antonium judicio privato causam defenderem, ¿nonne omnis nostra in jure versata defensio est? Quum enim M. Marius Gratidianus ædes Oratæ vendidisset neque servire quandam earum ædium partem in mancipii lege dixisset, defendebamus, quicquid fuisset incommodi in mancipio, id si venditor scisset neque declarasset, præstare debere. [179] Quo quidem in genere familiaris noster M. Buculejus, homo neque meo judicio stultus (et suo, ¡valde sapiens!) et a juris studio non abhorrens, simili in re quodammodo nuper erravit. Nam quum ædes L. Fufio venderet, in mancipio lumina, ‘uti tum essent,’ ita recepit. Fufius autem, simul atque ædificari cœptum est in quadam parte urbis quæ modo ex illis ædibus conspici posset, egit statim cum Buculejo, quod, cuicunque particulæ cæli officeretur, quamvis esset procul, mutari lumina putabat. [180] ¿Quid vero? ¿Clarissima M’. Curii causa Marcique Coponii nuper apud centumviros quo concursu hominum, qua exspectatione defensa est? Quum Q. Scævola, æqualis et collega meus, Homo omnium et disciplina juris civilis eruditissimus et ingenio prudentiaque acutissimus et oratione maxime limatus atque subtilis atque — ut ego soleo dicere — juris peritorum eloquentissimus, eloquentium juris peritissimus, ex scripto testamentorum jura defenderet, negaretque, nisi postumus et natus et, antequam in suam tutelam veniret, mortuus esset, heredem eum esse posse qui esset secundum postumum et natum et mortuum heres institutus ; ego autem defenderem hac eum tum mente fuisse qui testamentum fecisset, ut, si filius non esset qui in suam tutelam veniret, M’. Curius esset heres. ¿Num destitit uterque nostrum in ea causa, in auctoritatibus, in exemplis, in testamentorum formulis — hoc est, in medio jure civili — versari? | XXXIX. [176] “On the point too which the centumviri decided between the Marcelli and the Claudii, two patrician families, when the Marcelli said that an estate, which had belonged to the son of a freedman, reverted to them by right of stirps, and the Claudii alleged that the property of the man reverted to them by right of gens, was it not necessary for the pleaders in that cause to speak upon all the rights of stirps and gens?74 [177] As to that other matter also, which we have heard was contested at law before the centumviri, when an exile came to Rome, (who had the privilege of living in exile at Rome, if he attached himself to any citizen as a patron,) and died intestate, was not, in a cause of that nature, the law of attachment?75 obscure and indeed unknown, expounded and illustrated by the pleader? [178] When I myself lately defended the cause of Sergius Aurata, on a private suit against our friend Antonius, did not my whole defence turn upon a point of law? For when Marius Gratidianus had sold a house to Aurata, and had not specified, in the deed of sale, that any part of the building owed service,76 we argued, that for whatever incumbrance attended the thing sold, if the seller knew of it, and did not make it known, he ought to indemnify the purchaser.77 [179] In this kind of action our friend Marcus Bucculeius; a man not a fool in my opinion, and very wise in his own, and one who has no aversion to the study of law, made a mistake lately, in an affair of a somewhat similar nature. For when he sold a house to Lucius Fufius, he engaged, in the act of conveyance, that the window-lights should remain as they then were. But Fufius, as soon as a building began to rise in some part of the city, which could but just be seen from that house, brought an action against Bucculeius, on the ground that whatever portion of the sky was intercepted, at however great a distance, the window-light underwent a change.78 [180] Amidst what a concourse of people too, and with what universal interest, was the famous cause between Manius Curius and Marcus Copouius lately conducted before the centumviri ! On which occasion Quintus Scaevola, my equal in age, and my colleague,79 a man of all others the most learned in the practice of the civil law, and of most acute genius and discernment, a speaker most polished and refined in his language, and indeed, as I am accustomed to remark, the best orator among the lawyers, and the best lawyer among the orators, argued the law from the letter of the will, and maintained that he who was appointed second heir, after a posthumous son should be born and die, could not possibly inherit, unless such posthumous son had actually been born, and had died before he came out of tutelage: I, on the other side, argued that he who made the will had this intention, that if there was no son at all who could come out of tutelage, Manius Curius should be his heir. Did either of us, in that cause, fail to exert ourselves in citing authorities, and precedents, and forms of wills, that is, to dispute on the profoundest points of civil law?80 |
| [XL] [181] Omitto jam plura exempla causarum amplissimarum, quæ sunt innumerabilia : capitis nostri sæpe potest accidere ut causæ versentur in jure. Etenim si C. Mancinum, nobilissimum atque optimum virum atque consularem, quum eum propter invidiam Numantini fœderis pater patratus ex S. C. Numantinis dedidisset, eumque illi non recepissent posteaque Mancinus domum revenisset neque in Senatum introire dubitasset ; P. Rutilius (M. filius), Tribunus Plebis, de Senatu jussit educi, quod eum civem negaret esse ; quia memoria sic esset proditum, quem pater suus aut populus vendidisset aut pater patratus dedidisset, ei nullum esse postliminium. [182] ¿Quam possumus reperire ex omnibus rebus civilibus causam contentionemque majorem quam de ordine, de civitate, de libertate, de capite hominis consularis — præsertim quum hæc non in crimine aliquo, quod ille posset infitiari, sed in civili jure consisteret? Similique in genere — inferiore ordine — si quis apud nos servisset ex populo fœderato, seseque liberasset ac postea domum revenisset : quæsitum est apud majores nostros, num is ad suos ‘postliminio’ rediisset et amisisset hanc civitatem. [183] ¿Quid? ¿De libertate — quo judicium gravius esse nullum potest — nonne ex jure civili potest esse contentio quum quæritur, is qui domini voluntate census sit, continuone an ubi lustrum conditum, liber sit? ¿Quid? Quod usu — memoria patrum — venit, ut paterfamilias qui ex Hispania Romam venisset, quum uxorem prægnantem in provincia reliquisset, Romæ alteram duxisset neque nuntium priori remisisset, mortuusque esset intestato, et ex utraque filius natus esset : ¿mediocrisne res in controversiam adducta est, quum quæreretur de duobus civium capitibus — et de puero qui ex posteriore natus erat et de ejus matre? Quæ, si judicaretur certis quibusdam verbis — non novis nuptiis — fieri cum superiore divortium, in concubinæ locum duceretur. [184] Hæc igitur et horum similia jura suæ civitatis ignorantem, erectum et celsum, alacri et prompto ore atque vultu, huc atque illuc intuentem, vagari cum magna caterva toto foro, præsidium clientibus atque opem amicis, et prope cunctis civibus lucem ingenii et consilii sui porrigentem atque tendentem — ¿nonne imprimis flagitiosum putandum est? | XL. [181] “I forbear to mention many examples of causes of the greatest consequence, which are indeed without number. It may often happen that even capital cases may turn upon a point of law; for, as an example, Publius Rutilius, the son of Marcus, when tribune of the people, ordered Caius Mancinus, a most noble and excellent man, and of consular dignity, to be put out of the senate; on the occasion when the chief herald had given him up to the Numantines, according to a decree of the senate, passed on account of the odium which he had incurred by his treaty with that people, and they would not receive him,81 and he had then returned home, and had not hesitated to take his place in the senate; the tribune, I say, ordered him to be put out of the house, maintaining that he was not a citizen; because it was a received tradition, That he whom his own father, or the people, had sold, or the chief herald had given up, had no postliminium82 or right of return. [182] What more important cause or argument can we find, among all the variety of civil transactions, than one concerning the rank, the citizenship, the liberty, the condition of a man of consular dignity, especially as the case depended, not on any charge which he might deny, but on the interpretation of the civil law? In a like case, but concerning a person of inferior degree, it was inquired among our ancestors, whether, if a person belonging to a state in alliance with Rome had been in servitude amongst us, and gained his freedom, and afterwards returned home, he returned by the right of postliminium, and lost the citizenship of this city. [183] May not a dispute arise on a point of civil law respecting liberty, than which no cause can be of more importance, when the question is, for example, whether he who is enrolled as a citizen, by his master’s consent, is free at once, or when the lustrum is completed? As to the case also, that happened in the memory of our fathers, when the father of a family, who had come from Spain to Rome, and had left a wife pregnant in that province, and married another at Rome, without sending any notice of divorce to the former, and died intestate, after a son had been born of each wife, did a small matter come into controversy, when the question was concerning the rights of two citizens, I mean concerning the boy who was born of the latter wife and his mother, who, if it were adjudged that a divorce was effected from a former wife by a certain set of words, and not by a second marriage, would be deemed a concubine? [184] For a man, then, who is ignorant of these and other similar laws of his own country, to wander about the forum with a great crowd at his heels, erect and haughty, looking hither and thither with a gay and assured face and air, offering and tendering protection to his clients, assistance to his friends, and the light of his genius and counsel to almost all his fellow-citizens, is it not to be thought in the highest degree scandalous? |
| [XLI] [185] Et quoniam de impudentia dixi, castigemus etiam segnitatem hominum atque inertiam. Nam si esset ista cognitio juris magna atque difficilis, tamen utilitatis magnitudo deberet homines ad suscipiendum discendi laborem impellere. Sed — ¡O di immortales! — non dicerem hoc, audiente Scævola, nisi ipse dicere soleret nullius artis sibi faciliorem cognitionem videri. [186] Quod quidem certis de causis a plerisque aliter existimatur : primum, quia veteres illi qui huic scientiæ præfuerunt, obtinendæ atque augendæ potentiæ suæ causa, pervulgari artem suam noluerunt ; deinde, posteaquam jus est editum, expositis a Cn. Flavio primum actionibus, nulli fuerunt qui illa artificiose digesta generatim componerent. Nihil est enim quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius — qui illa tenet quorum artem instituere vult — habeat illam scientiam ut, ex eis rebus quarum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit. [187] Hoc video, dum breviter voluerim dicere, dictum a me esse paulo obscurius ; sed experiar et dicam, si potero, planius. | XLI. [185] “Since I have spoken of the audacity, let me also censure the indolence and inertness of mankind. For if the study of the law were illimitable and arduous, yet the greatness of the advantage ought to impel men to undergo the labor of learning it; but, ye immortal gods. I would not say this in the hearing of Scaevola, unless he himself were accustomed to say it, namely, that the attainment of no science seems to him more easy. [186] It is, indeed, for certain reasons, thought otherwise by most people, first, because those of old, who were at the head of this science, would not, for the sake of securing and extending their own influence, allow their art to be made public; in the next place, when it was published, the forms of actions at law being first set forth by Cneius Flavius, there were none who could compose a general system of those matters arranged under regular heads. For nothing can be reduced into a science, unless he who understands the matters of which he would form a science, has previously gained such knowledge as to enable him to constitute a science out of subjects in which there has never yet been any science. [187] I perceive that, from desire to express this briefly, I have expressed it rather obscurely; but I will make an effort to explain myself, if possible, with more perspicuity. |
| [XLII] Omnia fere, quæ sunt conclusa nunc artibus, dispersa et dissipata quondam fuerunt ; ut in musicis, numeri et voces et modi ; in geometria, lineamenta, formæ, intervalla, magnitudines ; in astrologia, cæli conversio, ortus, obitus motusque siderum ; in grammaticis, poëtarum pertractatio, historiarum cognitio, verborum interpretatio, pronuntiandi quidam sonus ; in hac denique ipsa ratione dicendi excogitare, ornare, disponere, meminisse, agere incondita quondam et diffusa late videbantur. [188] Adhibita est igitur ars quædam extrinsecus ex alio genere quodam quod sibi totum philosophi assumunt, quæ rem dissolutam divulsamque conglutinaret et ratione quadam constringeret. Sit ergo in jure civili finis hic : legitimæ atque usitatæ in rebus causisque civium æquabilitatis conservatio. [189] Tum sunt notanda genera, et ad certum numerum paucitatemque revocanda. Genus autem id est, quod sui similis communione quadam, specie autem differentes, duas aut plures complectitur partes ; partes autem sunt quæ generibus eis, ex quibus manant, subjiciuntur ; omniaque, quæ sunt vel generum vel partium nomina, definitionibus, quam vim habeant, est exprimendum ; est enim definitio rerum earum quæ sunt ejus rei propriæ quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta quædam explicatio. [190] Hisce ego rebus exempla adjungerem, nisi apud quos hæc haberetur oratio, cernerem ; nunc complectar quod proposui, brevi. Si enim aut mihi facere licuerit quod jamdiu cogito, aut alius quispiam, aut, me impedito, occuparit aut, mortuo, effecerit ut primum omne jus civile in genera digerat quæ perpauca sunt, deinde eorum generum quasi quædam membra dispertiat, tum propriam cujusque vim definitione declaret, perfectam artem juris civilis habebitis — magis magnam atque uberem quam difficilem et obscuram. [191] Atque interea tamen, dum hæc quæ dispersa sunt coguntur, vel passim licet carpentem, et colligentem undique, repleri justa juris civilis scientia. | XLII. “All things which arc now comprised in sciences, were formerly unconnected, and in a state, as it were, of dispersion; as in music, numbers, sounds, and measures; in geometry, lines, figures, spaces, magnitudes; in astronomy, the revolution of the heavens, the rising, setting, and other motions of the stars; in grammar, the study of the poets, the knowledge of history, the interpretation of words, the peculiar tone of pronunciation; and finally, in this very art of oratory, invention, embellishment, arrangement, memory, delivery, seemed of old not to be fully understood by any, and to be wholly unconnected. [188] A certain extrinsic art was therefore applied, adopted from another department of knowledge,83 which the philosophers wholly claim to themselves, an art which might serve to cement things previously separate and uncombined, and unite them in a kind of system. “Let then the end proposed in civil law be the preservation of legitimate and practical equity in the affairs and causes of the citizens. [189] The general heads of it are then to be noted, and reduced to a certain number, as few as may be. A general head is that which comprehends two or more particulars, similar to one another by having something in common, but differing in species. Particulars are included under the general heads from which they spring. All names, which are given either to general heads, or particulars, must be limited by definitions, showing what exact meaning they have. A definition is a short and concise specification of whatever properly belongs to the thing which we would define. [190] I should add examples on these points, were I not sensible to whom my discourse is addressed. I will now comprise what I proposed in a short space. For if I should have leisure to do what I have long meditated, or if any other person should undertake the task while I am occupied or accomplish it after my death, (I mean, to digest, first of all, the whole civil law under general heads, which are very few; next, to branch out those general heads, as it were, into members; then to explain the peculiar nature of each by a definition;) you will have a complete system of civil law, large and full indeed, but neither difficult nor obscure. [191] In the meantime, while what is unconnected is being combined, a person may, even by gathering here and there, and collecting from all parts, be furnished with a competent knowledge of the civil law. |
[XLIII] ¿Nonne videtis equitem Romanum, hominem acutissimo omnium ingenio, sed minime ceteris artibus eruditum, C. Aculeonem, qui mecum vivit semperque vixit, ita tenere jus civile, ut ei (quum ab hoc discesseritis) nemo de eis qui peritissimi sunt anteponatur? [192] Omnia sunt enim posita ante oculos, collocata in usu quotidiano, in congressione hominum atque in foro ; neque ita multis litteris aut voluminibus magnis continentur. Eadem enim elata sunt primum a pluribus ; deinde, paucis verbis commutatis — etiam ab eisdem scriptoribus — scripta sunt sæpius. [193] Accedit vero, quo facilius percipi cognoscique jus civile possit (quod minime plerique arbitrantur), mira quædam in cognoscendo suavitas et delectatio. Nam,
|
XLIII. “Do you not observe that Caius Aculeo,84 a Roman knight, a man of the most acute genius in the world, but of little learning in other sciences, who now lives, and has always lived with me, understands the civil law so well, that none even of the most skilful, if you except my friend Scaevola here, can be preferred to him? [192] Everything in it, indeed, is Bet plainly before our eyes, connected with our daily habits, with our intercourse among men, and with the forum, and is not contained in a vast quantity of writing, or many large volumes; for the elements that were at first published by several writers are the same; and the same things, with the change of a few words, have been repeatedly written by the same authors. [193] Added to this, that the civil law may be more readily learned and understood, there is (what most people little imagine) a wonderful pleasure and delight in acquiring a knowledge of it. For, whether any person is attracted by the study of antiquity,85 there is, in every part of the civil law, in the pontifical books, and in the Twelve Tables, abundance of instruction as to ancient matters, since not only the original sense of words is thence understood, but certain kinds of law proceedings illustrate the customs and lives of our ancestors; or if he has a view to the science of government (which Scaevola judges not to belong to the orator, but to science of another sort), he will find it all comprised in the Twelve Tables, every advantage of civil government, and every part of it being there described; or if authoritative and vaunting philosophy delight him, (I will speak very boldly,) he will find there the sources of all the philosophers’ disputations, which lie in civil laws and enactments; [194] for from these we perceive that virtue is above all things desirable, since honest, just, and conscientious industry is ennobled with honors, rewards, and distinctions; but the vices and frauds of mankind are punished by fines, ignominy, imprisonment, stripes, banishment, and death; and we are taught, not by disputations endless and full of discord, but by the authority and mandate of the laws, to hold our appetites in subjection, to restrain all our passions, to defend our own property, and to keep our thoughts, eyes, and hands, from that of others. |
| [XLIV] [195] Fremant omnes licet, dicam quod sentio : bibliothecas mehercule omnium philosophorum unus mihi videtur Duodecim Tabularum libellus, si quis legum fontes et capita viderit, et auctoritatis pondere et utilitatis ubertate superare. [196] Ac si nos, id quod maxime debet, nostra patria delectat, cujus rei tanta est vis ac tanta natura, ut ‘Ithacam illam in asperrimis saxulis tanquam nidulum affixam’ sapientissimus vir immortalitati anteponeret, ¿¡quo amore tandem inflammati esse debemus in ejusmodi patriam, quæ una in omnibus terris domus est virtutis, imperi, dignitatis!? Cujus primum nobis mens, mos, disciplina nota esse debet, vel quia est patria, parens omnium nostrum, vel quia tanta sapientia fuisse in jure constituendo putanda est, quanta fuit in his tantis opibus imperii comparandis. [197] Percipietis etiam illam ex cognitione juris lætitiam et voluptatem, quod, quantum præstiterint nostri majores prudentia ceteris gentibus, tum facillime intellegetis, si cum illorum Lycurgo et Dracone et Solone nostras leges conferre volueritis ; incredibile est enim, quam sit omne jus civile, præter hoc nostrum, inconditum ac pæne ridiculum ; de quo multa soleo in sermonibus quotidianis dicere, quum hominum nostrorum prudentiam ceteris hominibus et maxime Græcis antepono. His ego de causis dixeram, Scævola, eis, qui perfecti oratores esse vellent, juris civilis esse cognitionem necessariam. | XLIV. [195] “Though all the world exclaim against me, I will say what I think: that single little book of the Twelve Tables, if any one look to the fountains and sources of laws, seems to me, assuredly, to surpass the libraries of all the philosophers, both in weight of authority, and in plenitude of utility. [196] And if our country has our love, as it ought to have in the highest degree, our country, I say, of which the force and natural attraction is so strong, that one of the wisest of mankind preferred his Ithaca, fixed, like a little nest, among the roughest of rocks, to immortality itself, with what affection ought we to be warmed towards such a country as ours, which, preeminently above all other countries, is the seat of virtue, empire, and dignity? Its spirit, customs, and discipline ought to be our first objects of study, both because our country is the parent of us all, and because as much wisdom must be thought to have been employed in framing such laws, as in establishing so vast and powerful an empire. [197] You will receive also this pleasure and delight from the study of the law, that you will then most readily comprehend how far our ancestors excelled other nations in wisdom, if you compare our laws with those of their Lycurgus, Draco, and Solon. It is indeed incredible how undigested and almost ridiculous is all civil law, except our own; on which subject I am accustomed to say much in. my daily conversation, when I am praising the wisdom of our countrymen above that of all other men, and especially of the Greeks. For these reasons have I declared, Scaevola r that the knowledge of the civil law is indispensable to those who would become accomplished orators. |
|
[XLV] [198] Jam vero ipsa per sese quantum afferat eis, qui ei præsunt, honoris, gratiæ, dignitatis, ¿quis ignorat? Itaque, non, ut apud Græcos infimi homines, mercedula adducti, ministros se præbent in judiciis oratoribus, ii, qui apud illos πραγματικοί vocantur, sic in nostra civitate ; contra, amplissimus quisque et clarissimus vir — ut ille, qui propter hanc juris civilis scientiam sic appellatus a summo poëta est :
egregie cordatus homo, catus Ælius Sextus, multique præterea, qui, quum ingenio sibi auctore dignitatem peperissent, perfecerunt ut, in respondendo jure, auctoritate plus etiam quam ipso ingenio valerent. [199] ¿Senectuti vero celebrandæ et ornandæ quod honestius potest esse perfugium quam juris interpretatio? Equidem mihi hoc subsidium jam inde ab adulescentia comparavi, non solum ad causarum usum forensem, sed etiam ad decus atque ornamentum senectutis, ut, quum me vires — quod fere jam tempus adventat — deficere cœpissent, ista ab solitudine domum meam vindicarem. ¿Quid est enim præclarius quam honoribus et reipublicæ muneribus perfunctum senem posse suo jure dicere idem, quod apud Ennium dicat ille Pythius Apollo, se esse eum, unde sibi, si non populi et reges, at omnes sui cives consilium expetant, incertis certos, compotesque consilii dimitto, ut ne res temere tractent turbidas. |
XLV. [198] “And who does not know what an accession of honor, popularity, and dignity, such knowledge, even of itself, brings with it to those who are eminent in it? As, therefore, among the Greeks, men of the lowest rank, induced by a trifling reward, offer themselves as assistants to the pleaders on trials (men who are by them called pragmatici),86 so in our city, on the contrary, every personage of the most eminent rank and character, such as that Aelius Sextus,87 who, for his knowledge in the civil law, was called by our great poet, “A man of thought and prudence, nobly wise” and many besides, who, after arriving at distinction by means of their ability, attained such influence, that in answering questions on points of law,88 they found their authority of more weight than even their ability. [199] For ennobling and dignifying old age, indeed, what can be a more honourable resource than the interpretation of the law? For myself, I have, even from my youth, been securing this resource, not merely with a view to benefit in pleadings in the forum, but also for an honor and ornament to the decline of life; so that, when my strength begins to fail me (for which the time is even now almost approaching), I may, by that means, pre- serve my house from solitude. For what is more noble than for an old man, who has held the highest honors and offices of the state, to be able justly to say for himself, that which the Pythian Apollo says in Ennius, that he is the person from whom, if not nations and kings, yet all his fellow- citizens, solicit advice, “Uncertain how to act; whom, by my aid, I send away undoubting, full of counsel, No more with rashness things perplex’ d to sway” [200] for without doubt the house of an eminent lawyer is tho oracle of the whole city. Of this fact the gate and vestibule of our friend Quintus Mucius is a proof, which, even in his very infirm state of health, and advanced age, is daily frequented by a vast crowd of citizens, and by persons of the highest rank and splendor. |
| [XLVI] [201] Jam vero illa non longam orationem desiderant, quamobrem existimem publica quoque jura quæ sunt propria civitatis atque imperii, tum monumenta rerum gestarum et vetustatis exempla, oratori nota esse debere. Nam ut in rerum privatarum causis atque judiciis depromenda sæpe oratio est ex jure civili, et idcirco, ut ante diximus, oratori juris scientia necessaria est, sic in causis publicis judiciorum, contionum, Senatus, omnis hæc et antiquitatis memoria et publici juris auctoritas et regendæ reipublicæ ratio ac scientia tanquam aliqua materies eis oratoribus, qui versantur in republica, subjecta esse debet. [202] Non enim causidicum nescio quem, neque clamatorem aut rabulam, hoc sermone nostro conquirimus, sed eum virum, qui primum sit ejus artis antistes, cujus, quum ipsa natura magnam homini facultatem daret, auctor tamen esse deus putatur, id ipsum quod erat hominis proprium, non partum per nos, sed divinitus ad nos delatum videretur ; deinde, qui possit non tam caduceo quam nomine oratoris ornatus, incolumis, vel inter hostium tela, versari ; tum, qui scelus fraudemque nocentis possit dicendo subjicere odio civium, supplicioque constringere ; idemque ingenii præsidio innocentiam judiciorum pœna liberare ; idemque languentem labentemque populum aut ad decus excitare aut ab errore deducere, aut inflammare in improbos, aut incitatum in bonos, mitigare ; qui denique, quemcunque in animis hominum motum res et causa postulet, eum dicendo vel excitare possit, vel sedare. [203] Hanc vim, si quis existimat aut ab eis qui de dicendi ratione scripserunt expositam esse, aut a me posse exponi tam brevi, vehementer errat ; neque solum inscientiam meam, sed ne rerum quidem magnitudinem perspicit. Equidem vobis, quoniam ita voluistis, fontes unde hauriretis, atque itinera ipsa, ita putavi esse demonstranda, non ut ipse dux essem — quod et infinitum est et non necessarium — sed ut commonstrarem tantum viam et, ut fieri solet, digitum ad fontes intenderem.” | XLVI. [201] “It requires no very long explanation to show why I think the public laws89 also, which concern the state and government, as well as the records of history, and the precedents of antiquity, ought to be known to the orator; for as in causes and trials relative to private affairs, his language is often to be borrowed from the civil law, and therefore, as we said before, the knowledge of the civil law is necessary to the orator; so in regard to causes affecting public matters, before our courts, in assemblies of the people, and in the senate, all the history of these and of past times, the authority of public law, the system and science of governing the state, ought to be at the command of orators occupied with affairs of government, as the very groundwork of their speeches.90 [202] For we are not contemplating, in this discourse, the character of an everyday pleader, bawler, or barrator, but that of a man, who, in the first place, may be, as it were, the high-priest of this profession, for which, though nature herself has given rich endowments to man, yet it was thought to be a god that gave it, so that the very thing which is the distinguishing property of man, might not seem to have been acquired by ourselves, but bestowed upon us by some divinity; who, in the next place, can move with safety even amid the weapons of his adversaries-, distinguished not so much by a herald’s caduceus,91 as by his title of orator; who, likewise, is able, by means of his eloquence, to expose guilt and deceit to the hatred of his countrymen, and to restrain them by penalties; who can also, with the shield of his genius, protect innocence from punishment; who can rouse a spiritless and desponding people to glory, or reclaim them from infatuation, or inflame their rage against the guilty, or mitigate it, if incited against the virtuous; who, finally, whatever feeling in the minds of men his object and cause require, can either excite or calm it by his eloquence. [203] If any one supposes that this power has either been sufficiently set forth by those who have written on the art of speaking, or can be set forth by me in so brief a space, he is greatly mistaken, and understands neither my inability, nor the magnitude of the subject. For my own part, since it was your desire, I thought that the fountains ought to be shown you, from which you might draw, and the roads which you might pursue, not so that I should become your guide (which would be an endless and unnecessary labor), but so that I might point out to you the way, and, as the practice is, might hold out my finger towards the spring.”92 |
|
[XLVII] [204] “Mihi vero” inquit Mucius “satis superque abs te videtur istorum studiis, si modo sunt studiosi, esse factum. Nam, ut Socratem illum solitum ajunt dicere perfectum sibi opus esse, si qui satis esset concitatus cohortatione sua ad studium cognoscendæ percipiendæque virtutis (quibus enim id persuasum esset, ut nihil mallent esse se quam bonos viros, eis reliquam facilem esse doctrinam), sic ego intellego, si in hæc quæ patefecit oratione sua Crassus, intrare volueritis, facillime vos ad ea quæ cupitis perventuros ab hoc aditu, januaque patefacta.”
[205] “Nobis vero” inquit Sulpicius “ista sunt pergrata perque jucunda ; sed pauca etiam requirimus, imprimisque ea quæ valde breviter a te, Crasse, de ipsa arte percursa sunt, quum illa te et non contemnere et didicisse confiterere. Ea si paulo latius dixeris, expleris omnem exspectationem diuturni desiderii nostri. Nam nunc, quibus studendum rebus esset, accepimus, quod ipsum est tamen magnum ; sed vias earum rerum rationemque cupimus cognoscere.” [206] “¿Quid si,” inquit Crassus, “(quoniam ego, quo facilius vos apud me tenerem, vestræ potius obsecutus sum voluntati quam aut consuetudini aut naturæ meæ), petimus ab Antonio, ut ea quæ continet, neque adhuc protulit — ex quibus unum libellum sibi excidisse jamdudum questus est — explicet nobis, et illa dicendi mysteria enuntiet?” “Ut videtur,” inquit Sulpicius. “Nam, Antonio dicente, etiam quid tu intellegas sentiemus.” [207] “Peto igitur,” inquit Crassus, “a te, quoniam id — nobis, Antoni, hominibus id ætatis — oneris ab horum adulescentium studiis imponitur, ut exponas, quid eis de rebus quas a te quæri vides, sentias.” |
XLVII. [204] “To me,” remarked Scaevola, “enough appears to have been said by you, and more than enough, to stimulate the efforts of these young men, if they are but studiously inclined; for as they say that the illustrious Socrates used to observe that his object was attained if any one was by his exhortations sufficiently incited to desire to know and under- stand virtue; (since to those who were persuaded to desire nothing so much as to become good men, what remained to be learned was easy;) so I consider that if you wish to penetrate into those subjects which Crassus has set before you in his remarks, you will, with the greatest ease, arrive at your object, after this course and gate has been opened to you.” [205] “To us,” said Sulpicius, “these instructions are exceedingly pleasant and delightful; but there are a few things more which we still desire to hear, especially those which were touched upon so briefly by you, Crassus, in reference to oratory as an art, when you confessed that you did not despise them, but had learned them. If you will speak somewhat more at length on those points, you will satisfy all the eagerness of our long desire. For we have now heard to what objects we must direct our efforts, a point which is of great importance; but we long to be instructed in the ways and means of pursuing those objects.” [206] “Then,” said Crassus, “(since I, to detain you at my house with less difficulty, have rather complied with your desires, than my own habit or inclination,) what if we ask Antonius to tell us something of what he still keeps in reserve, and has not yet made known to us, (on which subjects he complained, a while ago, that a book has already dropped from his pen,) and to reveal to us his mysteries in the art of speaking?” “As you please,” said Sulpicius, “for, if Autonius speaks, we shall still learn what you think.” [207] “I request of you then, Antonius,” said Crassus, “since this task is put upon men of our time of life by the studious inclinations of these youths, to deliver your sentiments upon these subjects which, you see, are required from you.” |
|
[XLVIII] “Deprehensum equidem me,” inquit Antonius, “plane video atque sentio, non solum quod ea requiruntur a me quorum sum ignarus atque insolens, sed quia, quod in causis valde fugere soleo, ne tibi, Crasse, succedam, id me nunc isti vitare non sinunt. [208] Verum hoc ingrediar ad ea quæ vultis audacius, quod idem mihi spero usu esse venturum in hac disputatione, quod in dicendo solet, ut nulla exspectetur ornata oratio. Neque enim sum de arte dicturus quam nunquam didici, sed de mea consuetudine ; ipsaque illa quæ in commentarium meum rettuli sunt ejusmodi — non aliqua mihi doctrina tradita, sed in rerum usu causisque tractata ; quæ si vobis, hominibus eruditissimis, non probabuntur, vestram iniquitatem accusatote, qui ex me ea quæsieritis quæ ego nescirem ; meam facilitatem laudatote, quum vobis non meo judicio, sed vestro studio inductus non gravate respondero.”
[209] Tum Crassus “perge modo,” inquit, “Antoni. Nullum est enim periculum, ne quid tu eloquare nisi ita prudenter, ut neminem nostrum pæniteat ad hunc te sermonem impulisse." |
XLVIII. “I see plainly, and understand indeed,” replied Antonius, “that I am caught, not only because those things are required from me in which I am ignorant and unpractised, but because these young men do not permit me to avoid, on the present occasion, what I always carefully avoid in my public pleadings, namely, not to speak after you, Crassus. [208] But I will enter upon what you desire the more boldly, as I hope the same thing will happen to me in this discussion as usually happens to me at the bar, that no flowers of rhetoric will be expected from me. For I am not going to speak about art, which I never learned, but about my own practice; and those very particulars which I have entered in my common-place book are of this kind,93 not ex- pressed with anything like learning, but just as they are treated in business and pleadings; and if they do not meet with approbation from men of your extensive knowledge, you must blame your own unreasonableness, in requiring from me what I do not know; and you must praise my complaisance, since I make no difficulty in answering your questions, being induced, not by my own judgment, but your earnest desire.” [209] “Go on, Antonius,” rejoined Crassus, “for there is no danger that you will say anything otherwise than so discreetly that no one here will repent of having prompted you to speak.” |
| “Ego vero,” inquit, “pergam ; et id faciam quod in principio fieri in omnibus disputationibus oportere censeo : ut, quid illud sit de quo disputetur, explanetur, ne vagari et errare cogatur oratio, si ii qui inter se dissenserint, non idem illud quo de agitur, intellegant. [210] Nam si forte quæreretur quæ esset ars imperatoris, constituendum putarem, principio, quis esset imperator ; qui quum esset constitutus administrator quidam belli gerendi, tum adjungeremus de exercitu, de castris, de agminibus, de signorum collationibus, de oppidorum oppugnationibus, de commeatu, de insidiis faciendis atque vitandis, de reliquis rebus quæ essent propriæ belli administrandi ; quarum qui essent animo et scientia compotes, eos esse imperatores dicerem, utererque exemplis Africanorum et Maximorum ; Epaminondam atque Hannibalem, atque ejus generis homines nominarem. [211] Sin autem quæreremus quis esset is qui ad rempublicam moderandam usum, et scientiam, et studium suum contulisset, definirem hoc modo : qui, quibus rebus utilitas reipublicæ pararetur et augeretur, teneret, eisque uteretur, hunc reipublicæ rectorem et consilii publici auctorem esse habendum ; prædicaremque P. Lentulum, principem illum, et Tib. Gracchum patrem, et Q. Metellum et P. Africanum, et C. Lælium, et innumerabiles alios, quum ex nostra civitate, tum ex ceteris. [212] Sin autem quæreretur, quisnam jurisconsultus vere nominaretur, eum dicerem, qui legum et consuetudinis ejus qua privati in civitate uterentur, et ad respondendum, et ad agendum, et ad cavendum peritus esset ; et ex eo genere Sext. Ælium, M’. Manilium, P. Mucium nominarem. | “I will go on, then,” said Antonius, “and will do what I think ought to be done in all discussions at the commencement; I mean, that the subject, whatever it may be, on which the discussion is held, should be defined; so that the discourse may not be forced to wander and stray from its course, from the disputants not having the same notion of the matter under debate. [210] If, for instance, it were inquired, ‘What is the art of a general? I should think that we ought to settle, at the outset, what a general is; and when he was defined to be a commander for conducting a war, we might then proceed to speak of troops, of encampments, of marching in battle array, of engagements, of besieging towns, of provisions, of laying and avoiding ambuscades, and other matters relative to the management of a war; and those who had the capacity and knowledge to direct such affairs I should call generals; and should adduce the examples of the Africani and Maximi, and speak of Epaminondas, and Hannibal, and men of such character. [211] But if we should inquire what sort of character he is, who should contribute his experience, and knowledge, and zeal to the management of the state, I should give this sort of definition, that he who understands by what means the interests of the republic are secured and promoted, and employs those means, is worthy to be esteemed a director in affairs of government, and a leader in public councils; and I should mention Publius Lentulus, that chief of the senate,94 and Tiberius Gracchus the father, and Quintus Metellus, and Publius Africanus, and Caius Laelius, and others without number, as well of our own city as of foreign states. [212] But if it should be asked, ‘Who truly deserved the name of a lawyer?’ I should say that he deserves it who is learned in the laws, and that general usage’95 ‘which private persons observe in their intercourse in the community, who can give an answer on any point, can plead, and can take precautions for the interests of his client; and I should name Sextus Aelius, Manius Manilius, Publius Mucius, as distinguished in those respects. |
| [XLIX] Atque, ut jam ad leviora artium studia veniam — si musicus, si grammaticus, si poëta quæratur —, possim similiter explicare, quid eorum quisque profiteatur, et quo non amplius ab quoque sit postulandum. Philosophi denique ipsius, qui de sua vi ac sapientia unus omnia pæne profitetur, est tamen quædam descriptio, ut is qui studeat omnium rerum divinarum atque humanarum vim naturam causasque nosse, et omnem bene vivendi rationem tenere et persequi, nomine hoc appelletur. [213] Oratorem autem — quoniam de eo quærimus — equidem non facio eundem quem Crassus, qui mihi visus est omnem omnium rerum atque artium scientiam comprehendere uno oratoris officio ac nomine ; atque eum puto esse, qui et verbis ad audiendum jucundis, et sententiis ad probandum accommodatis uti possit in causis forensibus atque communibus : hunc ego appello oratorem, eumque esse præterea instructum voce et actione et lepore quodam volo. [214] Crassus vero mihi noster visus est oratoris facultatem non illius artis terminis, sed ingenii sui finibus, immensis pæne, describere. Nam et civitatum regendarum oratori gubernacula sententia sua tradidit — in quo per mihi mirum visum est, Scævola, te hoc illi concedere, quum sæpissime tibi Senatus, breviter impoliteque dicenti, maximis sit de rebus assensus. M. vero Scaurus, quem non longe, ruri, apud se esse audio, vir regendæ reipublicæ scientissimus, si audierit hanc auctoritatem gravitatis et consilii sui vindicari a te, Crasse, quod eam oratoris propriam esse dicas, jam, credo, huc veniat et hanc loquacitatem nostram vultu ipso aspectuque conterreat ; qui, quanquam est in dicendo minime contemnendus, prudentia tamen rerum magnarum magis quam dicendi arte nititur. [215] Neque vero — si quis utrumque potest — aut ille consilii publici auctor ac senator bonus, ob eam ipsam causam orator est, aut hic disertus atque eloquens, si est idem in procuratione civitatis egregius, eam ipsam scientiam dicendi copia est consecutus. Multum inter se distant istæ facultates, longeque sunt diversæ atque sejunctæ, neque eadem ratione ac via M. Cato, P. Africanus, Q. Metellus, C. Lælius — qui omnes eloquentes fuerunt — orationem suam et reipublicæ dignitatem exornabant. | XLIX. In like manner, to notice sciences of a less important character, if a musician, if a grammarian, if a poet were the subject of consideration, I could state that which each of them possesses, and than which nothing more is to be expected from each. Even of the philosopher himself, who alone, from his abilities and wisdom, professes almost everything, there is a sort of definition, signifying, that he who studies to learn the powers, nature, and causes of all things, divine and human, and to understand and explain the whole science of living virtuously, may justly deserve this appellation. [213] “The orator, however, since it is about him that we are considering, I do not conceive to be exactly the same character that Crassus makes him, who seemed to me to include all knowledge of all matters and sciences, under the single profession and name of an orator; but I regard him as one who can use words agreeable to hear, and thoughts adapted to prove, not only in causes that are pleaded in the forum, but in causes in general. Him I call an orator, and would have him besides accomplished in delivery and action, and with a certain degree of wit. [214] But our friend Crassus seemed to me to define the faculty of an orator, not by the proper limits of his art, but by the almost immense limits of his own genius; for, by his definition, he delivered the helm of civil government into the hands of his orator; a point, which it appeared very strange to me, Scaevola, that you should grant him; when the senate has often given its assent on affairs of the utmost consequence to yourself, though you have spoken briefly and without ornament. And M. Scaurus, who I hear is in the country, at his villa not far off, a man eminently skilled in affairs of government, if he should hear that the authority which his gravity and counsels hear with them, is claimed by you, Crassus, as you say that it is the property of the orator, he would, I believe, come hither without delay, and frighten us out of our talk by his very countenance and aspect; who, though he is no contemptible speaker, yet depends more upon his judgment in affairs of consequence, than upon his ability in speaking; [215] and, if any one has abilities in both these ways, he who is of authority in the public councils, and a good senator, is not on those accounts an orator; and if he that is an eloquent and powerful speaker be also eminent in civil administration, he did not acquire his political knowledge96 through oratory. Those talents differ very much in their nature, and are quite separate and distinct from each other; nor did Marcus Cato, Publius Africanus, Quintus Metellus, Caius Laelius, who were all eloquent, give lustre to their own orations, and to the dignity of the republic, by the same art and method. |
| [L] Neque enim est interdictum aut a rerum natura aut a lege aliqua atque more, ut singulis hominibus ne amplius quam singulas artes nosse liceat. [216] Quare non — etsi eloquentissimus Athenis Pericles idemque in ea civitate plurimos annos princeps consilii publici fuit — idcirco ejusdem hominis atque artis utraque facultas existimanda est ; nec, si P. Crassus idem fuit eloquens et juris peritus, ob eam causam inest in facultate dicendi, juris civilis scientia. [217] Nam si quisque, ut in aliqua arte et facultate excellens, aliam quoque artem sibi assumpserit, ita perficiet ut — quod præterea sciet — id ejus in quo excellet pars quædam esse videatur : licet ista ratione dicamus, pila bene et Duodecim Scriptis ludere proprium esse juris civilis, quoniam utrumque eorum P. Mucius optime fecerit ; eademque ratione dicantur, et quos φυσικούς Græci nominant, iidem poëtæ, quoniam Empedocles physicus egregium poëma fecerit. At hoc ne philosophi quidem ipsi — qui omnia sicut propria sua esse atque a se possideri volunt — dicere audent, geometriam aut musicam philosophi esse quia Platonem omnes in illis artibus præstantissimum fuisse fateantur. [218] Ac si jam placet omnes artes oratori subjungere, tolerabilius est sic potius dicere, ut, quoniam dicendi facultas non debeat esse jejuna atque nuda, sed aspersa atque distincta multarum rerum jucunda quadam varietate, sit boni oratoris multa auribus accepisse, multa vidisse, multa animo et cogitatione, multa etiam legendo percurrisse ; neque ea ut sua possedisse, sed ut aliena libasse. Fateor enim, callidum quendam hunc, et nulla in re tironem ac rudem, nec peregrinum atque hospitem in agendo esse debere. | L. “It is not enjoined, let me observe, by the nature of things, or by any law or custom, that one man must not know more than one art; [216] and therefore, though Pericles was the best orator in Athens, and was also for many years director of the public counsels in that city, the talent for both those characters must not be thought to belong to the same art because it existed in the same man; nor if Publius Crassus was both an orator and a lawyer, is the knowledge of the civil law for that reason included in the power of speaking. [217] For if every man who, while excelling in any art or science, has acquired another art or science in addition, shall represent that his additional knowledge is a part of that in which he previously excelled,97 we may, by such a mode of argument, pretend that to play well at tennis or counters,98 is a part of the knowledge of civil law, because Publius Mucius was skilled in both; and, by parity of reasoning, those whom the Greeks call physikoi (‘natural philosophers’) may be regarded as poets, because Empedocles the natural philosopher wrote an excellent poem. But not even the philosophers themselves, who would have everything, as their own right, to be theirs, and in their possession, have the confidence to say that geometry or music is a part of philosophy, because all acknowledge Plato to have been eminently excellent in those sciences. [218] And if it be still your pleasure to attribute all sciences to the orator, it will be better for us, rather, to express ourselves to this effect, that since eloquence must not be bald and unadorned, but marked and distinguished by a certain pleasing variety of manifold qualities, it is necessary for a good orator to have heard and seen much, to have gone over many subjects in thought and reflection, and many also in reading; though not so as to have taken possession of them as his own property, but to have tasted of them as things belonging to others. For I confess that the orator should be a knowing man, not quite a tiro or novice in any subject, not utterly ignorant or inexperienced in any business of life. |
| [LI] [219] Neque vero istis tragœdiis tuis — quibus uti philosophi maxime solent —, Crasse, perturbor, quod ita dixisti, neminem posse eorum mentes, qui audirent, aut inflammare dicendo aut inflammatas restinguere (quum eo maxime vis oratoris magnitudoque cernatur), nisi qui rerum omnium naturam, mores hominum atque rationes penitus perspexerit : in quo philosophia sit oratori necessario percipienda ; quo in studio hominum quoque ingeniosissimorum otiosissimorumque totas ætates videmus esse contritas. Quorum ego copiam magnitudinemque cognitionis atque artis non modo non contemno, sed etiam vehementer admiror ; nobis tamen, qui in hoc populo foroque versamur, satis est ea de moribus animorum et scire et dicere quæ non abhorrent ab hominum moribus. [220] ¿Quis enim unquam orator magnus et gravis, quum iratum adversario judicem facere vellet, hæsitavit ob eam causam, quod nesciret quid esset iracundia — fervorne mentis an cupiditas puniendi doloris? ¿Quis, quum ceteros animorum motus aut judicibus, aut populo, dicendo miscere atque agitare vellet, ea dixit quæ a philosophis dici solent? Qui partim omnino motus negant in animis ullos esse debere, quique eos in judicum mentibus concitent, scelus eos nefarium facere ; partim, qui tolerabiliores volunt esse et ad veritatem vitæ propius accedere, permediocres ac potius leves motus debere esse dicunt. [221] Orator autem omnia hæc, quæ putantur in communi vitæ consuetudine mala ac molesta et fugienda, multo majora et acerbiora verbis facit ; itemque ea, quæ vulgo expetenda atque optabilia videntur, dicendo amplificat atque ornat ; neque vult ita sapiens inter stultos videri, uti, qui audiant, aut illum ineptum et Græculum putent, aut, etiamsi valde probent ingenium oratoris, sapientiam admirentur, se esse stultos moleste ferant ; [222] sed ita peragrat per animos, ita sensus hominum mentesque pertractat, ut non desideret philosophorum descriptiones, neque exquirat oratione, summum illud bonum in animone sit an in corpore, virtute an voluptate definiatur ; an hæc inter se jungi copularique possint ; an vero, ut quibusdam visum, nihil certum sciri, nihil plane cognosci et percipi possit. Quarum rerum fateor magnam multiplicemque esse disciplinam, et multas, copiosas variasque rationes. [223] Sed aliud quiddam, longe aliud, Crasse, quærimus. Acuto homine nobis opus est, et natura usuque callido, qui sagaciter pervestiget quid sui cives, iique homines quibus aliquid dicendo persuadere velit, cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, exspectent. | LI. [219] “Nor am I discomposed, Crassus, by those tragic arguments of yours,99 on which the philosophers dwell most of all; I mean, when you said, That no man can, by speaking, excite the passions of his audience, or calm them when excited, (in which efforts it is that the power and greatness of an orator are chiefly seen,) unless one who has gained a thorough insight into the nature of all things, and the dispositions and motives of mankind; on which account philosophy must of necessity be studied by the orator; a study in which we see that the whole lives of men of the greatest talent and leisure are spent; the copiousness and magnitude of whose learning and knowledge I not only do not despise but greatly admire; but, for us who are engaged in so busy a state, and such occupations in the forum, it is sufficient to know and say just so much about the manners of mankind as is not inconsistent with human nature. For what great and powerful orator, whose object was to make a judge angry with his adversary, ever hesitated, because he was ignorant what anger was, whether ‘a heat of temper,’ or ‘a desire of vengeance for pain received ?’100 [220] Who, when he wished to stir up and inflame other passions in the minds of the judges or people by his eloquence, ever uttered such things as are said by the philosophers? part of whom deny that any passions whatever should be excited in the mind, and say that they who rouse them in the breasts of the judges are guilty of a heinous crime, and part, who are inclined to be more tolerant, and to accommodate themselves more to the realities of life, say that such emotions ought to be but very moderate and gentle. [221] But the orator, by his eloquence, represents all those things which, in the common affairs of life, are considered evil and troublesome, and to be avoided, as heavier and more grievous than they really are; and at the same time amplifies and embellishes, by power of language, those things which to the generality of mankind seem inviting and desirable; nor does he wish to appear so very wise among fools, as that his audience should think him impertinent or a pedantic Greek, or, though they very much approve his understanding, and admire his wisdom, yet should feel uneasy that they themselves are but idiots to him; [222] but he so effectually penetrates the minds of men, so works upon their senses and feelings, that he has no occasion for the definitions of philosophers, or to consider in the course of his speech, ‘ whether the chief good lies in the mind or in the body;’ ‘whether it is to be defined as consisting in virtue or in pleasure.’ ‘whether these two can be united and coupled together; or ‘whether,’ as some think, ‘nothing certain can be known, nothing clearly perceived and understood;’ questions in which I acknowledge that a vast multiplicity of learning, and a great abundance of varied reasoning is involved: [223] but we seek something of a far different character; we want a man of superior intelligence, sagacious by nature and from experience, who can acutely divine what his fellow-citizens, and all those whom he wishes to convince on any subject by his eloquence, think, feel, imagine, or hope. |
| [LII] Teneat oportet venas cujusque generis, ætatis, ordinis, et eorum apud quos aliquid aget, aut erit acturus, mentes sensusque degustet ; [224] philosophorum autem libros reservet sibi ad hujusce modi Tusculani requiem atque otium, ne, si quando ei dicendum erit de justitia et fide, mutuetur a Platone qui, quum hæc exprimenda verbis arbitraretur, novam quandam finxit in libris civitatem ; usque eo illa quæ dicenda de justitia putabat, a vitæ consuetudine et a civitatum moribus abhorrebant. [225] Quod si ea probarentur in populis atque in civitatibus, ¿quis tibi, Crasse, concessisset, clarissimo viro et amplissimo principi civitatis, ut illa diceres in maxima contione tuorum civium, quæ dixisti? “Eripite nos ex miseriis, eripite ex faucibus eorum, quorum crudelitas nisi nostro sanguine non potest expleri ; nolite sinere nos cuiquam servire, nisi vobis universis, quibus et possumus et debemus.” Omitto miserias, in quibus, ut illi ajunt, vir fortis esse non potest ; omitto faucis, ex quibus te eripi vis, ne judicio iniquo exsorbeatur sanguis tuus — quod sapienti negant accidere posse ; ¿servire vero non modo te, sed universum Senatum cujus tum causam agebas, ausus es dicere? [226] ¿Potestne virtus, Crasse, servire istis auctoribus quorum tu præcepta oratoris facultate complecteris? Quæ et semper et sola libera est, quæque, etiamsi corpora capta sint armis aut constricta vinculis, tamen suum jus atque omnium rerum impunitam libertatem tenere debeat. Quæ vero addidisti, non modo Senatum servire posse populo, sed etiam debere, ¿quis hoc philosophus tam mollis, tam languidus, tam enervatus, tam omnia ad voluptatem corporis doloremque referens, probare posset, Senatum servire populo, cui populus ipse moderandi et regendi sui potestatem quasi quasdam habenas tradidisset? | LII. He must penetrate the inmost recesses of the mind of every class, age, and rank; and must ascertain the sentiments and notions of those before whom he is pleading,101 or intends to plead; [224] but his books of philosophy he must reserve to himself, for the leisure and tranquillity of such a Tusculan villa as this, and must not, when he is to speak on justice and honesty, borrow from Plato; who, when he thought that such subjects were to be illustrated in writing, imagined in his pages a new kind of commonwealth; so much was that which he thought necessary to be said of justice, at variance with ordinary life and the general customs of the world. [225] But if such notions were received in existing communities and nations, who would have permitted you, Crassus, though a man of the highest character, and the chief leader in the- city, to utter what you addressed to a vast assembly of your fellow-citizens?102 DELIVER US FROM THESE MISERIES, DELIVER US FROM THE JAWS OF THOSE WHOSE CRUELTY CANNOT BE SATIATED EVEN WITH BLOOD; SUFFER US NOT TO BE SLAVES TO ANT BUT YOURSELVES AS A PEOPLE, WHOM WE BOTH CAN AND OUGHT TO SERVE. I say nothing about the word MISERIES, in which, as the philosophers say,103 a man of fortitude cannot be; I say nothing of the JAWS from which you desire to be delivered, that your blood may not he drunk by an unjust sentence; a thing which they say cannot happen to a wise man; but how durst you say that not only yourself, but the whole senate, whose cause you were then pleading, were SLAVES ? [226] Can virtue, Crassus, possibly be ENSLAVED, according to those whose precepts you make necessary to the science of an orator; ,virtue which is ever and alone free, and which, though our bodies be captured in war, or bound with fetters, yet ought to maintain its rights and liberty inviolate in all circumstances’?104 And as to what you added, that the senate not only CAN but OUGHT to be SLAVES to the people, what philosopher is so effeminate, so languid, so enervated, so eager to refer everything to bodily pleasure or pain, as to allow that the senate should be the SLAVES of the people, to whom the people themselves have delivered the power, like certain reins as it were, to guide and govern them? |
| [LIII] [227] Itaque hæc, quum a te divinitus ego dicta arbitrarer, P. Rutilius Rufus, homo doctus et philosophiæ deditus, non modo ‘parum commode,’ sed etiam ‘turpiter et flagitiose’ dicta esse dicebat. Idemque Servium Galbam (quem hominem probe commeminisse se ajebat) pergraviter reprehendere solebat quod is, L. Scribonio quæstionem in eum ferente, populi misericordiam concitasset, quum M. Cato, Galbæ gravis atque acer inimicus, aspere apud populum Romanum et vehementer esset locutus — quam orationem in ‘Originibus’ suis exposuit ipse. [228] Reprehendebat igitur Galbam Rutilius, quod is C. Sulpicii Galli, propinqui sui, Q. pupillum filium ipse pæne in umeros suos extulisset, qui patris clarissimi recordatione et memoria fletum populo moveret, et duos filios suos parvos tutelæ populi commendasset, ac se, tanquam in procinctu testamentum faceret, sine libra atque tabulis, populum Romanum tutorem instituere dixisset illorum orbitati. Itaque, quum et invidia et odio populi tum Galba premeretur, his quoque eum tragœdiis liberatum ferebat — quod item apud Catonem scriptum esse video, ‘nisi pueris et lacrimis usus esset, pœnas eum daturum fuisse’. Hæc Rutilius valde vituperabat et huic humilitati dicebat vel exilium fuisse vel mortem anteponendam. [229] Neque vero hoc solum dixit, sed ipse et sensit et fecit : nam quum esset ille vir exemplum, ut scitis, innocentiæ, quumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate, neque sanctior, non modo supplex judicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem aut liberius causam dici suam, quam simplex oratio veritatis ferebat ; paulum huic Cottæ tribuit partium, disertissimo adulescenti, sororis suæ filio ; dixit item causam illam quadam ex parte Q. Mucius, more suo, nullo apparatu, pure et dilucide. [230] Quod si tu tunc, Crasse, dixisses — qui subsidium oratori ex illis disputationibus quibus philosophi utuntur, ad dicendi copiam petendum esse paulo ante dicebas — et, si tibi pro P. Rutilio non philosophorum more, sed tuo, licuisset dicere : quamvis scelerati illi fuissent — sicuti fuerunt pestiferi cives supplicioque digni —, tamen omnem eorum importunitatem ex intimis mentibus evellisset vis orationis tuæ. Nunc talis vir amissus est — dum causa ita dicitur, ut si in illa commenticia Platonis civitate res ageretur. Nemo ingemuit, nemo inclamavit patronorum, nihil cuiquam doluit, nemo est questus, nemo rempublicam imploravit, nemo supplicavit. ¿Quid multa? Pedem nemo in illo judicio supplosit, credo, ne Stoicis renuntiaretur. | LIII. [227] “Accordingly, when I regarded these words of yours as the divinest eloquence, Publius Rutilius Rufus,105 a man of learning, and devoted to philosophy, observed that what you had said was not only injudicious, but base and dishonourable. The same Rutilius used severely to censure Servius Galba, whom he said he very well remembered, because, when Lucius Scribonius brought an accusation against him, and Marcus Cato, a bitter and implacable enemy to Galba, had spoken with rancour and vehemence against him before the assembled people of Rome, (in a speech which he published in his Origines,106) [228] Rutilius, I say, censured Galba, for holding up, almost upon his shoulders, Quintus, the orphan son of Caius Sulpicius Gallus, his near relation, that he might, through the memory of his most illustrious father, draw tears from the people, and for recommending two little sons of his own to the guardianship of the public, and saying that he himself (as if he was making his will in the ranks before a battle,107 without balance or writing tables,108) appointed the people of Rome protectors of their orphan condition. As Galba, therefore, labored under the ill-opinion and dislike of the people, Rutilius said that he owed his deliverance to such tragic tricks as these; and I see it is also recorded in date’s book, that if he had not employed children and tears, he would have suffered. Such proceedings Rutilius severely condemned, and said banishment, or even death, was more eligible than such meanness. [229] Nor did he merely say this, but thought and acted accordingly; for being a man, as you know, of exemplary integrity, a man to whom no person in the city was superior in honesty and sincerity, he not only refused to supplicate his judges, but would not allow his cause to be pleaded with more ornament or freedom of language than the simple plainness of truth carried with it.109 Small was the part of it he assigned to Cotta here, his sister’s son, and a youth of great eloquence; and Quintus Mucius also took some share in his defence, speaking in his usual manner, without ostentation, but simply and with perspicuity. [230] But if you, Crassus, had then spoken, you, who just now said that the orator must seek assistance from those disputations in which the philosophers indulge, to supply himself with matter for his speeches, if you had been at liberty to speak for Publius Rutilius, not after the manner of philosophers, but in your own way, although his accusers had been, as they really were, abandoned and mischievous citizens,:and worthy of the severest punishment, yet the force of your eloquence would have rooted all their unwarrantable cruelty from the bottom of their hearts. But, as it was, a man of such a character was lost, because his cause was pleaded in such a manner as if the whole affair had been transacted in the imaginary commonwealth of Plato. Not a single individual uttered a groan; not one of the advocates gave vent to an exclamation; no one showed any appearance of grief; no one complained; no one supplicated, no one implored the mercy of the public. In short, no one even stamped a foot on the trial, for fear, I suppose, of renouncing the doctrine of the Stoics. |
| [LIV] [231] Imitatus est homo Romanus et consularis veterem illum Socratem qui, quum omnium sapientissimus esset sanctissimeque vixisset, ita in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum. Quin etiam, quum ei scriptam orationem disertissimus orator Lysias attulisset, quam, si ei videretur, edisceret, ut ea pro se in judicio uteretur, non invitus legit et commode scriptam esse dixit ; “Sed,” inquit, “ut, si mihi calceos Sicyonios attulisses, non uterer, quamvis essent habiles atque apti ad pedem, quia non essent viriles” ; sic illam orationem disertam sibi et oratoriam videri, fortem et virilem non videri. Ergo ille quoque damnatus est ; neque solum primis sententiis quibus tantum statuebant judices, damnarent an absolverent, sed etiam illis quas iterum legibus ferre debebant. [232] Erat enim Athenis reo damnato, si fraus capitalis non esset, quasi pœnæ æstimatio ; et sententia quum judicibus daretur, interrogabatur reus, quam quasi æstimatione commeruisse se maxime confiteretur. Quod quum interrogatus Socrates esset, respondit sese meruisse ut amplissimis honoribus et præmiis decoraretur et ut ei victus quotidianus in Prytaneo publice præberetur — qui honos apud Græcos maximus habetur. [233] Cujus responso judices sic exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent. Qui quidem si absolutus esset — quod, mehercule, etiamsi nihil ad nos pertinet, tamen propter ejus ingenii magnitudinem vellem — ¿quonam modo istos philosophos ferre possemus qui nunc, quum ille damnatus est nullam aliam ob culpam nisi propter dicendi inscientiam, tamen a se oportere dicunt peti præcepta dicendi? Quibuscum ego non pugno utrum sit melius aut verius : tantum dico et aliud illud esse atque hoc, et hoc sine illo summum esse posse. | LIV. [231] “Thus a Roman, of consular dignity, imitated the illustrious Socrates of old, who, as he was a man of the greatest wisdom and had lived in the utmost integrity, spoke for himself, when on trial for his life, in such a manner as not to seem a suppliant or prisoner, but the lord and master of his judges. Even when Lysias. a most eloquent orator, brought him a written speech, which, if he pleased, he might, learn by heart, and repeat at his trial, he willingly read it over, and said it was written in a manner very well suited to the occasion; but, said he, if you had brought me Sicyonian shoes,110 I should not wear them, though they might be easy and suit my feet, because they would be effeminate; so that speech seems to me to be eloquent and becoming an orator, but not fearless and manly. In consequence, he also was condemned, not only by the first votes, by which the judges only decided whether they should acquit or condemn, but also by those which, in conformity with the laws, they were obliged to give afterwards. [232] For at Athens, if the accused person was found guilty, and if his crime was not capital, there was a sort of estimation of punishment; and when sentence was to be finally given by the judges, the criminal was asked what degree of punishment he acknowledged himself, at most, to deserve; and when this question was put to Socrates, he answered, that he deserved to be distinguished with the noblest honors and rewards, and to be daily maintained at the public expense in the Prytaneum; an honor which, amongst the Greeks, is accounted the very highest. [233] By which answer his judges were so exasperated, that they condemned the most innocent of men to death. But had he been acquitted, (which, indeed, though it is of no concern to us, yet I could wish to have been the case, because of the greatness of his genius,) how could we have patience with those philosophers who now, though Socrates was condemned for no other crime but want of skill in speaking, maintain that the precepts of oratory should be learned from them- selves, who are disciples of Socrates? With these men I have no dispute as to which of the two sciences is superior, or carries more truth in it; I only say that the one is distinct from the other, and that oratory may exist in the highest perfection without philosophy. |
| [LV] [234] Nam quod jus civile, Crasse, tam vehementer amplexus es, video quid egeris — ¡tum quum dicebas, videbam! Primum, Scævolæ te dedisti quem omnes amare meritissimo pro ejus eximia suavitate debemus ; cujus artem quum indotatam esse et incomptam videres, verborum eam dote locupletasti et ornasti. Deinde, quod in ea tu plus operæ laborisque consumpseras, quum ejus studii tibi et hortator et magister esset domi, veritus es nisi istam artem oratione exaggerasses, ne operam perdidisses. [235] Sed ego ne cum ista quidem arte pugno. Sit sane tanta, quantam tu illam esse vis. Etenim sine controversia et magna est et late patet et ad multos pertinet et summo in honore semper fuit, et clarissimi cives ei studio et hodie præsunt. Sed vide, Crasse, ne, dum novo et alieno ornatu velis ornare juris civilis scientiam, suo quoque eam concesso et tradito spolies atque denudes. [236] Nam, si ita diceres, qui jurisconsultus esset, esse eum oratorem — itemque qui esset orator, juris eundem esse consultum — præclaras duas artes constitueres atque inter se pares et ejusdem socias dignitatis. Nunc vero jurisconsultum sine hac eloquentia de qua quærimus, fateris esse posse — fuisseque plurimos. Oratorem negas, nisi illam scientiam assumpserit, esse posse. Ita est tibi jurisconsultus ipse per se nihil nisi legulejus quidam cautus et acutus, præco actionum, cantor formularum, auceps syllabarum ; sed quia sæpe utitur orator subsidio juris in causis, idcirco istam juris scientiam, eloquentiæ tanquam ancillulam pedisequamque adjunxisti. | LV. [234] “In bestowing such -warm approbation on the civil law, Crassus, I see what was your motive; “when you were speaking, I did not see it.111 In the first place, you were willing to oblige Scaevola, whom we ought all to esteem most deservedly for his singularly excellent disposition; and seeing his science undowried and unadorned, you have enriched it with your eloquence as with a portion, and decorated it with a pro- fusion of ornaments. In the next, as you had spent much pains and labor in the acquisition of it, (since you had in your own house one112 who encouraged and instructed you in that study,) you were afraid that you might lose the fruit of your industry, if you did not magnify the science by your eloquence. [235] But I have no controversy with the science; let it be of as much consequence as you represent it; for without doubt it is of great and extensive concern, having relation to multitudes of people, and has always been held in the highest honor; and our most eminent citizens have ever been, and are still, at the head of the profession of it; but take care, Crassus, lest, while you strive to adorn the knowledge of the civil law with new and foreign ornaments, you spoil and denude her of what is granted and accorded to her as her own. [236] For if you were to say, that he who is a lawyer is also an orator, and that he who is an orator is also a lawyer, you would make two excellent branches of knowledge, each equal to the other, and sharers of the same dignity; but now you allow that a man may be a lawyer without the eloquence which we are considering, and that there have been many such; and you deny that a man can be an orator who has not acquired a knowledge of law. Thus the lawyer is, of himself, nothing with you but a sort of wary and acute legalist, an instructor in actions,113 a repeater of forms, a catcher at syllables; but because the orator has frequent occasion for the aid of the law in his pleadings, you have of necessity joined legal knowledge to eloquence as a handmaid and attendant. |
| [LVI] [237] Quod vero impudentiam admiratus es eorum patronorum, qui aut — quum parva nescirent — magna profiterentur aut ea quæ maxima essent in jure civili, tractare auderent in causis, quum ea nescirent nunquamque didicissent, utriusque rei facilis est et prompta defensio. Nam neque illud est mirandum, qui, quibus verbis coëmptio fiat, nesciat, eundem ejus mulieris quæ coëmptionem fecerit, causam posse defendere ; nec, si parvi navigii et magni eadem est in gubernando scientia, idcirco qui, quibus verbis herctum cieri oporteat, nesciat, idem herciscundæ familiæ causam agere non possit. [238] Nam, quod maximas centumvirales causas in jure positas protulisti, ¿quæ tandem earum causa fuit, quæ ab homine eloquenti juris imperito non ornatissime potuerit dici? Quibus quidem in causis omnibus — sicut in ipsa M’. Curii quæ abs te nuper est dicta, et in C. Hostilii Mancini controversia, atque in eo puero, qui ex altera natus erat uxore, non remisso nuntio superiori — fuit inter peritissimos homines summa de jure dissensio. [239] Quæro igitur, quid adjuverit oratorem in his causis juris scientia, quum hic jurisconsultus superior fuerit discessurus qui esset non suo artificio, sed alieno — hoc est, non juris scientia, sed eloquentia —, sustentatus. Equidem hoc sæpe audivi, quum ædilitatem P. Crassus peteret eumque major natu, etiam consularis, Ser. Galba assectaretur (quod Crassi filiam Gajo filio suo despondisset), accessisse ad Crassum consulendi causa quendam rusticanum qui, quum Crassum seduxisset atque ad eum rettulisset responsumque ab eo verum, magis quam ad suam rem accommodatum, abstulisset, ut eum tristem Galba vidit, nomine appellavit quæsivitque, qua de re ad Crassum rettulisset. Ex quo ut audivit, commotumque ut vidit hominem, [240] “Suspenso,” inquit, “animo et occupato Crassum tibi respondisse video.” Deinde ipsum Crassum manu prehendit et, “Heus tu,” inquit, “¿quid tibi in mentem venit ita respondere?” Tum ille fidenter — homo peritissimus — confirmare, ita se rem habere, ut respondisset ; nec dubium esse posse. Galba autem, alludens varie et copiose, multas similitudines afferre, multaque pro æquitate contra jus dicere ; atque illum, quum disserendo par esse non posset (quanquam fuit Crassus in numero disertorum, sed par Galbæ nullo modo), ad auctores confugisse, et id quod ipse diceret, et in P. Mucii, fratris sui, libris et in Sext. Ælii commentariis scriptum protulisse — ac tamen concessisse Galbæ disputationem sibi probabilem et prope veram videri. | LVI. [237] “But as to your wonder at the effrontery of those advocates who, though they were ignorant of small things, profess great ones, or who ventured, in the management of causes, to treat of the most important points in the civil law, though they neither understood nor had ever learned them, the defence on both charges is easy and ready. For it is not at all surprising that he who is ignorant in what form of words- a contract of marriage is made, should be able to defend the cause of a woman who has- formed such a contract; nor, though the same skill in steering is requisite for a small as for a large vessel, is he therefore, who is ignorant of the form of words by which an estate is to be divided, in- capable of pleading a cause relative to the division of an estate.114 [238] For though you appealed to causes of great consequence, pleaded before the Centumviri, that turned upon points of law, what cause was there amongst; them all, which could not have been ably pleaded by an eloquent man un- acquainted with law? in all which causes, as in the cause of Manius Curius, which was lately pleaded by you,115 and that of Caius Hostilius Mancinus,116 and that of the boy who was born of a second wife, without any notice of divorce having been sent to the first,117 there was the greatest disagreement among the most skilful lawyers on points of law. [239] I ask, then, how in these causes a knowledge of the law could have aided the orator, when that lawyer must have had the superiority, who was supported, not by his own, but a foreign art, not by knowledge of the law, but by eloquence? I have often heard that, when Publius Crassus was a candidate for the sedileship, and Servius Galba, though older than he, and even of consular dignity, attended upon him to promote his interest, (having betrothed Crassus’s daughter to his son Caius,) there came a countryman to Crassus to consult him on some matter of law; and when he had taken Crassus aside, and laid the affair before him, and received from him such an answer as was rather right than suited to his wishes, Galba, seeing him look dejected, called him by his name, and asked him on what matter he had consulted Crassus; when, having heard his case, and seeing the man in great trouble, [240] ‘I perceive,’ said he, ‘that Crassus gave you an answer while his mind was anxious, and pre-occupied with other affairs.’ He then took Crassus by the hand, and said, ‘Hark you, how came it into your head to give this man such an answer?’ Crassus, who was a man of great legal knowledge, confidently repeated that the matter was exactly as he had stated in his answer, and that there could be no doubt. But Galba, referring to a variety and multiplicity of matters, adduced abundance of similar cases, and used many arguments for equity against the strict letter of law; while Crassus, as he could not maintain his ground in the debate, (for, though he was numbered among the eloquent, he was by no means equal to Galba,) had recourse to authorities, and showed what he had asserted in the books of his brother Publius Mucius,118 and in the commentaries of Sextus Aelius; though he allowed, at the same time, that Galba’s arguments had appeared to him plausible, and almost true. |
| [LVII] [241] Attamen, quæ causæ sunt ejusmodi, ut de earum jure dubium esse non possit, omnino in judicium vocari non solent. ¿Num quis eo testamento quod paterfamilias ante fecit quam ei filius natus esset, hereditatem petit? Nemo ; quia constat agnascendo rumpi testamentum ; ergo in hoc genere juris judicia nulla sunt : licet igitur impune oratori omnem hanc partem juris incontroversi ignorare, quæ pars sine dubio multo maxima est ; [242] in eo autem jure, quod ambigitur inter peritissimos, non est difficile oratori ejus partis — quamcunque defendet — auctorem aliquem invenire ; a quo quum amentatas hastas acceperit, ipse eas oratoris lacertis viribusque torquebit. Nisi vero (bona venia hujus optimi viri dixerim) Scævolæ tu libellis, aut præceptis soceri tui, causam M’. Curii defendisti, non arripuisti patrocinium æquitatis et defensionem testamentorum ac voluntatis mortuorum. [243] Ac mea quidem sententia — frequens enim te audivi, atque affui — multo majorem partem sententiarum sale tuo et lepore et politissimis facetiis pellexisti, quum et illud nimium acumen illuderes et admirarere ingenium Scævolæ, qui excogitasset ‘nasci prius oportere quam emori’ ; quumque multa colligeres, et ex legibus, et ex Senatus Consultis, et ex vita ac sermone communi, non modo acute, sed etiam ridicule ac facete, ubi si verba, non rem, sequeremur, confici nihil posset. Itaque hilaritatis plenum judicium ac lætitiæ fuit ; in quo quid tibi juris civilis exercitatio profuerit, non intellego ; dicendi vis egregia, summa festivitate et venustate conjuncta, profuit. [244] Ipse ille Mucius, paterni juris defensor et quasi patrimoni propugnator sui, ¿quid in illa causa, quum contra te diceret, attulit, quod de jure civili depromptum videretur? ¿Quam legem recitavit? ¿Quid patefecit dicendo, quod fuisset imperitis occultius? Nempe ejus omnis oratio versata est in eo, ut scriptum plurimum valere oportere defenderet, at in hoc genere pueri apud magistros exercentur omnes, quum in ejusmodi causis alias scriptum, alias æquitatem defendere docentur. [245] Et, credo, in illa militis causa, si tu aut heredem aut militem defendisses, ¡ad Hostilianas te ‘Actiones’ — non ad tuam vim et oratoriam facultatem — contulisses! Tu vero, vel si testamentum defenderes, sic ageres, ut omne omnium testamentorum jus in eo judicio positum videretur ; vel si causam ageres militis, patrem ejus, ut soles, dicendo a mortuis excitasses ; statuisses ante oculos ; complexus esset filium, flensque eum Centum Viris commendasset ; lapides mehercule omnes flere ac lamentari coëgisses, ut totum illud ‘UTI LINGUA NUNCUPASSIT’ non in Duodecim Tabulis, quas tu omnibus bibliothecis anteponis, sed in magistri carmine scriptum videretur. | LVII. [241] “But causes which are of such a kind, that there can be no doubt of the law relative to them, do not usually come to be tried at all. Does any one claim an inheritance under a will, which the father of a family made before he had a son born? Nobody; because it is clear that by the birth of a son the will is cancelled.119 Upon such points of law, therefore, there are no questions to be tried. The orator, accordingly, may be ignorant of all this part of the law relative to controversies,120 which is without doubt the far greater part; [242] but on those points which are disputed, even among the most skilful lawyers, it will not be difficult for the orator to find some writer of authority on that side, whichsoever it be, that he is to defend, from whom, when he has received his javelins ready for throwing, he will hurl them with the arm and strength of an orator. Unless we are to suppose, indeed, (I would wish to make the observation with- out offending this excellent man Scaevola,) that you, Crassus, defended the cause of Manius Curius out of the writings and rules of your father-in-law. Did you not, on the contrary, undertake the defence of equity, the support of wills, and the intention of the dead? [243] Indeed, in my opinion, (for I was frequently present and heard you,) you won the far greater number of votes by your wit, humor, and happy raillery, when you joked upon the extraordinary acuteness, and ex- pressed admiration of the genius, of Scaevola, who had discovered that a man must be born before he can die; and when you adduced many cases, both from the laws and decrees of the senate, as well as from common life and intercourse, not only acutely, but facetiously and sarcastically, in which, if we attended to the letter, and not the spirit, nothing would result. The trial, therefore, was attended with abundance of mirth and pleasantry; but of what service your knowledge of the civil law was to you upon it, I do not understand; your great power in speaking, united with the utmost humor and grace, certainly was of great service. [244] Even Mucius himself, the defender of the father’s right, who fought as it were for his own patrimony, what argument did he advance in the cause, when he spoke against you, that appeared to be drawn from the civil law? What particular law did he recite? What did he explain in his speech that was unintelligible to the unlearned? The whole of his oration was employed upon one point; that is, in maintaining that what was written ought to be valid. But every boy is exercised on such subjects by his master, when he is instructed to support, in such cases as these, sometimes the written letter, sometimes equity. [245] In that cause of the soldier, I presume, if you had defended either him or the heir, you would have had recourse to the cases of Hostilius,121 and not to your own power and talent as an orator. Nay, rather, if you had defended the will, you would have argued in such a manner, that the entire validity of all wills whatsoever would have seemed to depend upon that single trial; or, if you had pleaded the cause of the soldier, you would have raised his father, with your usual eloquence, from the dead; you would have placed him before the eyes of the audience; he would have embraced his son, and with tears have recommended him to the Centumviri; you would have forced the very stones to weep and lament, so that all that clause, AS THE TONGUE HAD DECLARED, would seem not to have been written in the Twelve Tables, which you prefer to all libraries, but in some mere formula of a teacher. |
[LVIII] [246] Nam quod inertiam accusas adulescentium
|
LVIII. [246] “As to the indolence of which you accuse our youth, for not learning that science, because, in the first place, it is very easy, (how easy it is, let them consider who strut about before us, presuming on their knowledge of the science, as if it were extremely difficult; and do you yourself also consider that point, who say, that it is an easy science, which you admit as yet to be no science at all, but say that if somebody shall ever learn some other science, so as to be able to make this a science, it will then be a science;) and! because, in the next place, it is full of pleasure, (but as to that matter, every one is willing to leave the pleasure to yourself, and is content to be without it, for there is not one of the young men who would not rather, if he must get anything by heart, learn the Teucer of Pacuvius than the Manilian laws122 on emption and vendition;) [247] and, in the third place, because you think, that, from love to our country, we ought to acquire a knowledge of the practices of our ancestors; do you not perceive that the old laws are either grown out of date from their very antiquity, or are set aside by such as are new?123 As to your opinion, that men are rendered good by learning the civil law, because, by laws, rewards are appointed for virtue, and punishments for vice; I, for my part, imagined that virtue was instilled into mankind (if it can be instilled by any means) by instruction and persuasion, not by menaces, and force, and terror. As to the maxim that we should avoid evil, we can understand how good a thing it is to do so without a knowledge of the law. [248] And as to myself, to whom alone you allow the power of managing causes satisfactorily, without any knowledge of law, I make you, Crassus, this answer: that I never learned the civil law, nor was ever at a loss for the want of know- ledge in it, in those causes which I was able to defend in the courts.124 It is one thing to be a master in any pursuit or art, and another to be neither stupid nor ignorant in common life, and the ordinary customs of mankind. [249] May not every one of us go over our farms, or inspect our country affairs, for the sake of profit or delight at least?125 No man lives without using his eyes and understanding, so far as to be entirely ignorant what sowing and reaping is; or what pruning vines and other trees means; or at what season of the year, and in what manner, those things are done. If, there- fore, any one of us has to look at his grounds, or give any directions about agriculture to his steward, or any orders to his bailiff, must we study the books of Mago the Carthaginian,126 or may we be content with our ordinary knowledge? Why, then, with regard to the civil law, may we not also, especially as we are worn out in causes and public business, and in the forum, be sufficiently instructed, to such a degree at least as not to appear foreigners and strangers in our own country? [250] Or, if any cause, a little more obscure than ordinary, should be brought to us, it would, I presume, be difficult to communicate with our friend Scaevola here; although indeed the parties, whose concern it is, bring nothing to us that has not been thoroughly considered and investigated. If there is a question about the nature of a thing itself under consideration; if about boundaries; (as we do not go in person to view the property itself127) if about writings and bonds;128 we of necessity have to study matters that are intricate and often difficult; and if we have to consider laws, or the opinions of men skilled in law, need we fear that we shall not be able to understand them, if we have not studied the civil law from our youth ? |
| [LIX] ¿Nihilne igitur prodest oratori juris civilis scientia? Non possum negare prodesse ullam scientiam — ei præsertim cujus eloquentia copia rerum debeat esse ornata ; sed multa et magna et difficilia sunt ea quæ sunt oratori necessaria, ut ejus industriam in plura studia distrahere nolim. [251] ¿Quis neget opus esse oratori, in hoc oratorio motu statuque, Roscii gestum et venustatem? Tamen nemo suaserit studiosis dicendi adulescentibus in gestu discendo histrionum more elaborare. ¿Quid est oratori tam necessarium quam vox? Tamen, me auctore, nemo dicendi studiosus, Græcorum more tragœdorum, voci serviet, qui et annos complures sedentes declamitant et quotidie, antequam pronuntient, vocem cubantes sensim excitant eandemque, quum egerunt, sedentes ab acutissimo sono usque ad gravissimum sonum recipiunt et quasi quodam modo colligunt. Hoc nos si facere velimus, ante condemnentur ii quorum causas receperimus, quam, totiens quotiens præscribitur, Pæanem aut Nomionem citarimus. [252] Quod si in gestu, qui multum oratorem adjuvat, et in voce, quæ una maxime eloquentiam vel commendat vel sustinet, elaborare nobis non licet — ac tantum in utroque assequi possumus, quantum in hac acie quotidiani muneris spatii nobis datur —, ¿quanto minus est ad juris civilis perdiscendi occupationem descendendum? Quod et summatim percipi sine doctrina potest, et hanc habet ab illis rebus dissimilitudinem, quod vox, et gestus, subito sumi et aliunde arripi non potest. ¡Juris utilitas ad quamque causam, quamvis repente, vel a peritis vel de libris depromi potest! [253] Itaque illi disertissimi homines ministros habent in causis juris peritos (quum ipsi sint imperitissimi), et qui — ut abs te paulo ante dictum est — ‘pragmatici’ vocantur. In quo nostri omnino melius multo, quod clarissimorum hominum auctoritate leges et jura tecta esse voluerunt. Sed tamen non fugisset hoc Græcos homines, si ita necesse esse arbitrati essent, oratorem ipsum erudire in jure civili, non ei pragmaticum adjutorem dare. | LIX. “Is the knowledge of the civil law, then, of no ad- vantage to the orator? I cannot deny that every kind of knowledge is of advantage, especially to him whose eloquence ought to be adorned with variety of matter; but the things which are absolutely necessary to an orator are numerous, important, and difficult, so that I would not distract his industry among too many studies. [251] Who can deny that the gesture and grace of Roscius are necessary in the orator’s action and deportment? Yet nobody would advise youths that are studying oratory to labor in forming their attitudes like players. What is so necessary to an orator as the voice? Yet, by my recommendation, no student in eloquence will be a slave to his voice like the Greeks and tragedians,129 who pass whole years in sedentary declamation, and daily, before they venture upon delivery, raise their voice by degrees as they sit, and, when they have finished pleading, sit down again, and lower and recover it, as it were, through a scale, from the highest to the deepest tone. If we should do this, they whose causes we undertake would be condemned, before we had repeated the paean and the munio130 as often as is prescribed. [252] But if we must not employ ourselves upon gesture, which is of great service to the orator, or upon the culture of the voice, which alone is a great recommendation and support of eloquence; and if we can only improve in either, in proportion to the leisure afforded us in this field of daily business; how much less must we apply to the occupation of learning the civil law? of which we may learn the chief points without regular study, and which is also unlike those other matters in this respect, that power of voice and gesture cannot be got suddenly, or caught up from another person, but a knowledge of the law, as far as it is useful in any cause, may be gained on the shortest possible notice, either from learned men or from books. [253] Those eminent Greek orators, therefore, as they are unskilled in the law themselves, have, in their causes, men acquainted with the law to assist them, who are, as you before observed, called pragmatici. In this respect our countrymen act far better, as they would have the laws and judicial decisions supported by the authority of men of the highest rank. But the Greeks would not have neglected, if they had thought it necessary, to instruct the orator in the civil law, instead of allowing him a pragmaticus for an assistant. |
| [LX] [254] Nam quod dicis, ‘senectutem a solitudine vindicari juris civilis scientia’ ; fortasse, etiam, pecuniæ magnitudine. Sed nos non quid nobis utile, verum quid oratori necessarium sit, quærimus. Quanquam, quoniam multa ad oratoris similitudinem ab uno artifice sumimus, solet idem Roscius dicere se, quo plus sibi ætatis accederet, eo tardiores tibicinis modos et cantus remissiores esse facturum. Quod si ille, astrictus certa quadam numerorum moderatione et pedum, tamen aliquid ad requiem senectutis excogitat, ¿¡quanto facilius nos non laxare modos, sed totos mutare possumus!? [255] Neque enim hoc te, Crasse, fallit quam multa sint et quam varia genera dicendi — et quod haud sciam an tu primus ostenderis qui jamdiu multo dicis remissius et lenius quam solebas ; neque minus hæc tamen tua gravissimi sermonis lenitas, quam illa summa vis et contentio probatur : multique oratores fuerunt, ut illum Scipionem audimus, et Lælium, qui omnia sermone conficerent paulo intentiore — nunquam, ut Ser. Galba, lateribus aut clamore contenderent. Quod si jam hoc facere non poteris aut noles, ¿vereris ne tua domus — talis et viri et civis —, si a litigiosis hominibus non colatur, a ceteris deseratur? Equidem tantum absum ab ista sententia, ut non modo non arbitrer subsidium senectutis in eorum, qui consultum veniant, multitudine esse ponendum, sed tanquam portum aliquem exspectem istam quam tu times, solitudinem. Subsidium enim bellissimum existimo esse senectuti otium. | LX. [254] “As to your remark, that age is preserved from solitude by the science of the civil law, we may perhaps also say that it is preserved from solitude by a large fortune. But we are inquiring, not what is advantageous to ourselves, but what is necessary for the orator. Although (since we take so many points of comparison with the orator from one sort of artist) Roscius, whom we mentioned before, is accustomed to say, that, as age advances upon him, he will make the measures of the flute-player slower, and the notes softer. But if he who is restricted to a certain modulation of numbers and feet, meditates, notwithstanding, something for his ease in the decline of life, how much more easily can we? I will not say lower our tones, but alter them entirely? [255] For it is no secret to you, Crassus, how many and how various are the modes of speaking; a variety which I know not whether you yourself have not been the first to exhibit to us, since you have for some time spoken more softly and gently than you used to do; nor is this mildness in your eloquence, which carries so high authority with it, less approved than your former vast energy and exertion; and there have been many orators, as we hear of Scipio and Laelius, who always spoke in a tone only a little raised above that of ordinary conversation, but never exerted their lungs or throats like Servius Galba. But if you shall ever be unable or unwilling to speak in this manner, are you afraid that your house, the house of such a man and such a citizen, will, if it be not frequented by the litigious, be deserted by the rest of mankind ? For my part, I am so far from having any similar feeling with regard to my own house, that I not only do not think that comfort for my old age is to be expected from a multitude of clients, but look for that solitude which you dread, as for a safe harbour; for I esteem repose, to be the most agreeable solace in the last stage of life. |
| [256] Reliqua vero etiamsi adjuvant (historiam dico, et prudentiam juris publici, et antiquitatis memoriam et exemplorum copiam), si quando opus erit, a viro optimo et istis rebus instructissimo, familiari meo Congo, mutuabor. Neque repugnabo quominus — id quod modo hortatus es — omnia legant, omnia audiant, in omni recto studio atque humanitate versentur ; sed mehercule non ita multum spatii mihi habere videntur, si modo ea facere et persequi volent quæ a te, Crasse, præcepta sunt, qui mihi prope jam nimis duras leges imponere visus es huic ætati, sed tamen ad id quod cupiunt adipiscendum prope necessarias. [257] Nam et subitæ ad propositas causas exercitationes, et accuratæ ac meditatæ commentationes, ac stilus ille tuus quem tu vere dixisti perfectorem dicendi esse ac magistrum, multi sudoris est ; et illa orationis suæ cum scriptis alienis comparatio, et de alieno scripto subita, vel laudandi vel vituperandi, vel comprobandi vel refellendi causa, disputatio, non mediocris contentionis est, vel ad memoriam vel ad imitandum. | [256] “Those other branches of knowledge (though they certainly assist the orator) I mean general history, and jurisprudence,, and the course of things in old times, and variety of precedents I will, if ever I have occasion for them, borrow from my friend Longinus,131 an excellent man, and one of the greatest erudition in such matters. Nor will I dissuade these youths from reading everything, hearing everything, and acquainting themselves with every liberal study, and all polite learning, as you just now recommended; but, upon my word, they do not seem likely to have too much time, if they are inclined to pursue and practise all that you, Crassus, have dictated; for you seemed to me to impose upon their youth obligations almost too severe, (though almost necessary I admit, for the attainment of their desires,) [257] since extemporary exercises upon stated cases, and accurate and studied meditations, and practice in writing, which you truly called the modeller and finisher of the art of speaking, are tasks of much difficulty; and that comparison of their own composition with the writings of others, and extemporal discussion, on the work of another by way of praise or censure, confirmation or refutation, demand no ordinary exertion, either of memory or powers of imitation. |
| [LXI] [258] Illud vero fuit horribile, quod mehercule vereor ne majorem vim ad deterrendum habuerit quam ad cohortandum. Voluisti enim in suo genere unumquemque nostrum quasi quendam esse Roscium ; dixistique non tam ea quæ recta essent probari, quam ea quæ prava essent, fastidiis adhærescere ; quod ego non tam fastidiose in nobis quam in histrionibus spectari puto ; [259] itaque nos raucos sæpe attentissime audiri video ; tenet enim res ipsa atque causa ; at Æsopum, si paulum irrauserit, explodi. A quibus enim nihil præter voluptatem aurium quæritur, in eis offenditur simul atque imminuitur aliquid de voluptate. In eloquentia autem multa sunt quæ teneant, quæ si omnia summa non sunt, et pleraque tamen magna sunt, necesse est, ea ipsa quæ sunt, mirabilia videri. | LXI. [258] “But what you added was appalling, and indeed will have, I fear, a greater tendency to deter than to encourage. You would have every one of us a Roscius in our profession;;and you said that what was excellent did not so much attract .approbation, as what was faulty produced settled disgust; but I do not think that want of perfection is so disparagingly regarded in us as in the players; [259] and I observe, accordingly, that we are often heard with the utmost attention, even when we are hoarse, for the interest of the subject itself and of the cause detains the audience; while Aesopus, if he has the least hoarseness, is hissed; for at those from whom nothing is expected but to please the ear, offence is taken whenever the least diminution of that pleasure occurs. But in eloquence there are many qualities that captivate; and, if they are not all of the highest excellence, and yet most of them are praiseworthy, those that are of the highest excellence must necessarily excite admiration. |
| [260] Ergo, ut ad primum illud revertar, sit orator nobis is qui, ut Crassus descripsit, accommodate ad persuadendum possit dicere. Is autem concludatur in ea quæ sunt in usu civitatum vulgari ac forensi ; remotisque ceteris studiis — quamvis ea sint ampla atque præclara — in hoc uno opere, ut ita dicam, noctes et dies urgeatur ; imiteturque illum cui sine dubio summa vis dicendi conceditur, Atheniensem Demosthenem, in quo tantum studium fuisse, tantusque labor dicitur, ut primum impedimenta naturæ diligentia industriaque superaret ; quumque ita balbus esset, ut ejus ipsius artis cui studeret primam litteram non posset dicere, perfecit meditando, ut nemo planius esse locutus putaretur ; [261] deinde quum spiritus ejus esset angustior, tantum continenda anima in dicendo est assecutus, ut una continuatione verborum — id quod ejus scripta declarant — binæ ei contentiones vocis et remissiones continerentur ; qui etiam, ut memoriæ proditum est, conjectis in os calculis, summa voce versus multos uno spiritu pronuntiare consuescebat — neque is consistens in loco, sed inambulans atque ascensu ingrediens arduo. [262] Hisce ego cohortationibus, Crasse, ad studium et ad laborem incitandos juvenes vehementer assentior ; cetera, quæ collegisti ex variis et diversis studiis et artibus, tametsi ipse es omnia consecutus, tamen ab oratoris proprio officio atque munere sejuncta esse arbitror.” | [260] “To return therefore to our first consideration, let the orator be, as Crassus described him, one who can speak in a manner adapted to persuade; and let him strictly devote himself to those things which are of common practice in civil communities, and in the forum, and, laying aside all other studies, however high and noble they may be, let him apply himself day and night, if I may say so, to this one pursuit, and imitate him to whom doubtless the highest excellence in oratory is conceded, Demosthenes the Athenian, in whom there is said to have been so much ardour and perseverance, that he overcame, first of all, the impediments of nature by pains and diligence; and, though his voice was so inarticulate that he was unable to pronounce the first letter of the very art which he was so eager to acquire, he accomplished so much by practice that no one is thought to have spoken more distinctly; [261] and though his breath was short, he effected such improvement by holding it in while he spoke, that in one sequence of words (as his writings show) two risings and two fallings of his voice were included;132 and he also (as is related), after putting pebbles into his mouth, used to pronounce several verses at the highest pitch of his voice without taking breath, not standing in one place, but walking forward, and mounting a steep ascent. [262] With such encouragements as these, I sincerely agree with you, Crassus, that youths should be incited to study and industry; other accomplishments which you have collected from various and distinct arts and sciences, though you have mastered them all yourself, I regard as unconnected with the proper business? And duty of an orator.” |
| [LXII] Hæc quum Antonius dixisset, sane dubitare visus est Sulpicius et Cotta, utrius oratio propius ad veritatem videretur accedere. [263] Tum Crassus, “Operarium nobis quendam, Antoni, oratorem facis ; atque haud scio an aliter sentias, et utare tua illa mirifica ad refellendum consuetudine, qua tibi nemo unquam præstitit ; cujus quidem ipsius facultatis exercitatio oratorum propria est, sed jam in philosophorum consuetudine versatur — maximeque eorum qui de omni re proposita in utramque partem solent copiosissime dicere. [264] Verum ego non solum arbitrabar, his præsertim audientibus, a me informari oportere qualis esse posset is qui habitaret in subselliis, neque quicquam amplius afferret quam quod causarum necessitas postularet ; sed majus quiddam videbam, quum censebam oratorem — præsertim in nostra republica — nullius ornamenti expertem esse oportere. Tu autem, quoniam exiguis quibusdam finibus totum oratoris munus circumdedisti, hoc facilius nobis expones ea quæ abs te de officiis præceptisque oratoris quæsita sunt. Sed, opinor, secundum hunc diem. Satis enim multa a nobis hodie dicta sunt. [265] Nunc et Scævola, quoniam in Tusculanum ire constituit, paulum requiescet dum se calor frangat ; et nos ipsi, quoniam id temporis est, valetudini demus operam.” Placuit sic omnibus. Tum Scævola, “Sane,” inquit, “vellem non constituissem, in Tusculanum me hodie venturum esse, L. Ælio ; libenter audirem Antonium.” Et, quum exsurgeret, simul arridens, “Neque enim,” inquit, “tam mihi molestus fuit, quod jus nostrum civile pervellit, quam jucundus, quod se id nescire confessus est.” | LXII. When Antonius had concluded these observations, Sulpicius and Cotta appeared to be in doubt whose discourse of the two seemed to approach nearer to the truth. [263] Crassus then said, “You make our orator a mere mechanic, Antonius, but I am not certain whether you are not really of another opinion, and whether you are not practising upon us your wonderful skill in refutation, in which no one was ever your superior; a talent of which the exercise belongs properly to orators, but has now become common among philosophers, especially those who are accustomed to speak fully and fluently on both sides of any question proposed. [264] But I did not think, especially in the hearing of these young men, that merely such an orator was to be described by me, as would pass his whole life in courts of justice, and would carry thither nothing more than the necessity of his causes required; but I contemplated something greater, when I expressed my opinion that the orator, especially in such a republic as ours, ought to be deficient in nothing that could adorn his profession. But you, since you have circumscribed the whole business of an orator within such narrow limits, will explain to us with the less difficulty what you have settled as to oratorical133 duties and rules; I think, however, that this may be done to-morrow, for we have talked enough for to-day. [265] And Scaevola, since he has appointed to go to his own Tusculan seat,134 will now repose a little till the heat is abated; and let us also, as the day is so far advanced, consult our health.”135 The proposal pleased the whole company. Scaevola then said, “Indeed, I could wish that 1 had not made an appointment with Laelius to go to that part of the Tusculan territory to-day. I would willingly hear Antonius;” and, as he rose from his seat, he smiled and added, “for he did not offend me so much when he pulled our civil law to pieces, as he amused me when he professed himself ignorant of it.” |
Notes to Book 11 After his consulship, A.U.C. 691 , in the forty-fourth year of his age. 2 There was a certain course of honors through which the Romans passed. After attaining the quaestorship, they aspired to the aedileship, and then to the praetorship and consulate. Cicero was augur, quaestor, aedile, praetor, consul, and proconsul of Asia. Proust. 3 He refers to his exile, and the proposed union between Caesar and Pompey to make themselves masters of the whole commonwealth,’ a matter to which he was unwilling to allude more plainly. Ellendt. 4 Qui locus. Quae vitae pars. Proust. 5 The civil wars of Marius and Sulla. Ellendt. 6 Alluding to the conspiracy of Catiline. 7 The two books De Inventione Rhetorica. 8 Prudentissimorum. Equivalent to doctissimorum. Pearce. Some manuscripts have eruditissimorum. 9 Deliberative and judicial oratory; omitting the epideictic or demonstrative kind. 10 P. 229. Compare Ruhnken ad Lex. Timaei, v. amphilaphes, and Manutius ad Cic. Div. ii. 11, p. 254. Cicero aptly refers to that dialogue of Plato, because much is said about eloquence in it. The plane-tree was greatly admired by the Romans for its wide-spreading shade. See I. H. Vossius ad Virg. Georg. ii. 70; Plin. H. N. xii. 1; xvii, 15; Hor. Od. ii. 15. 5; Gronov. Obss. i. 5. Ellendt. 11 Crassus. 12 Crassus and Antonius. 13 Livy, xlv. 15, says that the freedmen were previously dispersed among all the four city tribes, and that Gracchus included them all in the Esquiline tribe. The object was to allow the freedmen as little influence as possible in voting. 14 Cajus Papirius Carbo, after having been a very seditious tribune, went over in his consulship to the side of the patricians, and highly extolled Lucius Opimius for killing Cajus Gracchus. But, at the expiration of his consulship, being impeached by Crassus, on what grounds we do not know, he put himself to death. Cic. Orat. iii. 20, 74; Brut. 27, 103. Ellendt. 15 An edict of the praetor forbidding something to be done, in contradistinction to a decree, which ordered something to be done. Ellendt refers to Gajus, iv. 139, 160. 16 Iusto sacramento. The sacramentum was a deposit of a certain sum of money laid down by two parties who were going to law; and when the decision was made, the victorious party received his money back, while that of the defeated party went into the public treasury Varro, L. L. v. 180. 17 Crassus was quaestor in Asia, A.U.C. 645, and, on his return, at the expiration of his office, passed through Macedonia. Ellendt. 18 See Quintilian, ii. 21. 19 Though they are philosophers, and not orators or rhetoricians. 20 De jure civili generatim in ordines aetatesque descripto. Instead of civili, the old reading was civium, in accordance with which Lambinus altered descripto into descriptorum. Civili was an innovation of Ernesti, which Ellendt condemns, and retains civium; observing that Cicero means iura civium publica singulis ordinibus et aetatibus assignata. “By ordines,” says Ernesti, “are meant patricians and plebeians, senators, knights, and classes in the census; by aetates, younger and older persons.” 21 He is frequently mentioned by the ancients; the passages relating to him have been collected by Junius de Pictura in Catal. Artif. Ernesti. See Plin. H. N. vii. 38; Plut. Sull. c. 14; Val. Max. vii. 12. 22 A Roman shipbuilder. See Turneb. Advers. xi. 2. 23 See Plin. H. N. vii. 37. Celsus often refers to his authority as the founder of a new party. Ellnedt. 24 The son of the great Cajus Marius, seven times consul, had married Mucia, the daughter of the augur Scaevola. In Cicero’s Oration for Balbus, also, c. 21, 49, where the merits of that eminent commander are celebrated, Crassus is called his affinis, relation by marriage. Henrichsen. 25 The uncle of Cnejus Pompey the Great, who had devoted excellent talents to the attainment of a thorough knowledge of civil law, geometry, and the doctrines of the Stoics. See Cic. Brut. 47; Philipp. xii. 11; Beier, ad Off. L 6- 19. Ellendt. 26 Nicander, a physician, grammarian, and poet, flourished in the time of Attalus, the second king of Pergamus, about fifty years before Christ. His Theriaca and Alexipharmaca are extant; his Georgica, to which Cicero here alludes, has perished. Henrichsen. 27 See c. x. 28 It is Lucilius the Satirist that is meant. What cause there had been for unfriendliness between him and Scaevola is unknown; perhaps he might have spoken too freely, or made some satirical remark on the accusation of Scaevola by Albucius for bribery, on which there are some verses in b. iii. o. 43. Ellendt. 29 You granted me all that I desired when you said that all arts and sciences belong, as it were, respectively to those who have invented, or profess, or study them; […] but when you said that those arts and sciences are necessary to the orator, and that he can speak upon them, if he wishes, with more elegance and effect than those who have made them their peculiar study, you seemed to take them all from me again, and to transfer them to the orator as his own property. Proust. 30 Orellius reads Haec--irrisit, where the reader will observe that the pronoun is governed by the verb. Ellendt and some others read Quae instead of Haec. Several alterations have been proposed, but none of them bring the sentence into a satisfactory state. 31 The Stoics called eloquence one of their virtues, See Quintilian, ii. 20. 32 Charmadas. 33 Quasi dedita opera. As if Charmadas himself had collected all the writers on the art of rhetoric, that he might be in a condition to prove what he now asserted; or, as if the writers on the art of rhetoric themselves had purposely abstained from attempting to be eloquent. But Charmadas was very much in the wrong; for Gorgias, Isocrates, Protagoras, Theophrastus, and other teachers of rhetoric were eminent for eloquence. Proust. 34 Two Sicilians, said to have been the most ancient writers on rhetoric. See Quintilian, iii. 1. 35 See c. 47. Cicero speaks of it as exilis, poor and dry, Brut. 44; Orat. 5. 36 Cretionibus. An heir was allowed a certain time to determine, cernere, whether he would enter upon an estate bequeathed to him, or not. See Cic. ad Att. xi. 12; xiii. 46; Gajus, Instit. ii. l64; Ulpian, Fragm. xxii. 27; Heinecc. Syntagm. ii. 14, 17. 37 Marcus Pupius Piso Calpurnianus, to whom Cicero was introduced by his father, that he might profit by his learning and experience. See Ascon. Pedian. ad Pison. 26; Cic. Brut. 67; De Nat. Deor. 7, 16. 38 Cap. xx. 39 See Val. Max. iv. 5. 4. 40 Animi atque ingenii celeres quidam motus. This sense of motus, as Ellendt observes, is borrowed from the Greek kinesis, by which the philosophers intimated an active power, as, without motion, all things would remain unchanged, and nothing be generated. See Matth. ad Cic. pro Sext. 68, 143. 41 Tametsi id accidere non potest. “Quamvis id fieri non possit, ut qui optime dicit, in exordio non perturbetur.” Proust. 42 He seems to be Quintus Fabius Maximus Eburnus, who was consul A.U.C. 638, and who, it is probable, presided as praetor on the occasion of which Crassus speaks. Ellendt. 43 A town of Caria. The Apollonius mentioned above, c. 17, was Apollonius Molo, a native of Rhodes. Proust. 44 The young Roman nobles were accustomed to pursue one of three studies, jurisprudence, eloquence, or war. Proust. 45 Cotta speaks ironically. 46 Invention, disposition, embellishment, memory, and delivery. See ii. 19. Ellendt. 47 Atque id egisse. Most critics have supposed these words in some way faulty. Gesner conjectured, atque digessisse; Lambinus, atque in artem redegisse; Ernesti, ad artemque redegisse. Ellendt supposes that id egisse may mean ei rei operam dedisse. 48 Sed iis, qui ingrediuntur. Orellius and Ellendt retain this reading, though Ernesti had long before observed that there is no verb on which iis can be considered as dependent, and that we must read ii or hi as a nominative to the following possunt. 49 Quam maxime ad veritatem accommodate, “with as much adaptation as possible to truth.” 50 See c. x. 51 Adolescens. When he imitated the practice of Carbo, be was, he says, adolescentulus. 52 A practice recommended by Quintilian, x. 5. 53 This is sufficiently explained in book ii. c. 87. See also Quint xi. 2. 54 Veste. Under this word is included tapestry, coverings of couches, and other things of that sort. 55 An illustration, says Proust, borrowed from the practice of trader who allow goods, on which they set a high value, to be seen only through lattice-work. 56 Not Quintus Scaevola the augur, the father-in-law of Crassus, in whose presence Crassus is speaking, but another Quintus Scaevola, who was an eminent lawyer, and held the office of pontifex; but at the time to which Crassus alludes he was tribune of the people, B.C. 105. Proust. 57 The cause was as follows: As Scaevola the pontiff was going into the field of Mars, to the election of consuls, he passed, in his way, through the forum, where he found two orators in much litigation, and blundering grievously through ignorance of the civil law. One of them was Hypsaeus, the other Cnejus Octavius, who had been consul B.C. 128. Hypsaeus was accusing some guardian of maladministration of the fortunes of his ward. This sort of cause was called iudicium tutelae. Octavius defended the guardian. The judge of this controversy was Marcus Crassus, then city praetor, B.C. 105. He that was condemned on such a trial, was decreed to pay damages to his ward to the amount of what his affairs had suffered through his means, and, in addition, by the law of the Twelve Tables, was to pay something by way of fine. But if the ward, or his advocate, sought to recover more from the defendant than was due, he lost his cause. Hypsaeus proceeded in this manner, and therefore ought to have been nonsuited. Octavius, an unskilful defender of his client, should have rejoiced at this, for if he had made the objection and proved it, he would have obtained his cause; but he refused to permit Hypsaeus to proceed for more than was due, though such proceeding would, by the law, have been fatal to his suit. Proust. 58 Quintus Mucius Scaevola, mentioned in the last note but one. 59 The cause was this. One man owed another a sum of money, to be paid, for instance, in the beginning of January; the plaintiff would not wait till that time, but brought his action in December; the ignorant lawyer who was for the defendant, instead of contesting with the plaintiff this point, that he demanded his money before it was due, (which if he had proved, the plaintiff would have lost his cause,) only prayed the benefit of the exception, which forbade an action to be brought for money before the day of payment, and so only put off the cause for that time. This he did not perceive to be a clause inserted for the advantage of the plaintiff, that he might know when to bring his suit. Thus the plaintiff, when the money became due, was at liberty to bring a new action, as if this matter had never come to trial, which action he could never have brought, if the first had been determined on the other point, namely, its having been brought before the money was due; for then the defendant might have pleaded a former judgment, and precluded the plaintiff from his second action. Sea Justin. Instit. iv. 13. 5. de re iudicata. “Of which sum there is a time for payment,” were words of form in the exception from whence it was nominated; as, “That the matter had before come into judgment,” were in the other exception re iudicata. Proust. B. See Gajus, Instit. iv. 131, and Heffter, Obs. on Gajus, iv. 23, p. 109 seq. Ellendt. 60 Infitiator. The defendant or debtor. 61 Petitor. The plaintiff or creditor. 62 Publius Licinius Crassus Mucianus, son of Publius Mucius Scaovola, who had been adopted into the Licinian family. He was consul with Lucius Valerius Flaccus, A.U.C. 623. […] But the name of Dives had previously been in the family of the Crassi, for Publius Crassus. who was consul with Publius Africanus, A.U.C. 549, was so called. Ellendt. 63 By birth. He had his name of Crassus from adoption, as stated in the preceding note. 64 Publius Scaevola, his brother. In the phrase, neque ilium in jure civili satis illi arti facere posse, the words illi arti are regarded by Ernesti and Orellius as spurious, but Ellendt thinks them genuine, explaining in jure civili by quod ad ius civile attinet. I have followed Orellius and Ernesti in my translation. 65 Publius Crassus. 66 Illa tempora atque illa aetas. By tempora is meant the state of the times as to political affairs; by aetas, the period of advancement in learning and civilization which Home had reached. 67 Antonius. 68 A body of inferior iudices, chosen three out of each tribe, so that the full number was a hundred and five. They took cognisance of such minor causes as the praetor entrusted to their decision. 69 Gentilitatum. Kindred or family. Persons of the same family or descent had certain peculiar rights, e.g. in entering upon an inheritance, in undertaking guardianship. In such rights slaves, freedmen, and capite deminuti had no participation. See Cic. Top. 6, 29. Proust. 70 The agnati, as a brother by the same father, a brother’s son or grandson, an uncle’s son or grandson, had their peculiar rights. See Gajus, i. 156. 71 About these, various controversies might arise; as, when the force of a river has detached a portion from your land, and added it to that of your neighbour, to whom does that portion belong? Or if trees have been carried away from your land to that of your neighbour, and have taken root there, &c. Proust. 72 When a person was obliged to let the water, which dropped from his house, run into the garden or area of his neighbour; or to receive the water that fell from his neighbour’s house into his area. Adam’s Roman Antiquities, p. 49. 73 For he who had a son under his power should have taken care to institute him his heir, or to disinherit him by name; since if a father pretermitted or passed over his son in silence, the testament was of no effect. Just. Inst. ii. 13. And if the parents disinherited their children without cause, the civil law was, that they might complain that such testaments were invalid, under color that their parents were not of sound mind when they made them. Just. Inst. ii. 18. B. 74 The son of a freedman of the Claudian family had died without making a will, and his property fell by law to the Claudii: but there were two families of them, the Claudii Pulchri, who were patricians, and the Claudii Marcelli, who were plebeians; and these two families went to law about the possession of the dead man’s property. The patrician Claudii (whose family was the eldest of the name) claimed the inheritance by right of gens, on the ground that the freedman was of the gens Claudia, of which their family was the chief; […] while the Claudii Marcelli, or plebeian Claudii, claimed it by right of stirps, on the ground that the freedman was more nearly related to them than to the Pulchri. Pearce. The term gens was used in reference to patricians; that of stirps, to plebeians. Proust. 75 Ius applicationis. This was a right which a Roman quasi-patronus had to the estate of a foreign client dying intestate. He was called quasi-patronus, because none but Roman citizens could have patrons. The difficulty in this cause proceeded from the obscurity of the law on which this kind of right was founded. 76 The services of city estates are those which appertain to buildings. It is required by city services that neighbours should bear the burdens of neighbours; and, by such services, one neighbour may be permitted to place a beam upon the wall of another; may be compelled to receive the droppings and currents from the gutter-pipes of another man’s house upon his own house, area, or sewer; or may be exempted from receiving them; or may be restrained from raising his house in height, lest he should darken the habitation of his neighbour. Harris’s Jus tinian, ii. 3. 77 There is a more particular statement of this cause between Gratidianus and Aurata in Cicero’s Offices, iii. 16. The Roman law, in that particular founded on the law of nature, ordained, to avoid deceit in bargain and sale, that the seller should give notice of all the bad qualities in the thing sold which he knew of, or pay damages to the purchaser for his silence; to which law Horace alludes, Sat. iii. 2: 78 The mistake of Bucculejus seems to have consisted in this; he meant to restrain Fufius from raising the house in height, which might darken, or making any new windows which might overlook, some neighbouring habitation which belonged to him; but by the use of words adapted by law for another purpose, he restrained himself from building within the prospect of those windows already made in the house which Fufius purchased. B. 79 In the consulship. 80 This celebrated cause is so clearly stated by Cicero as to require no explanation. It was gained by Crassus, the evident intention of the testator prevailing over the letter of the will. It is quoted as a precedent by Cicero, pro Caecina, c. 18. 81 See Florus, ii. 18; Vell. Pat. ii. 1. 82 See Cic. Topic. c. 8; Gajus, i. 129; Aul. Gell. vii. 18. 83 From philosophy. 84 This Aculeo married Cicero’s aunt by the mother’s side, as he tells us in the beginning of the second book of this treatise, c. 1, and his sons by that marriage, cousins to Cicero and his brother Quintus, were all bred up together with them, in a method approved by L. Crassus, the chief character in this dialogue, and by those very masters under whom Crassus himself had been. B. 85 Orellius retains haec aliena studia, in his text, but acknowledges aliena to be corrupt. Wyttenbach conjectured antiqua studia, for antiquitatis studia. Ellendt observes that Madvig proposed Aeliana, from Lucius Aelius Stilo, the master of Varro, extolled by Cicero, Brut. 56; Acad. i. 2, 8; Legg. ii. 23. See Suetonius, de Ill. Gramm. c. 3; and Aul. Gell. x. 21. This conjecture, says Henrichsen, will suit very well with the word hate, which Crassus may be supposed to have used, because Aelius Stilo was then alive, and engaged in those studies. 86 It appears from Quintilian and Juvenal, that this was a Roman custom as well as a Grecian, under the emperors; they are also mentioned by Ulpian. But in Cicero’s time the Patroni causarum, or advocates, though they studied nothing but oratory, and were in general ignorant of the law, yet did not make use of any of these low people called Pragmatici, as the Greeks did at that time, but upon any doubts on the law, applied themselves to men of the greatest reputation in that science, such as the Scaevolae. But under the emperors there was not the same encouragement for these great men to study that science; the orators, therefore, fell of necessity into the Grecian custom. Quint, xii. 3: “ Neque ego sum nostri moris ignarus, oblitusve eorum, qui velut ad Arculas sedent, et tela agentibus subministrant, neque idem Graecos nescio factitare, unde nomen his Pragmaticorum datum est.” Juv. Sat. vii. 123: 87 As the collection of forms published by Flavius, and from him called Ius civile Flavianum, soon grew defective, as new contracts arose every day, another was afterwards compiled, or rather only made public, by Sextus Aelius, for the forms seem to have been composed as the different emergencies arose, by such of the patricians as understood the law, and to have been by them secreted to extend their own influence; however, this collection, wherein were many new forms adapted to the cases and circumstances which had happened since the time of Flavius, went under the title of Jus Aelianum, from this Aelius here praised by Ennius. B. 88 The custom Respondendi de Iure, and the interpretations and decisions of the learned, were so universally approved, that, although they were unwritten, they became a new species of law, and were called Auctoritas, or Responsa Prudentum. This custom continued to the time of Augustus without interruption, who selected particular lawyers, and gave them the sanction of a patent; but then grew into desuetude, till Hadrian renewed this office or grant, which made so considerable a branch of the Roman law. B. 89 Iura publica. Dr. Taylor, in his History of the Roman Law, p. 62, has given us the heads of the Roman Ius publicum, which were: religion and divine worship; peace and war legislation; exchequer and res fisci; escheats; the prerogative; law of treasons; taxes and imposts; coinage; jurisdiction; magistracies; regalia; embassies; honors and titles; colleges, schools, corporations; castles and fortifications; fairs, mercats, staple; forests; naturalization. B. 90 Tanquam aliqua materies. Ernesti’s text, says Orellius, has alia, by mistake. Aliqua is not very satisfactory. Nobbe, the editor of Tauchnitz’s text, retains Ernesti’s alia. 91 The herald’s caduceus, or wand, renders his person inviolable. Pearce. 92 Ut fieri solet. Ernesti conjectures ut dici solet. Ellendt thinks the common reading right, requiring only that we should understand a commonstrantibus. 93 Not recorded with any elegance, but in the plain style in which I am now going to express myself. Ernesti. 94 Principem illum. Nempe senatus. He wag consul with Cnejus Domitius, A.U.C. 592. Ellendt. 95 The unwritten law. 96 Aliquam scientiam. For aliquam Manutius conjectured illam, which Lambinus, Ernesti, and Mueller approve. Wyttenbach suggested alienam, which has been adopted by Schutz and Orellius. I have followed Manutius. 97 Sciet—excellet. The commentators say nothing against these futures. 98 Duodecim scriptis. This was a game played with counters on a board, moved according to throws of the dice, but different from our backgammon. The reader may find all that is known of it in Adam’s Roman Antiquities, p. 423, and Smith’s Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant. art. Latrunculi. 99 Istis tragoediis tuis. Persons are said tragoedias in nugis agere, who make a small matter great by clamouring over it, as is done by actors in tragedies. Proust. See b. ii. c. 51; Quint. vi. 1. 36. 100 See Aristotle, Rhetor. ii. 2; Cic. Tusc.. Quaest. iv. 101 Most copies have aget; Pearce, with the minority, prefers agit. 102 These words are taken from a speech which Crassus had a short time before delivered in an assembly of the people, and in which he had made severe complaints of the Roman knights, who exercised their judicial powers with severity and injustice, and gave great trouble to the senate. Crassus took the part of the senate, and addressed the exhortation in the text to the people. Proust. Crassus was supporting the Servilian law. Manutius. 103 Ut illi ajunt. The philosophers, especially the Stoics, who affirmed that the wise man alone is happy. Ellendt. 104 See the Paradox of Cicero on the words Omnes sapientes liberi, omnes stulti servi. 105 Mentioned by Cic. Brut. c. 30. Proust. He was a perfect Stoic. Ellendt. 106 A work on the origin of the people and cities of Italy, and other matters, now lost. Cic. Brut. c. 85; Corn. Nep. Life of Cato, c. 3. 107 When a soldier, in the hearing of three or more of his comrades, named some one his heir in case he should fall in the engagement. 108 When a person, in the presence of five witnesses and a libripens, assigned his property to somebody as his heir. Gajus, ii. 101; Aul. Gell. xv. 27. 109 He was falsely accused of extortion in his province of Asia, and, being condemned, was sent into exile. Cic. Brut. c. 30. Proust. 110 Shoes made at Sicyon, and worn only by the effeminate and luxurious. Lucret. iv. 1121. 111 Tum, quum dicebas, non videbam. Many copies omit the negative, an omission approved by Ernesti, Henrichsen, and Ellendt. 112 Either Scaevola, the father-in-law of Crassus, or Lucius Coelius Antipater, whom Cicero mentions in his Brutus. Proust. 113 Praeco actionum. One who informs those who are ignorant of law when the courts will be open; by what kind of suit any person must prosecute his claims on any other person; and acts in law proceedings as another sort of praeco acts at auctions. Strobaeus. 114 Herctum cieri--herciscundae familiae. Co-heirs, when an estate descended amongst them, were, by the Roman law, bound to each other by the action familiae herciscundae; that is, to divide the whole family inheritance, and settle all the accounts which related to it. Just. Inst. iii. 28. 4. The word herctum, says Festus, signifies whole or undivided, and cio, to divide; so, familiam herctam ciere was to divide the inheritance of the family, which two words, herctum ciere, were afterwards contracted into herciscere: hence this law-term used here, familiam herciscere. Servius has, therefore, from Donatus, thus illustrated a passage in Virgil, at the end of the VIIth Aeneid, 115 See c. 39. 116 C. 40. 117 C. 40 118 The Crassus here mentioned was Publius Crassus Dives, brother of Publius Mucius, Pontifex Maximus. See c. 37. Ellendt. 119 Cicero pro Caecina, c. 25; Gajus, ii. 138. 120 Omnem hanc partem iuris in controversiis. For in controversiis Lanibinus and Ernesti would read, from a correction in an old copy, incontroversi; but as tnsre is no authority for this word, Ellendt, with Bakius, prefers non controversi. With this alteration, the sense will be “all this uncontroverted part of the law.” 121 Certain legal formulae, of which some lawyer named Hostilius was the author. Ernesti. 122 Manilianos--leges. They were formulae which those who wished not to be deceived might use in buying and selling; they are called actiones by Varro, R. R. ii. 5, 11. […] The author was Manius Manilius, an eminent lawyer, who was consul A.U.C. 603. Ernesti, 123 There is no proper grammatical construction in this sentence. Ernesti observes that it is, perhaps, in some way unsound. 124 In Iure. “Apud tribunal praetoris.” Ernesti. 125 I translate the conclusion of this sentence in conformity with the text of Orellius, who puts tamen at the end of it, instead of letting it stand at the beginning of the next sentence, as is the case in other editions. His interpretation is, invisere saltem. “Though we be much occupied, yet we can visit our farms.” 126 He wrote eight-and-twenty books on country affairs in the Punic language, which were translated into Latin, by order of the senate, by Cassius Dionysius of Utica. See Varro, R. R. i. 1; and Columella. who calls him the father of farming. Proust. 127 Quum in rem praesentem non venimus. We do not go ad locum, unde praesentes rem et fines inspicere possimus. Ellendt. 128 Perscriptionibus. Perscriptio is considered by Ellendt to signify a draft or checque to be presented to a banker. 129 Graecorum more et tragoedorum. Lambinus would strike out et, on the authority of three manuscripts; and Pearce thinks that the conjunction ought to be absent. Ernesti thinks that some substantive belonging to Graecorum has dropped out of the text. A Leipsic edition, he observes, has Graecorum more sophistarum et tragoedorum, but on what authority he does not know. 130 Paeanem aut munionem. The word munionem is corrupt. Many editions have nomium, which is left equally unexplained. The best conjectural emendation, as Orellius observes, is nomum, proposed by a critic of Jena, 131 Ernesti supposes him to be Cajus Cassius Longinus, who is mentioned by Cicero, pro Planco, c. 24. 132 In one period or sentence he twice raised and twice lowered his voice: he raised it in the former members of the period, and lowered it in the latter; and this he did in one breath. Proust. This seems not quite correct. Cicero appears to mean, that of the two members the voice was once raised and once lowered in each. 133 Orellius’s text has praeceptis oratoris; but we must undoubtedly read oratoriis with Pearce. 134 Atticus was exceedingly pleased with this treatise, and commended it extremely, but objected to the dismission of Scaevola from the disputation, after he had been introduced into the first dialogue. Cicero defends himself by the example of their “god Plato,” as he calls him, in his book De Republica; where the scene being laid in the house of an old gentleman, Cephalus, the old man, after hearing a part in the first conversation, excuses himself, saying, that he must go to prayers, and returns no more, Plato not thinking it suitable to his age to be detained in the company through so long a discourse. With greater reason, therefore, he says that he had used the same caution in the case of Scaevola; since it was not to be supposed that a person of his dignity, extreme age, and infirm health, would spend several successive days in another man’s house: that the first day’s dialogue related to his particular profession, but the other two chiefly to the rules and precepts of the art, at which it was not proper for one of Scaevola’s temper and character to be present only as a hearer. Ad Attic, iv. 16. B. 135 Retire from the heat, like Scaevola, and take rest. |
Liber Secundus
[I] [1] Magna — nobis pueris, Quinte frater, si memoria tenes — opinio fuit L. Crassum non plus attigisse doctrinæ, quam quantum prima illa puerili institutione potuisset ; M. autem Antonium omnino omnis eruditionis expertem atque ignarum fuisse. Erantque multi qui, quanquam non ita sese rem habere arbitrarentur, tamen, quo facilius nos incensos studio dicendi a doctrina deterrerent, libenter id quod dixi, de illis oratoribus prædicarent, ut, si homines non eruditi summam essent prudentiam atque incredibilem eloquentiam consecuti, inanis omnis noster esse labor, et stultum in nobis erudiendis, patris nostri, optimi ac prudentissimi viri, studium videretur. [2] Quos tum, ut pueri, refutare domesticis testibus — patre et C. Aculeone propinquo nostro et L. Cicerone patruo — solebamus, quod de Crasso pater et Aculeo (quocum erat nostra matertera), quem Crassus dilexit ex omnibus plurimum, et patruus (qui cum Antonio in Ciliciam profectus una decesserat), multa nobis de ejus studio et doctrina sæpe narravit. Quumque nos (cum consobrinis nostris, Aculeonis filiis) et ea disceremus quæ Crasso placerent, et ab his doctoribus quibus ille uteretur, erudiremur, etiam illud sæpe intelleximus — quum essemus ejus domi, quod vel pueri sentire poteramus — illum et Græce sic loqui, nullam ut nosse aliam linguam videretur, et doctoribus nostris ea ponere in percontando, eaque ipsum omni in sermone tractare, ut nihil esse ei novum, nihil inauditum videretur. [3] De Antonio vero, quanquam sæpe ex humanissimo homine, patruo nostro, acceperamus, quemadmodum ille vel Athenis vel Rhodi se doctissimorum hominum sermonibus dedisset, tamen ipse adulescentulus — quantum illius ineuntis ætatis meæ patiebatur pudor — multa ex eo sæpe quæsivi. Non erit profecto tibi, quod scribo, hoc novum ; nam jam tum ex me audiebas, mihi illum ex multis variisque sermonibus, nullius rei — quæ quidem esset in his artibus de quibus aliquid existimare possem — rudem aut ignarum esse visum. [4] Sed fuit hoc in utroque eorum, ut Crassus non tam existimari vellet, non didicisse quam illa despicere, et nostrorum hominum in omni genere prudentiam Græcis anteferre ; Antonius autem probabiliorem huic populo orationem fore censebat suam, si omnino didicisse nunquam putaretur ; atque ita se uterque graviorem fore, si alter contemnere, alter ne nosse quidem Græcos videretur. [5] Quorum consilium quale fuerit, nihil sane ad hoc tempus ; illud autem est hujus institutæ scriptionis ac temporis, neminem eloquentia non modo sine dicendi doctrina, sed ne sine omni quidem sapientia, florere unquam et præstare potuisse. |
I. [1] THERE was, if you remember, brother Quintus, a strong persuasion in us when we were boys, that Lucius Crassus had acquired no more learning than he had been enabled to gain from instruction in his youth, and that Marcus Antonius was entirely destitute and ignorant of all erudition whatsoever; and there were many who, though they did not believe that such was really the case, yet, that they might more easily deter us from the pursuit of learning, when we were inflamed with a desire of attaining it, took a pleasure in reporting what I have said of those orators; so that, if men of no learning had acquired the greatest wisdom, and an incredible degree of eloquence, all our industry might seem vain, and the earnest perseverance of our father, one of the best and most sensible of men, in educating us, might appear to be folly. [2] These reasoners we, as boys, used at that time to refute with the aid of witnesses whom we had at home, our father, Caius Aculeo our relative, and Lucius Cicero our uncle; for our father, Aculeo (who married our mother’s sister, and whom Crassus esteemed the most of all his friends), and our own uncle (who went with Antonius into Cilicia, and quitted it at the same time with him), often told us many particulars about Crassus, relative to his studies and learning; and as we, with our cousins, Aculeo’s sons, learned what Crassus approved, and were instructed by the masters whom he engaged, we had also frequent opportunities of observing (since, though boys,1 we could understand this) that he spoke Greek so well that he might have been thought not to know any other language, and he put such questions to our masters, and discoursed upon such subjects in his conversation with them, that nothing appeared to be new or strange to him. [3] But with regard to Antonius, although we had frequently heard from our uncle, a person of the greatest learning, how he had devoted himself, both at Athens and at Rhodes, to the conversation of the most learned men; yet I myself also, when quite a youth, often asked him many questions on the subject, as far as the bashfulness of my early years would permit. What I am writing will certainly not be new to you, (for at that very time you heard it from me,) namely, that from many and various conversations, he appeared to me neither ignorant nor unaccomplished in anything in those branches of knowledge of which I could form any opinion. [4] But there was such peculiarity in each, that Crassus desired not so much to be thought unlearned as to hold learning in contempt, and to prefer, on every subject, the understanding of our countrymen to that of the Greeks; while Antonius thought that his oratory would be better received by the Roman people, if he were believed to have had no learning at all; and thus the one imagined that he should have more authority if he appeared to despise the Greeks, and the other if he seemed to know nothing of them. [5] But what their object was, is certainly nothing to our present purpose. It is pertinent, however, to the treatise which I have commenced, and to this portion of it, to remark that no man could ever excel and reach eminence in eloquence without learning, not only the art of oratory, but every branch of useful knowledge. |
[II] Etenim ceteræ fere artes se ipsæ per se tuentur singulæ ; bene dicere autem, quod est scienter et perite et ornate dicere, non habet definitam aliquam regionem cujus terminis sæpta teneatur : omnia quæcunque in hominum disceptationem cadere possunt bene sunt ei dicenda qui hoc se posse profitetur — aut eloquentiæ nomen relinquendum est. [6] Quare, equidem et in nostra civitate et in ipsa Græcia (quæ semper hæc summa duxit) multos et ingeniis excellentes et magna laude dicendi sine summa rerum omnium scientia, fuisse fateor ; talem vero exsistere eloquentiam, qualis fuit in Crasso et Antonio, non cognitis rebus omnibus quæ ad tantam prudentiam pertinerent, tantamque dicendi copiam, quanta in illis fuit, non potuisse confirmo. [7] Quo etiam feci libentius, ut eum sermonem quem illi quondam inter se de his rebus habuissent, mandarem litteris :
|
II. For almost all other arts can support themselves independently, and by their own resources; but to speak well, that is, to speak with learning, and skill, and elegance, has no definite province within the limits of which it is enclosed and restricted. Everything that can possibly fall under discussion among mankind, must be effectively treated by him who professes that he can practise this art, or he must relinquish all title to eloquence. [6] For my own part, therefore, though I confess that both in our own country and in Greece itself, which always held this art in the highest estimation, there have arisen many men of extraordinary powers, and of the highest excellence in speaking,2 without this absolute knowledge of everything; yet I affirm that such a degree of eloquence as was in Crassus and Antonius, could not exist without a knowledge of all subjects that contribute to form that wisdom and that force of oratory which were seen in them. [7] On this account, I had the greater satisfaction in committing to writing that dialogue which they formerly held on these subjects; both that the notion which had always prevailed, that the one had no great learning, and that the other was wholly unlearned, might be eradicated, and that I might preserve, in the records of literature, the opinions which I thought divinely delivered by those consummate orators concerning eloquence, if I could by any means learn and fully register them; and also, indeed, that I might, as far as I should be able, rescue their fame, now upon the decline, from silence and oblivion. If they could have been known from writings of their own, I should, perhaps, have [8] thought it less necessary for me to be thus elaborate; but as one left but little in writing, (at least, there is little extant,) and that he wrote in his youth,3 the other almost nothing, I thought it due from me to men of such genius, while we still retain a lively remembrance of them, to render their fame, if I could, imperishable. [9] I enter upon this undertaking with the greater hopes of effecting my object,4 because I am not writing of the eloquence of Servius Galba or Caius Carbo, concerning which I should be at liberty to invent whatever I pleased, as no one now living could confute me; but I publish an account to be read by those who have frequently heard the men themselves of whom I am speaking, that I may commend those two illustrious men to such as have never seen either of them, from the recollection, as a testimony, of those to whom both those orators were known, and who are now alive and present among us. |
[III] [10] Nec vero te, carissime frater atque optime, rhetoricis nunc quibusdam libris — quos tu agrestes putas — insequor ut erudiam ; ¿quid enim tua potest esse oratione aut subtilius aut ornatius? Sed
|
III. [10] Nor do I now aim at instructing you, dearest and best of brothers, by means of rhetorical treatises, which you regard as unpolished; (for what can be more refined or graceful than your own language?) but though, whether it be, as you use to say, from judgment, or, as Isocrates, the father of eloquence, has written of himself, from a sort of bashfulness and ingenuous timidity, that you have shrunk from speaking in public, or whether, as you sometimes jocosely remark, you thought one orator sufficient, not only for one family, but almost for a whole community, I yet think that these books will not appear to you of that kind which may deservedly be ridiculed on account of the deficiency in elegant learning in those who have discussed the art of speaking; [11] for nothing seems to me to be wanting in the conversation of Crassus and Antonius, that any one could imagine possible to be known or understood by men of the greatest genius, the keenest application, the most consummate learning, and the utmost experience; as you will very easily be able to judge, who have been pleased to acquire the knowledge and theory of oratory through your own exertions, and to observe the practice of it in mine. But that we may the sooner accomplish the task which we have undertaken, and which is no ordinary one, let us leave our exordium, and proceed to the conversation and arguments of the characters whom I have offered to your notice. |
[12] Postero igitur die quam illa erant acta, hora fere secunda, quum etiam tum in lecto Crassus esset et apud eum Sulpicius sederet, Antonius autem inambularet cum Cotta in porticu, repente eo Q. Catulus senex cum C. Julio fratre venit ; quod ubi audivit, commotus Crassus surrexit, omnesque admirati, majorem aliquam esse causam eorum adventus suspicati sunt. [13] Qui quum inter se, ut ipsorum usus ferebat, amicissime consalutassent : “¿Quid vos tandem?” Crassus, “¿Num quidnam,” inquit, “novi?” “Nihil sane,” inquit Catulus, “etenim vides esse ludos. Sed — vel tu nos ineptos licet,” inquit, “vel molestos putes — quum ad me in Tusculanum,” inquit, “heri vesperi venisset Cæsar de Tusculano suo, dixit mihi a se Scævolam hinc euntem esse conventum, ex quo mira quædam se audisse dicebat ; te, quem ego totiens omni ratione temptans ad disputandum elicere non potuissem, permulta de eloquentia cum Antonio disseruisse et tanquam in schola, prope ad Græcorum consuetudinem, disputasse. [14] Ita me frater exoravit (ne ipsum quidem a studio audiendi nimis abhorrentem, sed mehercule verentem, ne molesti vobis interveniremus) ut huc secum venirem ; Scævolam etenim ita dicere ajebat, bonam partem sermonis in hunc diem esse dilatam. Hoc tu si cupidius factum existimas, Cæsari attribues ; si familiarius, utrique nostrum ; nos quidem, nisi forte molesti intervenimus, venisse delectat.” |
[12] The next day, then, after the former conversation had taken place, about the second hour,5 while Crassus was yet in bed, and Sulpicius sitting by him, and Antonius walking with Cotta in the portico, on a sudden Quintus Catulus6 the elder, with his brother Caius Julius,7 arrived there; and when Crassus heard of their coming, he arose in some haste, and they were all in a state of wonder, suspecting that the occasion of their arrival was of more than common importance. [13] The parties having greeted each other with most friendly salutations, as their intimacy required, “What has brought, you hither at last?” said Crassus; “is it anything new?” “Nothing, indeed,” said Catulus; “for you know it is the time of the public games. But (you may think us, if you please,” added he, “either foolish or impertinent) when Caesar came yesterday in the evening to my Tusculan villa, from his own, he told me that he had met Scaevola going from hence; from whom he said that he had heard a wonderful account, namely, that you, whom I could never entice into such conversation, though I endeavoured to prevail on you in every way, had held long dissertations with Antonius on eloquence, and had disputed, as in the schools, almost in the manner of the Greeks; [14] and my brother, therefore, entreated me, not being of myself, indeed, averse to hear you, but, at the same time, afraid we might make a troublesome visit to you, to come hither with him; for he said that Scaevola had told him that a great part of the discourse was postponed till to-day. If you think we have acted too forwardly, you will lay the blame upon Caesar, if too familiarly, upon both of us; for we are rejoiced to have come, if we do not give you trouble by our visit.” |
[IV] [15] Tum Crassus, “equidem, quæcunque vos causa huc attulisset, lætarer, quum apud me viderem homines mihi carissimos et amicissimos ; sed tamen — vere dicam — quævis mallem fuisset, quam ista quam dicis. Ego enim, ut quemadmodum sentio loquar, nunquam mihi minus quam hesterno die placui ; magis, adeo, id facilitate, quam alia ulla culpa mea, contigit, qui, dum obsequor adulescentibus, me senem esse sum oblitus fecique id, quod ne adulescens quidem feceram, ut eis de rebus quæ doctrina aliqua continerentur, disputarem. Sed hoc tamen cecidit mihi peropportune, quod, transactis jam meis partibus, ad Antonium audiendum venistis.” [16] Tum Cæsar, “Equidem,” inquit, “Crasse, ita sum cupidus te in illa longiore ac perpetua disputatione audiendi, ut, si id mihi minus contingat, vel hoc sim quotidiano tuo sermone contentus. Itaque experiar equidem illud : ut ne Sulpicius familiaris meus aut Cotta plus quam ego apud te valere videantur ; et te exorabo profecto, ut mihi quoque et Catulo tuæ suavitatis aliquid impertias. Sin tibi id minus libebit, non te urgebo neque committam ut, dum vereare tu ne sis ‘ineptus,’ me esse judices.” [17] Tum ille, “Ego mehercule,” inquit, “Cæsar, ex omnibus Latinis verbis, hujus verbi vim vel maximam semper putavi. Quem enim nos ‘ineptum’ vocamus, is mihi videtur ab hoc nomen habere ductum, quod ‘non’ sit ‘aptus,’ idque in sermonis nostri consuetudine perlate patet ; nam qui aut tempus quid postulet non videt, aut plura loquitur, aut se ostentat, aut eorum, quibuscum est, vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habet, aut denique in aliquo genere aut inconcinnus aut multus est, is ‘ineptus’ esse dicitur. [18] Hoc vitio cumulata est eruditissima illa Græcorum natio ; itaque quod vim hujus mali Græci non vident, ne nomen quidem ei vitio imposuerunt ; ut enim quæras omnia, quomodo Græci ‘ineptum’ appellent, non reperies. Omnium autem ineptiarum (quæ sunt innumerabiles) haud sciam an nulla sit major quam — ut illi solent — quocunque in loco, quoscunque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis, aut non necessariis, argutissime disputare. Hoc nos ab istis adulescentibus facere inviti et recusantes heri coacti sumus.” |
IV. [15] Crassus replied, “Whatever object had brought you hither. I should rejoice to see at my house men for whom I have so much affection and friendship; but yet, (to say the truth,) I had rather it had been any other object than that which you mention. For I, (to speak as I think,) was never less satisfied with myself than yesterday; though this happened more through my own good nature than any other fault of mine; for, while I complied with the request of these youths, I forgot that I was an old man, and did that which I had never done even when young; I spoke on subjects that depended on a certain degree of learning. But it has happened very fortunately for me, that as my part is finished, you have come to hear Antonius.” [16] “For my part, Crassus,” returned Caesar, “I am indeed desirous to hear you in that kind of fuller and continuous discussion, yet so that, if I cannot have that happiness, I can be contented with your ordinary conversation. I will therefore endeavour that neither my friend Sulpicius, nor Cotta, may seem to have more influence with you than myself; and will certainly entreat you to show some of your good nature even to Catulus and me. But if you are not so inclined, I will not press you, nor cause you, while you are afraid of appearing impertinent yourself, to think me impertinent.” [17] “Indeed, Caesar,” replied Crassus, “I have always thought of all Latin words there was the greatest significance in that which you have just used; for he whom we call impertinent, seems to me to bear an appellation derived from not being pertinent; and that appellation, according to our mode of speaking, is of very extensive meaning; for whoever either does not discern what occasion requires, or talks too much, or is ostentatious of himself, or is forgetful either of the dignity or convenience of those in whose presence he is, or is in any respect awkward or presuming, is called impertinent. [18] With this fault that most learned nation of the Greeks abounds; and, consequently, because the Greeks do not feel the influence of this evil, they have not even found a name for the foible; for though you make the most diligent inquiry, you will not find out how the Greeks designate an impertinent person. But of all their other impertinences, which are innumerable, I do not know whether there be any greater than their custom of raising the most subtile disputatious on the most difficult or unnecessary points, in whatever place, and before whatever persons they think proper. This we were compelled to do by these youths yesterday, though against our will, and though we at first declined.” |
[V] [19] Tum Catulus, “ne Græci quidem,” inquit, “Crasse, qui in civitatibus suis clari et magni fuerunt — sicuti tu es, nosque omnes in nostra republica volumus esse — horum Græcorum, qui se inculcant auribus nostris, similes fuerunt, nec in otio sermones hujusmodi disputationesque fugiebant. [20] Ac si tibi videntur qui temporis, qui loci, qui hominum rationem non habent, inepti — sicut debent videri — ¿num tandem aut locus hic non idoneus videtur, in quo porticus hæc ipsa, ubi ambulamus, et palæstra, et tot locis sessiones, gymnasiorum et Græcorum disputationum memoriam quodammodo commovent? ¿Aut num importunum tempus in tanto otio, quod et raro datur, et nunc peroptato nobis datum est? ¿Aut homines ab hoc genere disputationis alieni, qui omnes ii sumus, ut sine his studiis vitam nullam esse ducamus?” [21] “Omnia ista,” inquit Crassus, “ego alio modo interpretor, qui primum palæstram et sedes et porticus etiam ipsos, Catule, Græcos exercitationis et delectationis causa, non disputationis, invenisse arbitror. Nam et sæculis multis ante gymnasia inventa sunt, quam in eis philosophi garrire cœperunt ; et hoc ipso tempore, quum omnia gymnasia philosophi teneant, tamen eorum auditores discum audire quam philosophum malunt ; qui simul ut increpuit, in media oratione de maximis rebus et gravissimis disputantem philosophum omnes unctionis causa relinquunt ; ita levissimam delectationem gravissimæ, ut ipsi ferunt, utilitati anteponunt. [22] Otium autem quod dicis esse, assentior ; verum otii fructus est non contentio animi, sed relaxatio. |
V. [19] “The Greeks, however, Crassus,” rejoined Catulus, “who were eminent and illustrious in their respective states, as you are, and as we all desire to be, in our own republic, bore no resemblance to those Greeks who force themselves on our ears; yet they did not in their leisure avoid this kind of discourse and disputation. [20] And if they seem to you, as they ought to seem, impertinent, who have no regard to times, places, or persons, does this place, I pray, seem ill adapted to our purpose, in which the very portico where we are walking, and this field of exercise, and the seats in so many directions, revive in some degree the remembrance of the Greek gymnasia and disputations? Or is the time unseasonable, during so much leisure as is seldom afforded us, and is now afforded at a season when it is most desirable? Or are the company unsuited to this kind of discussion, when we are all of such a character as to think that life is nothing without these studies?” [21] “I contemplate all these things,” said Crassus, “in a quite different light; for I think that even the Greeks themselves originally contrived their palaestrae, and seats, and porticoes, for exercise and amusement, not for disputation; since their gymnasia were invented many generations before the philosophers began to prate in them; and at this very day, when the philosophers occupy all the gymnasia, their audience would still rather hear the discus than a philosopher; and as soon as it begins to sound, they all desert the philosopher in the middle of his discourse, though discussing matters of the utmost weight and consequence, to anoint themselves for exercise; thus preferring the lightest amusement to what the philosophers represent to be of the utmost utility. As to the leisure which you say we have, I agree with you; [22] but the enjoyment of leisure is not exertion of mind, but relaxation. |
[VI] Sæpe ex socero meo audivi, quum is diceret socerum suum Lælium semper fere cum Scipione solitum rusticari eosque incredibiliter repuerascere esse solitos, quum rus ex urbe tanquam e vinculis evolavissent. Non audeo dicere de talibus viris, sed tamen ita solet narrare Scævola, conchas eos et umbilicos ad Cajetam et ad Lavernium legere consuesse, et ad omnem animi remissionem ludumque descendere. [23] Sic enim sese res habet, ut, quemadmodum volucres videmus, procreationis atque utilitatis suæ causa, effingere et construere nidos, easdem autem, quum aliquid effecerint, levandi laboris sui causa, passim ac libere, solutas opere, volitare ; sic nostri animi, forensibus negotiis atque urbano opere defessi, gestiant ac volitare cupiant, vacui cura ac labore. [24] Itaque illud quod ego in causa Curiana Scævolæ dixi, non dixi secus ac sentiebam : “Nam si,” inquam, “Scævola, nullum erit testamentum recte factum, nisi quod tu scripseris, omnes ad te cives cum tabulis veniemus, omnium testamenta tu scribes unus. ¿Quid igitur?” inquam, “Quando ages negotium publicum? ¿Quando amicorum? ¿Quando tuum? Quando denique nihil ages?” Tum illud addidi, “Mihi enim liber esse non videtur, qui non aliquando nihil agit.” In qua permaneo, Catule, sententia ; meque, quum huc veni, hoc ipsum nihil agere et plane cessare delectat. [25] Nam, quod addidisti tertium, vos esse eos qui vitam insuavem sine his studiis putaretis, id me non modo non hortatur ad disputandum, sed etiam deterret. Nam ut C. Lucilius, homo doctus et perurbanus, dicere solebat, ea quæ scriberet, neque ab indoctissimis se, neque a doctissimis legi velle ; quod alteri nihil intellegerent, alteri plus fortasse quam ipse ; de quo etiam scripsit, “Persium non curo legere,” — hic fuit enim (ut noramus) omnium fere nostrorum hominum doctissimus — “Lælium Decumum volo” (quem cognovimus virum bonum et non illitteratum, sed nihil ad Persium) ; sic ego, si jam mihi disputandum sit de his nostris studiis, nolim equidem apud rusticos, sed multo minus apud vos ; malo enim non intellegi orationem meam quam reprehendi.” |
VI. I have often heard from my father-in-law, in conversation, that his father-in-law Laelius was almost always accustomed to go into the country with Scipio, and that they used to grow incredibly boyish again when they had escaped out of town, as if from a prison, into the open fields. I scarcely dare to say it of such eminent persons yet Scaevola is in the habit of relating that they used to gather shells and pebbles at Caieta and Laurentum, and to descend to every sort of pastime and amusement. [23] For such is the case, that as we see birds form and build nests for the sake of procreation and their own convenience, and, when they have completed any part, fly abroad in freedom, disengaged from their toils, in order to alleviate their anxiety; so our minds, wearied with legal business and the labors of the city, exult and long to flutter about, as it were, relieved from care and solicitude. [24] In what I said to Scaevola, therefore, in pleading for Curius,8 I said only what I thought. ‘For if,’ said I, ‘Scaevola, no will shall be properly made but what is of your writing, all of us citizens will come to you with our tablets, and you alone shall write all our wills; but then,’ continued I, ‘when will you attend to public business? when to that of your friends 1 when to your own? when, in -a word, will you do nothing?’ adding, ‘for he does not seem to me to be a free man, who does not sometimes do nothing;’ of which opinion, Catulus, I still continue; and, when I come hither, the mere privilege of doing nothing, and of being fairly idle, delights me. [25] As to the third remark which you added, that you are of such a disposition as to think life insipid without these studies, that observation not only does not encourage me to any discussion, but even deters me from it. For as Caius Lucilius, a man of great learning and wit, used to say, that what he wrote he would neither wish to have read by the most illiterate persons, nor by those of the greatest learning, since the one sort understood nothing, and the other perhaps more than himself; to which purpose he also wrote, I do not care to be read by Persius9 (for he was, as we know, about the most learned of all our countrymen); but I wish to be read by Laelius Decimus (whom we also knew, a man of worth and of some learning, but nothing to Persius); so I, if I am now to discuss these studies of ours, should not wish to do so before peasants, but much less before you; for I had rather that my talk should not be understood than be censured.” |
[VII] [26] Tum Cæsar, “equidem,” inquit, “Catule, jam mihi videor navasse operam, quod huc venerim ; nam hæc ipsa recusatio disputationis disputatio quædam fuit mihi quidem perjucunda. ¿Sed cur impedimus Antonium — cujus audio esse partes, ut de tota eloquentia disserat, quemque jamdudum et Cotta et Sulpicius exspectant?” [27] “Ego vero,” inquit Crassus, “neque Antonium verbum facere patiar, et ipse obmutescam, nisi prius a vobis impetraro…” “Quidnam?” inquit Catulus. Tum, quum ille dubitaret, quod ad fratrem promiserat, “Ego,” inquit Julius, “pro utroque respondeo. ☺ Sic faciemus ; atque ista quidem condicione — vel ut verbum nullum faceres — me teneres. ☺” [28] Hic Catulus arrisit et simul, “Præcisa,” inquit, “mihi quidem est dubitatio, quoniam neque domi imperaram, et hic apud quem eram futurus, sine mea sententia tam facile promisit." |
VII. [26] “Indeed, Catulus,” rejoined Caesar, “I think I have already gained some profit10 by coming hither; for these reasons for declining a discussion have been to me a very agreeable discussion. But why do we delay Antonius, whose part is, I hear, to give a dissertation upon eloquence in general, and for whom Cotta and Sulpicius have been some time waiting?” [27] “But I,” interposed Crassus, “will neither allow Antonius to speak a word, nor will I utter a syllable myself, unless I first obtain one favor from you.” “What is it?” said Catulus. “That you spend the day here.” Then, while Catulus hesitated, because he had promised to go to his brother’s house, “I,” said Julius, “will answer for both. We will do so; and you would detain me even in case you were not to say a single word.” [28] Here Catulus smiled, and said, “My hesitation then is brought to an end; for I had left no orders at home, and he, at whose house I was to have been, has thus readily engaged us to you, without waiting for my assent.” |
Tum omnes oculos in Antonium conjecerunt ; et ille, “¡Audite vero, audite!” inquit. “Hominem enim audietis de schola atque a magistro et Græcis litteris eruditum ; et eo quidem loquar confidentius, quod Catulus auditor accessit, cui non solum nos Latini sermonis, sed etiam Græci ipsi solent suæ linguæ, subtilitatem elegantiamque concedere. [29] ☺ Sed quia tamen hoc totum, quicquid est — sive artificium sive studium dicendi —, nisi accessit os, nullum potest esse, docebo vos, discipuli, quod ipse non didici : quid de omni genere dicendi sentiam. ☺” [30] Hic posteaquam arriserunt, “Res mihi videtur esse,” inquit, “facultate præclara, arte mediocris. Ars enim earum rerum est quæ sciuntur ; oratoris autem omnis actio opinionibus, non scientia, continetur. Nam et apud eos dicimus qui nesciunt, et ea dicimus, quæ nescimus ipsi ; itaque et illi alias aliud eisdem de rebus et sentiunt et judicant, et nos contrarias sæpe causas dicimus — non modo ut Crassus contra me dicat aliquando, aut ego contra Crassum, quum alterutri necesse sit falsum dicere, sed etiam ut uterque nostrum eadem de re alias aliud defendat, quum plus uno verum esse non possit. Ut igitur in ejusmodi re, quæ mendacio nixa sit, quæ ad scientiam non sæpe perveniat, quæ opiniones hominum, et sæpe errores, aucupetur, ita dicam, si causam putatis esse, cur audiatis.” |
They then all turned their eyes upon Antonius, who cried out, “Be attentive, I say, be attentive, for you shall hear a man from the schools, a man from the professor’s chair, deeply versed in Greek learning;11 and I shall on this account speak with the greater confidence, that Catulus is added to the audience, to whom not only we of the Latin tongue, but even the Greeks themselves, are wont to allow refinement and elegance in the Greek language. [29] But since the whole process of speaking, whether it be an art or a business, can be of no avail without the addition of assurance, I will teach you, my scholars, that which I have not learned myself, what I think of every kind of speaking.” [30] When they all laughed, “It is a matter that seems to me,” proceeded he, “to depend very greatly on talent, but only moderately on art; for art lies in things which are known; but all the pleading of an orator depends not on knowledge, but on opinion; for we both address ourselves to those who are ignorant, and speak of what we do not know ourselves; and consequently our hearers think and judge differently at different times concerning the same subjects, and we often take contrary sides, not only so that Crassus sometimes speaks against me, or I against Crassus, when one of us must of necessity advance what is false; but even that each of as, at different times, maintains different opinions on the same question; when more than one of those opinions cannot possibly be right. I will speak, therefore, as on a subject which is of a character to defend falsehood, which rarely arrives at knowledge,12 and which is ready to take advantage of the opinions and even errors of mankind, if you think that there is still reason why you should listen to me.” |
[VIII] [31] “Nos vero et valde quidem,” Catulus inquit, “putamus atque eo magis, quod nulla mihi ostentatione videris esse usurus. Exorsus es enim non gloriose ; magis, ut tu putas, a veritate quam a nescio qua dignitate.” [32] “Ut igitur de ipso genere sum confessus,” inquit Antonius, “artem esse non maximam, sic illud affirmo, præcepta posse quædam dari peracuta ad pertractandos animos hominum et ad excipiendas eorum voluntates. Hujus rei scientiam, si quis volet magnam quandam artem esse dicere, non repugnabo. Etenim quum plerique temere ac nulla ratione causas in foro dicant, nonnulli autem propter exercitationem, aut propter consuetudinem aliquam, callidius id faciant, non est dubium quin, si quis animadverterit, quid sit, quare alii melius quam alii dicant, id possit notare. Ergo id qui toto in genere fecerit, is si non plane artem, at quasi artem quandam invenerit. [33] Atque ¡utinam, ut mihi illa videre videor in foro atque in causis, item nunc, quemadmodum ea reperirentur, possem vobis exquirere! Sed de me videro ; nunc hoc propono, quod mihi persuasi, quamvis ars non sit, tamen nihil esse perfecto oratore præclarius. Nam ut usum dicendi omittam, qui in omni pacata et libera civitate dominatur, tanta oblectatio est in ipsa facultate dicendi, ut nihil hominum aut auribus aut mentibus jucundius percipi possit. [34] ¿Qui enim cantus moderata oratione dulcior inveniri potest? ¿Quod carmen artificiosa verborum conclusione aptius? ¿Qui actor in imitanda, quam orator in suscipienda, veritate jucundior? ¿Quid autem subtilius quam acutæ crebræque sententiæ? ¿Quid admirabilius quam res splendore illustrata verborum? ¿Quid plenius, quam omni rerum genere cumulata oratio? Neque ulla non propria oratoris est res, quæ quidem ornate dici graviterque debet. |
VIII. [31] “We think, indeed, that there is very great reason,” said Catulus, “and the more so, as you seem resolved to use no ostentation; for you have commenced, not boastfully, but rather, as you think, with truth, than with any fanciful notion of the dignity of your subject.” [32] “As I have acknowledged then,” continued Antonius, “that it is not one of the greatest of arts, so I allow, at the same time, that certain artful directions may be given for moving the feelings and gaining the favor of mankind. If any one thinks proper to say that the knowledge how to do this is a great art, I shall not contradict him; for as many speakers speak upon causes in the forum without due consideration or method, while others, from study, or a certain degree of practice, do their business with more address, there is no doubt, that if any one sets himself to observe what is the cause why some speak better than others, he may discover that cause; and, consequently, he who shall extend such observation over the whole field of eloquence, will find in it, if not an art absolutely, yet something resembling an art. [33] And I could wish, that as I seem to see matters as they occur in the forum, and in pleadings, so I could now set them before you just as they are conducted! “But I must consider my own powers. I now assert only that of which I am convinced, that although oratory is not an art, no excellence is superior to that of a consummate orator. For to say nothing of the advantages of eloquence, which has the highest influence in every well-ordered and free state, there is such delight attendant on the very power of eloquent speaking, that nothing more pleasing can be received into the ears or understanding of man. [34] What music can be found more sweet than the pronunciation of a well-ordered oration? What poem more agreeable than the skilful structure of prose? What actor has ever given greater pleasure in imitating, than an orator gives in supporting, truth? What penetrates the mind more keenly than an acute and quick succession of arguments’? What is more admirable than thoughts illumined by brilliancy of expression? What nearer to perfection than a speech replete with every variety of matter? for there is no subject susceptible of being treated with elegance and effect, that may not fall under the province of the orator. |
[IX] [35] Hujus est, in dando consilio de maximis rebus, cum dignitate explicata sententia ; ejusdem et languentis populi incitatio, et effrenati moderatio. Eadem facultate et fraus hominum ad perniciem, et integritas ad salutem vocatur. ¿Quis cohortari ad virtutem ardentius, quis a vitiis acrius revocare? ¿Quis vituperare improbos asperius, quis laudare bonos ornatius? ¿Quis cupiditatem vehementius frangere accusando potest? ¿Quis mærorem levare mitius consolando? [36] ¿Historia vero — testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriæ, magistra vitæ, nuntia vetustatis —, qua voce alia nisi oratoris, immortalitati commendatur? Nam
|
IX. [35] It is his, in giving counsel on important affairs, to deliver his opinion with clearness and dignity; it is his to rouse a people when they are languid, and to calm them when immoderately excited. By the same power of language, the wickedness of mankind is brought to destruction, and virtue to security. Who can exhort to virtue more ardently than the orator? Who reclaim from vice with greater energy? Who can reprove the bad with more asperity, or praise the good with better grace? Who can break the force of unlawful desire by more effective reprehension? Who can alleviate grief with more soothing consolation? [36] By what other voice, too, than that of the orator, is history,, the evidence of time, the light of truth, the life of memory, the directress of life, the herald of antiquity, committed to immortality? For if there be any other art, which professes skill in inventing or selecting words; if any one, besides the orator, is said to form a discourse, and to vary and adorn it with certain distinctions, as it were, of words and thoughts; or if any method of argument, or expression of thought, or distribution and arrangement of matter, is taught, except by this one art, let us confess that either that, of which this art makes profession, is foreign to it, or possessed in common with some other art. [37] But if such method and teaching be confined to this alone, it is not, though professors of other arts may have spoken well, the less on that account the property of this art; but as an orator can speak best of all men on subjects that belong to other arts, if he makes himself acquainted with them, (as Crassus observed yesterday,) so the professors of other arts speak more eloquently on their own subjects, if they have acquired any instruction from this art; [38] for if any person versed in agriculture has spoken or written with eloquence on rural affairs, or a physician, as many have done, on diseases, or a painter upon painting, his eloquence is not on that account to be considered as belonging to any of those arts; although in eloquence, indeed, such is the force of human genius, many men of every class and profession13 attain some proficiency even without instruction; but though you may judge what is peculiar to each art, when you have observed what they severally teach, yet nothing can be more certain than that all other arts can discharge their duties without eloquence, but that an orator cannot even acquire his name without it; so that other men, if they are eloquent, borrow something from him; while he, if he is not supplied from his own stores, cannot obtain the power of speaking from any other art.” |
[X] [39] Tum Catulus, “Etsi,” inquit, “Antoni, minime impediendus est interpellatione iste cursus orationis tuæ, patiere tamen, mihique ignosces ; ‘non enim possum quin exclamem,’ ut ait ille in ‘Trinummo’ — ita mihi vim oratoris quum exprimere subtiliter visus es, tum laudare copiosissime — quod quidem eloquentem vel optime facere oportet, ut eloquentiam laudet. Debet enim, ad eam laudandam, ipsam illam adhibere quam laudat. Sed perge porro ; tibi enim assentior, vestrum esse hoc totum diserte dicere, idque si quis in alia arte faciat, eum assumpto aliunde uti bono, non proprio nec suo.” [40] Et Crassus, “Nox te,” inquit, “nobis, Antoni, expolivit hominemque reddidit ; nam hesterno sermone, unius cujusdam operis, et ut ait Cæcilius, ‘remigem aliquem aut bajulum,’ nobis oratorem descripseras, inopem quendam humanitatis atque inurbanum.” Tum Antonius, “Heri enim,” inquit, “hoc mihi proposueram, ut, si te refellissem, hos a te discipulos abducerem ; nunc, Catulo audiente et Cæsare, videor debere non tam pugnare tecum quam quid ipse sentiam dicere. [41] Sequitur igitur, quoniam nobis est hic de quo loquimur in foro atque in oculis civium constituendus, ut videamus quid ei negotii demus, cuique eum muneri velimus esse præpositum ; nam Crassus heri (quum vos, Catule et Cæsar, non adessetis) posuit breviter in artis distributione idem quod Græci plerique posuerunt. Neque, sane, quid ipse sentiret, sed quid ab illis diceretur, ostendit : duo prima genera quæstionum esse in quibus eloquentia versaretur — unum infinitum, alterum certum. [42] Infinitum mihi videbatur id dicere, in quo aliquid generatim quæreretur, hoc modo : “¿Expetendane esset eloquentia? ¿Expetendine honores?” Certum autem, in quo quid in personis et in constituta re et definita quæreretur ; cujusmodi sunt quæ in foro atque in civium causis disceptationibusque versantur. [43] Ea mihi videntur aut in lite oranda aut in consilio dando esse posita ; nam illud tertium, quod et a Crasso tactum est, et — ut audio — ille ipse Aristoteles, qui hæc maxime illustravit, adjunxit, etiamsi opus est, tamen minus est necessarium.” “¿Quidnam?” inquit Catulus. “An laudationes? Id enim video poni genus tertium.” |
X. [39] Catulus then said, “Although, Antonius, the course of your remarks ought by no means to be retarded by interruption, yet you will bear with me and grant me pardon; for I cannot help crying out, as he in the Trinummus14 says, so ably do you seem to me to have described the powers of the orator, and so copiously to have extolled them, as the eloquent man, indeed, must necessarily do; he must extol eloquence best of all men; for to praise it he has to employ the very eloquence which he praises. But proceed, for I agree with you, that to speak eloquently is all your own; and that, if any one does so on any other art, he employs an accomplishment borrowed from something else, not peculiar to him, or his own.” [40] “The night,” added Crassus, “has made you polite to us, Antonius, and humanized you; for in yesterday’s address to us,15 you described the orator as a man that can do only one thing, like a waterman or a porter, as Caecilius16 says; a fellow void of all learning and politeness.” “Why yesterday,” rejoined Antonius, “I had made it my object, if I refuted you, to take your scholars from you;17 but now, as Catulus and Caesar make part of the audience, I think I ought not so much to argue against you, as to declare what I myself think. [41] It follows then, that, as the orator of whom we speak is to be placed in the forum, and in the view of the public, we must consider what employment we are to give him, and to what duties we should wish him to be appointed. For Crassus18 yesterday, when you, Catulus and Caesar, were not present, made, in a few words, the same statement, in regard to the division of the art, that most of the Greeks have made; not expressing what he himself thought, but what was said by them; that there are two principal sorts of questions about which eloquence is employed; one indefinite, the other definite. [42] He seemed to me to call that indefinite in which the subject of inquiry is general, as, Whether eloquence is desirable; whether honors should be sought; and that definite in which there is an inquiry with respect to particular persons, or any settled and denned point; of which sort are the questions agitated in the forum, and in the causes and disputes of private citizens. [43] These appear to me to consist either in judicial pleadings, or in giving counsel; for that third kind, which was noticed by Crassus, and which, I hear, Aristotle19 himself, who has fully illustrated these subjects, added, is, though it be useful, less necessary.” “What kind do you mean?” said Catulus; “is it panegyric? for I observe that that is introduced as a third kind.” |
[XI] [44] “Ita,” inquit Antonius “et in eo quidem genere scio et me, et omnes qui affuerunt, delectatos esse vehementer, quum abs te est Popilia, mater vestra, laudata, cui primum mulieri hunc honorem in nostra civitate tributum puto. Sed non omnia, quæcunque loquimur, mihi videntur ad artem et ad præcepta esse revocanda. [45] Ex eis enim fontibus unde omnia ornate dicendi præcepta sumuntur, licebit etiam laudationem ornare, neque illa elementa desiderare — quæ ut nemo tradat, ¿quis est qui nesciat quæ sint in homine laudanda? Positis enim eis rebus quas Crassus in illius orationis suæ, quam contra collegam censor habuit, principio dixit : ‘Quæ natura aut fortuna darentur hominibus, in eis rebus se vinci, posse animo æquo pati ; quæ ipsi sibi homines parare possent, in eis rebus se pati non posse, vinci.’ Qui laudabit quempiam intelleget, exponenda sibi esse fortunæ bona. [46] Ea sunt generis, pecuniæ, propinquorum, amicorum, opum, valetudinis, formæ, virium, ingenii ceterarumque rerum quæ sunt aut corporis aut extraneæ ; si habuerit, bene rebus eis usum ; si non habuerit, sapienter caruisse ; si amiserit, moderate tulisse ; deinde, quid sapienter is quem laudet, quid liberaliter, quid fortiter, quid juste, quid magnifice, quid pie, quid grate, quid humaniter, quid denique cum aliqua virtute aut fecerit aut tulerit. Hæc et quæ sunt ejus generis facile videbit qui volet laudare ; et qui vituperare, contraria.” [47] “¿Cur igitur dubitas,” inquit Catulus, “facere hoc tertium genus, quoniam inest in ratione rerum? Non enim, si est facilius, eo de numero quoque est excerpendum.” “Quia nolo,” inquit, “omnia, quæ cadunt aliquando in oratorem, quamvis exigua sint, ea sic tractare, quasi nihil possit dici sine præceptis suis. [48] Nam et testimonium sæpe dicendum est, ac nonnunquam etiam accuratius, ut mihi etiam necesse fuit in Sex. Titium, seditiosum civem et turbulentum. Explicavi in eo testimonio dicendo omnia consilia consulatus mei quibus illi Tribuno Plebis pro republica restitissem ; quæque ab eo contra rempublicam facta arbitrarer, exposui. Diu retentus sum, multa audivi, multa respondi. ¿Num igitur placet, quum de eloquentia præcipias, aliquid etiam de testimoniis dicendis quasi in arte tradere?” |
XI. [44] “It is so,” says Antonius; “and as to this kind of oratory, I know that I myself, and all who were present, were extremely delighted when your mother Popilia20 was honoured with a panegyric by you; the first woman, I think, to whom such honor was ever paid in this city. But it does not seem to me that all subjects on which we speak are to be included in art, and made subject to rules; [45] for from those fountains, whence all the ornaments of speech are drawn, we may also take the ornaments of panegyric, without requiring elementary instructions; for who is ignorant, though no one teach him, what qualities are to be commended in any person? For if we but look to those things which Crassus has mentioned, in the beginning of the speech which he delivered when censor in opposition to his colleague,21 That in those things which are bestowed on mankind by nature or fortune, he could contentedly allow himself to be excelled; but that in whatever men could procure for themselves, he could not suffer himself to be excelled, he who would pronounce the panegyric of any person, will understand that he must expatiate on the blessings of fortune; [46] and these are advantages of birth, wealth, relationship, friends, resources, health, beauty, strength, talent, and such other qualities as are either personal, or dependent on circumstances; and, if he possessed these, he must show that he made a proper use of them; if not, that he managed wisely without them; if he lost them, that he bore the loss with resignation; he must then state what he whom he praises did or suffered with wisdom, or with liberality, or with fortitude, or with justice, or with honor, or with piety, or with gratitude, or with humanity, or, in a word, under the influence of any virtue. These particulars, and whatever others are of similar kind, he will easily observe who is inclined to praise any person; and he who is inclined to blame him the contrary.” [47] “Why then do you hesitate,” said Catulus, “to make this a third kind, since it is so in the nature of things? for if it is more easy than others, it is not, on that account, to be excluded from the number.” “Because I am unwilling,” replied Antonius, “to treat of all that falls under the province of an orator, as if nothing, however small it may be, could be uttered without regard to stated rules. [48] Evidence, for instance, is often to be given, and sometimes with great exactness, as I was obliged to give mine against Sextus Titius,22 a seditious and turbulent member of the commonwealth; when, in delivering my evidence, I explained all the proceedings of my consulate, in which I, on behalf of the commonwealth, opposed him as tribune of the people, and exposed all that I thought he had done contrary to the interest of the state; I was detained long, I listened to much, I answered many objections; but would you therefore wish, when you give precepts on eloquence, to add any instructions on giving evidence as a portion of the art of oratory?” “There is, indeed,” said Catulus, “no necessity.” |
[XII] [49] “¿Quid? Si, quod sæpe summis viris accidit, mandata sint exponenda, aut in Senatu ab imperatore, aut ad imperatorem, aut ad regem, aut ad populum aliquem a Senatu, ¿num quia genere orationis in ejusmodi causis accuratiore est utendum, idcirco pars etiam hæc causarum numeranda videtur, aut propriis præceptis instruenda?” “Minime vero,” inquit Catulus ; “non enim deerit homini diserto in ejusmodi rebus facultas ex ceteris rebus et causis comparata.” [50] “Ergo item,” inquit, “illa, quæ sæpe diserte agenda sunt, et quæ ego paulo ante, quum eloquentiam laudarem, dixi oratoris esse, neque habent suum locum ullum in divisione partium neque certum præceptorum genus — et agenda sunt non minus diserte quam quæ in lite dicuntur : objurgatio, cohortatio, consolatio, quorum nihil est, quod non summa dicendi ornamenta desideret. Sed ex artificio res istæ præcepta non quærunt.” “Plane,” inquit Catulus, “assentior.” [51] “Age vero,” inquit Antonius, “¿qualis oratoris et quanti hominis in dicendo putas esse historiam scribere?” “Si ut Græci scripserunt, summi,” inquit Catulus ; “si ut nostri, nihil opus est oratore ; satis est non esse mendacem.” “Atqui, ne nostros contemnas,” inquit Antonius, “Græci quoque ipsi sic initio scriptitarunt, ut noster Cato, ut Pictor, ut Piso. [52] Erat enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio, cujus rei memoriæque publicæ retinendæ causa, ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad P. Mucium pontificem maximum, res omnes singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus, referebatque in album et proponebat tabulam domi, potestas ut esset populo cognoscendi, hique etiam nunc ‘Annales Maximi’ nominantur. [53] Hanc similitudinem scribendi multi secuti sunt, qui sine ullis ornamentis monumenta solum temporum, hominum, locorum gestarumque rerum reliquerunt. Itaque qualis apud Græcos Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acusilas fuit, aliique permulti, talis noster Cato et Pictor et Piso, qui neque tenent quibus rebus ornetur oratio — modo enim huc ista sunt importata — et, dum intellegatur quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse brevitatem. [54] Paululum se erexit et addidit historiæ majorem sonum vocis vir optimus, Crassi familiaris, Antipater ; ceteri non exornatores rerum, sed tantummodo narratores fuerunt.” |
XII. [49] “Or if (as often happens to the greatest men) communications are to be delivered, either in the senate from a commander in chief, or to such a commander, or from the senate to auj king or people, does it appear to you that because, on such subjects, we must use a more accurate sort of language than ordinary, this kind of speaking should be counted as a department of eloquence, and he furnished with peculiar precepts? ““ By no means,” replied Catulus; “for an eloquent man, in speaking on subjects of that sort, will not be at a loss for that talent which he has acquired by practice on other matters and topics.” [50] “Those other kinds of subjects, therefore,” continued Antonius, “which often require to be treated with eloquence, and which, as I said just now, (when I was praising eloquence,) belong to the orator, have neither any place in the division of the parts of oratory, nor fall under any peculiar kind of rules, and yet must be handled as eloquently as arguments in pleadings; such are reproof, exhortation, consolation, all which demand the finest graces of language; yet these matters need no rules from art.” [51] “I am decidedly of that opinion,” said Catulus. “Well, then, to proceed,” said Antonius, “what sort of orator, or how great a master of language, do you think it requires to write history?” “If to write it as the Greeks have written, a man of the highest powers,” said Catulus; “if as our own countrymen, there is no need of an orator; it is sufficient for the writer to tell truth.” “But,” rejoined Antonius, “that you may not despise those of our own country, the Greeks themselves too wrote at first just like our Cato, and Pictor, and Piso. [52] For history was nothing else but a compilation of annals; and accordingly, for the sake of preserving the memory of public events, the pontifex maximus used to commit to writing the occurrences of every year, from the earliest period of Roman affairs to the time of the pontifex Publius Mucius, and had them engrossed on white tablets, which he set forth as a register in his own house, so that all the people had liberty to inspect it; and these records are yet called the Great Annals. [53] This mode of writing many have adopted, and, without any ornaments of style, have left behind them simple chronicles of times, persons, places, and events. Such, therefore, as were Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acusilas,23 and many others among the Greeks, are Cato, and Pictor, and Piso with us, who neither understand how composition is to be adorned (for ornaments of style have been but recently introduced among us), and, provided what they related can be understood, think brevity of expression the only merit. [54] Antipater,24 an excellent man, the friend of Crassus, raised himself a little, and gave history a higher tone; the others were not embellishers of facts, but mere narrators.” |
[XIII] “Est,” inquit Catulus, “ut dicis ; sed iste ipse Cælius neque distinxit historiam varietate locorum neque verborum collocatione et tractu orationis leni et æquabili perpolivit illud opus, sed ut homo neque doctus neque maxime aptus ad dicendum, sicut potuit, dolavit ; vicit tamen, ut dicis, superiores.” [55] “Minime mirum,” inquit Antonius, “si ista res adhuc nostra lingua illustrata non est ; nemo enim studet eloquentiæ nostrorum hominum, nisi ut in causis atque in foro eluceat ; apud Græcos autem eloquentissimi homines, remoti a causis forensibus, quum ad ceteras res illustres, tum ad scribendam historiam, maxime se applicaverunt. Namque et Herodotum illum, qui princeps genus hoc ornavit, in causis nihil omnino versatum esse accepimus ; atqui tanta est eloquentia, ut me quidem, quantum ego Græce scripta intellegere possum, magnopere delectet. [56] Et post illum Thucydides omnes dicendi artificio mea sententia facile vicit ; qui ita creber est rerum frequentia, ut is verborum prope numerum sententiarum numero consequatur, ita porro verbis est aptus et pressus, ut nescias, utrum res oratione an verba sententiis illustrentur. Atqui ne hunc quidem, quanquam est in republica versatus, ex numero accepimus eorum, qui causas dictitarunt ; et hos ipsos libros tum scripsisse dicitur, quum a republica remotus atque — id quod optimo cuique Athenis accidere solitum est — in exilium pulsus esset. [57] Hunc consecutus est Syracusius Philistus, qui, quum Dionysi tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historia scribenda maximeque Thucydidem est (sicut mihi videtur) imitatus. Postea vero, rhetorum ex clarissima quasi officina, duo præstantes ingenio, Theopompus et Ephorus, ab Isocrate magistro impulsi, se ad historiam contulerunt ; causas omnino nunquam attigerunt. |
XIII. “It is,” rejoined Catulus, “as you say; but Antipater himself neither diversified his narrative by variety of thoughts, nor polished his style by an apt arrangement of words, or a smooth and equal flow of language, but rough-hewed it as he could, being a man of no learning, and not extremely well qualified for an orator; yet he excelled, as you say, his predecessors.” [55] “It is far from being wonderful,” said Antonius, “if history has not yet made a figure in our language; for none of our countrymen study eloquence, unless that it may be displayed in causes and in the forum; whereas among the Greeks, the most eloquent men, wholly unconnected with public pleading, applied themselves as well to other honourable studies as to writing history; for of Herodotus himself, who first embellished this kind of writing, we hear that he was never engaged in pleading; yet his eloquence is so great as to delight me extremely, as far as I can understand Greek writing. [56] After him, in my opinion, Thucydides has certainly surpassed all historians in the art of composition; for he is so abundant in matter, that he almost equals the number of his words by the number of his thoughts; and he is so happy and judicious in his expressions,25 that you are at a loss to decide whether his facts are set off by his style, or his style by his thoughts; and of him too we do not hear, though he was engaged in public affairs, that he was of the number of those who pleaded causes, and he is said to have written his books at a time when he was removed from all civil employments, and, as usually happened to every eminent man at Athens, was driven into banishment. [57] He was followed by Philistus26 of Syracuse, who, living in great familiarity with the tyrant Dionysius, spent his leisure in writing history, and, as I think, principally imitated Thucydides But afterwards, two men of great genius, Theopompus and Ephorus, coming from what we may call the noblest school of rhetoric, applied themselves to history by the persuasion of their master Isocrates, and never attended to pleading at all. |
[XIV] [58] Denique etiam a philosophia profectus : princeps Xenophon, Socraticus ille ; post, ab Aristotele Callisthenes, comes Alexandri, scripsit historiam, et is quidem rhetorico pæne more ; ille autem superior leniore quodam sono est usus, et qui illum impetum oratoris non habeat, vehemens fortasse minus, sed aliquanto tamen est — ut mihi quidem videtur — dulcior. Minimus natu horum omnium Timæus, quantum autem judicare possum, longe eruditissimus et rerum copia et sententiarum varietate abundantissimus et, ipsa compositione verborum non impolitus, magnam eloquentiam ad scribendum attulit — sed nullum usum forensem.” [59] Hæc quum ille dixisset, “¿Quid est,” inquit, “Catule?” Cæsar. “¿Ubi sunt qui Antonium Græce negant scire? ¡Quot historicos nominavit! ¡Quam scienter, quam proprie de uno quoque dixit!” “Id mehercule,” inquit Catulus, “admirans illud, jam admirari desino quod multo magis ante mirabar : hunc, quum hæc nesciret, in dicendo posse tantum.” “Atqui, Catule,” inquit Antonius, “non ego utilitatem aliquam ad dicendum aucupans, horum libros et nonnullos alios, sed delectationis causa, quum est otium, legere soleo. [60] ¿Quid ergo est? Fatebor, aliquid tamen : ut, quum in sole ambulem, etiamsi ego aliam ob causam ambulem, fieri natura tamen, ut colorer, sic, quum istos libros ad Misenum (nam Romæ vix licet) studiosius legerim, sentio illorum tactu orationem meam quasi colorari. Sed ne latius hoc vobis patere videatur : hæc dumtaxat in Græcis intellego quæ ipsi, qui scripserunt, voluerunt vulgo intellegi. [61] In philosophos vestros si quando incidi, deceptus indicibus librorum — quod sunt fere inscripti de rebus notis et illustribus, de virtute, de justitia, de honestate, de voluptate —, verbum prorsus nullum intellego, ita sunt angustis et concisis disputationibus illigati. Poëtas omnino, quasi alia quadam lingua locutos, non conor attingere. Cum his me (ut dixi) oblecto qui res gestas, aut qui orationes scripserunt suas, aut qui ita loquuntur, ut videantur voluisse nobis qui non sumus eruditissimi esse familiares. |
XIV. [58] At last historians arose also among the philosophers; first Xenophon, the follower of Socrates, and afterwards Callisthenes, the pupil of Aristotle and companion of Alexander. The latter wrote in an almost rhetorical manner; the former used a milder strain of language, which has not the animation of oratory, but, though perhaps less energetic, is, as it seems to me, much more pleasing. Timseus, the last of all these, but, as far as I can judge, by far the most learned, and abounding most with richness of matter and variety of thought, and not unpolished in style, brought a large store of eloquence to this kind of writing, but no experience in pleading causes.” [59] When Antonius had spoken thus, “What is this, Catulus?’ said Cæsar. “Where are they who say that Antonius is ignorant of Greek? how many historians has he named! and how learnedly and judiciously has he spoken of each! ““On my word,” said Catulus, “while I wonder at this, I cease to wonder at what I regarded with much greater wonder before, namely, that he, being unacquainted with these matters, should have such power as a speaker.” “But, Catulus,” said Antonius,” my custom is to read these books, and some others, when I have leisure, not to hunt for anything that may improve me in speaking, but for my own amusement. [60] What profit is there from it then? I own that there is not much; yet there is some: for as, when I walk in the sun, though I may walk for another purpose, yet it naturally happens that I gain a deeper color; so when I have read those books attentively at Misenum,27 (for at Rome I have scarcely opportunity to do so,) I can perceive that my language acquires a complexion,28 as it were, from my intercourse with them. But, that you may not take what I say in too wide a sense, I only understand such of the Greek writings as their authors wished to be understood by the generality of people. [61] If I ever fall in with the philosophers, deluded by the titles to their books, as they generally profess to be written on well-known and plain subjects, as virtue, justice, probity, pleasure, I do not understand a single word of them; so restricted are they to close and exact disputations. The poets, as speaking in a different language, I never attempt to touch at all; but amuse myself, as I said, with those who have written history, or their own speeches,29 or who have adopted such a style that they seem to wish to be familiar to us who are not of the deepest erudition. |
[XV] [62] Sed illuc redeo. ¿Videtisne, quantum munus sit oratoris historia? Haud scio an flumine orationis et varietate maximum. Neque eam reperio usquam separatim instructam rhetorum præceptis ; sita sunt enim ante oculos. Nam ¿quis nescit primam esse historiæ legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat? Deinde ¿ne quid veri non audeat? ¿Ne qua suspicio gratiæ sit in scribendo? ¿Ne qua simultatis? [63] Hæc scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus ; ipsa autem exædificatio posita est in rebus et verbis. Rerum ratio ordinem temporum desiderat, regionum descriptionem ; vult etiam, quoniam in rebus magnis memoriaque dignis consilia primum, deinde acta, postea eventus exspectentur, et de consiliis significari quid scriptor probet, et in rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quomodo ; et quum de eventu dicatur, ut causæ explicentur omnes, vel casus, vel sapientiæ, vel temeritatis — hominumque ipsorum non solum res gestæ, sed etiam, qui fama ac nomine excellant, de cujusque vita atque natura. [64] Verborum autem ratio et genus orationis fusum atque tractum, et cum lenitate quadam æquabiliter profluens, sine hac judiciali asperitate et sine sententiarum forensibus aculeis, persequendum est. ¿Harum tot tantarumque rerum videtisne ulla esse præcepta quæ in artibus rhetorum reperiantur? In eodem silentio multa alia oratorum officia jacuerunt — cohortationes, consolationes, præcepta, admonita — quæ tractanda sunt omnia disertissime ; sed locum suum in his artibus quæ traditæ sunt habent nullum. [65] Atque in hoc genere illa quoque est infinita silva, quod oratori plerique (ut etiam Crassus ostendit) duo genera ad dicendum dederunt :
|
XV. [62] But I return to my subject. Do you see how far the study of history is the business of the orator? I know not whether it is not his most important business, for flow and variety of diction; yet I do not find it anywhere treated separately under the rules of the rhetoricians. Indeed, all rules respecting it are obvious to common view; for who is ignorant that it is the first law in writing history, that the historian must not dare to tell any falsehood, and the next, that he must be bold enough to tell the whole truth? Also, that there must be no suspicion of partiality in his writings, or of personal animosity? [63] These fundamental rules are doubtless universally known. The superstructure depends on facts and style. The course of facts requires attention to order of time, and descriptions of countries; and since, in great affairs, and such as are worthy of remembrance, first the designs, then the actions, and afterwards the results, are expected, it demands also that it should be shown, in regard to the designs, what the writer approves, and that it should be told, in regard to the actions, not only what was done or said, but in what manner; and when the result is stated, that all the causes contributing to it should be set forth, whether arising from accident, wisdom, or temerity; and of the characters concerned, not only their acts, but, at least of those eminent in reputation and dignity, the life and mariners of each. [64] The sort of language and character of style to be observed must be regular and continuous, flowing with a kind of equable smoothness, without the roughness of judicial pleadings, and the sharp-pointed sentences used at the bar. Concerning all these numerous and important points, there are no rules, do you observe, to be found in the treatises of the rhetoricians. “In the same silence have lain many other duties of the orator; exhortation, consolation, precept, admonition, all of which are subjects for the highest eloquence, and yet have no place in those treatises on the art which are in circulation. [65] Under this head, too, there is an infinite field of matter; for as Crassus observed) most writers assign to the orator two kinds of subjects on which he may speak; the one concerning stated and defined questions, such as are treated in judicial pleadings or political debates, to which he that will may add panegyrics; the other, what all authors term, (though none give any explanation,) questions unlimited in their kind, without reference to time or person. When they speak of this sort of subjects, they do not appear to know the nature and extent of it; [66] for if it is the business of an orator to be able to speak on whatever subject is proposed without limitation, he will have to speak on the magnitude of the sun, and on the shape of the earth; nor will be able, when he has undertaken such a task, to refuse to speak on mathematical and musical subjects. In short, for him who professes it to be his business to speak not only on those questions which are confined to certain times and persons, (that is, on all judicial questions,) but also on such as are unlimited in their kinds, there can be no subject for oratory to which he can take exception. |
[XVI] [67] Sed si illam quoque partem quæstionum oratori volumus adjungere vagam et liberam et late patentem — ut de rebus bonis aut malis, expetendis aut fugiendis, honestis aut turpibus, utilibus aut inutilibus, de virtute, de justitia, de continentia, de prudentia, de magnitudine animi, de liberalitate, de pietate, de amicitia, de officio, de fide, de ceteris virtutibus contrariisque vitiis dicendum oratori putemus, itemque de republica, de imperio, de re militari, de disciplina civitatis, de hominum moribus —, assumamus eam quoque partem, sed ita, ut sit circumscripta modicis regionibus. [68] Equidem omnia quæ pertinent ad usum civium, morem hominum, quæ versantur in consuetudine vitæ, in ratione reipublicæ, in hac societate civili, in sensu hominum communi, in natura, in moribus, comprehendenda esse oratori puto ; si minus ut separatim de his rebus philosophorum more respondeat, at certe ut in causa prudenter possit intexere — hisce autem ipsis de rebus, ut ita loquatur, ut ii qui jura, qui leges, qui civitates constituerunt, locuti sunt, simpliciter et splendide, sine ulla serie disputationum et sine jejuna concertatione verborum. [69] Hoc loco, ne qua sit admiratio, si tot tantarumque rerum nulla a me præcepta ponentur, sic statuo : ut in ceteris artibus, quum tradita sint cujusque artis difficillima, reliqua, quia aut faciliora aut similia sint, tradi non necesse esse ; ut in pictura, qui hominis speciem pingere perdidicerit, posse eum cujusvis vel formæ vel ætatis — etiamsi non didicerit —, pingere ; neque esse periculum, qui leonem aut taurum pingat egregie, ne idem in multis aliis quadrupedibus facere non possit. Neque est omnino ars ulla in qua omnia quæ illa arte effici possint a doctore tradantur. Sed qui primarum et certarum rerum genera ipsa didicerunt, reliqua non incommode per se assequentur. [70] Similiter arbitror in hac sive ratione sive exercitatione dicendi, qui illam vim adeptus sit, ut eorum mentes qui — aut de republica aut de ipsius rebus aut de eis contra quos aut pro quibus dicat — cum aliqua statuendi potestate audiant, ad suum arbitrium movere possit, hunc de toto illo genere reliquarum orationum non plus quæsiturum esse quid dicat quam Polyclitum illum, quum Herculem fingebat, quemadmodum pellem aut Hydram fingeret, etiamsi hæc nunquam separatim facere didicisset.” |
XVI. [67] “But if we are disposed to assign to the orator that sort of questions, also, which are undefined, unsettled, and of extreme latitude, so as to suppose that he must speak of good and evil, of things to be desired or avoided, honourable or dishonourable, profitable or unprofitable; of virtue, justice, temperance, prudence, magnanimity, liberality, piety, friendship, fidelity, duty, and of other virtues and their opposite vices, as well as on state affairs, on government, on military matters, on civil polity, on morality; let us take upon us that sort of subjects also, but so that it be circumscribed by moderate limits. [68] I think, indeed, that all matters relative to intercourse between fellow-citizens, and the transactions of mankind in general, every thing that concerns habits of life, administration of public affairs, civil society, the common sense of mankind, the law of nature, and moral duties, falls within the province of an orator, if not to such an extent that he may answer on every subject separately, like the philosophers, yet so at least that he may interweave them judiciously into his pleadings; and may speak upon such topics as those who established laws, statutes, and commonwealths, have spoken upon them, with simplicity and perspicuity, without any strict order of discussion, or jejune contention about words. [69] That it may not seem wonderful that no rules on so many topics of such importance are here laid down by me, I give this as my reason: As, in other arts, when the most difficult parts of each have been taught, other particulars, as being easier, or similar, are not necessary to be taught: for example, in painting, he who has learned to paint the figure of a man, can paint one of any shape or age without special instruction; and as there is no danger that he who excels in painting a lion or a bull, will be unable to succeed in painting other quadrupeds; (for there is indeed no art whatever, in which everything capable of being effected by it is taught by the master; but they who have learned the general principles regarding the chief and fixed points, accomplish the rest of themselves without any trouble;) [70] so I conceive that in oratory, whether it be an art, or an attainment from practice only, he who has acquired such ability, that he can, at his pleasure, influence the understandings of those who listen to him with some power of deciding, on questions concerning public matters, or his own private affairs, or concerning those for or against whom he speaks, will, on every other kind of oratorical subject, be no more at a loss what to say than the famous Polycletus, when he formed his Hercules, was at a loss how to execute the lion’s skin, or the hydra, although he had never been taught to form them separately.” |
[XVII] [71] Tum Catulus, “Præclare mihi videris, Antoni, posuisse,” inquit, “ante oculos, quid discere oporteret eum, qui orator esset futurus, quid — etiamsi non didicisset — ex eo quod didicisset assumeret. Deduxisti enim totum hominem in duo genera solum causarum ; cetera innumerabilia exercitationi et similitudini reliquisti. Sed videto ne in istis duobus generibus Hydra tibi sit et pellis, Hercules autem et alia opera majora in illis rebus quas prætermittis relinquantur ; non enim mihi minus operis videtur, de universis generibus rerum quam de singulorum causis, ac multo etiam majus, de natura deorum quam de hominum litibus dicere.” “Non est ita,” inquit Antonius. [72] “Dicam enim tibi, Catule, non tam doctus quam — id quod est majus — expertus : omnium ceterarum rerum oratio, mihi crede, ludus est homini non hebeti neque inexercitato neque communium litterarum et politioris humanitatis experti. In causarum contentionibus magnum est quoddam opus, atque haud sciam an de humanis operibus longe maximum, in quibus vis oratoris plerumque ab imperitis exitu et victoria judicatur, ubi adest armatus adversarius qui sit et feriendus et repellendus, ubi sæpe is qui rei dominus futurus est, alienus atque iratus — aut etiam amicus adversario et inimicus tibi est — ; quum aut docendus is est aut dedocendus aut reprimendus aut incitandus aut omni ratione ad tempus, ad causam oratione moderandus (in quo sæpe benevolentia ad odium, odium autem ad benevolentiam deducendum est) ; aut tanquam machinatione aliqua tum ad severitatem tum ad remissionem animi, tum ad tristitiam ad lætitiam est contorquendus. [73] Omnium sententiarum gravitate, omnium verborum ponderibus est utendum. Accedat oportet actio varia, vehemens, plena animi, plena spiritus, plena doloris, plena veritatis. In his operibus si quis illam artem comprehenderit ut tanquam Phidias Minervæ signum efficere possit, non sane, quemadmodum (ut in clipeo idem artifex) minora illa opera facere discat, laborabit.” |
XVII. [71]Catulus then observed, “You seem to me, Antonius, to have set clearly before us what he who designs to be an orator ought to learn, and what he may assume from that which he has learned without particular instruction; for you have reduced his whole business to two kinds of causes only, and have left particulars, which are innumerable, to practice and comparison. But take care lest the hydra and lion’s skin be included in those two kinds, and the Hercules, and other greater works be left among the matters which you omit. For it does not seem to me to be less difficult to speak on the nature of things in general, than on the causes of particular persons, and it seems even much more difficult to discourse on the nature of the gods, than on matters that are litigated amongst men.” [72] “It is not so,” replied Antonius; “for to you, Catulus, I will speak, not so much like a person of learning, as, what is more, one of experience. To speak on all other subjects is, believe me, mere play to a man who does not want parts or practice, and is not destitute of common literature or polite instruction; but, in contested causes, the business is of great difficulty; I know not whether it be not the greatest by far of all human efforts, where the abilities of the orator are, by the unlearned, estimated according to the result and success; where an adversary presents himself armed at all points, who is to be at once attacked and repelled; where he, who is to decide the question, is averse, or offended, or even friendly to your adversary, and hostile to yourself; when he is either to be instructed or undeceived, restrained or incited, or managed in every way, by force of argument, according to the cause and occasion; when his benevolence is often to be turned to hostility, and his hostility to benevolence; when he is to be moved, as by some machinery, to severity or to indulgence, to sorrow or to merriment, [73] you must exert your whole power of thought, and your whole force of language; with which must be joined a delivery varied, energetic, full of life, full of spirit, full of feeling, full of nature. If any one, in such efforts as these, shall have mastered the art to such a degree, that, like Phidias, he can make a statue of Minerva, he will, like that great artist, find no difficulty in learning how to execute the smaller figures upon the shield.” |
[XVIII] [74] Tum Catulus, “Quo ista majora ac mirabiliora fecisti, eo me major exspectatio tenet, quibusnam rationibus quibusque præceptis ea tanta vis comparetur. Non quo mea quidem jam intersit (neque enim ætas id mea desiderat, et aliud quoddam genus dicendi nos secuti sumus — qui nunquam sententias de manibus judicum vi quadam orationis extorsimus, ac potius placatis eorum animis tantum quantum ipsi patiebantur, accepimus), sed tamen ista tua, nullum ad usum meum, tantum cognoscendi studio, adductus requiro. [75] Nec mihi opus est Græco aliquo doctore qui mihi pervulgata præcepta decantet, quum ipse nunquam forum, nunquam ullum judicium aspexerit — ut Peripateticus ille dicitur Phormio, quum Hannibal Karthagine expulsus Ephesum ad Antiochum venisset exul, proque eo quod ejus nomen erat magna apud omnes gloria, invitatus esset ab hospitibus suis, ut eum quem dixi, si vellet, audiret ; quumque is se non nolle dixisset, locutus esse dicitur homo copiosus aliquot horas de imperatoris officio et de omni re militari. Tum, quum ceteri qui illum audierant vehementer essent delectati, quærebant ab Hannibale quidnam ipse de illo philosopho judicaret. Hic Pœnus non optime Græce, sed tamen libere, respondisse fertur, multos se deliros senes sæpe vidisse, sed qui magis quam Phormio deliraret, vidisse neminem. [76] ¡Neque mehercule injuria! ¿Quid enim aut arrogantius aut loquacius fieri potuit quam Hannibali, qui tot annos de imperio cum populo Romano, omnium gentium victore, certasset, Græcum hominem, qui nunquam hostem, nunquam castra vidisset, nunquam denique minimam partem ullius publici muneris attigisset, præcepta de re militari dare? Hoc mihi facere omnes isti, qui de arte dicendi præcipiunt, videntur ; quod enim ipsi experti non sunt, id docent ceteros. Sed hoc minus fortasse errant, quod non te — ut Hannibalem ille — sed pueros aut adulescentulos docere conantur.” |
XVIII. [74] “The greater and more wonderful you represent such performances,” said Catulus, “the greater longing possesses me to know by what methods or precepts such power in oratory may be acquired; not that it any longer concerns me personally, (for my age does not stand in need of it, and we use I to pursue a different plan of speaking, as we never extorted decisions from the judges by force of eloquence, but rather received them from their hands, after conciliating their goodwill only so far as they themselves would permit,) yet I wish to learn your thoughts, not for any advantage to myself, as I say, but from a desire for knowledge. [75] Nor have I occasion for any Greek master to repeat his hackneyed precepts, when he himself never saw the forum, or was present at a trial; presumption similar to what is told of Phormio the peripatetic; for when Hannibal, driven from Carthage, came to Ephesus as an exile to seek the protection of Antiochus, and, as his name was held in great honor among all men, was invited by those who entertained him to hear the philosopher whom I mentioned, if he were inclined; and when he had signified that he was not unwilling, that copious speaker is said to have harangued some hours upon the duties of a general, and the whole military art; [76] and when the rest of the audience, who were extremely delighted, inquired of Hannibal what he thought of the philosopher, the Carthaginian is reported to have answered, not in very good Greek, but with very good sense, that ‘he had seen many doting old men, but had never seen any one deeper in his dotage than Phormio.’ Nor did he say so, indeed, without reason; for what could have been a greater proof of arrogance, or impertinent loquacity, than for a Greek, who had never seen an enemy or a camp, or had the least concern in any public employment, to deliver instructions on the military art to Hannibal, who had contended so many years for empire with the Romans, the conquerors of all nations? In this manner all those seem to me to act, who give rules on the art of speaking; for they teach others that of which they have no experience themselves. But they are perhaps less in error in this respect, that they do not attempt to instruct you, Catulus, as he did Hannibal, but boys only, or youths.” |
[XIX] [77] “Erras, Catule,” inquit Antonius, “nam egomet in multos jam Phormiones incidi. ¿Quis enim est istorum Græcorum qui quemquam nostrum quicquam intellegere arbitretur? Ac mihi quidem non ita molesti sunt ; facile omnes perpetior et perfero. Nam aut aliquid afferunt quod mihi non displiceat, aut efficiunt, ut me non didicisse minus pæniteat. Dimitto autem eos non tam contumeliose quam philosophum illum Hannibal, et eo fortasse plus habeo etiam negotii ; sed tamen est eorum doctrina, quantum ego judicare possum, perridicula. [78] Dividunt enim totam rem in duas partes : in causæ controversiam ; et in quæstionis. Causam appellant rem positam in disceptatione reorum et controversia ; quæstionem autem, rem positam in infinita dubitatione. De causa præcepta dant ; de altera parte dicendi mirum silentium est. [79] Denique quinque faciunt quasi membra eloquentiæ,
|
XIX. [77] “You are wrong, Catulus,” said Antonius, “for I myself have met with many Phormios. Who, indeed, is there among those Greeks that seems to think any of us understand anything? To me, however, they are not so very troublesome; I easily bear with and endure them all; for they either produce something which diverts me, or make me repent less of not having learned from them. I dismiss them less contumeliously than Hannibal dismissed the philosopher, and on that account, perhaps, have more trouble with them; but certainly all their teaching, as far as I can judge, is extremely ridiculous. [78] For they divide the whole matter of oratory into two parts; the controversy about the cause and about the question. The cause they call the matter relating to the dispute or litigation affecting the persons concerned;30 the question, a matter of infinite doubt. Respecting the cause they give some precepts; on the other part of pleading they are wonderfully silent. [79] They then make five parts, as it were, of oratory; to invent what you are to say, to arrange what you have invented, to clothe it in proper language, then to commit it to memory, and at last to deliver it with due action and elocution; a task, surely, requiring no very abstruse study. For who would not understand without assistance, that nobody can make a speech unless he has settled what to say, and in what words, and in what order, and remembers it? Not that I find any fault with these rules, but I say that they are obvious to all; as are likewise those four, five, six, or even seven partitions, (since they are differently divided by different teachers,) into which every oration is by them distributed; [80] for they bid us adopt such an exordium as to make the hearer favorable to us, and willing to be informed and attentive; then to state our case in such a manner, that the detail may be probable, clear, and concise; next, to divide or propound the question; to confirm what makes for us by arguments and reasoning, and refute what makes for the adversary; after this some place the conclusion of the speech, and peroration as it were; others direct you, before you come to the peroration, to make a digression by way of embellishment or amplification, then to sum up and conclude. [81] Nor do I altogether condemn these divisions; for they are made with some nicety, though without sufficient judgment, as must of necessity be the case with men who had no experience in real pleading. For the precepts which they confine to the exordium and statement of facts are to be observed through the whole speech; [82] since I can more easily make a judge favorable to me in the progress of my speech, than when no part of the cause has been heard; and desirous of information, not when I promise that I will prove something, but when I actually prove and explain; and I can best make him attentive, not by the first statement, but by working on his mind through the whole course of the pleading. [83] As to their direction that the statement of facts should be probable, and clear, and concise, they direct rightly; but in supposing that these qualities belong more peculiarly to the statement of facts than to the whole of the speech, they seem to me to be greatly in error; and their whole mistake lies assuredly in this, that they think oratory an art or science, not unlike other sciences, such as Crassus said yesterday might be formed from the civil law itself; so that the general heads of the subject must first be enumerated, when it is a fault if any head be omitted; next, the particulars under each general head, when it is a fault if any particular be either deficient or redundant; then the definitions of all the terms, in which there ought to be nothing either wanting or superfluous. |
[XX] [84] Sed hoc si in jure civili, si etiam in parvis aut mediocribus rebus doctores assequi possunt, non idem sentio, tanta hac in re, tamque immensa, posse fieri. Sin autem qui arbitrantur, deducendi sunt ad eos qui hæc docent ; omnia jam explicata et perpolita assequentur. Sunt enim innumerabiles de his rebus libri, neque abditi neque obscuri. Sed videant quid velint : ad ludendumne an ad pugnandum arma sint sumpturi. Aliud enim pugna et acies, aliud ludus campusque noster desiderat. Attamen ars ipsa ludicra armorum et gladiatori et militi prodest aliquid ; sed animus acer, et præsens, et acutus, idem atque versutus invictos viros efficit — non difficilius arte conjuncta. [85] Quare ego tibi oratorem sic jam instituam, si potuero, ut, quid efficere possit, ante perspiciam. Sit enim mihi tinctus litteris ; audierit aliquid, legerit, ista ipsa præcepta acceperit ; temptabo quid deceat : quid voce, quid viribus, quid spiritu, quid lingua efficere possit. Si intellegam posse ad summos pervenire, non solum hortabor, ut elaboret, sed etiam, si vir quoque mihi bonus videbitur, obsecrabo ; tantum ego in excellenti oratore, et eodem viro bono, pono esse ornamenti universæ civitati. Sin videbitur, quum omnia summa fecerit, tamen ad mediocres oratores esse venturus, permittam ipsi quid velit ; molestus magnopere non ero ; sin plane abhorrebit et erit absurdus, ut se contineat aut ad aliud studium transferat, admonebo. [86] Nam neque is qui optime potest, deserendus ullo modo est a cohortatione nostra, neque is qui aliquid potest, deterrendus : quod alterum divinitatis mihi cujusdam videtur, alterum — vel non facere quod non optime possis, vel facere quod non pessime facias — humanitatis. Tertium vero illud — clamare contra quam deceat et quam possit —, hominis est (ut tu, Catule, de quodam clamatore dixisti) stultitiæ suæ quam plurimos testes domestico præconio colligentis. [87] De hoc igitur qui erit talis, ut cohortandus adjuvandusque sit, ita loquamur, ut ei tradamus ea dumtaxat quæ nos usus docuit, ut, nobis ducibus, veniat eo, quo sine duce ipsi pervenimus, quoniam meliora docere non possumus. |
XX. [84] “But if the more learned can attain this exactness in the civil law, as well as in other studies of a small or moderate extent, the same cannot, I think, be done in an affair of this compass and magnitude. If, however, any are of opinion that it can be done, they must be introduced to those who profess to teach these things as a science; they will find everything ready set forth and complete; for there are books without number on these subjects, neither concealed nor obscure. But let them consider what they mean to do; whether they will take up arms for sport or for real warfare; for with us a regular engagement and field of battle require one thing, the parade and school of exercise another. Yet preparatory exercise in arms is of some use both to the gladiator and the soldier; but it is a bold and ready mind, acute and quick at expedients, that renders men invincible, and certainly not less effectively if art be united with it. [85] “I will now, therefore, form an orator for you, if I can; commencing so as to ascertain, first of all, what he is able to do. Let him have a tincture of learning; let him have heard and read something; let him have received those very instructions in rhetoric to which I have alluded. I will try what becomes him; what he can accomplish with his voice, his lungs, his breath, and his tongue. If I conceive that he may reach the level of eminent speakers, I will not only exhort him to persevere in labor, but, if he seem to me to be a good man,31 will entreat him; so much honor to the whole community do I think that there is in an excellent orator, who is at the same time a good man. But if he shall appear likely, after he has done his utmost in every way, to be numbered only among tolerable speakers, I will allow him to act as he pleases, and not be very troublesome to him. But if he shall be altogether unfit for the profession, and wanting in sense, I will advise him to make no attempts, or to turn himself to some other pursuit. [86] For neither is he, who can do excellently, to be left destitute of encouragement from us, nor is he, who can do some little, to be deterred; because one seems to me to be the part of a sort of divinity; the other, either to refrain from what you cannot do extremely well, or to do what you can perform not contemptibly, is the part of a reasonable human being; but the conduct of the third character, to declaim, in spite of decency and natural deficiency, is that of a man who, as you said, Catulus, of a certain haranguer, collects as many witnesses as possible of his folly by a proclamation from himself. [87] Of him then, who shall prove such as to merit our exhortation and encouragement, let me so speak as to communicate to him only what experience has taught myself, that, under my guidance, he may arrive at that point which I have reached without any guide; for I can give him no better instructions. |
[XXI] [88] Atque ut a familiari nostro exordiar, hunc ego, Catule, Sulpicium primum in causa parvula adulescentulum audivi ; voce et forma, et motu corporis, et reliquis rebus aptis ad hoc munus de quo quærimus ; oratione autem celeri et concitata, quod erat ingenii, et verbis effervescentibus, et paulo nimium redundantibus, quod erat ætatis. Non sum aspernatus ; volo enim se efferat in adulescente fecunditas ; nam sicut facilius, in vitibus, revocantur ea quæ sese nimium profuderunt, quam, si nihil valet materies, nova sarmenta cultura excitantur, ita volo esse in adulescente, unde aliquid amputem ; non enim potest in eo sucus esse diuturnus, quod nimis celeriter est maturitatem assecutum. [89] Vidi statim indolem, neque dimisi tempus, et eum sum cohortatus, ut forum sibi ludum putaret esse ad discendum ; magistrum autem, quem vellet, eligeret ; me quidem si audiret, L. Crassum ; quod iste arripuit, et ita sese facturum confirmavit, atque etiam addidit, gratiæ scilicet causa, me quoque sibi magistrum futurum. Vix annus intercesserat ab hoc sermone cohortationis meæ, quum iste accusavit C. Norbanum, defendente me. Non est credibile, quid interesse mihi sit visum, inter eum qui tum erat, et qui anno ante fuerat. Omnino in illud genus eum Crassi magnificum atque præclarum natura ipsa ducebat ; sed ea non satis proficere potuisset, nisi eodem studio atque imitatione intendisset, atque ita dicere consuesset, ut tota mente Crassum atque omni animo intueretur. |
XXI. [88] “To commence then, Catulus, by taking an example from our friend Sulpicius here; I first heard him, when he was but a youth, in a cause of small importance; he was possessed of a voice, figure, deportment, and other qualifications suited for the profession which we are considering. His mode of speaking was quick and hurried, which was owing to his genius; his style animated and somewhat too redundant, which was owing to his youth. I was very far from entertaining a slight opinion of him, since I like fertility to show itself in a young man; for, as in vines, those branches which have spread too luxuriantly are more easily pruned than new shoots are produced by culture if the stem is defective; so I would wish there to be that in a youth from which I may take something away. The sap cannot be enduring in that which attains maturity too soon. [89] I immediately saw his ability; nor did I lose any time, but exhorted him to consider the forum as his school for improving himself, and to choose whom he pleased for a master; if he would take my advice, Lucius Crassus. To this advice he eagerly listened, and assured me that he would act accordingly; and added also, as a compliment, that T too should be a master to him. Scarce a year had passed from the time of this conversation and recommendation of mine, when he accused Caius Norbanus,32 and I defended him. It is incredible what a difference there appeared to me between him as he was then and as he had been a year before; nature herself led him irresistibly into the magnificent and noble style of Crassus; but he could never have arrived at a satisfactory degree of excellence in it, if he had not directed his efforts, by study and imitation, in the same course in which nature led him, so as intently to contemplate Crassus with his whole mind and faculties. |
[XXII] [90] Ergo hoc sit primum in præceptis meis, ut demonstremus, quem imitetur atque ita ut, quae maxime excellant in eo quem imitabitur, ea diligentissime persequatur. Tum accedat exercitatio qua illum quem delegerit, imitando effingat atque exprimat — non ut multos imitatores sæpe cognovi qui aut ea quæ facilia sunt, aut etiam illa quæ insignia ac pæne vitiosa, consectantur imitando. [91] Nihil est facilius quam amictum imitari alicujus, aut statum, aut motum. Si vero etiam vitiosi aliquid est, id sumere et in eo ambitiosum esse non magnum est, ut ille qui nunc etiam, amissa voce, furit in republica, Fufius, nervos in dicendo C. Fimbriæ (quos tamen habuit ille) non assequitur, oris pravitatem et verborum latitudinem imitatur. Sed tamen ille nec deligere scivit cujus potissimum similis esset, et in eo ipso quem delegerat, imitari etiam vitia voluit. [92] Qui autem ita faciet ut oportet, primum vigilet necesse est in deligendo ; deinde, quem probarit, in eo, quæ maxime excellent, ea diligentissime persequatur. ¿Quid enim causæ censetis esse, cur ætates extulerint singulæ singula prope genera dicendi? Quod non tam facile in nostris oratoribus possumus judicare (quia scripta ex quibus judicium fieri posset non multa sane reliquerunt) quam in Græcis ex quorum scriptis, cujusque ætatis quæ dicendi ratio voluntasque fuerit, intellegi potest. [93] Antiquissimi fere sunt quorum quidem scripta constent, Pericles atque Alcibiades et eadem ætate Thucydides — subtiles, acuti, breves, sententiisque magis quam verbis abundantes. Non potuisset accidere ut unum esset omnium genus, nisi aliquem sibi proponerent ad imitandum. Consecuti sunt hos Critias, Theramenes, Lysias : multa Lysiæ scripta sunt ; nonnulla Critiæ ; de Theramene audivimus. Omnes etiam tum retinebant illum Periclis sucum ; sed erant paulo uberiore filo. [94] Ecce tibi est exortus Isocrates, magister istorum omnium qui ejus e ludo, tanquam ex equo Trojano, meri principes exierunt ; sed eorum partim in pompa, partim in acie illustres esse voluerunt. |
XXII. [90] “Let this, then, be the first of my precepts, to point out to the student whom he should imitate, and in such a manner that he may most carefully copy the chief excellencies of him whom he takes for his model. Let practice then follow, by which he may represent in his imitation the exact resemblance of him whom he chose as his pattern; not as I have known many imitators do, who endeavour to acquire by imitation what is easy, or what is remarkable, or almost faulty; [91] for nothing is easier than to imitate any person’s dress, or attitude, or carriage; or if there is anything offensive in a character, it is no very difficult matter to adopt it, and be offensive in the same way; in like manner as that Fusius, who even now, though he has lost his voice, rants on public topics, could never attain that nervous style of speaking which Caius Fimbria had, though he succeeds in imitating his distortion of features and broad pronunciation; but he neither knew how to choose a pattern whom he would chiefly resemble, and in him that he did choose, he preferred copying the blemishes. [92] But he who shall act as he ought, must first of all be very careful in making this choice, and must use the utmost diligence to attain the chief excellencies of him whom he has approved. “What, let me ask, do you conceive to be the reason why almost every age has produced a peculiar style of speaking? a matter on which we cannot so easily form a judgment in regard to the orators of our own country, (because they have, to say the truth, left but few writings from which such judgment might be formed,) as those of the Greeks, from whose writings it may be understood what was the character and tendency of eloquence in each particular age. [93] The most ancient, of whom there are any works extant, are Pericles33 and Alcibiades,34 and, in the same age, Thucydides, writers perspicacious, pointed, concise, abounding more in thoughts than in words. It could not possibly have happened that they should all have the same character, unless they had proposed to themselves some one example for imitation. These were followed in order of time by Critias, Theramenes, and Lysias. There are extant many writings of Lysias, some of Critias;35 of Theramenes36 we only hear. They all still retained the vigorous style of Pericles, but had somewhat more exuberance. [94] Then behold Isocrates arose, from whose school,37 as from the Trojan horse, none but real heroes proceeded; but some of them were desirous to be distinguished on parade, gome in the field of battle. |
[XXIII] Atque et illi — Theopompi, Ephori, Philisti, Naucratæ multique alii — naturis differunt, voluntate autem similes sunt et inter sese et magistri ; et ii, qui se ad causas contulerunt — ut Demosthenes, Hyperides, Lycurgus, Æschines, Dinarchus aliique complures — etsi inter se pares non fuerunt, tamen omnes sunt in eodem veritatis imitandæ genere versati, quorum quamdiu mansit imitatio, tamdiu genus illud dicendi studiumque vixit. [95] Posteaquam, exstinctis his, omnis eorum memoria sensim obscurata est et evanuit, alia quædam dicendi molliora ac remissiora genera viguerunt. Inde Demochares, quem ajunt sororis filium fuisse Demosthenis ; tum Phalereus ille Demetrius, omnium istorum, mea sententia, politissimus, aliique horum similes exstiterunt. Quæ si volemus usque ad hoc tempus persequi, intellegemus, ut hodie etiam Alabandensem illum Meneclem et ejus fratrem Hieroclem (quos ego audivi) tota imitetur Asia, sic semper fuisse aliquem cujus se similis plerique esse vellent. [96] Hanc igitur similitudinem qui imitatione assequi volet, quum exercitationibus crebris atque magnis, tum scribendo maxime persequatur ; quod si noster Sulpicius faceret, multo ejus oratio esset pressior ; in qua nunc interdum (ut in herbis rustici solent dicere in summa ubertate) inest luxuries quædam quæ stilo depascenda est.” [97] Hic Sulpicius, “Me quidem,” inquit, “recte mones, idque mihi gratum est ; sed ne te quidem, Antoni, multum scriptitasse arbitror.” Tum ille, “¡Quasi vero,” inquit, “non ea præcipiam aliis quæ mihi ipsi desint! Sed tamen ne tabulas quidem conficere existimor. Verum et in hoc, ex re familiari mea, et in illo, ex eo quod dico, quantulum id quumque est, quid faciam judicari potest. [98] Atque esse tamen multos videmus, qui neminem imitentur et suapte natura, quod velint, sine cujusquam similitudine consequantur. Quod et in vobis animum adverti recte potest, Cæsar et Cotta ; quorum alter inusitatum nostris quidem oratoribus leporem quendam et salem, alter acutissimum et subtilissimum dicendi genus est consecutus. Neque vero vester æqualis Curio — patre, mea sententia, vel eloquentissimo temporibus illis — quemquam mihi magnopere videtur imitari ; qui tamen verborum gravitate et elegantia et copia, suam quandam expressit quasi formam figuramque dicendi ; quod ego maxime potui judicare in ea causa quam ille contra me apud Centumviros pro fratribus Cossis dixit ; in qua nihil illi defuit quod non modo copiosus, sed etiam sapiens, orator habere deberet. |
XXIII. Accordingly those Theopompi, Ephori, Philisti,38 Naucratae,39 and many others, differ in genius, but in their manner bear a strong resemblance both to each other and to their master; and those who applied themselves to causes, as Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, and a multitude of others, although they were dissimilar in abilities one to another, yet were all engaged in imitating the same kind of natural excellence; and as long as the imitation of their manner lasted, so long did that character and system of eloquence prevail. [95] Afterwards, when these were dead, and all recollection of them grew gradually obscure, and at last vanished, more lax and remiss modes of speaking prevailed. Subsequently Demochares, who, they say, was the son of Demosthenes’ sister and the famous Demetrius Phalereus, the most polished of all that class, in my opinion, and others of like talents, arose; and if we choose to pursue the list down to the present times, we shall understand, that, as at this day all Asia imitates the famous Menecles of Alabanda, and his brother Hierocles, to both of whom we have listened, so there has always been some one whom the generality desired to resemble. [96] “Whoever, then, shall seek to attain such resemblance, let him endeavour to acquire it by frequent and laborious exercise, and especially by composition; and if our friend Sulpicius would practise this, his language would be more compact; for there is now in it at times, as farmers say of their corn when in the blade, amidst the greatest fertility, a sort of luxuriance which ought to be, as it were, eaten down40 by the use of the pen.” [97] Here Sulpicius observed, “You advise me rightly, and I am obliged to you; but I think that even you, Antonius, have never written much.” “As if,” rejoined Antonius, “I could not direct others in matters in which I am deficient myself; but. indeed, I am supposed not to write even my own accounts. But in this particular a judgment may be formed from my circumstances, and in the other from my ability in speaking, however small it be, what I do in either way. [98] We see, however, that there are many who imitate nobody, but attain what they desire by their own natural powers, without resembling any one; a fact of which an instance may be seen in you, Caesar and Cotta; for one of you has acquired a kind of pleasing humor and wit, unusual in the orators of our country; the other an extremely keen and subtle species of oratory. Nor does Curio, who is about your age, and the son of a father who was, in my opinion, very eloquent for his time, seem to me to imitate any one much; but by a certain force, elegance, and copiousness of expression, has formed a sort of style and character of eloquence of his own; of which I was chiefly enabled to judge in that cause which he pleaded against me before the Centumviri, in behalf of the brothers Cossi, and in which no quality was wanting in him that an orator, not merely of fluency, but of judgment, ought to possess. |
[XXIV] [99] Verum, ut aliquando ad causas deducamus illum quem constituimus, et eas quidem in quibus plusculum negotii est judiciorum atque litium (riserit aliquis fortasse hoc præceptum — est enim non tam acutum quam necessarium, magisque monitoris non fatui quam eruditi magistri), hoc ei primum præcipiemus, quascunque causas erit tractaturus, ut eas diligenter penitusque cognoscat. [100] Hoc in ludo non præcipitur ; faciles enim causæ ad pueros deferuntur : |
XXIV. [99] “But to conduct, at length, him whom we are forming to the management of causes, and those in which there is considerable trouble, judicial trials, and contested suits, (somebody will perhaps laugh at the precept which I am going to give, for it is not so much sagacious as necessary, and seems rather to proceed from a monitor who is not quite a fool, than from a master of profound learning,) our first precept for him shall be, That whatever causes he undertakes to plead, he must acquire a minute and thorough knowledge of them. [100] This is not a precept laid down in the schools; for easy causes are given to boys. ‘The law forbids a stranger to ascend the wall; he ascends it; he beats back the enemy; he is accused.’ It is no trouble to understand such a cause as this. They are right, therefore, in giving no precepts about learning the cause; for such is generally the form of causes in the schools. But in the forum, wills, evidence, contracts, covenants, stipulations, relationship by blood, by affinity, decrees, opinions of lawyers, and even the lives and characters of those concerned in the cause, are all to be investigated; and by negligence in these particulars we see many causes lost, especially those relative to private concerns, as they are often of greater intricacy. [101] Thus some, while they would have their business thought very extensive, that they may seem to fly about the whole forum, and to go from one cause to another, speak upon causes which they have not mastered, whence they incur much censure; censure for negligence, if they voluntarily undertake the business, or for perfidiousness, if they undertake it under any engagement;41 but such censure is assuredly of worse consequence than they imagine, since nobody can possibly speak on a subject which he does not understand, otherwise than to his own disgrace; and thus, while they despise the imputation of ignorance, which is in reality the greater fault, they incur that of stupidity also, which they more anxiously avoid. [102] “It is my custom to use my endeavour, that every one of my clients may give me instructions in his own affairs himself, and that nobody else be present, so that he may speak with the greater freedom.42 I am accustomed also to plead to him the cause of his adversary, in order to engage him to plead his own, and state boldly what he thinks of his own case. When he is gone, I conceive myself in three characters, my own, that of the adversary, and that of the judge. Whatever circumstance is such as to promise more support or assistance than obstruction, I resolve to speak upon it; whereever I find more harm than good, I set aside and totally reject that part entirely; [103] and thus I gain this advantage, that I consider at one time what I shall say, and say it at another; two things which most speakers, relying upon their genius, do at one and the same time; but certainly those very persons would speak considerably better, if they would but resolve to take one time for premeditation, and another for speaking. [104] “When I have acquired a thorough understanding of the business and the cause, it immediately becomes my consideration what ground there may be for doubt. For of all points that are disputed among mankind, whether the case is of a criminal nature, as concerning an act of violence; or controversial, as concerning an inheritance; or deliberative, as on going to war; or personal, as in panegyric; or argumentative, as on modes of life; there is nothing in which the inquiry is not either what has been done, or is being done, or will be done, or of what nature a thing is, or how it should be designated. |
[XXV] [105] Ac nostræ fere causæ — quæ quidem sunt criminum — plerumque infitiatione defenduntur ; nam et de pecuniis repetundis, quæ maximæ sunt, neganda fere sunt omnia ; et de ambitu raro illud datur, ut possis liberalitatem atque benignitatem ab ambitu atque largitione sejungere ; de sicariis, de veneficiis, de peculatu infitiari necesse est. Id est igitur genus primum causarum in judiciis ex controversia facti ; in deliberationibus plerumque ex futuri, raro ex instantis aut acti. [106] Sæpe etiam res, non sit necne, sed qualis sit, quæritur ; ut quum L. Opimi causam defendebat apud populum, audiente me, C. Carbo consul, nihil de C. Gracchi nece negabat, sed id jure pro salute patriæ factum esse dicebat — ut eidem Carboni Tribuno Plebis (alia tum mente rempublicam capessenti), P. Africanus, de Ti. Graccho interroganti, responderat jure cæsum videri. Jure autem omnia defenduntur quæ sunt ejus generis — ut aut oportuerit aut licuerit aut necesse fuerit aut imprudentia aut casu facta esse videantur. [107] Jam quid vocetur quæritur, cum quo verbo quid appellandum sit contenditur ; ut mihi ipsi cum hoc Sulpicio fuit in Norbani causa summa contentio. Pleraque enim de eis quæ ab isto objiciebantur, quum confiterer, tamen ab illo ‘majestatem minutam’ negabam, ex quo verbo, lege Appuleja, tota illa causa pendebat. [108] Atque hoc in genere causarum nonnulli præcipiunt ut verbum illud quod causam facit breviter uterque definiat — quod mihi quidem perquam puerile videri solet. Alia est enim, quum inter doctos homines de eis ipsis rebus, quæ versantur in artibus, disputatur verborum definitio — ut quum quæritur quid sit ars, quid sit lex, quid sit civitas, in quibus hoc præcipit ratio et doctrina, ut vis ejus rei quam definias sic exprimatur, ut neque absit quicquam neque supersit. [109] Quod quidem in illa causa neque Sulpicius fecit neque ego facere conatus sum ; nam quantum uterque nostrum potuit, omni copia dicendi dilatavit, quid esset ‘majestatem minuere.’ Etenim definitio, primum, reprehenso verbo uno — aut addito aut dempto —, sæpe extorquetur e manibus ; deinde, genere ipso doctrinam redolet exercitationemque pæne puerilem ; tum et in sensum et in mentem judicis intrare non potest — ante enim præterlabitur quam percepta est. |
XXV. [105] “Our causes, such at least as concern criminal matters, are generally defended by the plea of not guilty; for in charges of extortion of money, which are the most important, the facts are almost all to be denied; and in those of bribery to procure offices, it is seldom in our power to distinguish munificence and liberality from corruption and criminal largess. In accusations of stabbing, or poisoning, or embezzlement of the public money, we necessarily deny the charge. On trials, therefore, the first kind of causes is that which arises from dispute as to the fact. In deliberations, the discussion generally springs from a question as to what is to be done, rarely about anything present or already done. [106] But oftentimes the question is not whether a thing is a fact or not, but of what nature it is; as when the consul, Caius Carbo, in my hearing, defended the cause of Opimius before the people, he denied no circumstance of the death of Caius Gracchus, but maintained that it was a lawful act for the good of his country; or, as when Publius Africanus replied to the same Carbo, (then tribune of the people, engaging in political affairs with very different views,43 and asking a question about the death of Tiberius Gracchus,) ‘that he seemed to have been lawfully put to death.’ But every thing may be asserted to have been done lawfully, which is of such a kind that it may be said that it ought to have been done, or was properly or necessarily done, or done unawares, or by accident. [107] Then the question, ‘what a thing should be called,’ arises when there is a dispute by what term an act should be designated; as was the great point of dispute between myself and our friend Sulpicius in Norbanus’s cause; for though I admitted most of the charges made by him on the other side, I still denied that treason had been committed by Norbanus; on the signification of which word, by the Apuleian law,44 the whole cause depended. [108] And in this species of causes some lay it down as a rule, that both parties should define clearly and briefly the term that gives rise to the question. This seems to me extremely puerile; for it is quite a different thing from defining words, when any dispute arises among the learned about matters relating to science; as when it is inquired, what is an art, what is a law, what is a state? On which occasions reason and learning direct, that the whole force of the thing which you define should be expressed in such a manner that there be nothing omitted or superfluous; [109] but this neither Sulpicius did in that cause, nor did I attempt to do it; for each of us, to the best of our abilities, enlarged with the utmost copiousness of language upon what it was to commit treason. Since, in the first place, a definition, if one word is objectionable, or may be added or taken away, is often wrested out of our hands; and in the next, the very practice itself savours of school learning and almost puerile exercise; and besides, it cannot penetrate into the mind and understanding of the judge, for it glides off before it has made any impression. |
[XXVI] [110] Sed in eo genere, in quo quale sit quid ambigitur, exsistit etiam ex scripti interpretatione sæpe contentio, in quo nulla potest esse nisi ex ambiguo controversia. Nam illud ipsum — quod scriptum a sententia discrepat — genus quoddam habet ambigui ; quod tum explicatur, quum ea verba quæ desunt suggesta sunt — quibus additis, defenditur sententiam scripti perspicuam fuisse. Ex contrariisque scriptis si quid ambigitur, non novum genus nascitur, sed superioris generis causa duplicatur. Idque aut nunquam dijudicari poterit, aut ita dijudicabitur ut, referendis præteritis verbis, id scriptum (quodcunque defendemus) suppleatur. Ita fit, ut unum genus (in eis causis quæ propter scriptum ambiguntur) relinquatur, si est scriptum aliquid ambigue. [111] Ambiguorum autem quum plura genera sunt (quæ mihi videntur ii melius nosse qui dialectici appellantur, hi autem nostri ignorare qui non minus nosse debeant), tum illud est frequentissimum in omni consuetudine vel sermonis vel scripti, quum idcirco aliquid ambigitur quod aut verbum aut verba sint prætermissa. [112] Iterum autem peccant, quum genus hoc causarum, quod in scripti interpretatione versatur, ab illis causis in quibus qualis quæque res sit disceptatur, sejungunt ; nusquam enim tam quæritur quale sit genus ipsum rei, quam in scripto — quod totum a facti controversia separatum est. [113] Ita tria sunt omnino genera, quæ in disceptationem et controversiam cadere possint : quid fiat, factum, futurumve sit ; aut quale sit ; aut quomodo nominetur. Nam illud quod quidam Græci adjungunt, “rectene factum sit,” totum in eo est “quale sit.” Sed jam ad institutum revertar meum. |
XXVI. [110] “But in that kind of causes in which it is disputed of what nature any thing is, the contest often arises from the interpretation of writing; when there can be no controversy but about something that is doubtful. For even the case, in which the written letter differs from the intention, involves a species of doubt, which is cleared up when the words which are wanting are supplied; and such addition being made, it is maintained that the intention of the writing was clear; and if any doubt arises from contradictory writings, it is not a new kind of controversy that arises, but a cause of the former sort is doubled;45 and this can either never be determined, or must be so determined, that by supplying the omitted words, the writing which we defend, whichsoever of the two it is, may be rendered complete. Thus, of those causes which arise from a controversy about a writing, when anything is expressed ambiguously, there exists but one kind. [111] But as there are many sorts of ambiguities, (which they who are called logicians seem to me to understand better than other men; while those of our profession, who ought to know them full as well, seem to be ignorant of them,) so that is the most frequent in occurrence, either in discourse or writing, when a question arises from a word or words being left out. [112] They make another mistake when they distinguish this kind of causes, which consist in the interpretation of writing, from those in which it is disputed of what nature a thing is; for there is nowhere so much dispute respecting the exact nature of a thing as in regard to writing, which is totally separated from controversy concerning fact. [113] There are in all, therefore, three sorts of matters, which may possibly fall under doubt and discussion; what is now done, what has been done, or what is to be done; what the nature of a thing is, or how it should be designated; for as to the question which some Greeks add, whether a thing be rightly done, it is wholly included in the inquiry, what the nature of the thing is. |
[XXVII] [114] Quum igitur, accepta causa et genere cognito, rem tractare cœpi, nihil prius constituo quam quid sit illud, quo mihi sit referenda omnis illa oratio quæ sit propria quæstionis et judicii. Deinde illa duo diligentissime considero:
|
XXVII. [114] “But to return to my own method. When, after hearing and understanding the nature of a cause, I proceed to examine the subject matter of it, I settle nothing until I have ascertained to what point my whole speech, bearing immediately on the question and case, must be directed. I then very diligently consider two other points; the one, how to recommend myself, or those for whom I plead; the other, how to sway the minds of those before whom I speak to that which I desire. [115] Thus the whole business of speaking rests upon three things for success in persuasion; that we prove what we maintain to be true; that we conciliate those who hear; that we produce in their minds whatever feeling our cause may require. [116] For the purpose of proof, two kinds of matter present themselves to the orator; one, consisting of such things as are not invented by him, but, as appertaining to the cause, are judiciously treated by him, as deeds, testimonies, covenants, contracts, examinations, laws, acts of the senate, precedents, decrees, opinions of lawyers, and whatever else is not found out by the orator, but brought under his notice by the cause and by his clients; the other, consisting entirely in the orator’s own reasoning and arguments: [117] so that, as to the former head, he has only to handle the arguments with which he is furnished; as to the latter, to invent arguments likewise. Those who profess to teach eloquence, after dividing causes into several kinds, suggest a number of arguments for each kind; which method, though it may be better adapted to the instruction of youth, in order that when a case is proposed to them they may have something to which they may refer, and from whence they may draw forth arguments ready prepared; yet it shows a slowness of mind to pursue the rivulets, instead of seeking for the fountain-head; and it becomes our age and experience to derive what we want to know from the source, and to ascertain the spring from which everything proceeds. [118] “But that first kind of matters which are brought before the orator, ought to be the constant subject of our contemplation for general practice in affairs of that nature. For in support of deeds and against them, for and against evidence, for and against examinations by torture, and in other subjects of that sort, we usually speak either of each kind in general and abstractedly, or as confined to particular occasions, persons, and causes; and such commonplaces (I speak to you, Cotta and Sulpicius) you ought to keep ready and prepared with much study and meditation. [119] It would occupy too much time at present to show by what means we should confirm or invalidate testimony, deeds, and examinations. These matters are all to be attained with a moderate share of capacity, though with very great practice; and they require art and instruction only so far, as they should be illustrated with certain embellishments of language. [120] So also those which are of the other kind, and which proceed wholly from the orator, are not difficult of invention, but require perspicuous and correct exposition. As these two things, therefore, are the objects of our inquiry in causes, first, what we shall say, and next, how we shall say it; the former, which seems to be wholly concerned with art, though it does indeed require some art, is yet an affair of but ordinary understanding, namely, to see what ought to be said; the latter is the department in which the divine power and excellence of the orator is seen; I mean in delivering what is to be said with elegance, copiousness, and variety of language. |
[XXVIII] [121] Quare illam partem superiorem, quoniam semel ita vobis placuit, non recusabo quominus perpoliam atque conficiam — quantum consequar, vos judicabitis — quibus ex locis ad eas tres res quæ ad fidem faciendam solæ valent, ducatur oratio, ut et concilientur animi {A} et doceantur {B} et moveantur {C}. Hæc sunt enim tria. Ea vero quemadmodum illustrentur, præsto est qui omnes docere possit, qui hoc primus in nostros mores induxit, qui maxime auxit, qui solus effecit. [122] Namque ego, Catule (dicam enim non reverens assentandi suspicionem), neminem esse oratorem paulo illustriorem arbitror, neque Græcum neque Latinum, quem ætas nostra tulerit, quem non et sæpe et diligenter audierim. Itaque si quid est in me (quod jam sperare videor, quoniam quidem vos, his ingeniis homines, tantum operæ mihi ad audiendum datis), ex eo est, quod nihil quisquam unquam, me audiente, egit orator, quod non in memoria mea penitus insederit. Atque ego is qui sum, quantuscunque sum ad judicandum, omnibus auditis oratoribus, sine ulla dubitatione sic statuo et judico, neminem omnium tot et tanta, quanta sint in Crasso, habuisse ornamenta dicendi. [123] Quamobrem, si vos quoque hoc idem existimatis, non erit, ut opinor, iniqua partitio si, quum ego hunc oratorem quem nunc fingo — ut institui — crearo, aluero, confirmaro —, tradam eum Crasso et vestiendum et ornandum.” [124] Tum Crassus, “Tu vero,” inquit, “Antoni, perge ut instituisti ; neque enim est boni neque liberalis parentis, quem procrearis et eduxeris eum non et vestire et ornare, præsertim quum te locupletem esse negare non possis. ¿Quod enim ornamentum, quæ vis, qui animus, quæ dignitas illi oratori defuit, qui in causa peroranda non dubitavit excitare reum consularem et ejus diloricare tunicam et judicibus cicatrices adversas senis imperatoris ostendere? ¿Qui idem, hoc accusante Sulpicio, quum hominem seditiosum furiosumque defenderet, non dubitavit seditiones ipsas ornare ac demonstrare gravissimis verbis multos sæpe impetus populi non injustos esse, quos præstare nemo posset ; multas etiam e republica seditiones sæpe esse factas, ut quum reges essent exacti, ut quum tribunicia potestas constituta ; illam Norbani seditionem ex luctu civium et ex Cæpionis odio qui exercitum amiserat, neque reprimi potuisse et jure esse conflatam? [125] ¿Potuit hic locus tam anceps, tam inauditus, tam lubricus, tam novus sine quadam incredibili vi ac facultate dicendi tractari? ¿Quid ego de Cn. Mallii, quid de Q. Regis commiseratione dicam? ¿Quid de aliis innumerabilibus? In quibus non maxime hoc enituit quod tibi omnes dant — acumen quoddam singulare —, sed hæc ipsa quæ nunc ad me delegare vis, ea semper in te eximia et præstantia fuerunt.” |
XXVIII. [121] “The former part,46 then, since you have once declared it to be your pleasure, I will not refuse to finish off and complete, (how far I shall succeed you will best judge,) and shall show from what topics a speech must be furnished in order to effect these three objects which alone have power to persuade; namely, that the minds of the audience be conciliated, informed, and moved, for these are the three; but how they should be illustrated, there is one present who can instruct us all; one who first introduced this excellence into our practice, who principally improved it, who alone has brought it to perfection. [122] For I think, Catulus, (and I will say this without any dread of a suspicion of flattery,) that there is no orator, at all more eminent than ordinary, either Grecian, or Roman, that our age ha-s produced, whom I have not heard often and attentively; and, therefore, if there is any ability in me, (as I may now presume to hope, since you, men of such talents, take so much trouble in giving me audience,) it arises from this, that no orator ever delivered anything in my hearing, which did not sink deeply into my memory; and I, such as I am, and as far as I have capacity to form a judgment, having heard all orators, without any hesitation decide and pronounce this, That none of them all had so many and such excellent accomplishments in speaking as are in Crassus. [123] On which account, if you also are of the same opinion, it will not, as I think, be an unjust partition, if, when I shall have given birth and education and strength to this orator whom I am forming, as is my design, I deliver him to Crassus to be furnished with apparel and ornaments.” [124] Crassus then said, “Do you rather, Antonius, go on as you have commenced; for it is not the part of a good or liberal parent not to clothe and adorn him whom he has engendered and brought up especially as you cannot deny that you are wealthy enough. For what grace, what power, what spirit, what dignity was wanting to that orator, who at the close of a speech did not hesitate to call forth his accused client, though of consular rank, and to tear open his garment, and to expose to the judges the scars on the breast of the old commander?47 who also, when he defended a seditious madman,48 Sulpicius here being the accuser, did not hesitate to speak in favor of sedition itself, and to demonstrate, with the utmost power of language, that many popular insurrections are just, for which nobody could be accountable? adding that many seditions had occurred to the benefit of the commonwealth, as when the kings were expelled, and when the power of the tribunes was established; and that the sedition of Norbanus, proceeding from the grief of the citizens, and their hatred to Caepio, who had lost the army, could not possibly be restrained, and was blown up into a flame by a just indignation. [125] Could this, so hazardous a topic, so unprecedented, so delicate, so new, be handled without an incredible force and power of eloquence? What shall I say of the compassion excited for Cneius Manlius,49 or that in favor of Quintus Rex?50 What of other innumerable instances, in which it was not that extraordinary acuteness, which everybody allows you, that was most conspicuous, but it was those very qualities which you now ascribe to me, that were always eminent and excellent in you.” |
[XXIX] [126] Tum Catulus, “Ego vero” inquit, “in vobis hoc maxime admirari soleo quod, quum inter vos in dicendo dissimillimi sitis, ita tamen uterque vestrum dicat, ut ei nihil, neque a natura denegatum, neque a doctrina non delatum esse videatur. Quare, Crasse, neque tu tua suavitate nos privabis, ut, si quid ab Antonio aut prætermissum aut relictum sit, non explices ; neque te, Antoni, si quid non dixeris, existimabimus non potuisse potius quam a Crasso dici maluisse.” [127] Hic Crassus : “Quin tu,” inquit, “Antoni, omittis ista quæ proposuisti quæ nemo horum desiderat — quibus ex locis ea quæ dicenda sunt in causis reperiantur —, quæ, quanquam a te novo quodam modo præclareque dicuntur, sunt tamen et re faciliora et præceptis pervagata. Illa deprome nobis unde afferas, quæ sæpissime tractas, semperque divinitus." |
XXIX. [126] “For my part,” said Catulus, “what I am accustomed most to admire in you both, is, that while you are totally unlike each other in your manner of speaking, yet each of you speaks so well, that nothing seems either to have been denied you by nature, or not to have been bestowed on you by learning. You, therefore, Crassus, from your obliging disposition, will neither withhold from us the illustration of whatever may have been inadvertently or purposely omitted by Antonius; nor if you, Antonius, do not speak on every point, we shall think, not that you could not speak on it, but that you preferred that it should be treated by Crassus.” [127] Here Crassus said, “Do you rather, Antonius, omit those particulars which you have proposed to treat, and which no one here needs, namely, from what topics the statements made in pleadings are to be derived, which, though they would be treated by you in a new and excellent way, are in their nature very easy, and commonly set forth in books of rules; but show us those resources whence you draw that eloquence which you frequently exert, and always divinely.” |
[128] “Depromam equidem,” inquit, “et quo facilius id a te exigam quod petam, nihil tibi a me postulanti recusabo. Meæ totius rationis in dicendo et istius ipsius facultatis — quam modo Crassus in cælum verbis extulit — tres sunt partes, ut ante dixi : una {A} conciliandorum hominum, altera {B} docendorum, tertia {C} concitandorum. [129] Harum trium partium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acumen, tertia vim desiderat. Nam hoc necesse est, ut is qui nobis causam adjudicaturus sit, aut inclinatione voluntatis propendeat in nos, aut defensionis argumentis adducatur, aut animi permotione cogatur. Sed quoniam illa pars {B}, in qua rerum ipsarum explicatio ac defensio posita est, videtur omnem hujus generis quasi doctrinam continere, de ea primum loquemur et pauca dicemus. Pauca enim sunt quæ usu jam tractata et animo quasi notata habere videamur. |
[128] “I will indeed show you them,” said Antonius; “and that I may the more easily obtain from you what I require, I will refuse you nothing that you ask. The supports of my whole eloquence, and that power of speaking which Crassus just now extolled to the skies, are, as I observed before, three processes; the first, that of conciliating my hearers; the second, that of instructing them; and the third, that of moving them. [129] The first of these divisions requires mildness of address; the second penetration; the third energy; for it is impossible but that he, who is to determine a cause in our favor, must either lean to our side from propensity of feeling, or be swayed by the arguments of our defence, or be forced by action upon his mind. Bat since that part, in which the opening of the case itself and the defence lie, seems to comprehend all that is laid down as doctrine on this head, I shall speak on that first, and say but few words; for I seem to have but few observations gained from experience, and imprinted as it were on my memory. |
[XXX] [130] Ac tibi sapienter monenti, Crasse, libenter assentiemur, ut singularum causarum defensiones quas solent magistri pueris tradere, relinquamus ; aperiamus autem capita ea unde omnis ad omnem et causam et orationem disputatio ducitur. Neque enim quotiens verbum aliquod est scribendum nobis, totiens ejus verbi litteræ sunt cogitatione conquirendæ, nec quotiens causa dicenda est, totiens ad ejus causæ seposita argumenta revolvi nos oportet, sed habere certos locos qui, ut litteræ ad verbum scribendum, sic illi ad causam explicandam statim occurrant. [131] Sed hi loci ei demum oratori prodesse possunt qui est versatus in rerum vel usu quem ætas denique afferet, vel auditione et cogitatione quæ studio et diligentia præcurrit ætatem. Nam si tu mihi quamvis eruditum hominem adduxeris, quamvis acrem et acutum in cogitando, quamvis ad pronuntiandum expeditum, si erit idem in consuetudine civitatis, in exemplis, in institutis, in moribus ac voluntatibus civium suorum hospes, non multum ii loci proderunt illi ex quibus argumenta promuntur. Subacto mihi ingenio opus est, ut agro non semel arato, sed novato et iterato, quo meliores fetus possit, et grandiores, edere. Subactio autem est usus, auditio, lectio, litteræ. [132] Ac primum naturam causæ videat, quæ nunquam latet : factumne sit quæratur, an quale sit, an quod nomen habeat. Quo perspecto, statim occurrit naturali quadam prudentia — non his subductionibus quas isti docent — quid faciat causam, id est, quo sublato controversia stare non possit ; deinde quid veniat in judicium — quod isti sic jubent quærere : ‘Interfecit Opimius Gracchum. ¿Quid facit causam? Quod reipublicæ causa, quum ex Senatus Consulto ad arma vocasset. Hoc tolle, causa non erit. At id ipsum negat contra leges licuisse Decius. Veniet igitur in judicium licueritne ex Senatus Consulto servandæ reipublicæ causa.’ Perspicua sunt hæc quidem et in vulgari prudentia sita. Sed illa quærenda, quæ et ab accusatore et a defensore — argumenta ad id quod in judicium venit spectantia — debent afferri. |
XXX. [130] “We shall willingly consent to your judicious proposal, Crassus, to omit those defences for every sort of causes which the masters of rhetoric are accustomed to teach boys; and to open those sources whence all arguments for every cause and speech are derived. For neither, as often as we have occasion to write any word, need the letters of that word be so often collected in our thoughts; nor, as often as we are to plead a cause, need we turn to the separate arguments for that cause; but we should have certain commonplaces which, like letters for forming a word, immediately occur to us to aid in stating a cause. [131] But these commonplaces can be of advantage only to that orator who is conversant in business, and has that experience which age at length brings with it: or one who has so much attention and power of thought as to anticipate age by study and diligence. For if you bring to me a man of ever so deep erudition, of ever so acute and subtile an intellect, or ever so ready an elocution, if he be a stranger to the customs of civil communities, to the examples, to the institutions, to the manners and inclinations of his fellow-citizens, the common-places from which arguments are drawn will be of little benefit to him. I must have a well-cultivated genius, like a field not once ploughed only, but again and again, with renewed and repeated tillage, that it may produce better and larger crops; and the cultivation here required is experience, attentive hearing of other orators, reading, and writing. [132] “First, then, let him examine the nature of his cause, which is never obscure so far as the inquiry ‘whether a thing has been done or not;’ or ‘of what nature it is;’ or ‘what name it should receive;’ and when this is ascertained, it immediately occurs, with the aid of natural good sense, and not of those artifices which teachers of rhetoric inculcate, ‘what constitutes the cause,’ that is, the point without which there would be no controversy; then, ‘what is the matter for trial,’ which they direct you to ascertain in this manner: Opimius slew Gracchus: what constitutes the cause? ‘That he slew him for the good of the republic, when he had called the people to arms, in consequence of a decree of the senate.’ Set this point aside, and there will be no question for trial. But Decius denies that such a deed could be authorized contrary to the laws. The point therefore to be tried will be, ‘whether Opimius had authority to do so from the decree of the senate, for the good of the commonwealth.’ These matters are indeed clear, and may be settled by common sense; but it remains to be considered what arguments, relative to the point for trial, ought to be advanced, as well by the accuser as by him who has undertaken the defence. |
[XXXI] [133] Atque hic illud videndum est in quo summus est error istorum magistrorum ad quos liberos nostros mittimus, non quo hoc quidem ad dicendum magnopere pertineat, sed tamen ut videatis, quam sit genus hoc eorum qui sibi ‘eruditi’ videntur hebes atque impolitum. Constituunt enim in partiendis orationum modis duo genera causarum : unum appellant, in quo sine personis atque temporibus de universo genere quæratur ; alterum, quod personis certis et temporibus definiatur — ¡ignari omnes controversias ad universi generis vim et naturam referri! [134] Nam in ea ipsa causa de qua ante dixi, nihil pertinet ad oratoris locos Opimii persona, nihil Decii. De ipso universo genere infinita quæstio est : num pœna videatur esse afficiendus qui civem ex Senatus Consulto patriæ conservandæ causa interemerit, quum id per leges non liceret. Nulla denique est causa in qua id quod in judicium venit, reorum personis, ac non generum ipsorum universa disputatione, quæratur. [135] Quin etiam in eis ipsis, ubi de facto ambigitur — ceperitne pecunias contra leges P. Decius —, argumenta et criminum et defensionis revocentur oportet ad genus et naturam universam : quod sumptuosus, de luxurie ; quod alieni appetens, de avaritia ; quod seditiosus, de turbulentis et malis civibus ; quod a multis arguitur, de genere testium. Contraque, quæ pro reo dicentur, omnia necessario a tempore atque homine ad communes rerum et generum summas revolventur. [136] Atque hæc, forsitan, homini non omnia quæ sunt in natura rerum celeriter animo comprehendenti, permulta videantur quæ veniant in judicium tum, quum de facto quæratur ; sed tamen criminum multitudo est et defensionum — non locorum — infinita. |
XXXI. [133] “Here we must notice a capital error in those masters to whom we send our children; not that it has much to do with speaking, but that you may see how stupid and unpolished a set of men they are who imagine themselves learned. For, in distinguishing the different kinds of speaking, they make two species of causes. One they call, ‘that in which the question is about a general proposition, without reference to persons and times;’ the other, ‘that which is confined to certain persons and times;’ being ignorant that all controversies must have relation to the force and nature of the general position; [134] for in that very cause which I mentioned, the person of Opimius or Decius has nothing to do with the common arguments of the orator; since the inquiry has unrestricted reference to the question in general, ‘whether he seems deserving of punishment who has slain a citizen under a decree of the senate for the preservation of his country, when such a deed was not permitted by the laws.’ There is indeed no cause in which the point that falls under dispute is considered with reference to the parties to the suit, and not from arguments relating to such questions in general. [135] But even in those very cases where the dispute is about a fact, as ‘whether Publius Decius51 has taken money contrary to law, the arguments both for the accusation and for the defence must have reference to the general question, and the general nature of the case; as, to show that the defendant is expensive, the arguments must refer to luxury; that he is covetous of another’s property, to avarice; that he is seditious, to turbulent and ill-designing citizens in general; that he is convicted by many proofs, to the general nature of evidence: and, on the other side, whatever is said for the defendant, must of necessity be abstracted from the occasion and individual, and referred to the general notions of things and questions of the kind. [136] These, perhaps, to a man who cannot readily comprehend in his mind all that is in the nature of things, may seem extremely numerous to come under consideration when the question is about a single fact; but it is the number of charges, and not of modes of defence, or topics for them, that is infinite.52 |
[XXXII] [137] Quæ vero, quum de facto non ambigitur, quæruntur, qualia sint, ea si ex reis numeres, et innumerabilia sunt et obscura ; si ex rebus, valde et modica et illustria. Nam si Mancini causam in uno Mancino ponimus, quotienscunque is quem pater patratus dediderit receptus non erit, totiens causa nova nascetur. Sin illa controversia causam facit, videaturne ei quem pater patratus dediderit — si ‘is non sit receptus’ — postliminium esse, nihil ad artem dicendi nec ad argumenta defensionis Mancini nomen pertinet. [138] Ac, si quid affert præterea hominis aut dignitas aut indignitas, extra quæstionem est ; et ea tamen ipsa oratio ad universi generis disputationem referatur necesse est. Hæc ego non eo consilio disputo, ut homines eruditos redarguam ; quanquam reprehendendi sunt qui in genere definiendo istas causas describunt in personis et in temporibus positas esse. [139] Nam etsi incurrunt tempora et personæ, tamen intellegendum est, non ex eis, sed ex genere quæstionis pendere causas. Sed hoc nihil ad me ; nullum enim nobis certamen cum istis esse debet. Tantum satis est intellegi ne hoc quidem eos consecutos quod in tanto otio, etiam sine hac forensi exercitatione, efficere potuerunt : ut genera rerum discernerent eaque paulo subtilius explicarent. [140] Verum hoc, ut dixi, nihil ad me. Illud ad me ac multo etiam magis ad vos, Cotta noster et Sulpici : quomodo nunc se istorum artes habent, pertimescenda est multitudo causarum ; est enim infinita, si in personis ponitur ; quot homines, tot causæ ; sin ad generum universas quæstiones referuntur, ita modicæ et paucæ sunt, ut eas omnes diligentes et memores et sobrii oratores percursas animo et prope dicam decantatas habere debeant ; nisi forte existimatis a M’. Curio causam didicisse L. Crassum et ea re multa attulisse, quamobrem, postumo non nato, Curium tamen heredem Coponii esse oporteret. [141] Nihil ad copiam argumentorum, neque ad causæ vim ac naturam, nomen Coponii aut Curii pertinuit. In genere erat universo rei negotiique, non in tempore ac nominibus, omnis quæstio, quum scriptum ita sit, SI MIHI FILIUS GENITUR, ISQUE PRIUS MORITUR, et cetera, TUM MIHI ILLE SIT HERES — si natus filius non sit, videaturne is qui, filio mortuo, institutus heres sit, heres esse. Perpetui juris et universi generis quæstio non hominum nomina, sed rationem dicendi et argumentorum fontes desiderat. |
XXXII. [137] “But when there is no contest about facts, the questions on the nature of facts, if you reckon them from the number of the parties accused, are innumerable and intricate; if from the facts themselves, very few and clear. For if we consider the case of Mancinus53 so as referring to Mancinus alone, then, whenever a person whom the chief herald has surrendered to the enemy is not re-admitted into his country, a new case will arise. But if what gives rise to the controversy be the general question, ‘whether to him whom the chief herald has surrendered, if he has not been re-admitted into his country, there seems to be a right of return,’ the name of Mancinus has nothing to do with the mode of speaking upon it, or the arguments for the defence. [138] And if the merit or demerit of the person give rise to any discussion, it is wholly beside the question; and the part of the speech referring to the question must, of necessity, be adapted to such arguments in general. I do not reason upon these subjects for the purpose of confuting learned teachers: although those merit reproof, who, in their general definition, describe this sort of causes as relating to persons and times. [139] For, although times and persons are incident to them, yet it should be understood, that the causes depend not upon them, but upon the general question. But this is not my business; for we ought to have no contest with that sort of people; it is sufficient that this only should be known, that they have not even attained a point which they might have effected amid so much leisure, even without any experience in affairs of the forum; that is, they might have distinguished the general natures of cases, and explained them a little more accurately. [140] But this, as I said, is not my business; it is mine, and much more yours, my friends Cotta and Sulpicius, to know, that as their artificial rules now stand, the multitude of causes is to be dreaded; for it is infinite, if they are referred to persons; so many men, so many causes; but, it they are referred to general questions, they are so limited and few, that studious orators of good memory and judgment ought to have them digested in their minds, and, I may almost say, learned by heart; unless perhaps you imagine that Lucius Crassus took his notion of that famous cause54 from Manius Curius personally; and thus brought many arguments to show why, though no posthumous son was born, yet Curius ought to be the heir of Coponius. [141] The name of Coponius, or of Curius, had no influence at all on the array of arguments advanced, or on the force and nature of the question; the whole controversy had regard to all affairs and events of that kind in general, not to particular occasions or names; since the writing was thus, If a son is born to me, and he die before, etc., then let him be my heir; and if a son was not born, the question was whether he ought to be heir who was appointed heir on the death of the son. |
[XXXIII] [142] In quo etiam isti nos jurisconsulti impediunt, a discendoque deterrent. Video enim in Catonis et in Bruti libris nominatim fere referri, quid alicui de jure viro aut mulieri responderit ; credo, ut putaremus in hominibus, non in re, consultationis aut dubitationis causam aliquam fuisse — ut, quod homines innumerabiles essent, debilitati jure cognoscendo, voluntatem discendi simul cum spe perdiscendi abjiceremus. Sed hæc Crassus aliquando nobis expediet et exponet discripta generatim ; est enim — ne forte nescias — heri nobis ille hoc, Catule, pollicitus se jus civile, quod nunc diffusum et dissipatum esset, in certa genera coacturum et ad artem facilem redacturum.” [143] “Et quidem,” inquit Catulus, “haudquaquam id est difficile Crasso, qui et, quod disci potuit de jure, didicit et, quod eis qui eum docuerunt, defuit, ipse afferet, ut, quæ sint in jure, vel acute describere vel ornate illustrare possit.” “Ergo,” inquit, “ista,” Antonius, “tum a Crasso discemus, quum se de turba et a subselliis in otium, ut cogitat, soliumque contulerit.” [144] “Jam id quidem sæpe,” inquit Catulus, “ex eo audivi, quum diceret sibi jam certum esse a judiciis causisque discedere ; ☺ sed, ut ipsi soleo dicere, non licebit ; neque enim ipse auxilium suum sæpe a viris bonis frustra implorari patietur, neque id æquo animo feret civitas, quæ si voce L. Crassi carebit, ornamento quodam se spoliatam putabit. ☺” “☺ Nam hercle,” inquit Antonius, “si hæc vere a Catulo dicta sunt, tibi mecum in eodem est pistrino, Crasse, vivendum ; et istam oscitantem et dormitantem sapientiam Scævolarum et ceterorum beatorum otio concedamus. ☺” [145] Arrisit hic Crassus leviter et, “Pertexe modo,” inquit, “Antoni, quod exorsus es ; me tamen ista oscitans sapientia, simul atque ad eam confugero, in libertatem vindicabit.” |
XXXIII. [142] “A question regarding unvarying equity, and of a general nature, requires no names of persons, but merely skill in speaking, and sources of proper argument. In this respect even the lawyers themselves are an impediment to us, and hinder us from learning; for I perceive it to be generally reported in the books of Cato and of Brutus, what answers they gave on points of law to any particular man or woman by name; that we might imagine, I suppose, some cause for consultation or doubt to have arisen from the persons, not from the thing; so that, since persons are innumerable, we might be deterred from the study of the law, and lay aside all inclination to learn it, at the same time with all hope of ever attaining a thorough knowledge of it. “But Crassus will some day make all these points clear to us, and set them forth arranged under general heads; for you must know, Catulus, that he promised us yesterday, that he would reduce the civil law, which is now in a state of confusion and dispersion, under certain general heads, and digest it into an easy system.” [143] “And indeed,” said Catulus, “that is by no means a difficult undertaking for Crassus, who has all of law that can be learned, and he will supply that which was wanting in those who taught him; for he will be able to define exactly, and to illustrate eloquently, every point comprehended in the law.” “We shall then,” said Antonius, “learn all these things from Crassus, when he shall have betaken himself, as he intends, frcm the tumult of public business and the benches of the forum, to a quiet retreat, and to his throne.”55 [144] “I have indeed often,” observed Catulus, “heard him say, ‘that he was resolved to retire from pleading and the courts of justice;’ but, as I frequently tell him, it will never be in his power; for neither will he permit his assistance to be repeatedly implored in vain by persons of character, nor will the public endure his retirement patiently, as they will think that if they lose the eloquence of Lucius Crassus, they will lose one of the principal ornaments of the city.” “Indeed then,” remarked Antonius, “if what Catulus says is true, Crassus, you must still live on in the same workshop with me, and we must give up that yawning and sleepy science to the tranquillity of the Scaevolae and other such happy people.” [145] Here Crassus smiled a little, and said, “Finish weaving, Antonius, the web which you have begun; yet that yawning science, as you term it, when I have sheltered myself under it, will vindicate my right to liberty.” |
[XXXIV] “Hujus quidem loci, quem modo sum exorsus, hic est finis,” inquit Antonius, “(quoniam intellegitur non in hominum innumerabilibus personis neque in infinita temporum varietate, sed in generum causis atque naturis omnia sita esse quæ in dubium vocarentur — genera autem esse definita non solum numero, sed etiam paucitate) : ut eam materiem orationis quæ cujusque esset generis, studiosi qui essent dicendi, omnibus locis descriptam, instructam ornatamque comprehenderent — rebus dico et sententiis. [146] Ea, vi sua, verba parient quæ semper satis ornata mihi quidem videri solent si ejusmodi sunt, ut ea res ipsa peperisse videatur. Ac si verum quæritis — quod mihi quidem videatur (nihil enim aliud affirmare possum nisi sententiam et opinionem meam) — : hoc instrumentum causarum et generum universorum in forum deferre debemus, neque, ut quæque res delata ad nos erit, tum denique scrutari locos ex quibus argumenta eruamus. Quæ quidem omnibus qui ea mediocriter modo considerarint, studio adhibito et usu, pertractata esse possunt. Sed tamen, animus referendus est ad ea capita et ad illos quos sæpe jam appellavi locos ex quibus omnia ad omnem orationem inventa ducuntur. [147] Atque hoc totum est (sive artis, sive animadversionis, sive consuetudinis) nosse regiones intra quas venere et pervestiges quod quæras. Ubi eum locum omnem cogitatione sæpseris, si modo usum rerum percallueris, nihil te effugiet, atque omne quod erit in re occurret atque incidet. |
XXXIV. [146] “This is indeed the end,” continued Antonius, “of that part on which I just now entered; for it is now understood that all matters which admit of doubt are to be decided, not with reference to individuals, who are innumerable, or to occasions, which are infinitely various, but to general considerations, and the nature of things; that general considerations are not only limited in number, but very few; that those who are studious of speaking should embrace in their minds the subjects peculiar to the several departments of eloquence, arranged under general heads, as well as arrayed and adorned, I mean with thoughts and illustrations. These will, by their own force, beget words, which always seem to me to be elegant enough, if they are such that the subject seems to have suggested them. And if you ask the truth, (as far, that is, as it is apparent to me, for I can affirm nothing more than my own notions and opinions,) we ought to carry this preparatory stock of general questions and common-places into the forum with us; and not, when any cause is brought before us, begin then to seek for topics from which we may draw our arguments; topics which, indeed, by all who have made them the subject of but moderate consideration, may be thoroughly prepared by means of study and practice; but the thoughts must still revert to those general heads and common-places to which I have so often alluded, and from which all arguments are drawn for every species of oratory. [147] All that is required, whether it result from art, or observation, or practice, is but to know those parts of the field in which you may hunt for, and trace out, what you wish to find; for when you have embraced in your thoughts the whole of any topic, if you are but well practised in the treatment of subjects, nothing will escape you, and every circumstance material to the question will occur and suggest itself to you. |
[XXXV] Et sic, quum ad inveniendum in dicendo tria sint — acumen, deinde ratio (quam licet, si volumus, appellemus artem), tertium diligentia —, non possum equidem non ingenio primas concedere ; sed tamen ipsum ingenium diligentia etiam ex tarditate incitat ; [148] diligentia, inquam, quæ quum omnibus in rebus, tum in causis defendendis plurimum, valet. Hæc præcipue colenda est nobis ; hæc semper adhibenda ; hæc nihil est quod non assequatur :
|
XXXV. “Since, then, in speaking, three things are requisite for finding argument; genius, method, (which, if we please, we may call art,) and diligence, I cannot but assign the chief place to genius; yet diligence can raise even genius itself out of dulness; diligence, I say, which, as it avails in all things, is also of the utmost moment in pleading causes. [148] Diligence is to be particularly cultivated by us; it is to be constantly exerted; it is capable of effecting almost everything. That a cause is thoroughly understood, as I said at first, is owing to diligence; that we listen to our adversary attentively, and possess ourselves, not only of his thoughts, but even of his every word; that we observe all the motions of his countenance, which generally indicate the workings of the mind, is owing to diligence; [149] [but to do this covertly, that he may not seem to derive any advantage to himself, is the part of prudence ;]56 that the mind ruminates on those topics which I shall soon mention, that it insinuates itself thoroughly into the cause, that it fixes itself on it with care and attention, is owing to diligence; that it applies the memory like a light, to all these matters, as well as the tone of voice and power of delivery, is owing to diligence. [150] Betwixt genius and diligence there is very little room left for art; art only shows you where to look, and where that lies which you want to find; all the rest depends on care, attention, consideration, vigilance, assiduity, industry; all which I include in that one word which I hare so often repeated, diligence; a single virtue, in which all other virtues are comprehended. [151] For we see how the philosophers abound in copiousness of language, who, as I think, (but you, Catulus, know these matters better,) lay down no precepts of eloquence, and yet do not, on that account, the less undertake to speak with fulness and fluency on whatever subject is proposed to them.” |
[XXXVI] [152] Tum Catulus, “Est,” inquit, “ut dicis, Antoni, ut plerique philosophi nulla tradant præcepta dicendi — ¡et habeant paratum tamen quid de quaque re dicant! Sed Aristoteles — is quem ego maxime admiror — proposuit quosdam locos, ex quibus omnis argumenti via non modo ad philosophorum disputationem, sed etiam ad hanc orationem qua in causis utimur, inveniretur ; a quo quidem homine, jamdudum, Antoni, non aberrat oratio tua — sive tu similitudine illius divini ingenii in eadem incurris vestigia, sive etiam illa ipsa legisti atque didicisti, quod quidem mihi magis verisimile videtur. Plus enim te operæ Græcis dedisse rebus video quam putaram.” [153] Tum ille, “Verum,” inquit, “ex me audies, Catule : semper ego existimavi jucundiorem et probabiliorem huic populo oratorem fore qui, primum, quam minimam artificii alicujus, deinde nullam Græcarum rerum, significationem daret. Atque ego idem existimavi pecudis esse, non hominis — quum tantas res Græci susciperent, profiterentur, agerent seseque et videndi res obscurissimas, et bene vivendi, et copiose dicendi rationem daturos hominibus pollicerentur — non admovere aurem et — si palam audire eos non auderes (ne minueres apud tuos cives auctoritatem tuam) — subauscultando tamen excipere voces eorum et procul quid narrarent attendere. Itaque feci, Catule, et istorum omnium summatim causas et genera ipsa gustavi.” |
XXXVI. [152] Catulus then observed, “It is as you say, Antonius, that most philosophers deliver no precepts of eloquence, and yet are prepared with something to say on any subject. But Aristotle, he whom I admire more than any of them, has set forth certain topics from which every line of argument may be deduced, not only for the disputations of philosophy, but even for the reasoning which we use in pleading causes; from whose notions your discourse, Antonius, has for some time past not varied; whether you, from a resemblance to that divine genius, hit upon his track, or whether you have read and made yourself master of his writings; a supposition indeed which seems to be more probable than the other, for I see that you have paid more attention to the Greek writers than we had imagined.” [153] “You shall hear from myself,” said he, “Catulus, what is really the case: I always thought that an orator would be more agreeable to the Roman people, and better approved, who should give, above all, as little indication as possible of artifice, and none at all of having studied Grecian literature. At the same time, when the Greeks undertook, professed, and executed such great things, when they offered to teach mankind how to penetrate the most obscure subjects, to live virtuously and to speak eloquently, I thought it the part of an irrational animal rather than a man, not to pay them some degree of attention, and, if we cannot venture to hear them openly, for fear of diminishing our authority with our own fellow-citizens, to catch their words at least by listening privately, and hearkening at a distance to what they stated; and thus I have acted, Catulus, and have gained a general notion of the arguments and subjects of all their writers.” |
[XXXVII] [154] “Valde, hercule,” inquit Catulus, “timide, tanquam ad aliquem libidinis scopulum, sic tuam mentem ad philosophiam appulisti quam hæc civitas aspernata nunquam est. Nam et referta quondam Italia Pythagoreorum fuit tum, quum erat in hac gente magna illa Græcia ; ex quo etiam quidam Numam Pompilium, regem nostrum, fuisse Pythagoreum ferunt, qui annis ante permultis fuit quam ipse Pythagoras ; quo etiam major vir habendus est, quoniam illam sapientiam constituendæ civitatis duobus prope sæculis ante cognovit, quam eam Græci natam esse senserunt. Et certe non tulit ullos hæc civitas aut gloria clariores, aut auctoritate graviores, aut humanitate politiores P. Africano, C. Lælio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Græcia palam semper habuerunt. [155] Atque ego hoc ex eis sæpe audivi, quum dicerent pergratum Athenienses et sibi fecisse et multis principibus civitatis, quod, quum ad Senatum legatos de suis maximis rebus mitterent, tres illius ætatis nobilissimos philosophos misissent, Carneadem et Critolaum et Diogenem ; itaque eos, dum Romæ essent, et a se et ab aliis frequenter auditos ; quos tu quum haberes auctores, Antoni, miror cur philosophiæ, sicut Zethus ille Pacuvianus, prope bellum indixeris.” [156] “Minime,” inquit Antonius, “ac sic decrevi philosophari potius ut Neoptolemus apud Ennium, ‘Paucis ; nam omnino haud placet.’ Sed tamen hæc est mea sententia quam videbar exposuisse : ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint : opinionem istorum studiorum et suspicionem artificii apud eos qui res judicent, oratori adversariam esse arbitror ; imminuit enim et oratoris auctoritatem et orationis fidem. |
XXXVII. [154] “Really and truly,” said Catulus, “you have steered your bark to the coasts of philosophy with the utmost caution, as if you had been approaching some rock of unlawful desire,57 though this country has never despised philosophy. For Italy was formerly full of Pythagoreans, at the time when part of this country was called Great Greece:58 (whence some report that Numa Pompilius, one of our kings, was a Pythagorean; though he lived many years before the time of Pythagoras; for which reason he is to be accounted the greater man, as he had the wisdom and knowledge to regulate our state, almost two centuries before the Greeks knew that it had arisen in the world;) and certainly this country never produced men more renowned for glorious actions, or of greater gravity and authority, or possessed of more polite learning than Publius Africanus, Caius Laelius, and Lucius Furius, who always had about them publicly the most learned men from Greece. [155] I have often heard them say, that the Athenians had done what was very pleasing to them, and to many of the leading men in the city, in sending, when they despatched ambassadors to the senate about important concerns of their own, the three most illustrious philosophers of that age, Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes; who, during their stay at Rome, were frequently heard lecturing by them and others. And when you had such authorities as these, Antonius, I wonder why you should, like Zethus in Pacuvius’s play,59 almost declare war against philosophy.” [156] “I have not by any means done so,” replied Antonius, “for I have determined rather to philosophize, like Ennius’s Neoptolemus, a little, since to be absolutely a philosopher is not agreeable to me. But my opinion, which I think I have clearly laid down, is this: I do not disapprove of such studies, if they be but moderately pursued; but I think that the reputation of that kind of learning, and all suspicion of artifice, is prejudicial to the orator with those who have the decision of affairs; for it diminishes the authority of the speaker and the credit of his speech.” |
[XXXVIII] [157] Sed ut eo revocetur unde huc declinavit oratio : ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis quos Romam venisse dixisti, ¿videsne Diogenem eum fuisse qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi, quam verbo Græco διαλεκτικήν appellaret? In hac arte (si modo est hæc ars) nullum est præceptum quomodo verum inveniatur, sed tantum est quomodo judicetur. [158] Nam et omne quod eloquimur sic, ut id aut esse dicamus aut non esse,
|
XXXVIII. [157] “But that our conversation may return to the point from which it digressed, do you observe that of those three illustrious philosophers, who, as you said, came to Rome, one was Diogenes, who professed to teach the art of reasoning well, and distinguishing truth from falsehood, which he called by the Greek name dialektike, or logic? In this art, if it be an art, there are no directions how truth may be discovered, but only how it may be judged. [158] For everything of which we speak we either affirm to be or not to be;60 and if it be expressed absolutely, the logicians take it in hand to judge whether it be true or false; or, if it be expressed conditionally, and qualifications are added, they determine whether such qualifications are rightly added, and whether the conclusion of each syllogism is true; and at last they torment themselves with their own subtilties, and, after much disquisition, find out not only what they themselves cannot resolve, but even arguments, by which what they had before begun to resolve, or rather had almost made clear, is again involved in obscurity. [159] Here, then, that Stoic61 can be of no assistance to me, because he does not teach me how to find out what to say; he is rather even an impediment to me; for he finds many difficulties which he says can by no means be cleared, and unites with them a kind of language that is not clear, easy, and fluent; but poor, dry, succinct, and concise; and if any one shall approve such a style, he will approve it with the acknowledgment that it is not suited to the orator. For our mode of speaking is to be adapted to the ear of the multitude, to fascinate and excite their minds, and to prove matters that are not weighed in the scales of the goldsmith, but in the balance, as it were, of popular opinion; [160] we may therefore entirely dismiss an art which is too silent about the invention of arguments, and too full of words in pronouncing judgment on them. That Critolaus, whom you mention as having come hither with Diogenes, might, I fancy, have been of more assistance to our studies, for he was out of the school of that Aristotle from whose method I seem to you not greatly to differ. Between this Aristotle, (of whom I have read, as well that book in which he explains the rhetorical systems of all who went before him, as those in which he gives us some notions of his own on the art,) between him, I say, and the professed teachers of the art, there appeared to me to be this difference: that he with the same acuteness of intellect with which he had penetrated the qualities and nature of things throughout the universe, saw into everything that pertained to the art of rhetoric, which he thought beneath him; but they, who thought this art alone worthy of cultivation, passed their whole lives in contemplating this one subject, not with as much ability as he, but with constant practice in their single pursuit, and greater devotion to it. [161] As to Carneades, that extraordinary force and variety of eloquence which he possessed would be extremely desirable for us; a man who never took up any argument in his disputations which he did not prove; never attacked any argument that he did not overthrow. But this is too arduous an accomplishment to be expected from those who profess and teach rhetoric. |
[XXXIX] [162] Ego autem, si quem nunc plane rudem institui ad dicendum velim, his potius tradam assiduis uno opere eandem incudem diem noctemque tundentibus, qui omnes tenuissimas particulas atque omnia minima mansa ut nutrices infantibus pueris in os inserant. Sin sit is qui et doctrina mihi liberaliter institutus et aliquo jam imbutus usu et satis acri ingenio esse videatur, illuc eum rapiam, ubi non seclusa aliqua aquula teneatur, sed unde universum flumen erumpat — qui illi sedes et quasi domicilia omnium argumentorum commonstret et ea breviter illustret verbisque definiat. [163] ¿Quid enim est in quo hæreat qui viderit omne quod sumatur in oratione — aut ad probandum aut ad refellendum — aut ex re sua sumi vi atque natura, aut assumi foris?
|
XXXIX. [162] “If it were my desire that a person totally illiterate should be instructed in the art of speaking, I would willingly send him to these perpetual workers at the same employment, who hammer day and night on the same anvil, and who would put his literary food into his mouth, in the smallest pieces, minced as fine as possible, as nurses put theirs into the mouths of children. But if he were one who had had a liberal education, and some degree of practice, and seemed to have some acuteness of genius, I would instantly conduct him, not where a little brook of water was confined by itself, but to the source whence a whole flood gushed forth; to an instructor who would show him the seats and abodes, as it were, of every sort of arguments, and would illustrate them briefly, and define them in proper terms. [163] For what point is there in which he can hesitate, who shall see that whatever is assumed in speaking, either to prove or to refute, is either derived from the peculiar force and nature of the subject itself, or borrowed from something foreign to it? From its own peculiar force: as when it is inquired, ‘what the nature of a whole thing is,’ or ‘a part of it’ or ‘what name it has,’ or whatever belongs to the whole matter. From what is foreign to it: as when circumstances which are extrinsic, and not inherent in the nature of the thing, are enumerated in combination. [164] If the inquiry regard the whole, its whole force is to be explained by a definition, thus: ‘If the majesty of a state be its greatness and dignity, he is a traitor to its majesty who delivers up an army to the enemies of the Roman people, not he who delivers up him who has violated it into the power of the Roman people.’ [165] But if the question respect only a part, the matter must be managed by partition in this manner: ‘Either the senate should have been obeyed concerning the safety of the republic, or some other authority should have been constituted, or he should have acted on his own judgment: to constitute another authority had been haughty; to act on his own judgment had been arrogant; he had therefore to obey the direction of the senate.’ If we argue from a name, we may express ourselves like Carbo: ‘If he be a consul who consults the good of his country, what else has Opimius done?’ [166] But if we argue from what is intimately connected with the subject, there are many sources of arguments and common-places; for we shall look to adjuncts, to general views, to particulars falling under general views, to things similar and dissimilar, contrary, consequential; to such as agree with the case, and are, as it were, forerunners of it, and such as are at variance with it; we shall investigate the causes of circumstances, and whatever has arisen from those causes; and shall notice cases that are stronger, or similar, or weaker. |
|
XL. [167] “From things closely relating to the subject arguments are drawn thus: ‘If the utmost praise is to be attributed to filial duty, you ought to be moved when you see Quintus Metellus mourn so tenderly.’ From general considerations, thus: ‘If magistrates ought to be under the power of the Roman people, of what do you accuse Norbanus, whose tribuneship was subservient to the will of the state?’ [168] From particulars that fall under the general consideration, thus: ‘If all who consult the interest of the public ought to be dear to us, certainly military commanders should be peculiarly dear, by whose conduct, courage, and exposure to danger, we preserve our own safety and the dignity of the empire.’ From similarity, thus: ‘If wild beasts love their offspring, what affection ought we to feel for our children?’ [169] From dissimilarity, thus: ‘If it be the character of barbarians to live as it were for a short season, our plans ought to have respect to perpetuity.’ In both modes of comparison, from similarity as well as dissimilarity, examples are taken from the acts, sayings, and successes of others; and fictitious narratives may often be introduced. From contraries, arguments are drawn thus: [170] ‘If Gracchus acted in a detestable, Opimius has acted in a glorious, manner.’ From subsequent circumstances, thus: ‘If he be slain with a weapon, and you, his enemy, are found on the very spot with a bloody sword, and nobody but you is seen there, and no one else had any reason to commit the act, and you were always of a daring character, what ground is there on which we can possibly doubt of your guilt?’ From concurrent, antecedent, and repugnant circumstances, thus, as Crassus argued when he was quite a young man: ‘Although, Carbo, you defended Opimius, this audience will not on that account esteem you a good citizen; for it is clear that you dissembled and had other views, because you often, in your harangues, deplored the fate of Tiberius Gracchus, because you were an accomplice in the death of Publius Africanus, because you proposed a law of such a nature in your tribuneship, because you have always dissented from good members of the state.’ [171] From the causes of things, thus: ‘If you would abolish avarice, you must abolish the parent of it, luxury.’ From whatever arises from those causes, thus: ‘If we use the money in the treasury as well for the services of war as the ornaments of peace, let us take care of the public revenues.’ Stronger, weaker, and parallel instances, we shall compare thus: from a stronger we shall argue in this way, ‘If a good name be preferable to riches, and money is pursued with so much industry, with how much more exertion is glory to be sought? ‘From a weaker, thus: “Since merely for a small acquaintance’ sake He takes this woman’s death so nearly, what If he himself had loved? what would he feel For me, his father?62 “From a parallel case, thus: ‘It is natural to the same character, to be rapacious of the public money, and to be profuse of it to the public prejudice.’ [173] But instances borrowed from extraneous circumstances are such as are not supported by their own strength, but somewhat foreign: as, ‘This is true; for Quintus Lutatius has affirmed it:’ ‘This is false; for an examination has been made:’ ‘This must of necessity follow; for I shall read the writings;’ on which head I spoke fully a little while ago.” |
[XLI] [174] Hæc, ut brevissime dici potuerunt, ita a me dicta sunt. Ut enim si aurum cui, quod esset multifariam defossum, commonstrare vellem, satis esse deberet, si signa et notas ostenderem locorum, quibus cognitis ille sibi ipse foderet, et id quod vellet parvo labore, nullo errore, inveniret, sic has ego argumentorum novi notas quæ illa mihi quærenti demonstrant, ubi sint ; reliqua cura et cogitatione eruuntur. [175] Quod autem argumentorum genus cuique causarum generi maxime conveniat, non est artis exquisitæ præscribere, et est mediocris ingenii judicare. Neque enim nunc id agimus, ut artem aliquam dicendi explicemus, sed ut doctissimis hominibus usus nostri quasi quædam admonita tradamus. His igitur locis in mente et cogitatione defixis et in omni re ad dicendum posita excitatis, nihil erit quod oratorem effugere possit — non modo in forensibus disceptationibus, sed omnino in ullo genere dicendi. [176] Si vero assequetur, ut talis videatur qualem se videri velit, et animos eorum ita afficiat apud quos aget, ut eos, quocunque velit, vel trahere vel rapere possit, nihil profecto præterea ad dicendum requiret. Jam illud videmus nequaquam satis esse, reperire quid dicas, nisi id inventum tractare possis. [177] Tractatio autem varia esse debet, ne aut cognoscat artem qui audiat, aut defetigetur similitudinis satietate:
|
XLI. [174] I have been as brief in the exemplification of these matters as their nature would permit. For as, if I wished to make known to any one a quantity of gold, that was buried in separate heaps, it ought to be sufficient if I told him the signs and marks of the places, with the knowledge of which he might dig for himself, and find what he wished with very little trouble, and without any mistake; so I wished to specify such marks, as it were, of arguments, as would let him who seeks them know where they are;63 what remains is to be brought out by industry and thought. [175] What kind of arguments is most suitable to any particular kind of cause it requires no exquisite skill to prescribe, but merely moderate capacity to determine. For it is not now my design to set forth any system of rhetoric, but to communicate to men of eminent learning some hints drawn from my own experience. These common-places, therefore, being fixed in the mind and memory, and called forth on every subject proposed to be discussed, there will be nothing that can escape the orator, not merely in matters litigated in the forum, but in any department of eloquence whatever. [176] But if he shall attain such success, as to seem to be what he would wish to seem, and to affect the minds of those before whom he pleads in such a manner as to lead or rather force them in whatever direction he pleases, he will assuredly require nothing else to render him accomplished in oratory. “We now see, that it is by no means sufficient to find out what to say, unless we can handle it skilfully when we have found it. [177] This treatment ought to be diversified, that he who listens may neither discover any artifice, nor be tired and satiated with uniformity. Whatever you advance, should be laid down as a proposition, and you should show why it is so; and, from the same premises, you should sometimes form a conclusion, and sometimes leave it to be formed by the hearer, and make a transition to something else. Frequently, however, you need make no proposition, but show, by the reasoning which you shall use, what proposition might have been made. If you produce a comparison to anything, you should first confirm what you offer as a comparison; and then apply to it the point in question. In general, you should shade the distinctive points of your arguments, so that none of your hearers may count them; and that, while they appear clear as to matter, they may seem blended in your mode of speaking on them. |
[XLII] [178] Hæc properans — ut et apud doctos et semidoctus ipse — percurro, ut aliquando ad illa majora veniamus. Nihil est enim in dicendo, Catule, majus, quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur, ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam judicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines judicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut lætitia aut spe aut timore aut errore aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut præscripto aut juris norma aliqua aut judicii formula aut legibus. [179] Quare, nisi quid vobis aliud placet, ¡ad illa pergamus! “Paululum,” inquit Catulus, “etiam nunc deesse videtur eis rebus, Antoni, quas exposuisti, quod sit tibi ante explicandum quam illuc proficiscare, quo te dicis intendere.” “Qui ordo tibi placeat,” inquit Catulus, “et quæ dispositio argumentorum in qua tu mihi semper deus videri soles.” [180] “Vide quam sim,” inquit, “‘deus’ in isto genere, Catule : non, hercule, mihi nisi admonito venisset in mentem ; ut possis existimare me in ea, in quibus nonnunquam aliquid efficere videor, usu solere in dicendo — vel casu potius — incurrere. Ac res quidem ista quam ego, quia non noram, sic tanquam ignotum hominem præteribam, tantum potest in dicendo, ut ad vincendum nulla plus possit ; sed tamen mihi videris ante tempus a me rationem ordinis et disponendarum rerum requisisse. [181] Nam si ego omnem vim oratoris in argumentis et in re ipsa per se probanda posuissem, tempus esset jam de ordine argumentorum et de collocatione aliquid dicere ; sed quum tria sint a me proposita, de uno dictum, quum de duobus reliquis dixero, tum erit denique de disponenda tota oratione quærendum. |
XLII. [178] “I run over these matters cursorily, as addressing men of learning, and, being myself but half-learned, that we may at length arrive at matters of greater consequence. For there is nothing, Catulus, of more importance in speaking than that the hearer should be favorable to the speaker, and be himself so strongly moved that he may be influenced more by impulse and excitement of mind, than by judgment or reflection. For mankind make far more determinations through hatred, or love, or desire, or anger, or grief, or joy, or hope, or fear, or error, or some other affection of mind, than from regard to truth, or any settled maxim, or principle of right, or judicial form, or adherence to the laws. Unless anything else, [179] therefore, be agreeable to you, let us proceed to consider these points.” “There seems,” observed Catulus, “to be still some little wanting to those matters which you have discussed, Antonius, something that requires to be explained before you proceed to what you propose.” “What is it?” asked Antonius. “What order,” replied Catulus, “and arrangement of arguments, has your approbation; for in that department you always seem a god to me.” [180] “You may see how much of a god I am in that respect, Catulus,” rejoined Antonius; “for I assure you the matter would never have come into my thoughts if I had not been reminded of it; so that you may suppose I am generally led by mere practice in speaking, or father perhaps by chance, to fix on that arrangement of matter by which I seem at times to produce some effect However, that very point which I, because I had no thought of it, passed by as I should by a person unknown to me, is of such efficacy in oratory, that nothing is more conducive to victory; but yet you seem to me to have required from me prematurely an account of the order and disposition of the orator’s material; [181] for if I had placed all his power in argumentation, and in proving his case from its own inherent merits, it might be time to say something on the order and arrangement of his arguments; but as three heads were specified by me, and I have spoken on only one, it will be proper, after I have attended to the other two, to consider, last of all, about the general arrangement of a speech. |
[XLIII] [182] Valet igitur multum ad vincendum :
|
XLIII. [182] “It contributes much to success in speaking, that the morals, principles, conduct, and lives of those who plead causes, and of those for whom they plead, should be such as to merit esteem; and that those of their adversaries should be such as to deserve censure; and also that the minds of those before whom the cause is pleaded should be moved as much as possible to a favorable feeling, as well towards the speaker as towards him for whom he speaks. The feelings of the hearers are conciliated by a person’s dignity, by his actions, by the character of his life; particulars which can more easily be adorned by eloquence, if they really exist, than be invented, if they have no existence. But the qualities that attract favor to the orator are a soft tone of voice, a countenance expressive of modesty, a mild manner of speaking; so that if he attacks any one with severity, he may seem to do so unwillingly and from compulsion. It is of peculiar advantage that indications of good nature, of liberality, of gentleness, of piety, of grateful feelings, free from selfishness and avarice, should appear in him; and everything that characterizes men of probity and humility, not acrimonious, nor pertinacious, nor litigious, nor harsh, very much conciliates benevolence, and alienates the affections from those in whom such qualities are not apparent. The contrary qualities to these, therefore, are to be imputed to your opponents. [183] This mode of address is extremely excellent in those causes in which the mind of the judge cannot well be inflamed by ardent and vehement incitation; for energetic oratory is not always desirable, but often smooth, submissive, gentle language, which gains much favor for rei, or defendants, a term by which I designate not only such as are accused, but all persons about whose affairs there is any litigation; for in that sense people formerly used the word. [184] To describe the character of your clients in your speeches, therefore, as just, full of integrity, religious, unpresuming, and patient of injuries, has an extraordinary effect; and such a description, either in the commencement, or in your statement of facts, or in the peroration, has so much influence, if it is agreeably and judiciously managed, that it often prevails more than the merits of the cause. Such influence, indeed, is produced by a certain feeling and art in speaking, that the speech seems to represent, as it were, the character of the speaker; for, by adopting a peculiar mode of thought and expression, united with action that is gentle and indicative of amiableness, such an effect is produced, that the speaker seems to be a man of probity, integrity, and virtue. |
[XLIV] [185] Huic autem est illa dispar adjuncta ratio orationis, quæ alio quodam genere mentes judicum permovet impellitque, ut aut oderint aut diligant aut invideant aut salvum velint aut metuant aut sperent aut cupiant aut abhorreant aut lætentur aut mæreant aut misereantur aut pœnire velint, aut ad eos motus deducantur, si qui finitimi sunt et propinqui his ac talibus animi permotionibus. [186] Atque illud optandum est oratori, ut aliquam permotionem animorum sua sponte ipsi afferant ad causam judices ad id, quod utilitas oratoris feret, accommodatam. Facilius est enim currentem, ut ajunt, incitare quam commovere languentem. Sin id aut non erit aut erit obscurius, sicut medico diligenti, priusquam conetur ægro adhibere medicinam, non solum morbus ejus cui mederi volet, sed etiam consuetudo valentis et natura corporis cognoscenda est, sic equidem, quum aggredior in ancipiti causa et gravi ad animos judicum pertractandos, omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque versor, ut odorer quam sagacissime possim, quid sentiant, quid existiment, quid exspectent, quid velint, quo deduci oratione facillime posse videantur. [187] Si se dant et, ut ante dixi, sua sponte, quo impellimus, inclinant atque propendent, accipio quod datur et ad id, unde aliquis flatus ostenditur, vela do. Sin est integer quietusque judex, plus est operis ; sunt enim omnia dicendo excitanda, nihil adjuvante natura. Sed tantam vim habet illa quæ recte a bono poëta dicta est “flexanima atque omnium regina rerum oratio,” ut non modo inclinantem excipere aut stantem inclinare, sed etiam adversantem ac repugnantem, ut imperator bonus ac fortis, capere possit. |
XLIV. [185] “To this mode of speaking we may subjoin the opposite method, which moves the minds of the judges by very different means, and impels them to hate, or love, or envy, or benevolence, or fear, or hope, or desire, or abhorrence, or joy, or grief, or pity, or severity; or leads them to whatever feelings resemble and are allied to these and similar emotions of mind. [186] It is desirable, too, for the orator, that the judges may voluntarily bring to the hearing of the cause some feelings in their breasts favorable to the object of the speaker. For it is easier, as they say, to increase the speed of him that is already running, than to excite to motion him that is torpid. But if such shall not be the case, or be somewhat doubtful, then, as a careful physician, before he proceeds to administer any medicine to a patient, must not only understand the disease of him whom he would cure, but also his habit and constitution of body when in health; so I, for my part, when I undertake a cause of such doubt and importance as is likely to excite the feelings of the judges, employ all my sagacity on the care and consideration of ascertaining, as skilfully as I can, what their sentiments and opinions are, what they expect, to which side they incline, and to what conclusion they are likely to be led, with the least difficulty, by the force of oratory. [187] If they yield themselves up, and, as I said before, voluntarily incline and preponderate to the side to which I would impel them, I embrace what is offered, and turn my sails to that quarter from whence any breath of wind is perceived to blow. But if the judge is unbiassed, and free from all passion, it is a work of greater difficulty; for every feeling must then be moved by the power of oratory, without any assistance from nature. But so great are the powers of that which was rightly termed by a good poet,64 Incliner of the soul, and queen of all things, Eloquence, that it can not only make him upright who is biassed, or bias him who is steadfast, but can, like an able and resolute commander, lead even him captive who resist? and opposes. |
[XLV] [188] Hæc sunt illa quæ me ludens Crassus modo flagitabat, quum a me divinitus tractari solere diceret, et in causa M’. Aquilii, Gajique Norbani, nonnullisque aliis quasi præclare acta laudaret. Quæ mehercule ego, Crasse, quum a te tractantur in causis, horrere soleo. Tanta vis animi, tantus impetus, tantus dolor oculis, vultu, gestu, digito denique isto tuo significari solet ; tantum est flumen gravissimorum optimorumque verborum, tam integræ sententiæ, tum veræ, tam novæ, tam sine pigmentis fucoque puerili, ut mihi non solum tu incendere judicem, sed ipse ardere videaris. [189] Neque fieri potest, ut doleat is qui audit, ut oderit, ut invideat, ut pertimescat aliquid, ut ad fletum misericordiamque deducatur, nisi omnes illi motus quos orator adhibere volet judici, in ipso oratore impressi esse atque inusti videbuntur. Quodsi fictus aliqui dolor suscipiendus esset et si in ejusmodi genere orationis nihil esset nisi falsum atque imitatione simulatum, major ars aliqua forsitan esset requirenda. Nunc ego quid tibi, Crasse, quid ceteris accidat, nescio ; de me autem causa nulla est cur apud homines prudentissimos atque amicissimos mentiar. Non, mehercule, unquam apud judices aut dolorem, aut misericordiam, aut invidiam, aut odium dicendo excitare volui, quin ipse, in commovendis judicibus his ipsis sensibus ad quos illos adducere vellem, permoverer. [190] Neque enim facile est perficere, ut irascatur ei cui tu velis judex, si tu ipse id lente ferre videare ; neque ut oderit eum quem tu velis, nisi te ipsum flagrantem odio ante viderit ; neque ad misericordiam adducetur, nisi tu ei signa doloris tui verbis, sententiis, voce, vultu, collacrimatione denique ostenderis. Ut enim nulla materies tam facilis ad exardescendum est, quæ, nisi admoto igni, ignem concipere possit, sic nulla mens est tam ad comprehendendam vim oratoris parata quæ possit incendi, nisi inflammatus ipse ad eam et ardens accesserit. |
XLV. [188] “These are the points about which Crassus just now jocosely questioned me when he said that I treated them divinely, and praised what I did, as being meritoriously done, in the causes of Manius Aquilius,65 Caius Norbanus,66 and some others; but really, Crassus, when such arts are adopted by you in pleading, I use to feel terrified; such power of mind, such impetuosity, such passion, is expressed in your eyes, your countenance, your gesture, and even in your very finger;67 such a torrent is there of the most emphatic and best chosen words, such noble thoughts, so just, so new, so free from all disguise or puerile embellishment, that you seem not only to me to fire the judge, but to be yourself on fire. [189] Nor is it possible that the judge should feel concern, or hate, or envy, or fear in any degree, or that he should be moved to compassion and tears, unless all those sensations which the orator would awaken in the judge shall appear to be deeply felt and experienced by the orator himself. For if a counterfeit passion were to be assumed, and if there were nothing, in a speech of that kind, but what was false and simulated, still greater art would perhaps be necessary. What is the case with you, however, Crassus, or with others, I do not know; as to myself, there is no reason why I should say what is false to men of your great good sense and friendship for me, I never yet, upon my honor, tried to excite sorrow, or compassion, or envy, or hatred, when speaking before a court of judicature, but I myself, in rousing the judges, was affected with the very same sensations that I wished to produce in them. [190] For it is not easy to cause the judge to be angry with him with whom you desire him to be angry, if you yourself appear to take the matter coolly; or to make him hate him whom you wish him to hate, unless he first see you burning with hatred; nor will he be moved to pity, unless you give him plain indications of your own acute feelings, by your expressions, sentiments, tone of voice, look, and finally by sympathetic tears; for as no fuel is so combustible as to kindle without the application of fire, so no disposition of mind is so susceptible of the impressions of the orator as to be animated to strong feeling, unless he himself approach it full of inflammation and ardour. |
[XLVI] [191] Ac, ne hoc forte magnum ac mirabile esse videatur, hominem totiens irasci, totiens dolere, totiens omni motu animi concitari, præsertim in rebus alienis, magna vis est earum sententiarum atque eorum locorum quæ agas tractesque dicendo — nihil ut opus sit simulatione et fallaciis. Ipsa enim natura orationis ejus quæ suscipitur ad aliorum animos permovendos, oratorem ipsum magis etiam quam quemquam eorum qui audiunt permovet. [192] Et ne hoc in causis, in judiciis, in amicorum periculis, in concursu hominum, in civitate, in foro accidere miremur, quum agitur non solum ingenii nostri existimatio — nam id esset levius (quanquam, quum professus sis te id posse facere quod pauci, ne id quidem neglegendum est). Sed alia sunt majora multo : fides, officium, diligentia, quibus rebus adducti, etiam quum alienissimos defendimus, tamen eos alienos, si ipsi viri boni volumus haberi, existimare non possumus. [193] Sed, ut dixi, ne hoc in nobis mirum esse videatur, ¿quid potest esse tam fictum quam versus, quam scæna, quam fabulæ? Tamen in hoc genere sæpe ipse vidi, ut ex persona mihi ardere oculi hominis histrionis viderentur, sponte aliena dicentis : ¿Neque paternum aspectum es veritus?
|
XLVI. [191] “And that it may not appear to you extraordinary and astonishing, that a man should so often be angry, so often grieve, and be so often excited by every passion of the mind, especially in other men’s concerns, there is such force, let me assure you, in those thoughts and sentiments which you apply, handle, and discuss in speaking, that there is no occasion for simulation or deceit; for the very nature of the language which is adopted to” move the passions of others, moves the orator himself in a greater degree than any one of those who listen to him. [192] That we may not be surprised, too, that this happens in causes, in criminal trials, in the danger of our friends, and before a multitude in the city and in the forum, where not only our reputation for ability is at stake, (for that might be a slight consideration; although, when you have professed to accomplish what few can do, it is not wholly to be neglected;) but where other things of greater importance are concerned, fidelity, duty to our clients, and earnestness in discharging that duty; we are so much moved by such considerations, that even while we defend the merest strangers, we cannot regard them as strangers, if we wish to be thought honest men ourselves. [193] But, as I said, that this may not appear surprising in us, what can be more fictitious than poetry, than theatrical representations, than the argument of a play? Yet on the stage I myself have often observed the eyes of the actor through his mask appear inflamed with fury, while he was repeating these verses,68 Have you, then, dared to separate him from you, Or enter Salamis without your brother? And dreaded not your father’s countenance? He never uttered the word ‘countenance’ but Telamon seemed to me to be distracted with rage and grief for his son. And how, lowering his voice to a tone of sorrow, did he appear to weep and bewail, as he exclaimed, Whom childless now in the decline of life You have afflicted, and bereaved, and killed; Regardless of your brother’s death, regardless Of his young son entrusted to your keeping! And if even the player who pronounced these verses every day, could not yet pronounce them efficiently without a feeling of real grief, can you suppose that Pacuvius, when he wrote them, was in a cool and tranquil state of mind? Such could not be the case; [194] for I have often heard that no man can be a good poet (as they say is left recorded in the writings of both Democritus and Plato) without ardour of imagination, and the excitement of something similar to frenzy. |
[XLVII] Quare nolite existimare me ipsum (qui non heroum veteres casus fictosque luctus velim imitari atque adumbrare dicendo — neque actor sim alienæ personæ, sed auctor meæ), quum mihi M’. Aquilius in civitate retinendus esset, quæ in illa causa peroranda fecerim, sine magno dolore fecisse. [195] Quem enim ego consulem fuisse, imperatorem, ornatum a Senatu, ovantem in Capitolium ascendisse meminissem, hunc quum afflictum, debilitatum, mærentem, in summum discrimen adductum viderem, non prius sum conatus misericordiam aliis commovere quam misericordia sum ipse captus. Sensi equidem tum magnopere moveri judices, quum excitavi mæstum ac sordidatum senem, et quum ista feci quæ tu, Crasse, laudas, non arte — de qua quid loquar nescio —, sed motu magno animi ac dolore, ut discinderem tunicam, ut cicatrices ostenderem. [196] Quum C. Marius mærorem orationis meæ præsens ac sedens multum lacrimis suis adjuvaret, quumque ego illum crebro appellans collegam ei suum commendarem atque ipsum advocatum ad communem imperatorum fortunam defendendam invocarem, non fuit hæc sine meis lacrimis, non sine dolore magno miseratio omniumque deorum et hominum et civium et sociorum imploratio. Quibus omnibus verbis quæ a me tum sunt habita, si dolor afuisset meus, non modo non miserabilis, sed etiam irridenda fuisset oratio mea. Quamobrem hoc vos doceo, Sulpici, bonus ego videlicet atque eruditus magister, ut in dicendo irasci, ut dolere, ut flere possitis. [197] Quanquam, ¿te quidem quid hoc doceam, qui in accusando sodali et quæstore meo tantum incendium non oratione solum, sed etiam multo magis vi et dolore et ardore animi concitaras, ut ego ad id restinguendum vix conarer accedere? Habueras enim tu omnia in causa superiora : vim, fugam, lapidationem, crudelitatem tribuniciam in Cæpionis gravi miserabilique casu in judicium vocabas ; deinde principem et Senatus et civitatis, M. Æmilium, lapide percussum esse constabat ; vi pulsum e templo L. Cottam et T. Didium, quum intercedere vellent rogationi, nemo poterat negare. |
XLVII. “Do not therefore imagine that I, who had no desire to imitate or represent the calamities or fictitious sorrows of the heroes of antiquity in my speech, and was no actor of a foreign and personated part, but a supporter of my own, when Manius Aquilius, by my efforts, was to be maintained in his rights as a citizen, did that which I did in the peroration of that cause, without a strong feeling. [195] For when I saw him whom I remembered to have been consul, and, as a general honoured by the senate, to have marched up to the Capitol with the pomp of an ovation, afflicted, dejected, sorrowful, reduced to the last extremity of danger, I no sooner attempted to excite compassion in others, than I was myself moved with compassion. I observed, indeed, that the judges were wonderfully moved, when I brought forward the sorrowful old man habited in mourning, and did what you, Crassus, commend, not with art (of which I know not what to say), but with great concern and emotion of mind, so that I tore open his garment and showed his scars; [196] when Caius Marius, who was present and sat by, heightened the sorrow expressed in my speech by his tears; and when I, frequently calling upon him, recommended his colleague to his protection, and invoked him as an advocate to defend the common fortune of commanders. This excitement of compassion, this adjuration of all gods and men, of citizens and allies, was not unaccompanied by my tears and extreme commiseration on my part; and if, from all the expressions which I then used, real concern of my own had been absent, my speech would not only have failed to excite commiseration, but would have even deserved ridicule. I, therefore, instruct you in these particulars, Sulpicius, I that am, forsooth, so skilful and so learned a master, showing you how, in speaking, you may be angry, and sorrowful, and weep. [197] “Though why, indeed, should I teach you this, who, in accusing my quaestor and companion in office,69 raised so fierce a flame, not only by your speech, but much more by your vehemence, passion, and fiery spirit, that I could scarce venture to approach to extinguish it? For you had in that cause everything in your favor; you brought before the judges violence, flight, pelting with stones, the cruel exercise of the tribunitian power in the grievous and miserable calamity of Caepio; it also appeared that Marcus Aemilius, the first man, not only in the senate, but in the city, had been struck with one of the stones; and nobody could deny that Lucius Cotta and Titus Didius, when they would have interposed their negative upon the passing of the law, had been driven in a tumultuous manner from the temple. |
[XLVIII] [198] Accedebat ut hæc tu adulescens pro republica queri summa cum dignitate existimarere ; ego, homo censorius, vix satis honeste viderer seditiosum civem et in hominis consularis calamitate crudelem posse defendere. Erant optimi cives judices, bonorum virorum plenum forum, vix ut mihi tenuis quædam venia daretur excusationis — quod tamen eum defenderem qui mihi quæstor fuisset. ¿Hic ego quid dicam, me artem aliquam adhibuisse? Quid fecerim, narrabo ; si placuerit, vos meam defensionem in aliquo artis loco reponetis. [199] Omnium seditionum genera, vitia, pericula collegi eamque orationem ex omni reipublicæ nostræ temporum varietate repetivi conclusique ita, ut dicerem, etsi omnes molestæ semper seditiones fuissent, justas tamen fuisse nonnullas et prope necessarias. Tum illa quæ modo Crassus commemorabat egi : neque reges ex hac civitate exigi, neque Tribunos Plebis creari, neque plebiscitis totiens consularem potestatem minui, neque provocationem — patronam illam civitatis ac vindicem libertatis — populo Romano dari sine nobilium dissensione potuisse ; ac, si illæ seditiones saluti huic civitati fuissent, non continuo, si qui motus populi factus esset, id C. Norbano in nefario crimine atque in fraude capitali esse ponendum. Quod si unquam populo Romano concessum esset ut jure incitatus videretur — id quod docebam sæpe esse concessum —, nullam illa causa justiorem fuisse. Tum omnem orationem traduxi et converti in increpandam Cæpionis fugam, in deplorandum interitum exercitus. Sic et eorum dolorem qui lugebant suos oratione refricabam et animos equitum Romanorum, apud quos tum judices causa agebatur, ad Q. Cæpionis odium, a quo erant ipsi propter judicia abalienati, renovabam atque revocabam. |
XLVIII. [198] There was also this circumstance in your favor ( that you, being merely a youth, were thought to make these complaints on behalf of the commonwealth with the utmost propriety; I, a man of censorian rank, was thought hardly in a condition to appear with any honor in defence of a seditious citizen, a man who had been unrelenting at the calamity of a consular person. The judges were citizens of the highest character; the forum was crowded with respectable people, so that scarcely even a slight excuse was allowed me, although I was to speak in defence of one who had been my quaestor. In these circumstances why need I say that I had recourse to some degree of art? I will state how I acted, and, if you please, you may place my defence under some head of art. [199] I noticed, in connexion, the natures, ill effects, and dangers of every kind of sedition. I brought down my discourse on that subject through all the changes of circumstances in our commonwealth; and I concluded by observing, that though all seditions had ever been attended with troubles, yet that some had been supported by justice, and almost by necessity. I then dwelt on those topics which Crassus just now mentioned, that neither could kings have been expelled from this city, nor tribunes of the people have been created, nor the consular power have been so often diminished by votes of the commonalty, nor the right of appeal, that patroness of the state and guardian of our liberty, have been granted to the Roman people, without disagreement with the nobility; and if those seditions had been of advantage to the republic, it should not immediately, if any commotion had been raised among the people, be laid to the charge of Caius Norbanus as a heinous crime or capital misdemeanour; but that, if it had ever been allowed to the people of Rome to appear justly provoked (and I showed that it had been often allowed), no occasion was ever more just than that of which I was speaking. I then gave another turn to my speech, and directed it to the condemnation of Caepio’s flight, and lamentation for the loss of the army. By this diversion I made the grief of those to flow afresh who were mourning for their friends, and re-excited the minds of the Roman knights before whom, as judges, the cause was being pleaded, to hatred towards Quintus Caepio, from whom they were alienated en account of the right of judicature.70 |
[XLIX] [200] Quod ubi sensi me in possessionem judicii ac defensionis meæ constitisse — quod et populi benevolentiam mihi conciliaram, cujus jus etiam cum seditionis conjunctione defenderam, et judicum animos totos vel calamitate civitatis vel luctu ac desiderio propinquorum vel odio proprio in Cæpionem ad causam nostram converteram —, tum admiscere huic generi orationis vehementi atque atroci genus illud alterum, de quo ante disputavi, lenitatis et mansuetudinis cœpi : me pro meo sodali (qui mihi in liberum loco more majorum esse deberet), et pro mea omni fama prope fortunisque decernere ; nihil mihi ad existimationem turpius, nihil ad dolorem acerbius accidere posse, quam si is qui sæpe alienissimis a me, sed meis tamen civibus saluti existimarer fuisse, sodali meo auxilium ferre non potuissem. [201] Petebam a judicibus ut illud ætati meæ, ut honoribus, ut rebus gestis, si justo, si pio, dolore me esse affectum viderent, concederent — præsertim si in aliis causis intellexissent omnia me semper pro amicorum periculis, nihil unquam pro me ipso deprecatum. Sic in illa omni defensione atque causa, quod esse in arte positum videbatur — ut de lege Appuleja dicerem, ut quid esset “minuere majestatem” explicarem — perquam breviter perstrinxi atque attigi. His duabus partibus orationis, quarum altera commendationem habet, altera concitationem, quæ minime præceptis artium sunt perpolitæ, omnis est a me illa causa tractata, ut et acerrimus in Cæpionis invidia renovanda et in meis moribus erga meos necessarios declarandis mansuetissimus viderer. Ita magis affectis animis judicum quam doctis, tua, Sulpici, est a nobis tum accusatio victa.” |
XLIX. [200] “But as soon as I perceived that I was in possession of the favor of the court, and that I had secured ground for defence, because I had both conciliated the good feeling of the people, whose rights I had maintained even in conjunction with sedition, and had brought over the whole feeling of the judges to our side of the question, either from their concern for the calamity of the public, or from grief or regret for their relations, or from their own individual aversion to Caepio, I then began to intermix with this vehement and ardent style of oratory that other species of which I discoursed before, full of lenity and mildness; saying that I was contending for my companion in office, who, according to the custom of our ancestors, ought to stand in relation to me as one of my children, and for almost my whole reputation and fortunes; that nothing could possibly happen more dishonourable to my character, or more bitterly adapted to give pain to me, than if I, who was reputed to have been oftentimes the preservation of those who were entire strangers to me, but yet my fellow-citizens, should not be able to assist an officer of my own. [201] I requested of the judges to make this concession to my age, to the honors which I had attained, to the actions which I had performed, if they saw that I was affected with a just and tender sorrow, and especially if they were sensible that in other causes I had asked everything for my friends in peril, but never anything for myself. Thus, in the whole of that defence and cause, the part which seemed to depend on art, the speaking on the Apuleian law, and explaining what it was to commit treason, I skimmed and touched upon as briefly as possible. But by the aid of these two parts of eloquence, to one of which belongs the excitement of the passions, to the, other recommendation to favor, (parts not at all fully treated in the rules in books on the art,) was the whole of that cause conducted by me; so that, in reviving the popular displeasure against Csepio, I appeared to be a person of the keenest acrimony; and, in speaking of my behaviour towards my friends, to be of the most humane disposition. In this manner, rather by exciting the passions of the judges than by informing their understandings, was your accusation, Sulpicius, at that time overthrown by me.” |
[L] [202] Hic Sulpicius, “Vere, hercule,” inquit, “Antoni, ista commemoras. Nam ego nihil unquam vidi, quod tam e manibus elaberetur, quam mihi tum est elapsa illa ipsa causa. Quum enim, quemadmodum dixisti, tibi ego non judicium, sed incendium tradidissem, ¡quod tuum principium, di immortales, fuit! ¡Qui timor! ¡Quæ dubitatio! ¡Quanta hæsitatio tractusque verborum! ¡Ut, tuo illud initio quod tibi unum ad ignoscendum homines dabant, tenuisti, te pro homine pernecessario, quæstore tuo, dicere! ¡Quam tibi primum munisti ad te audiendum viam! [203] Ecce autem : quum te nihil aliud profecisse arbitrarer, nisi ut homines tibi civem improbum defendenti ignoscendum propter necessitudinem arbitrarentur, serpere occulte cœpisti, nihildum aliis suspicantibus, me vero jam pertimescente, ut illam non Norbani seditionem, sed Populi Romani iracundiam neque eam injustam, sed meritam ac debitam fuisse defenderes. Deinde ¿qui locus a te prætermissus est in Cæpionem? ¡Ut tu illa omnia odio, invidia, misericordia miscuisti! Neque hæc solum in defensione, sed etiam in Scauro ceterisque meis testibus quorum tu testimonia non refellendo, sed ad eundem impetum populi confugiendo refutasti. [204] Quæ quum abs te modo commemorarentur, equidem nulla præcepta desiderabam ; ipsam tamen istam demonstrationem defensionum tuarum esse doctrinam non mediocrem puto.” “Atqui, si ita placet,” inquit, “trademus etiam quæ nos sequi in dicendo quæque maxime spectare solemus. Docuit enim jam nos longa vita ususque rerum maximarum, ut, quibus rebus animi hominum moverentur, teneremus. |
L. [202] “In good truth, Antonius,” interposed Sulpicius, “you recall these circumstances to my memory with justice; since I never saw anything slip out of any person’s hands, as that cause then slipped out of mine. For whereas, as you observed, I had given you not a cause to plead, but a flame to extinguish; what a commencement was it (immortal gods!) that you made! What timidity was there! What distrust! What a degree of hesitation and slowness of speech! But as soon as you had gained that by your exordium, which was the only thing that the assembly allowed you as an excuse, namely, that you were pleading for a man intimately connected with you, and your own quaestor, how quickly did you secure your way to a fair audience! [203] But lo! when I thought that you had reaped no other benefit than that the hearers would think they ought to excuse you for defending a pernicious citizen, on account of the ties of union betwixt you, you began to proceed gradually and tacitly, while others had as yet no suspicion of your designs, though I myself felt some apprehension, to maintain in your defence that what had happened was not sedition in Norbanus, but resentment on the part of the Roman people, resentment not excited unjustly, but deservedly, and in conformity with their duty. In the next place, what argument did you omit against Caepio? How did you confound all the circumstances of the case by allusions to hatred, ill-will, and compassion? Nor was this the case only in your defence, but even in regard to Scaurus and my other witnesses, whose evidence you did not confute by disproving it, but by having recourse to the same impetuosity of the people. [204] When those circumstances were mentioned by you just now, I felt no desire for any rules of instruction; for the very demonstration of your methods of defence, as stated by yourself, I regard as no ordinary instruction.” “But if you are so disposed,” said Antonius, “I will tell you what maxims I adopt in speaking, and what I keep principally in view; for a long life and experience in important affairs have taught me to discern by what means the minds of men are to be moved. |
[LI] [205] Equidem primum considerare soleo, postuletne causa. Nam neque parvis in rebus adhibendæ sunt hæ dicendi faces neque ita animatis hominibus, ut nihil ad eorum mentes oratione flectendas proficere possimus, ne aut irrisione aut odio digni putemur, si aut tragœdias agamus in nugis aut convellere adoriamur ea quæ non possint commoveri. [206] Jam quoniam hæc fere maxime sunt in judicum animis — aut quicunque illi erunt apud quos agemus — oratione molienda : amor, odium (iracundia), invidia, misericordia, spes, lætitia, timor, molestia. Sentimus amorem conciliari si id in re videamur quod sit utile ipsis apud quos agas defendere — aut si pro bonis viris, aut certe pro eis, qui illis boni atque utiles sint, laborare. Namque hæc res amorem magis conciliat, illa — virtutis defensio — caritatem. Plusque proficit, si ponetur spes utilitatis futuræ quam præteriti beneficii commemoratio. [207] Enitendum est ut ostendas, in ea re quam defendas, aut dignitatem inesse aut utilitatem ; eumque cui concilies hunc amorem, significes nihil ad utilitatem suam rettulisse ac nihil omnino fecisse causa sua. Invidetur enim commodis hominum ipsorum, studiis autem eorum ceteris commodandi favetur. [208] Videndumque hoc loco est, ne, quos ob benefacta diligi volemus, eorum laudem atque gloriam cui maxime invideri solet, nimis efferre videamur. Atque eisdem his ex locis et in alios odium struere discemus et a nobis ac nostris demovere ; eademque hæc genera sunt tractanda in iracundia vel excitanda vel sedanda. Nam si, quod ipsis qui audiunt perniciosum aut inutile sit, id factum augeas, odium creatur ; sin, quod aut in bonos viros aut in eos quos minime quisque debuerit, aut in rempublicam, tum excitatur, si non tam acerbum odium, tamen aut invidiæ aut odii non dissimilis offensio. [209] Item timor incutitur aut ex ipsorum periculis aut ex communibus : interior est ille proprius ; sed hic quoque communis ad eandem similitudinem est perducendus. |
LI. [205] “The first thing I generally consider is, whether the cause requires that the minds of the audience should be excited; for such fiery oratory is not to be exerted on trivial subjects, nor when the minds of men are so affected that we can do nothing by eloquence to influence their opinions, lest we be thought to deserve ridicule or dislike, if we either act tragedies about trifles or endeavour to pluck up what cannot be moved. For as the feelings on which we have to work in the minds of the judges, or whoever they may be before whom we may plead, are love, hatred, anger, envy, pity, hope, joy, fear, anxiety, we are sensible that love may be gained if you seem to advocate what is advantageous to the persons before whom you are speaking; or if you appear [206] to exert yourself in behalf of good men, or at least for such as are good and serviceable to them; for the latter case more engages favor, the former, the defence of virtue, esteem; and if a hope of future advantage is proposed, it has a greater effect than the mention of past benefits. [207] You must endeavour to show that in the cause which you defend, either their dignity or advantage is concerned; and you should signify that he for whom you solicit their love has referred nothing to his own private benefit, and done nothing at all for his own sake; for dislike is felt for the selfish gains of individuals, while favor is shown to their desires to serve others. [208] But we must take care, while we are on this topic, not to appear to extol the merit and glory of those whom we would wish to be esteemed for their good deeds, too highly, as these qualities are usually the greatest objects of envy. From these considerations, too, we shall learn how to draw hatred on our adversaries, and to avert it from ourselves and our friends. The same means are to be used, also, either to excite or allay anger; for if you exaggerate every fact that is hurtful or disadvantageous to the audience, their hatred is excited; but if anything of the kind is thrown out against men of worth, or against characters on whom no one ought to cast any reflection, or against the public, there is then produced, if not so violent a degree of hatred, at least an unfavorable feeling, or displeasure near akin to hatred. [209] Fear is also inculcated either from people’s own dangers or those of the public. Personal fear affects men more deeply; but that which is common to all is to be treated by the orator as having similar influence.71 |
[LII] Par atque una ratio est spei, lætitiæ, molestiæ ; sed haud sciam an acerrimus longe sit omnium motus invidiæ, nec minus virium opus sit in ea comprimenda quam in excitanda. Invident autem homines maxime paribus aut inferioribus, quum se relictos sentiunt, illos autem dolent evolasse ; sed etiam superioribus invidetur sæpe vehementer et eo magis, si intolerantius se jactant et æquabilitatem communis juris, præstantia dignitatis aut fortunæ suæ, transeunt. Quæ si inflammanda sunt,
|
LII. “Similar, or rather the same, is the case with regard to hope, joy, and anxiety; but I know not whether the feeling of envy is not by far the most violent of all emotions; nor does it require less power to suppress than to excite it. Men envy chiefly their equals or inferiors when they perceive themselves left behind, and are mortified that the others have outstripped them; but there is often a strong unfavorable feeling towards superiors, which is the stronger if they are intolerably arrogant, and transgress the fair bounds of common justice through super-eminence in dignity or fortune. If such advantages are to be made instruments to kindle dislike,72 the chief thing to be said is, ‘that they are not the acquisitions of virtue, that they have even been gained perhaps by vice and crime; and that, however honourable or imposing they may appear, no merit was ever carried so high as the insolence of mankind and their contumelious disdain.’ [210] To allay envy, it may be observed, ‘that such advantages have been gained by extreme toil and imminent perils; that they have not been applied to the individual’s own private benefit, but that of others; that he himself, if he appear to have gained any glory, although it might not be an undue reward for danger, was not elated with it, but wholly set it aside and undervalued it;’ and such an effect must by all means be produced (since most men are envious, and it is a most common and prevalent vice, and envy is felt towards all super-eminent and flourishing fortune), that the opinion entertained of such characters be lowered, and that their fortunes, so excellent in people’s imaginations, may appear mingled with labor and trouble. [211] “Pity is excited, if he who hears can be induced to apply to his own circumstances those unhappy particulars which are lamented in the case of others, particulars which they have either suffered or fear to suffer; and while he looks at another, to glance frequently at himself. Thus, as all the circumstances incident to human suffering are heard with concern, if they are pathetically represented, so virtue in affliction and humiliation is the most sorrowful of all objects of contemplation; and as that other department of eloquence which, by its recommendation of goodness, ought to give the picture of a virtuous man, should be in a gentle and (as I have often observed) a submissive strain, so this, which is adopted by the orator to effect a change in the minds of the audience, and to work upon them in every way, should be vehement and energetic. |
[LIII] [212] Sed est quædam in his duobus generibus — quorum alterum lene, alterum vehemens esse volumus — difficilis ad distinguendum similitudo. Nam, et ex illa lenitate qua conciliamur eis qui audiunt, ad hanc vim acerrimam qua eosdem excitamus influat oportet aliquid, et ex hac vi nonnunquam animi aliquid inflandum est illi lenitati ; neque est ulla temperatior oratio quam illa, in qua asperitas contentionis oratoris ipsius humanitate conditur, remissio autem lenitatis quadam gravitate et contentione firmatur. [213] In utroque autem genere dicendi — et illo in quo vis atque contentio quæritur, et hoc quod ad vitam et mores accommodatur —, et principia tarda sunt, et exitus item spissi et producti esse debent. Nam neque assiliendum statim est ad genus illud orationis (abest enim totum a causa, et homines prius illud ipsum quod proprium sui judicii est audire desiderant), nec quum in eam rationem ingressus sis, celeriter discedendum est. [214] Non enim sicut argumentum, simul atque positum est, arripitur, alterumque et tertium poscitur, ita misericordiam aut invidiam aut iracundiam, simul atque intuleris, possis commovere. Argumentum enim ratio ipsa confirmat quæ, simulatque emissa est, adhærescit ; illud autem genus orationis non cognitionem judicis, sed magis perturbationem requirit — quam consequi, nisi multa et varia et copiosa oratione et simili contentione actionis, nemo potest. [215] Quare, qui aut breviter aut summisse dicunt, docere judicem possunt, commovere non possunt ; in quo sunt omnia. Jam illud perspicuum est, omnium rerum in contrarias partes facultatem ex eisdem suppeditari locis. Sed argumento resistendum est aut eis, quæ comprobandi ejus causa sumuntur, reprehendendis, aut demonstrando id quod concludere illi velint non effici ex propositis, nec esse consequens ; aut, si ita non refellas, afferendum est in contrariam partem quod sit aut gravius aut æque grave. [216] Illa autem, quæ aut conciliationis causa leniter, aut permotionis vehementer, aguntur, contrariis commotionibus auferenda sunt — ut odio benevolentia, ut misericordia invidia tollatur. |
LIII. [212] “But there is a certain resemblance in these two kinds (one of which we would have to be gentle, the other vehement), that makes it difficult to distinguish them. For something of that lenity with which we conciliate the affections of an audience, ought to mingle with the ardour with which we awaken their passions; and something of this ardour should occasionally communicate a warmth to our gentleness of language; nor is there any species of eloquence better tempered than that in which the asperity of contention in the orator is mitigated by his humanity, or in which the relaxed tone of lenity is sustained by a becoming gravity and energy. [213] But in both modes of speaking, as well that in which spirit and force are required as that which is brought down to ordinary life and manners, the beginning should be slow, but the sequel full and diffuse.73 For you must not spring at once into the pathetic portion of your speech, as it forms no part of the question, and men are first desirous to learn the very point that is to come under their judgment; nor, when you have entered upon that track, are you suddenly to diverge from it; [214] for you are not to suppose that as an argument is understood as soon as it is stated, and a second and a third are then desired, so you can with the same ease move compassion, or envy, or anger, as soon as you make the attempt.74 Reason itself confirms an argument which fixes itself in the mind as soon as it is delivered; but that sort of eloquence does not aim at instructing the judge, but rather at agitating his mind by excessive emotion, which no one can produce unless by fulness and variety and even copiousness of language, and a proportionate energy of delivery. [215] Those, therefore, who speak either with brevity, or in a low submissive strain, may indeed inform the judge, but can never move him, an effect on which success altogether depends. “It is clear, that the ability of arguing on every subject on both sides of the question is drawn from the same considerations. But we must resist the force of an argument, either by refuting those things which are assumed in support of it, or by showing that the conclusion which our opponents would draw cannot be deduced from the premises, or possibly follow from them; or, if you cannot refute an argument in this manner, you must bring something against it of greater or equal weight. [216] But whatever is delivered with gentleness to conciliate favor, or with vehemence to excite emotion, is to be obviated75 by moving contrary feelings, so that benevolence may be eradicated by hatred, and compassion be dispelled by jealousy. |
[LIV] Suavis autem est et vehementer sæpe utilis jocus et facetiæ ; quæ, etiamsi alia omnia tradi arte possunt, naturæ sunt propria certe, neque ullam artem desiderant. In quibus tu longe aliis, mea sententia, Cæsar, excellis ; quo magis mihi etiam aut testis esse potes, nullam esse artem salis aut, si qua est, eam tu potissimum nos docere.” [217] “Ego vero,” inquit, “omni de re facilius puto esse — ab homine non inurbano — quam de ipsis facetiis disputari. Itaque quum quosdam Græcos inscriptos libros esse vidissem “De Ridiculis,” nonnullam in spem veneram, posse me ex eis aliquid discere. Inveni autem ridicula et salsa multa Græcorum — nam et Siculi in eo genere et Rhodii et Byzantii et præter ceteros Attici excellunt —, sed qui ejus rei rationem quandam conati sunt artemque tradere, sic insulsi exstiterunt, ut nihil aliud eorum nisi ipsa insulsitas rideatur. [218] Quare mihi quidem nullo modo videtur doctrina ista res posse tradi. Etenim quum duo genera sint facetiarum, alterum æquabiliter in omni sermone fusum, alterum peracutum et breve, illa a veteribus superior “cavillatio,” hæc altera “dicacitas” nominata est. Leve nomen habet utraque res. Quippe ; leve enim est totum hoc, risum movere. [219] Verum tamen, ut dicis, Antoni, multum in causis persæpe lepore et facetiis profici vidi. Sed quum illo in genere perpetuæ festivitatis ars non desideretur (natura enim fingit homines et creat imitatores et narratores facetos, adjuvante et vultu et voce et ipso genere sermonis), tum vero in hoc altero, dicacitatis, ¿quid habet ars loci, quum ante illud facete dictum emissum hærere debeat, quam cogitari potuisse videatur? [220] ¿Quid enim hic meus frater ab arte adjuvari potuit, quum a Philippo interrogatus, quid latraret, furem se videre respondit? ¿Quid in omni oratione Crassus, vel apud Centumviros contra Scævolam, vel contra accusatorem Brutum, quum pro C. Planco diceret? Nam id, quod tu mihi tribuis, Antoni, Crasso est omnium sententia concedendum. Non enim fere quisquam reperietur præter hunc in utroque genere leporis excellens — et illo qui in perpetuitate sermonis, et hoc qui in celeritate atque dicto est. [221] Nam hæc perpetua contra Scævolam Curiana defensio tota redundavit hilaritate quadam et joco. Dicta illa brevia non habuit — parcebat enim adversarii dignitati, in quo ipse conservabat suam ; quod est hominibus facetis et dicacibus difficillimum, habere hominum rationem et temporum, et ea quæ occurrunt — quum salsissime dici possint — tenere. Itaque nonnulli ridiculi homines hoc ipsum non insulse interpretantur. [222] Dicere enim ajunt Ennium, “Flammam a sapiente facilius ore in ardente opprimi, quam bona dicta teneat” — hæc scilicet bona dicta, quæ salsa sint, nam ea dicta appellantur proprio jam nomine. |
LIV. “A jocose manner, too, and strokes of wit, give pleasure to an audience, and are often of great advantage to the speaker; qualities which, even if everything else can be taught by art, are certainly peculiar gifts of nature, and require no aid from instruction. In that department you, Caesar, in my opinion, far excel all other men; on which account you can better bear me testimony, either that there is no art in wit, or, if there be any, you will best instruct us in it.” [217] “I indeed,” says Caesar, “think that a man who is not destitute of polite learning can discourse upon any subject more wittily than upon wit itself. Accordingly, when I met with some Greek books entitled ‘On Jests,’ I conceived some hope that I might learn something from them. I found, it is true, many laughable and witty sayings of the Greeks; for those of Sicily excel in that way, as well as the Rhodians and Byzantines, but, above all, the people of Attica. But they who have attempted to deliver rules and principles on that subject, have shown themselves so extremely foolish, that nothing else in them has excited laughter but their folly. [218] This talent, therefore, appears to me incapable of being communicated by teaching. As there are two kinds of wit, one running regularly through a whole speech, the other pointed and concise; the ancients denominated the former humor,76 the latter jesting. Each sort has but a light name, and justly;77 for it is altogether but a light thing to raise a laugh. [219] However, as you observe, Antonius, I have seen advantageous effects produced in pleadings by the aid of wit and humor; but, as in the former kind, I mean humor that runs through a speech, no aid from art is required, (for Nature forms and produces men to be facetious mimics or story-tellers; their look, and voice, and mode of expression assisting their conceptions;) so likewise in the other, that of occasional facetiousness, what room is there for art, when the joke ought to be uttered, and fixed in the mind of the hearer, before it appears possible to have been conceived? [220] For what assistance could my brother here receive from art, when, being asked by Philippus why he barked so, he replied, Because he saw a thief? Or what aid could Crassus have received in that whole speech which he delivered before the Centumviri, in opposition to Scaevola, or when he pleaded for Cneius Plancus against the accusation of Brutus? For that talent which you, Antonius, attribute to me, must be allowed to Crassus by the confession of all mankind; since hardly any person can be found besides him eminent in both these kinds of wit, that which runs through a continued discourse, and that which consists in smartness and occasional jokes. [221] His whole defence in the cause of Curius, in opposition to Scaevola, was redundant with a certain pleasantry and humor; but of those sharp short jests it had none; for he was tender of the dignity of his opponent, and in that respect maintained his own; though it is extremely difficult for men of wit and facetiousness to preserve a regard to persons and times, and to suppress what occurs to them when it may be expressed with most pungent effect. Accordingly, some jesters put a humorous interpretation upon the well-known words of Ennius; [222] for he said, as they observe, That a wise man can more easily keep in flame while his mouth is on fire, than withhold ‘bona dicta,’ good words; and they say that good words mean witty sayings; for sayings are called dicta by an appropriate term. |
[LV] Sed, ut in Scævola continuit ea Crassus atque illo altero genere (in quo nulli aculei contumeliarum inerant) causam illam disputationemque lusit, sic in Bruto, quem oderat et quem dignum contumelia judicabat, utroque genere pugnavit. [223] ¡Quam multa de balneis, quas nuper ille vendiderat, quam multa de amisso patrimonio dixit! ¡Atque illa brevia! Quum ille diceret se sine causa sudare, “Minime,” inquit, “modo enim existi de balneis.” Innumerabilia hujuscemodi fuerunt, sed non minus jucunda illa perpetua. Quum enim Brutus duo lectores excitasset et alteri “De Colonia Narbonensi” Crassi orationem legendam dedisset, alteri “De Lege Servilia,” et quum contraria inter sese de republica capita contulisset, noster hic facetissime tres patris Bruti “De Jure Civili” libellos tribus legendos dedit. [224] Ex libro primo : “Forte evenit, ut in Privernati essemus ego et Marcus filius….”
|
LV. “But as Crassus forbore from such jests in his speech against Scaevola, and sported throughout that cause and discussion with that other species of humor in which there are no stings of sarcasm; so in that against Brutus, whom he hated, and thought deserving of insult, he fought with both kinds of wit. [223] How many severe things did he say about the baths which Brutus had lately sold? how many on the loss of his paternal estate? And they were concise; as when Brutus, speaking of himself, said that he sweated without cause. ‘No wonder that you sweat,” said Crassus, ‘for you are just turned out of the baths.’ There were innumerable things of this kind in the speech, but his continuous vein of pleasantry was not less amusing; for when Brutus had called up two readers, and had given to one the speech of Crassus upon the colony of Narbonne, to the other that on the Servilian law, to read, and had compared together the contradictory sections on public affairs contained in each, our friend very facetiously gave the three books of Brutus’s father, written on the civil law, to three different persons to read. [224] Out of the first book was read this sentence, ‘It happened by chance that we were on my estate at Privernum.’ On which clause Crassus made this observation, ‘Brutus, your father testifies that he left you an estate at Privernum.’ Again, out of the second book, ‘My son Marcus and I were at my Alban villa;’ when Crassus remarked, ‘This wise man, who was justly ranked among the wisest in our city, had evidently some foreknowledge of this spendthrift’s character, and was afraid, that when he came to have nothing, it might be imagined that nothing was left him.’ Afterwards out of the third book, with which the author concluded his work, (for that number of books, as I have heard Scaevola say, are the genuine compositions of Brutus,) ‘It chanced that my son Marcus and myself were sitting in my villa near Tibur;’ when Crassus exclaimed, ‘Where are those estates now, Brutus, that your father left you, as recorded in his public commentaries? But if he had not seen you arrived at the age of puberty, he would have composed a fourth book, and left it in writing that he talked with his son in his own baths’ [225] Who does not acknowledge, now, that Brutus was not less confuted by this humor, these comic jests, than by that tragic tone which the same orator adopted, when by accident, during the hearing of the same cause, the funeral procession of the old lady Junia passed by? Ye immortal gods! what force and energy was that with which he spoke! how unexpected! how sudden! when, casting his eyes that way, with his whole gesture directed towards Brutus, with the utmost gravity and rapidity of expression, he exclaimed, ‘Brutus, why do you sit still? What would you have that old lady communicate to your father? What to all those whose statues you see carried by? What to your other ancestors? What to Lucius Brutus, who freed this people from regal tyranny? What shall she say that you are doing? What business, what glory, what virtue shall she say that you are pursuing? That you are engaged in increasing your patrimony? But that is no characteristic of nobility. [226] Yet suppose it were; you have none left to increase; your extravagance has squandered the whole of it That you are studying the civil law? That was your father’s pursuit; but she will relate that when you sold your house, you did not even among the moveables78 reserve the chair from which your father answered his clients. That you are applying to the military art? You who have never seen a camp. Or to eloquence? But no portion of eloquence dwells in you; and such power of voice and tongue as you have, you have devoted to the infamous trade of a common informer. Dare you even behold the light? Or look this assembly in the face I Dare you present yourself in the forum, in the city, in the public assembly of the citizens? Do you not fear even that dead corpse, and those very images of your ancestors, you who have not only left yourself no room for the imitation of their virtues, but none in which you can place their statues?’ |
[LVI] [227] Sed hæc tragica atque divina ; faceta autem et urbana innumerabilia vel ex una contione meministis. Nec enim contentio major unquam fuit, nec apud populum gravior oratio, quam hujus contra collegam in censura nuper — neque lepore et festivitate conditior. Quare tibi, Antoni, utrumque assentior, et multum facetias in dicendo prodesse sæpe, et eas arte nullo modo posse tradi. Illud quidem admiror, te nobis in eo genere tribuisse tantum, et non hujus rei quoque palmam, ut ceterarum, Crasso detulisse.” [228] Tum Antonius, “Ego vero ita fecissem,” inquit, “nisi interdum in hoc Crasso paululum inviderem. Nam esse quamvis facetum atque salsum, non nimis est per se ipsum invidendum ; sed, quum omnium sit venustissimus et urbanissimus, omnium gravissimum et severissimum et esse et videri (quod isti contigit uni), id mihi vix ferendum videbatur.” [229] Hic quum arrisisset ipse Crassus, “Ac tamen,” inquit Antonius, “quum artem esse facetiarum, Juli, negares, aperuisti quiddam quod præcipiendum videretur. Haberi enim dixisti rationem oportere hominum, rei, temporis, ne quid jocus de gravitate decerperet — quod quidem imprimis a Crasso observari solet. Sed hoc præceptum prætermittendarum est facetiarum, quum eis nihil opus sit. Nos autem quomodo utamur, quum opus sit, quærimus, ut in adversarium, et maxime — si ejus stultitia poterit agitari — in testem stultum, cupidum, levem, si facile homines audituri videbuntur. [230] Omnino probabiliora sunt, quæ lacessiti dicimus quam quæ priores, nam et ingenii celeritas major est quæ apparet in respondendo — et humanitatis est responsio. Videmur enim quieturi fuisse, nisi essemus lacessiti — ut in ipsa ista contione nihil fere dictum est ab hoc, quod quidem facetius dictum videretur, quod non provocatus responderit ; erat autem tanta in Domitio gravitas, tanta auctoritas, ut, quod esset ab eo objectum, lepore magis levandum quam contentione frangendum videretur.” |
LVI. [227] “This is in a tragic and sublime strain of language; but you all recollect instances without number of facetiousness and polite humor in one speech; for never was there a more vehement dispute on any occasion, or an oration of greater power delivered before the people, than that of Crassus lately in his censorship, in opposition to his colleague, nor one better seasoned with wit and humor. I agree with you, therefore, Antonius, in both points, that jesting is often of great advantage in speaking, and that it cannot be taught by any rules of art. But I am astonished that you should attribute so much power to me in that way, and not assign to Crassus the palm of pre-eminence in this as in other departments of eloquence.” [228] “I should have done so,” said Antonius, “if I had not sometimes envied Crassus a little in this respect; for to he ever so facetious and witty is not of itself an extraordinary subject of envy; but, when you are the most graceful and polite of speakers, to be, and to be thought, at the same time, the most grave and dignified of men, a distinction which has been granted to Crassus alone, seems to me almost unendurable.” [229] Crassus having smiled at this, Antonius said, “But, Julius, while you denied that art had anything to do with facetiousness, you brought to our notice something that seemed worthy of precept; for you said that regard ought to be paid to persons, times, and circumstances, that jesting might not detract from dignity; a rule which is particularly observed by Crassus. But this rule only directs that jokes should be suppressed when there is no fair occasion for them; what we desire to know is, how we may use them when there is occasion; as against an adversary, especially if his folly be open to attack, or against a foolish, covetous, trifling witness, if the audience seem disposed to listen patiently. [230] Those sayings are more likely to be approved which we utter on provocation, than those which we utter when we begin an attack; for the quickness of wit, which is shown in answering, is more remarkable, and to reply is thought allowable, as being natural to the human temper; since it is presumed that we should have remained quiet if we had not been attacked; as in that very speech to which you alluded scarcely anything was said by our friend Crassus here, anything at least that was at all humorous, which he did not utter in reply, and on provocation. For there was so much gravity and authority in Domitius,79 that the objections which came from him seemed more likely to be enfeebled by jests than broken by arguments.” |
[LVII] [231] Tum Sulpicius, “¿Quid igitur? ¿Patiemur,” inquit, “Cæsarem, qui quanquam Crasso facetias concedit, tamen multo in eo studio magis ipse elaborat, non explicare nobis totum genus hoc jocandi — quale sit et unde ducatur — præsertim quum tantam vim et utilitatem salis et urbanitatis esse fateatur?” “¿Quid, si,” inquit Julius, “assentior Antonio dicenti, nullam esse artem salis?” [232] Hic quum Sulpicius reticuisset, “¡Quasi vero,” inquit Crassus, “horum ipsorum, de quibus Antonius jamdiu loquitur, ars ulla sit! Observatio quædam est, ut ipse dixit, earum rerum quæ in dicendo valent ; quæ si eloquentes facere posset, ¿quis esset non eloquens? ¿Quis enim hæc non vel facile vel certe aliquo modo posset ediscere? Sed ego in his præceptis hanc vim et hanc utilitatem esse arbitror, non ut ad reperiendum quod dicamus, arte ducamur, sed ut ea quæ natura, quæ studio, quæ exercitatione consequimur, aut recta esse confidamus aut prava intellegamus, quum quo referenda sint didicerimus. [233] Quare, Cæsar, ego quoque hoc a te peto, ut, si tibi videtur, disputes de hoc toto jocandi genere quid sentias, ne qua forte dicendi pars, quoniam ita voluistis, in hoc tali cœtu atque in tam accurato sermone præterita esse videatur.” “Ego vero,” inquit ille, “quoniam collectam a conviva, Crasse, exigis, non committam, ut, si defugerim, tibi causam aliquam dem recusandi — quanquam soleo sæpe mirari eorum impudentiam, qui agunt in scæna gestum, inspectante Roscio. ¿Quis enim sese commovere potest, cujus ille vitia non videat? ☺ Sic ego nunc, Crasso audiente, primum loquar de facetiis et docebo sus, ut ajunt, oratorem — eum quem quum Catulus nuper audisset, ‘fenum alios,’ ajebat, ‘ēsse oportere.’ ☺” [234] Tum ille, “Jocabatur,” inquit, “Catulus — ☺ præsertim quum ita dicat ipse, ut ambrosia alendus esse videatur. ☺ Verum te, Cæsar, audiamus, ut Antonii reliqua videamus.” Et Antonius, “Perpauca quidem mihi restant,” inquit, “sed tamen defessus jam labore atque itinere disputationis meæ, requiescam in Cæsaris sermone quasi in aliquo peropportuno deversorio.” |
LVII. [231] Sulpicius soon after said, “Shall we, then, suffer Caesar, who, though he allows wit to Crassus, is yet himself far more intent on acquiring a character for it, to exempt himself from explaining to us the whole subject of humor, what is the nature of it, and from whence derived; especially as he owns that there is so much efficacy and advantage in wit and jesting?” “What if I agree with Antonius,” rejoined Caesar, “in thinking that art has no concern with wit?” [232] As Sulpicius made no remark, “As if,” said Crassus, “art could at all assist in acquiring those talents of which Antonius has been so long speaking. There is a certain observation to be paid, as he remarked, to those particulars which are most effective in oratory; but if such observation could make men eloquent, who would not be so? For who could not learn these particulars, if not with ease, at least in some way? But I think that of such precepts, the use and advantage is, not that we may be directed by art to find out what we are to say, but that we may either feel certain as to what we attain by natural parts, by study, or by exercise, that it is right, or understand that it is wrong, having been instructed to what rule the several particulars are to be referred. [233] I, therefore, also join in the petition to you, Caesar, that you would, if it is agreeable to you, tell us what you think on jocoseness in general, lest, by accident, any part of eloquence, since that is your object, should appear to have been passed over in so learned an assembly, and such a studied conversation.” “Well, then, Crassus,” replied Caesar, “since you require payment from a guest, I will, by refusing it, furnish you with a pretext for refusing to entertain us again; though I am often astonished at the impudence of those who act upon the stage while Roscius is a spectator of their attitudes; for who can make the least motion without Roscius seeing his imperfections? So I shall now have to speak first on wit in the hearing of Crassus, and to teach like a swine,80 as they say, that orator of whom Catulus said, when he heard him lately, That other speakers ought to be fed upon hay.”81 [234] “Ah!” said Crassus, “Catulus was joking, especially as he speaks himself in such a manner that he seems to deserve to be fed on ambrosia. But let us hear you, Caesar, that we may afterwards return to the remainder of the discourse of Antonius.” “There is little remaining for me to say,” replied Antonius; “but as I am wearied with the labor and the length of what I have said, I shall repose during the discourse of Caesar as in some opportune place of entertainment.” |
[LVIII] “Atqui,” inquit Julius, “non nimis liberale hospitium meum dices. ☺ Nam te in viam, simul ac perpaulum gustaris, extrudam et ejiciam. ☺” [235] Ac ne diutius vos demorer, de omni isto genere quid sentiam perbreviter exponam. De risu quinque sunt, quæ quærantur :
|
LVIII. “But,” said Caesar, “you will not pronounce my entertainment very liberal; for as soon as you have tasted a little I shall thrust you out, and turn you into the road again. [235] However, not to detain you any longer, I will deliver my sentiments very briefly on this department of eloquence in general. “Concerning laughter, there are five things which are subjects of consideration: one, ‘What it is;’ another, ‘Whence it originates;’ a third, ‘Whether it becomes the orator to wish to excite laughter;’ a fourth, ‘To what degree;’ a fifth, ‘What are the several kinds of the ridiculous?’ As to the first, ‘What laughter itself is,’ by what means it is excited, where it lies, how it arises, and bursts forth so suddenly that we are unable, though we desire, to restrain it, and how it affects at once the sides, the face, the veins, the countenance, the eyes, let Democritus consider; for all this has nothing to do with my remarks, and if it had to do with them, I should not be ashamed to say that I am ignorant of that which not even they understand who profess to explain it. [236] But the seat and as it were province of what is laughed at, (for that is the next point of inquiry,) lies in a certain offensiveness and deformity; for those sayings are laughed at solely or chiefly which point out and designate something offensive in an inoffensive manner. But, to come to the third point, it certainly becomes the orator to excite laughter; either because mirth itself attracts favor to him by whom it is raised; or because all admire wit, which is often comprised in a single word, especially in him who replies, and sometimes in him who attacks; or because it overthrows the adversary, or hampers him, or makes light of him, or discourages, or refutes him; or because it proves the orator himself to be a man of taste, or learning, or polish; but chiefly because it mitigates and relaxes gravity and severity, and often, by a joke or a laugh, breaks the force of offensive remarks, which cannot easily be overthrown by arguments. [237] But to what degree the laughable should be carried by the orator requires very diligent consideration; a point which we placed as the fourth subject of inquiry; for neither great vice, such as is united with crime, nor great misery, is a subject for ridicule and laughter; since people will have those guilty of enormous crimes attacked with more forcible weapons than ridicule; and do not like the miserable to be derided, unless perhaps when they are insolent; and you must be considerate, too, of the feelings of mankind, lest you rashly speak against those who are personally beloved. |
[LIX] [238] Hæc igitur adhibenda est primum in jocando moderatio. Itaque ea facillime luduntur, quæ neque odio magno neque misericordia maxima digna sunt. Quamobrem materies omnis ridiculorum est in eis vitiis, quæ sunt in vita hominum neque carorum, neque calamitosorum, neque eorum qui ob facinus ad supplicium rapiendi videntur ; eaque, belle agitata, ridentur. [239] Est etiam deformitatis et corporis vitiorum satis bella materies ad jocandum ; sed quærimus idem quod in ceteris rebus maxime quærendum est : “¿Quatenus?” In quo non modo illud præcipitur, ne quid insulse, sed etiam quid perridicule possis (vitandum est oratori utrumque), ne aut scurrilis jocus sit aut mimicus. Quæ cujusmodi sint, facilius jam intellegemus, quum ad ipsa ridiculorum genera venerimus. Duo sunt enim genera facetiarum, quorum alterum re tractatur, alterum dicto. [240] Re, si quando quid tanquam aliqua fabella narratur, ut olim tu, Crasse, in Memmium : “Comedisse eum lacertum Largi,” quum esset cum eo Tarracinæ de amicula rixatus. Salsa, ac tamen a te ipso ficta tota narratio. Addidisti clausulam : tota Tarracina tum omnibus in parietibus inscriptas fuisse litteras tria L.L.L., duo M.M. Quum quæreres id quid esset, senem tibi quendam oppidanum dixisse, “Lacerat lacertum Largi mordax Memmius.” [241] Perspicitis genus hoc quam sit facetum, quam elegans, quam oratorium, sive habeas vere quod narrare possis — quod tamen est mendaciunculis aspergendum —, sive fingas. Est autem hujus generis virtus, ut ita facta demonstres, ut mores ejus de quo narres, ut sermo, ut vultus omnes exprimantur, ut eis qui audiunt tum geri illa fierique videantur. [242] In re est item ridiculum, quod ex quadam depravata imitatione sumi solet, ut idem Crassus : “¡Per tuam nobilitatem! ¡Per vestram familiam!” ¿Quid aliud fuit in quo contio rideret, nisi illa vultus et vocis imitatio? “¡Per tuas statuas!” vero quum dixit et, extento bracchio, paululum etiam de gestu addidit, vehementius risimus. Ex hoc genere est illa Rosciana imitatio senis : |
LIX. [238] “Such is the caution that must be principally observed in joking. Those subjects accordingly are most readily jested upon which are neither provocative of violent aversion, nor of extreme compassion. All matter for ridicule is therefore found to lie in such defects as are to be observed in the characters of men not in universal esteem, nor in calamitous circumstances, and who do not appear deserving to be dragged to punishment for their crimes; such topics nicely managed create laughter. [239] In deformity, also, and bodily defects, is found fair enough matter for ridicule; but we have to ask the same question here as is asked on other points, ‘How far the ridicule may be carried?’ In this respect it is not only directed that the orator should say nothing impertinently, but also that, even if he can say anything very ridiculously, he should avoid both errors, lest his jokes become either buffoonery or mimicry; qualities of which we shall better understand the nature when we come to consider the different species of the ridiculous. “There are two sorts of jokes, one of which is excited by things, the other by words. [240] By things, whenever any matter is told in the way of a story; as you, Crassus, formerly stated in a speech against Memmius,82 That he had eaten a piece of Largius’s arm, because he had had a quarrel with him at Tarracina about a courtesan; it was a witty story, but wholly of your own invention. You added this particular, that throughout Tarracina these letters were inscribed on every wall, M M, LLL; and that when you inquired what they meant, an old man of the town replied, Mordacious Memmius Lacerates Largius’s Limb.83 [241] You perceive clearly how facetious this mode of joking may be, how elegant, how suitable’ to an orator; whether you have any true story to tell, (which, however must be interspersed with fictitious circumstances,) or whether you merely invent. The excellence of such jesting is, that you can describe things as occurring in such a way, that the manners, the language, and every look of the person of whom you speak, may be represented, so that the occurrence may seem to the audience to pass and take place at the very time when you address them. [242] Another kind of jest taken from things, is that which is derived from a depraved sort of imitation, or mimicry; as when Crassus also exclaimed, By your nobility, by your family, what else was there at which the assembly could laugh but that mimicry of look and tone? But when he said, by your statues, and added something of gesture by extending his arm, we all laughed immoderately.84 Of this species is Roscius’s imitation of an old man; when he says, For you, my Antipho, I plant these trees,85 it is old age itself that seems to speak while I listen to him. But all this department of ridicule is of such a nature that it must be attempted with the greatest caution. For if the imitation is too extravagant, it becomes, like indecency, the part of players in pantomime and farce; the orator should be moderate in imitation, that the audience may conceive more than they can see represented by him; he ought also to give proof of ingenuousness and modesty, by avoiding everything offensive or unbecoming in word or act. |
[LX] [243] Ergo hæc duo genera sunt ejus ridiculi, quod in re positum est ; quæ sunt propria perpetuarum facetiarum, in quibus describuntur hominum mores et ita effinguntur ut aut, re narrata aliqua, quales sint intellegantur aut, imitatione breviter injecta, in aliquo insigni ad irridendum vitio reperiantur. [244] In dicto autem ridiculum est id quod verbi aut sententiæ quodam acumine movetur. Sed ut in illo superiore genere — vel narrationis vel imitationis — vitanda est mimorum et ethologorum similitudo, sic in hoc, scurrilis oratori dicacitas magnopere fugienda est. ¿Qui igitur distinguemus a Crasso, a Catulo, a ceteris, familiarem vestrum Granium aut Vargullam amicum meum? Non mehercule in mentem mihi quidem venit ; sunt enim dicaces — Granio quidem nemo dicacior. Hoc, opinor, primum, ne — quotienscunque potuerit dictum dici — necesse habeamus dicere. [245] Pusillus testis processit. “¿Licet,” inquit, “rogare?” — Philippus. Tum quæsitor properans, “Modo breviter.” Hic ille, “Non accusabis. Perpusillum rogabo.” Ridicule. Sed sedebat judex L. Aurifex brevior ipse quam testis etiam : omnis est risus in judicem conversus ; visum est totum scurrile ridiculum. Ergo hæc, quæ cadere possunt in quos nolis, quamvis sint bella, sunt tamen ipso genere scurrilia. [246] Ut iste qui se vult dicacem (et mehercule est), Appius — sed nonnunquam in hoc vitium scurrile delabitur : “Cenabo,” inquit, “apud te,” huic lusco familiari meo, C. Sextio ; “Uni enim locum esse video.” Est hoc scurrile, quod sine causa lacessivit ; et tamen id dixit quod in omnes luscos conveniret. Ea, quia meditata putantur esse, minus ridentur. Illud egregium Sextii et ex tempore, “Manus lava,” inquit, “et cena.” [247] Temporis igitur ratio et ipsius dicacitatis moderatio, et temperantia, et raritas dictorum distinguet oratorem a scurra ; et quod nos cum causa dicimus, non ut ridiculi videamur, sed ut proficiamus aliquid, illi totum diem et sine causa. ¿Quid enim est Vargulla assecutus, quum eum candidatus A. Sempronius cum M. suo fratre complexus esset, “Puer, ¡abige muscas!”? Risum quæsivit, qui est mea sententia vel tenuissimus ingenii fructus. Tempus igitur dicendi prudentia et gravitate moderabimur. ¡Quarum utinam artem aliquam haberemus! Sed domina natura est. |
LX. [243] “These, therefore, are the two kinds of the ridiculous which is drawn from things; and they suit well with continuous pieces of humor, in which the manners of mankind are so described and expressed, that, either by means of some narrative, their character is exactly understood, or, by throwing in a little mimicry, they may be convicted of some impropriety remarkable enough for ridicule. [244] But in words, the ridiculous is that which is excited by the point of a particular expression or thought: but as, in the former kind, both in narration and imitation, all resemblance to the players of pantomime should be avoided, so, in this, all scurrilous buffoonery is to be studiously shunned by the orator. How, then, shall we distinguish from Crassus, from Catulus, and from others, your acquaintance Granius, or my friend Vargula? No proper distinction really occurs to me; for they are both witty; no man has more of verbal witticism than Granius. The first point to be observed, however, is, I think, that we should not fancy ourselves obliged to utter a jest whenever one may be uttered. A very little witness was produced. [245] May I question him? says Philippus. The judge who presided,86 being in a hurry, replied, Yes, if he is short. You shall have no fault to find, said Philippus, for I shall question him very short. This was ridiculous enough; but Lucius Amifex was sitting as judge in the cause, who was shorter than the witness himself; so that all the laughter was turned upon the judge, and hence the joke appeared scurrilous. Those good things, therefore, which hit those whom you do not mean to hit, however witty they are, are yet in their nature scurrilous; [246] as when Appius, who would be thought witty, and indeed is so, but sometimes slides into this fault of scurrility, said to Caius Sextius, an acquaintance of mine, who is blind of an eye, I will sup with you tonight, for I see that there is a vacancy for one. This was a scurrilous joke, both because he attacked Sextius without provocation, and said what was equally applicable to all one-eyed persons. Such jokes, as they are thought premeditated, excite less laughter; but the reply of Sextius was excellent and extempore: Wash your hands87 said he, and come to supper. [247] A regard, therefore, to proper times, moderation and forbearance in jesting, and a limitation in the number of jokes, will distinguish the orator from the buffoon; and the circumstance, besides, that we joke with an object, not that we may appear to be jesters, but that we may gain some advantage, while they joke all day without any purpose whatever. For what did Vargula gain by saying, when Aulus Sempronius, then a candidate for office, and his brother Marcus, saluted him, Boy, drive away the flies? His aim was to raise a laugh, which is, in my opinion, a very poor effect of wit. The proper season, then, for jesting, we must determine by our own prudence and judgment; in the exercise of which I wish that we had some body of rules to direct us; but nature is the sovereign guide. |
[LXI] [248] { 5.} Nunc exponamus genera ipsa summatim, quæ risum maxime moveant. Hæc igitur sit prima partitio : quod facete dicatur, id alias in re, habere, alias in verbo, facetias ; maxime autem homines delectari, si quando risus conjuncte re verboque moveatur.
|
LXI. [248] “Let us now consider briefly the sorts of jests that chiefly excite laughter. Let this, then, be our first division, that whatever is expressed wittily, consists sometimes in a thought, sometimes in the mere language, but that men are most delighted with a joke when the laugh is raised by the thought and the language in conjunction. But remember this, that whatever topics I shall touch upon, from which ridicule may be drawn, from almost the same topics serious thoughts may be derived: there is only this difference, that seriousness is used on dignified subjects with gravity, joking on such as are in some degree unbecoming, and as it were grotesque; for instance, we may with the very same words commend a thrifty servant, and jest upon one that is extravagant. That old saying of Nero88 about a thieving servant is humorous enough, That he was the only one from whom nothing in the house was sealed or locked up; a thing which is not only said of a good servant, but in the very same words. [249] From the same sources spring all kinds of sayings. What his mother said to Spurius Carvilius, who halted grievously from a wound received in the public service, and was on that account ashamed to go out of doors, Go, my Spurius, that as often as you take a step you may be reminded of your merits, was a noble and serious thought; but what Glaucia said to Calvinus, when he limped, Where is the old proverb Does he claudicate? no; but he clodicates,89 is ridiculous; and yet both are derived from what may be observed with regard to lameness. What is more ignave than this Naevius?90 said Scipio with severity; but Philippus, with some humor, to one who had a strong smell, I perceive that I am circumvented by you;91 yet it is the resemblance of words, with the change only of a letter, that constitutes both jokes. [250] “Those smart sayings which spring from some ambiguity are thought extremely ingenious; but they are not always employed to express jests, but often even grave thoughts. What Publius Licinus Varus said to Africanus the elder, when he was endeavouring to fit a chaplet to his head at an entertainment, and it broke several times, Do not wonder if it does not fit you, for you have a great head, was a fine and noble thought; but He is bald enough, for he says but little,92 is of the same sort. Not to be tedious, there is no subject for jest from which serious and grave reflections may not be drawn. [251] It is also to be observed that everything which is ridiculous is not witty; for what can be so ridiculous as a buffoon?93 But it is by his face, his appearance, his look, his mimicry, his voice, and, in fine, by his whole figure, that he excites laughter I might, indeed, call him witty, but not in such a way that I would have an orator, but an actor in pantomime, to be witty. |
|
LXII. “This kind of jesting, above all, then, though it powerfully excites laughter, is not suited to us; it represents the morose, the superstitious, the suspicious, the vainglorious, the foolish; habits of mind which are in themselves ridiculous; and such kind of characters we are to expose, not to assume. [252] There is another kind of jesting which is extremely ludicrous, namely mimicry; but it is allowable only in us to attempt it cautiously, if ever we do attempt it, and but for a moment, otherwise it is far from becoming to a man of education. A third is distortion of features, utterly unworthy of us. A fourth is indecency in language, a disgrace not only to the forum, but to any company of well-bred people. So many things, then, being deducted from this part of oratory, the kinds of jesting which remain are (as I distinguished them before) such as consist in thought or in expression. That which, in whatever terms you express it, is still wit, consists in the thought; that which by a change of words loses its spirit, has no wit but what depends on expression. |
|
[253] “Plays on ambiguous words are extremely ingenious, but depend wholly on the expression, not on the matter. They seldom, however, excite much laughter, but are rather commended as jests of elegance and scholarship; as that about Titius, whom, being a great tennis-player, and at the same time suspected of having broken the sacred images by night, Terentius Vespa excused, when his companions inquired for him, as he did not come to the Campus Martius, by saying that he had broken an arm. Or as that of Africanus, which is in Lucilius, Quid? Decius, nuculam an confixum vis facere? inquit.94 Or, as your friend Granius, Crassus, said of somebody, That he was not worth the sixth part of an as.95 [254] And if you were to ask me, I should say that he who is called a jester, excels chiefly in jokes of this kind; but that other jests excite laughter in a greater degree. The ambiguous gains great admiration, as I observed before, from its nature, for it appears the part of a wit to be able to turn the force of a word to quite another sense than that in which other people take it; but it excites surprise rather than laughter, unless when it happens to be joined with some other sorts of jesting. |
|
LXIII. [255] “Some of these sorts of jesting I will now run over: but you are aware that that is the most common kind of joke, when we expect one thing and another is said; in which case our own disappointed expectation makes us laugh. But if something of the ambiguous is thrown in with it, the wit is heightened; as in Naevius, a man seems to be moved with compassion who, seeing another, that was sentenced for debt, being led away, inquires, For how much is he adjudged? He is answered, A thousand sestertii. If he had then added only, You may take him away, it would have been a species of joke that takes you by surprise; but as he said, I add no more; you may take him away, (thus introducing the ambiguous, another kind of jest,) the repartee, as it seems to me, is rendered witty in the highest degree. Such equivocation is most happy, when, in any dispute, a word is caught from your adversary, and thence something severe is turned upon the very person who gave the provocation, as by Catulus upon Philippus.96 [256] But as there are several sorts of ambiguity, with regard to which accurate study is necessary, we should be attentive and on the watch for words; and thus, though we may avoid frigid witticisms, (for we must be cautious that a jest be not thought far-fetched,) we shall hit upon may acute sayings. Another kind is that which consists in a slight change in a word, which, when produced by the alteration of a letter, the Greeks call paronomasia, as Cato called Nobilior97 Mobilior; or as, when he had said to a certain person, Eamus deambulatum, and the other asked, Quid opus fuit DD? Cato rejoined, Imo vero, quid opus fuit TE?98 Or that repartee of the same Cato, If you are both adverse and averse in your shameless practices. [257] The interpretation of a name also has wit in it, when you assign a ridiculous reason why a person is so called; as I lately said of Nummius, who distributed money99 at elections, that he had found a name in the Campus Martius as Neoptolemus found one at Troy. |
|
LXIV. “All such jokes lie in a single word. Often too a verse is humorously introduced, either just as it is, or with some little alteration; or some part of a verse, as Statius said to Scaurus when in a violent passion: (whence some say, Crassus, that your law100 on citizenship had its rise:) Hush! Silence! what is all this noise? Have you, Who neither have a father nor a mother, Such confidence? Away with all that pride. In the case of Caelius, that joke of yours, Antonius, was assuredly of advantage to your cause; when, appearing as a witness, he had admitted that a great deal of money had gone from him, and as he had a son who was a man of pleasure, you, as he was going away, said, See you the old man, touch’d for thirty minae? [258] To the same purpose proverbs may be applied; as in the joke of Scipio, when Asellus was boasting that while he had served in the army, he had marched through all the provinces, Drive an ass, &c.101 Such jokes, as they cannot, if any Change is made in the words of them, retain the same grace ,are necessarily considered as turning, not on the matter, but on the mere expression. [259] “There is also a kind of joke, not at all absurd, which lies in expression, when you seem to understand a thing literally, and not in its obvious meaning; in which kind it was that Tutor,102 the old mimic, an exceedingly laughable actor, exclusively distinguished himself. But I have nothing to do with actors; I only wished this kind of jesting y to be illustrated by some notable example. Of this kind was your answer lately, Crassus, to one who asked you whether he should be troublesome if he came to you some time before it was light: and you said, You will not be troublesome: when he rejoined, You will order yourself to be waked then? to which you replied, Surely I said that you would not be troublesome. [260] Of the same sort was that old joke which they say that Marcus Scipio Maluginensis made, when he had to report from his century that Acidinus was voted consul, and the officer cried out, Declare as to Lucius Manlius, he said, I declare him to be a worthy man, and an excellent member of the commonwealth. The answer of Lucius [Porcius]103 Nasica to Cato the censor was humorous enough, when Cato said to him, Are you truly satisfied that you have taken a wife? No, indeed, replied Nasica, I am not truly satisfied.104 Such jests are insipid, or witty only when another answer is expected; for our surprise (as I before105 observed) naturally amuses us; and thus, when we are deceived, as it were, in our expectation, we laugh. |
[LXV] [261] In verbis etiam illa sunt, quæ aut ex immutata oratione ducuntur, aut ex unius verbi translatione, aut ex inversione verborum.
|
LXV. [261] “Those jests also lie in words, which spring from some allegorical phraseology, or from a metaphorical use of some one word, or from using words ironically. From allegorical phraseology: as when Rusca, in old times, proposed the law to fix the ages of candidates for offices, and Marcus Servilius, who opposed the law, said to him; Tell me, Marcus Pinarius Rusca, if I speak against you, will you speak ill of me as you have spoken of others? As you shall sow, replied he, so you shall reap. [262] From the use of a single word in a metaphorical sense: as when the elder Scipio said to the Corinthians, who offered to put up a statue of him in the place where those of other commanders were, That he did not like such comrades. From the ironical use of words: as when Crassus spoke for Aculeo before Marcus Perperna as judge, and Lucius Aelius Lama appeared for Gratidianus against Aculeo, and Lama, who was deformed, as you know, offered impertinent interruptions, Crassus said, Let us hear this beautiful youth. When a laugh followed, I could not form my own shape, said Lamia, but I could form my understanding. Then, said Crassus, let us hear this able orator; when a greater laugh than before ensued. Such jests are agreeable as well in grave as in humorous speeches. For I observed, a little while ago,106 that the subjects for jest and for gravity are distinct; but that the same form of expression will serve for grave remarks, as for jokes. [263] Words antithetically used107 are a great ornament to language; and the same mode of using them is often also humorous; thus, when the well-known Servius Galba carried to Lucius Scribonius the tribune a list of his own intimates to be appointed as judges, and Libo said, What, Galba, will you never go out of your own dining-room? Yes, replied Galba, when you go out of other men’s bedchambers. To this kind of joke the saying of Glaucia to Metellus is not very dissimilar: You have your villa at Tibur, but your court on mount Palatine.108 |
|
LXVI. [264] “Such kinds of jokes as lie in words I think that I have now sufficiently discussed; but such as relate to things are more numerous, and excite more laughter, as I observed before.109 Among them is narrative, a matter of exceeding difficulty; for such things are to be described and set before the eyes, as may seem to be probable, which is the excellence of narration, and such also as are grotesque, which is the peculiar province of the ridiculous; for an example, as the shortest that I recollect, let that serve which I mentioned before, the story of Crassus about Memmius.110 To this head we may assign the narratives given in fables. [265] Allusions are also drawn from history; as when Sextus Titius111 said he was a Cassandra, I can name, said Antonius, many of your Ajaces Oilei.112 Such jests are also derived from similitudes, which include either comparison or something of bodily representation. A comparison, as when Gallus, that was once a witness against Piso, said that a countless sum of money had been given to Magius113 the governor, and Scaurus tried to confute him, by alleging the poverty of Magius, You mistake me, Scaurus, said he, for I do not say that Magius has saved it, but that, like a man gathering nuts without his clothes, he has put it into his belly. Or, as when Marcus Cicero114 the elder, the father of that excellent man our friend, said, That the men of our times were like the Syrian slaves; the more Greek they knew, the greater knaves they were. [266] Representations also create much laughter, and these commonly bear upon some deformity, or bodily defect, with a comparison to something still more deformed: as my own saying on Helvius Mancia, I will now show, said I, what sort of man you are; when he exclaimed, Show us, I pray you; and I pointed with my finger to a Gaul represented upon the Cimbrian shield of Marius under the new shops115 in the forum, with his body distorted, his tongue lolling out, and his cheeks flabby. A general laugh ensued; for nothing was ever seen to resemble Mancia so much. Or as I said to the witness Titus Pinarius, who twisted his chin about while he was speaking, That he might speak, if he pleased, if he had done cracking his nut. [267] There are jokes, too, from things being extenuated or exaggerated hyperbolically, and to astonish; as you, Crassus, said in a speech to the people, that Memmius fancied himself so great a man, that as he came into the forum he stooped his head at the arch of Fabius. Of which kind is the saying also, that Scipio is reported to have uttered at Numantia when he was angry with Metellus, that If his mother were to produce a fifth, she would bring forth an ass.116 [268] There is also frequently acuteness shown, when something obscure and not commonly known is illustrated by a slight circumstance, and often by a single word; as when Publius Cornelius, a man, as was suspected, of a covetous and rapacious disposition, but of great courage and an able commander, thanked Caius Fabricius for having, though he was his enemy, made him consul, especially during a difficult and important war, You have no reason to thank me, returned Fabricius, if I had rather be pillaged than sold for a slave. Or, as Africanus said to Asellus, who objected to him that unfortunate lustration in his censorship, “Do not wonder; for he who restored you to the rights of a citizen, completed the lustration and sacrificed the bull.” There was a tacit suspicion, that Mummius seemed to have laid the state under the necessity of expiation by removing the mark of ignominy from Asellus. |
|
LXVII. [269] “Ironical dissimulation has also an agreeable effect, when you say something different from what you think; not after the manner to which I alluded before, when you say the exact reverse of what you mean, as Crassus said to Lamia, but when through the whole course of a speech you are seriously jocose, your thoughts being different from your words; as our friend Scaevola said to that Septumuleius of Anagnia, (to whom its weight in gold was paid for the head of Caius Gracchus,) when he petitioned that he would take him as his lieutenant-general into Asia, What would you have, foolish man? there is such a multitude of bad citizens that, I warrant you, if you stay at Rome, you will in a few years make a vast fortune. [270] Fannius, in his Annals, says that Africanus the younger, he that was named Aemilianus, was remarkable for this kind of jests; and calls him by a Greek term eiron, an ironical jester; but, according to what those say who know these matters better than myself, I conceive that Socrates, for irony and dissimulation, far excelled all other men in the wit and genius which he displayed. It is an elegant kind of humor, satirical with a mixture of gravity, and adapted to oratory as well as to polite conversation. [271] Indeed all the kinds of humor of which I have spoken, are seasonings not more appropriate to law-pleadings in the forum, than to any other kind of discourse. For that which is mentioned by Cato, (who has reported many apophthegms, several of which have been produced by me as examples,) seems to me a very happy saying, that Gains Publius used to observe that Publius Mummius was a man for all occasions; so it certainly is with regard to our present subject, that there is no time of life in which wit and polite humor may not very properly be exercised. [272] “But I will pursue the remainder of my subject. It is a kind of joking similar to a sort of dissimulation, when anything disgraceful is designated by an honourable term; as when Africanus the censor removed from his tribe that centurion who absented himself from the battle in which Paulus commanded, alleging that he had remained in the camp to guard it, and inquiring why he had such a mark of ignominy set upon him, I do not like, replied Africanus, over-vigilant people. [273] It is an excellent joke, too, when you take any part of another person’s words in a different sense from that which he intended; as Fabius Maximus did with Livius Salinator,117 when, on Tarentum being lost, Livius had still preserved the citadel, and had made many successful sallies from it, and Fabius, some years afterwards, having retaken the town, Livius begged him to remember that it was owing to him that Tarentum was retaken. How can I do otherwise than remember, said Fabius, for I should never have retaken it if you had not lost it. [274] Such jokes as the following, too, are, though rather absurd, often en that very account extremely amusing, and very apposite, not only to characters in plays, but also to us orators: The foolish man! As soon as he had come to wealth, he died. That woman, what is she to you? My wife. Like you, by Hercules!118 As long as he was living at the waters He never119 died. |
|
LXVIII. “This kind of jokes is rather trifling, and, as I said, fit for actors in farces; but sometimes it finds a proper place with us, as even one who is not a fool may express himself like a fool in a humorous way, as Mancia congratulated you, Antonius, when he heard that you were accused by Marcus Duronius of bribery in your censorship: At length, said he, you will have an opportunity of attending to your own business. [275] Such jests excite great laughter, and in truth all sayings that are uttered by men of sense with a degree of absurdity and sarcasm, under the pretence of not understanding what is said to them. A joke of this kind is not to seem to comprehend what you comprehend very well; as when Pontidius, being asked, What do you think of him who is taken in adultery? replied, That he is slow. Or such as was my reply to Metellus, when, at a time of levying troops, he would not excuse me from serving for the weakness of my eyes, and said to me, What! can you see nothing? [276] Yes truly, answered I, I can see your villa from the Esquiline-Gate.120 Or as the repartee of Nasica, who, having called at the house of the poet Ennius, and the maid-servant having told him, on his inquiring at the door, that Ennius was not at home, saw that she had said so by her master’s order, and that he was really within: and when, a few days afterwards, Ennius called at Nasica’s house, and inquired for him at the gate, Nasica cried out, That lie was not at home. What? says Ennius, do I not know your voice? You are an impudent fellow, rejoined Nasica; when I inquired for you, I believed your servant when she told me that you were not at home, and will not you believe me when I tell you that I am not at home? [277] It is a very happy stroke, too, when he who has uttered a sarcasm is jested upon in the same strain in which he has attacked another: as when Quiutus Opimius, a man of consular dignity, who had the report of having been licentious in his youth, said to Egilius, a man of wit, who seemed to be an effeminate person, but was in reality not so, How do you do, my Egilia? when will you pay me a visit with your distaff and spindle? and Egilius replied, I certainly dare not; for my mother forbad me to visit women of bad character. |
|
LXIX. [278] “There are witty sayings also which carry a concealed suspicion of ridicule; of which sort is that of the Sicilian, who, when a friend of his made lamentation to him, saying, that his wife had hanged herself upon a fig-tree, said, I beseech you give me some shoots of that tree, that I may plant them. Of the same sort is what Catulus said to a certain bad orator, who, when he imagined that he had excited compassion at the close of a speech, asked our friend here, after he had sat down, whether he appeared to have raised pity in the audience: Very great pity, replied Crassus, for I believe there is no one here so hard-hearted but that your speech seemed pitiable to him. [279] Those jests amuse me extremely, which are expressed in passion and as it were with moroseness; not when they are uttered by a person really morose, for in that case it is not the wit, but the natural temper that is laughed at. Of this kind of jest there is a very humorous example, as it appears to me, in Naevius: Why mourn you, father? Strange that I do not sing! I am condemned. Contrasted with this there is a patient and cool species of the humorous: as when Cato received a stroke from a man carrying a trunk, who afterwards called to him to take care, he asked him, whether he carried anything else besides the trunk? [280] There is also a witty mode of exposing folly; as when the Sicilian to whom Scipio, when praetor, assigned his host for an advocate in some cause, a man of rank but extremely stupid, said, I beseech you, praetor, give this advocate to my adversary, and give me none. Explanations of things; too, are amusing, which are given from conjecture in a sense far different from that which they are intended to convey, but with ingenuity and aptness. As when Scaurus accused Rutilius of bribery, (at the time when he himself was made consul, and Rutilius suffered a disappointment,) and showed these letters in Rutilius’s books,121 A. F. P. R., and said that they signified, Actum Fide Publii Rutilii, ‘transacted on the faith of Publius Rutilius;’ while Rutilius declared that they meant, Ante Factum, Post Relatum, ‘done before, entered after;’ but Caius Canius, being on the side of Rufus, observed that neither of those senses was intended by the letters: What then is the meaning? inquired Scaurus. Aemilius fecit, plectitur Rutilius, replied Canius; ‘Aemilius is guilty, Rutilius is punished.’ |
|
LXX. [281] “A union of discordant particulars is laughable: as, What is wanting to him, except fortune and virtue? A familiar reproof of a person, as if he were in error, is also amusing; as when Albucius taunted Granius, because, when something appeared to be proved by Albucius from Granius’s writing, Granius rejoiced extremely that Scaevola122 was acquitted, and did not understand that judgment was given against the credit of his own writing. [282] Similar to this is friendly admonition by way of giving advice: as when Granius persuaded a bad pleader, who had made himself hoarse with speaking, to drink a cold mixture of honey and wine as soon as he got home: I shall ruin my voice, said he, if I do so. [283] It will be better, said Granius, than to ruin your clients. It is a happy hit, too, when something is said that is peculiarly applicable to the character of some particular person; as when Scaurus had incurred some unpopularity for having taken possession of the effects of Phrygio Pompeius, a rich man who died without a will, and was sitting as counsel for Bestia, then under impeachment, Caius Memmius the accuser, as a funeral procession passed by, said, Look, Scaurus, a dead body is going by, if you can but get possession! [284] But of all jokes none create greater laughter than something said contrary to expectation; of which there are examples without number. Such was the saying of Appius the elder,123 who, when the matter about the public lands, and the law of Thorius, was in agitation in the senate, and Lucilius was hard pressed by those who asserted that the public pastures were grazed by his cattle, said, They are not the cattle of Lucilius; you mistake; (he seemed to be going to defend Lucilius;) I look upon them as free, for they feed where they please. [285] That saying also of the Scipio who slew Tiberius Gracchus amuses me. When, after many charges were made against him, Marcus Flaccus proposed Publius Mucius as one of his judges, I except against him, said he, lie is unjust; and when this occasioned a general murmur, A hi said he, I do not except against him, Conscript Fathers, as unjust to me, but to everybody. But nothing could be more witty than the joke of our friend Crassus. When Silus, a witness, was injuring the cause of Piso, by something that he said he had heard against him, It is possible, said he, Silus, that the person from whom you heard this said it in anger. Silus assented. It is possible, too, that you did not rightly understand him. To this also he assented with the lowest of bows, expressing entire agreement with Crassus. It u also possible, continued Crassus, that what you say you have heard you never heard at all. This was so different from what was expected, that the witness was overwhelmed by a general laugh. Naevius is full of this kind of humor, and it is a familiar joke, Wise man, if you are cold you will shake; and there are many other such sayings. |
|
LXXI. [286] “You may often also humorously grant to your adversary what he wishes to detract from you; as Caius Laelius, when a man of disreputable family told him that he was unworthy of his ancestors, replied, But, by Hercules, you are worthy of yours. Jokes, too, are frequently uttered in a sententious manner; as Marcus Cincius, on the day when he proposed his law about gifts and presents, and Caius Cento stood forth and asked him with some scorn, What are you proposing, little Cincius? replied, That you, Caius, may pay for what you wish to use.124 [287] Things also which are impossible are often wished for with much wit; as Marcus Lepidus, when he lay down upon the grass, while others were taking their exercise in the Campus Martius, exclaimed, I wish this were labor.125 It is an excellent joke also to give inquisitive people who tease you as it were, a calm answer, of such a nature as they do not expect; as Lepidus the censor, when he deprived Antistius of Pyrgi of his horse;126 and his friends called out to him, and inquired what reason Antistius could give his father why his horse was taken from him, when he was127 an excellent, industrious, modest, frugal member of the colony, rejoined, That I believe not a, word of it. [288] Some other sorts of jests are enumerated by the Greeks, as execrations, expressions of admiration, threats. But I think that I have divided these matters into too many heads already; for such as lie in the force and meaning of a word, are commonly easy to settle and define; but in general, as I observed before, they are heard rather with approbation than laughter. [289] Jokes, however, which lie in the subject and thought, are, though infinite in their varieties, reducible under a very few general heads; for it is by deceiving expectation, by satirising the tempers of others, by playing humorously on our own, by comparing a thing with something worse, by dissembling, by uttering apparent absurdities, and by reproving folly, that laughter is excited; and he who would be a facetious speaker, must be endowed with a natural genius for such kinds of wit, as well as with personal qualifications, so that his very look may adapt itself to every species of the ridiculous; and the graver and more serious such a person is, as is the case with you, Crassus, so much more humorous do the sayings which fall from him generally appear. [290] “But now I think that you, Antonius, who said128 that you would repose during my discourse, as in some place of refreshment, will, as if you had stopped in the Pomptine Marsh, neither a pleasant nor a wholesome region, consider that you have rested long enough, and will proceed to complete the remainder of your journey.” |
“Ego vero, atque hilare quidem a te acceptus,” inquit, “et quum doctior per te, tum etiam audacior factus jam ad jocandum. Non enim vereor ne quis me in isto genere leviorem jam putet, quoniam quidem tu Fabricios mihi auctores, et Africanos, Maximos, Catones, Lepidos protulisti. [291] Sed habetis ea quæ voluistis ex me audire, de quibus quidem accuratius dicendum et cogitandum fuit. Nam cetera faciliora sunt, atque ex eis quæ jam dicta sunt, reliqua nascuntur omnia. |
“I will,” said Antonius, “having been very pleasantly entertained by you, and having also acquired instruction, as well as encouragement, to indulge in jesting; for I am no longer afraid lest any one should charge me with levity in that respect, since you have produced such authorities as the Fabricii, the Africani, the Maximi, the Catos, and the Lepidi, in its favor. [291] But you have heard what you desired from me, at least such points as it was necessary to consider and detail with particular accuracy; the rest are more easy, and arise wholly from what has been already said. |
[LXXII] Ego enim quum ad causam sum aggressus atque omnia cogitando, quoad facere potui, persecutus, quum et argumenta causæ et eos locos quibus animi judicum conciliantur, et illos quibus permoventur, vidi atque cognovi, tum constituo quid habeat causa quæque boni, quid mali. Nulla enim fere potest res in dicendi disceptationem aut controversiam vocari, quæ non habeat utrumque ; sed quantum habeat, id rēfert. [292] Mea autem ratio hæc esse in dicendo solet ut, boni quod habeat, id amplectar, exornem, exaggerem, ibi commorer, ibi habitem, ibi hæream, a malo autem vitioque causæ ita recedam, non ut me id defugere appareat, sed ut totum bono illo ornando et augendo dissimulatum obruatur. Et, si causa est in argumentis, firmissima quæque maxime tueor, sive plura sunt sive aliquod unum ; sin autem in conciliatione aut in permotione causa est, ad eam me potissimum partem, quæ maxime movere animos hominum potest, confero. [293] Summa denique hujus generis hæc est, ut, si in refellendo adversario firmior esse oratio quam in confirmandis nostris rebus potest, omnia in illum tela conferam ; si nostra probari facilius, quam illa redargui possunt, abducere animos a contraria defensione et ad nostram conor deducere. [294] Duo denique illa quæ facillima videntur (quoniam quæ difficiliora sunt, non possum) mihi pro meo jure sumo :
|
LXXII.129 “For when I have entered upon a cause, and traced out all its bearings in my mind, as far as I could possibly do so; when I have ascertained and contemplated the proper arguments for the case, and those particulars by which the feelings of the judges maybe conciliated or excited, I then consider what strong or weak points the cause contains; for hardly any subject can be called into question and controversy in pleading, which has not both; but to what degree is the chief concern. [292] In pleading, my usual method is, to fix on whatever strong points a cause has, and to illustrate and make the most of them, dwelling on them, insisting on them, clinging to them; but to hold back from the weak and defective points, in such a way that I may not appear to shun them, but that their whole force may be dissembled and overwhelmed130 by the ornament and amplification of the strong parts. If the cause turn upon arguments, I maintain chiefly such as are the strongest, whether they are several or whether there be but one; but if the cause depend on the conciliation or excitement of the feelings of the judges, I apply myself chiefly to that part which is best adapted to move men’s minds. [293] Finally, the principal point for consideration on this head is, that if my speech can be made more effective by refuting my adversary, than by supporting my own side of the question, I employ all my weapons against him; but if my own ease can be more easily supported, than that on the other side can be confuted, I endeavour to withdraw the attention of the judges from the opposite party’s defence, and to fix it on my own. [294] In conclusion, I adopt, on my own responsibility, two courses which appear to me most easy (since I cannot attempt what is more difficult): one, that I make, sometimes, no reply at all to a troublesome or difficult argument or point; (and at such forbearance perhaps somebody may reasonably laugh; for who is there that cannot practise it? but I am now speaking of my own abilities, not those of others; and I confess that, if any particular press very hard upon me, I usually retreat from it, but in such a manner as not only not to appear to flee with my shield thrown away, but even with it thrown over my shoulders; adopting, at the same time, a certain pomp and parade of language, and a mode of flight that resembles fighting; and keeping upon my guard in such a way, that I seem to have retired, not to avoid my enemy, but to choose more advantageous ground;) [295] the other is one which I think most of all worthy of the orator’s precaution and foresight, and which generally occasions me very great anxiety: I am accustomed to study not so much to benefit the causes which I undertake, as not to injure them; not but that an orator must aim at both objects; but it is however a much greater disgrace to him to be thought to have damaged a cause, than not to have profited it. “But what are you saying among yourselves on this subject, Catulus? |
[LXXIII] “An hæc, ut sunt contemnenda, contemnitis?” “Minime,” inquit ille, “sed Cæsar de isto ipso quiddam velle dicere videbatur.” “Me vero libente,” inquit Antonius, “dixerit sive refellendi causa sive quærendi.” [296] Tum Julius : “Ego mehercule,” inquit, “Antoni, semper is fui qui de te oratore sic prædicarem, unum te in dicendo mihi videri tectissimum, propriumque hoc esse laudis tuæ, nihil a te unquam esse dictum quod obesset ei pro quo diceres. Idque memoria teneo, quum mihi sermo cum hoc ipso Crasso multis audientibus esset de te institutus, Crassusque plurimis verbis eloquentiam laudaret tuam, dixisse me, cum ceteris tuis laudibus, hanc esse vel maximam, quod non solum quod opus esset diceres, sed etiam quod non opus esset non diceres. [297] Tum illum mihi respondere memini, cetera in te summe esse laudanda, illud vero improbi esse hominis et perfidiosi, dicere quod alienum esset et noceret ei pro quo quisque diceret. Quare non sibi eum disertum qui id non faceret videri, sed improbum qui faceret. Nunc, si tibi videtur, Antoni, demonstres velim, quare tu hoc ita magnum putes nihil in causa mali facere, ut nihil tibi in oratore majus esse videatur.” |
LXXIII. Do you slight what I say, as indeed it deserves to be slighted?” “By no means,” rejoined Catulus; “but Csesar seemed desirous to say something on the point.” “Let him say it, then, with all my heart,” continued Antonius, “whether he wish to confute, or to question me.” [296] “Indeed, Antonius,” said Caesar, “I have always been the man to say of you as an orator, that you appeared to me in your speeches the most guarded of all men, and that it was your peculiar merit, that nothing was ever spoken by you that could injure him for whom you spoke. And I well remember, that, on entering into a conversation with Crassus here concerning you, in the hearing of a large company, and Crassus having largely extolled your eloquence, I said, that amongst your other merits this was even the principal, that you not only said all that ought to be said, but also never said anything that ought not to be said; [297] and I recollect that he then observed to me, that your other qualities deserved the highest degree of praise, but that to speak what was not to the purpose, and to injure one’s own client, was the conduct of an unprincipled and perfidious person; and, consequently, that he did not appear to him to be a good pleader, who avoided doing so, though he who did so was certainly dishonest. Now, if you please, Antonius, I would wish you to show why you think it a matter of such importance, to do no harm to a cause; so much so, that nothing in an orator appears to you of greater consequence.” |
[LXXIV] [298] “Dicam equidem, Cæsar,” inquit, “quid intellegam ; sed et tu et vos hoc omnes,” inquit, “mementote, non me de perfecti oratoris divinitate quadam loqui, sed de exercitationis et consuetudinis meæ mediocritate. Crassi quidem responsum excellentis cujusdam est ingenii ac singularis ; cui quidem, portenti simile esse visum est, posse aliquem inveniri oratorem, qui aliquid mali faceret dicendo, obessetque ei quem defenderet. [299] Facit enim de se conjecturam ; cujus tanta vis ingenii est, ut neminem nisi consulto putet quod contra se ipsum sit dicere. Sed ego non de præstanti quadam et eximia, sed prope de vulgari et communi prudentia disputo. Ut apud Græcos fertur incredibili quadam magnitudine consilii atque ingenii Atheniensis ille fuisse Themistocles ; ad quem quidam doctus homo atque imprimis eruditus accessisse dicitur, eique artem memoriæ quæ tum primum proferebatur pollicitus esse se traditurum ; quum ille quæsisset quidnam illa ars efficere posset, dixisse illum doctorem, ut omnia meminisset ; et ei Themistoclen respondisse, gratius sibi illum esse facturum, si se oblivisci quæ vellet quam si meminisse docuisset. [300] ¿Videsne quæ vis in homine acerrimi ingenii, quam potens et quanta mens fuerit? Qui ita responderit, ut intellegere possemus nihil ex illius animo, quod semel esset infusum, unquam effluere potuisse ; quum quidem ei fuerit optabilius oblivisci posse potius quod meminisse nollet quam quod semel audisset vidissetve meminisse. Sed neque propter hoc Themistocli responsum, memoriæ nobis opera danda non est, neque illa mea cautio et timiditas in causis propter præstantem prudentiam Crassi neglegenda est. Uterque enim istorum non mihi attulit aliquam, sed suam significavit facultatem. [301] Etenim permulta sunt in causis in omni parte orationis circumspicienda, ne quid offendas, ne quo irruas. Sæpe aliquis testis aut non lædit aut minus lædit, nisi lacessatur. Orat reus, urgent advocati, ut invehamur, ut maledicamus, denique ut interrogemus ; non moveor, non obtempero, non satisfacio ; neque tamen ullam assequor laudem — homines enim imperiti facilius quod stulte dixeris reprehendere quam quod sapienter tacueris laudare possunt. [302] ¡Hic quantum fit mali, si iratum, si non stultum, si non levem testem læseris! Habet enim et voluntatem nocendi in iracundia et vim in ingenio et pondus in vita. Nec, si hoc Crassus non committit, ideo non multi et sæpe committunt. Quo quidem mihi turpius videri nihil solet, quam quum ex oratoris dicto aliquo aut responso aut rogato sermo ille sequitur : “Occidit.” “¿Adversariumne?” “Immo vero,” ajunt, “se et eum, quem defendit.” |
LXXIV. [298] “I will readily tell you, Caesar,” replied Antonius, “what I mean; but do you, and all who are here, remember this, that I am not speaking of the divine power of the complete orator, but of my own humble efforts and practice. The remark of Crassus is indeed that of an excellent and singular genius; to whom it appeared something like a prodigy, that any orator could possibly be found, who could do any mischief in speaking, and injure him whom he had to defend. [299] For he judges from himself; as his force of intellect is such, that he thinks no man speaks what makes against himself, unless on purpose; but I am not alluding to any supereminent and illustrious power, but to common and almost universal sense. Amongst the Greeks, Themistocles the Athenian is reported to have possessed an incredible compass of understanding and genius; and a certain person of learning and singular accomplishments is said to have gone to him, and offered to teach him the art of memory, an art then first made public. When he inquired what that art could do for him, the professor replied, that it would enable him to remember everything; when Themistocles rejoined, that he would oblige him much more if he could instruct him how to forget, rather than to remember, what he chose. [300] Do you conceive what force and vigor of genius, how powerful and extensive a capacity, there was in that great man? who answered in such a manner that we may understand that nothing, which had once entered his mind, could ever slip out of it; and to whom it was much more desirable to be enabled to forget what he did not wish to remember, than to remember whatever he had once heard or seen. But neither on account of this answer of Themistocles are we to forbear to cultivate our memory; nor is my precaution and timidity in pleading causes to be slighted on account of the excellent understanding of Crassus; for neither the one nor the other of them has given me any additional ability, but has merely signified his own. [301] There are numbers of points131 in causes that call for circumspection in every part of your speech, that you may not stumble, that you may not fall over anything. Oftentimes some witness either does no mischief, or does less, if he be not provoked; my client entreats me, the advocates press me, to inveigh against him, to abuse him, or, finally, to plague him with questions; I am not moved, I do not comply, I will not gratify them; yet I gain no commendations; for ignorant people can more easily blame what you say injudiciously, than praise you for what you discreetly leave unnoticed. [302] In such a case how much harm may be done if you offend a witness who is passionate, or one who is a man of sense, or of influential character? for he has the will to do you mischief from his passion, the power in his understanding, and the means in his reputation; nor, if Crassus never commits this offence, is that a reason that many are not guilty of it, and often; on which account nothing ever appears to me more ignominious, than when from any observation, or reply, or question, of a pleader, such remarks as this follow: He has ruined Whom? his adversary? No truly, but himself and his client. |
[LXXV] [303] Hoc Crassus non putat nisi perfidia accidere posse ; ego autem sæpissime video in causis aliquid mali facere homines minime malos. ¿Quid? Illud, quod supra dixi, solere me cedere et, ut planius dicam, fugere ea quæ valde causam meam premerent, quum id non faciunt alii, versanturque in hostium castris ac sua præsidia dimittunt — ¿mediocriterne causis nocent, quum aut adversariorum adjumenta confirmant aut ea quæ sanare nequeunt exulcerant? [304] ¿Quid? Quum personarum quas defendunt rationem non habent, si quæ sunt in eis invidiosa non mitigant extenuando, sed laudando et efferendo invidiosiora faciunt — ¿quantum est in eo tandem mali? ¿Quid? Si in homines caros judicibusque jucundos sine ulla præmunitione orationis acerbius et contumeliosius invehare — ¿nonne a te judices abalienes? [305] ¿Quid? Si, quæ vitia aut incommoda sunt in aliquo judice uno aut pluribus, ea tu in adversariis exprobrando non intellegas te in judices invehi — ¿mediocre peccatum est? ¿Quid? Si, quum pro altero dicas, litem tuam facias aut læsus efferare iracundia, causam relinquas — ¿nihilne noceas? In quo ego, non quo libenter male audiam, sed quia causam non libenter relinquo, nimium patiens et lentus existimor ; ut quum te ipsum, Sulpici, objurgabam, quod ministratorem peteres, non adversarium ; ex quo etiam illud assequor, ut, si quis mihi maledicat, petulans aut plane insanus esse videatur. [306] In ipsis autem argumentis si quid posueris aut aperte falsum aut ei, quod dixeris dicturusve sis, contrarium aut genere ipso remotum ab usu judiciorum ac foro — ¿nihilne noceas? ¿Quid multa? Omnis cura mea solet in hoc versari semper — dicam enim sæpius —: si possim, ut boni efficiam aliquid dicendo ; sin id minus, ut certe ne quid mali. |
LXXV. [303] “This Crassus thinks can never happen but through perfidiousness; but I very frequently observe that persons by no means dishonest do mischief in causes. In regard to that particular which I mentioned before, that I am used to retreat, or, to speak more plainly, to flee from those points which would press hard on my side of the question, how much harm do others do when they neglect this, saunter in the enemy’s camp, and dismiss their own guards? Do they occasion but slight detriment to their causes, when they either strengthen the supports of their adversaries or inflame the wounds which they cannot heal? [304] What harm do they cause when they pay no regard to the characters of those whom they defend? If they do not mitigate by extenuation those qualities in them that excite ill-will, but make them more obnoxious to it by commending and extolling them, how much mischief is caused by such management? Or what if, without any precautionary language, you throw bitter and contumelious invectives upon popular persons, in favor with the judges, do you not alienate their feelings from you? [305] Or what if there be vices or bad qualities in one or more of the judges, and you, in upbraiding your adversaries with such demerits, are not aware that you are attacking the judges, is it a small error which you then commit? Or what if, while you are speaking for another, you make his cause your own, or, taking affront, are carried away from the question by passion, and start aside from the subject, do you occasion no harm? In this respect I am esteemed too patient and forbearing, not because I willingly hear myself abused, but because I am unwilling to lose sight of the cause; as, for instance, when I reproved you yourself, Sulpicius, for attacking an agent, not me your adversary.132 From such conduct, however, I acquire this advantage, that if any one does abuse me, he is thought to be either ill-tempered or out of his wits. [306] Or if in your arguments you shall state anything either manifestly false, or contradictory to what you have said or are going to say, or foreign in its nature to the practice of trials and of the forum, do you occasion no damage to your cause? Why need I say more on this head? My whole care is constantly devoted to this object, (for I will repeat it frequently,) to effect, if I can, some good by speaking; but if not, to do at least no harm. |
[LXXVI] [307] Itaque nunc illuc redeo, Catule, in quo tu me paulo ante laudabas, ad ordinem collocationemque rerum ac locorum. Cujus ratio est duplex : { 1.} altera, quam affert natura causarum ; { 2.} altera, quæ oratorum judicio et prudentia comparatur.
|
LXXVI. [307] “I now return therefore to that point, Catulus, on which you a little while ago accorded me praise; the order and arrangement of facts and topics of argument. On this head, two methods may be observed; one, which the nature of causes dictates; the other, which is suggested by the orator’s judgment and prudence. For, to premise something before we come to the main point; then to explain the matter in question; then to support it by strengthening our own arguments, and refuting those on the other side; next, to sum up, and corns to the peroration; is a mode of speaking that nature herself prescribes. [308] But to determine how we should arrange the particulars that are to be advanced in order to prove, to inform, to persuade, more peculiarly belongs to the orator’s discretion. For many arguments occur to him; many, that seem likely to be of service to his pleading; but some of them are so trifling as to be utterly contemptible; some, if they are of any assistance at all, are sometimes of such a nature, that there is some defect inherent in them; while that which appears to be advantageous, is not of such import that it need be advanced in conjunction with anything prejudicial. [309] And as to those arguments which are to the purpose, and deserving of trust, if they are (as it often happens) very numerous, I think that such of them as are of least weight, or as are of the same tendency with others of greater force, ought to be set aside, and excluded altogether from our pleading. I myself, indeed, in collecting proofs, make it a practice rather to weigh than to count them. |
[LXXVII] [310] Et quoniam, quod sæpe jam dixi, tribus rebus homines ad nostram sententiam perducimus — aut docendo aut conciliando aut permovendo —, una ex tribus his rebus res præ nobis est ferenda, ut nihil aliud nisi docere velle videamur ; reliquæ duæ, sicuti sanguis in corporibus, sic illæ in perpetuis orationibus fusæ esse debebunt. Nam et principia et ceteræ partes orationis, de quibus paulo post pauca dicemus, habere hanc vim magnopere debent, ut ad eorum mentes apud quos agitur permanare possint. [311] Sed his partibus orationis quæ, etsi nihil docent argumentando, persuadendo tamen et commovendo proficiunt plurimum, quanquam maxime proprius est locus et in exordiendo et in perorando, digredi tamen ab eo quod proposueris atque agas permovendorum animorum causa sæpe utile est. [312] Itaque, vel re narrata et exposita, sæpe datur ad commovendos animos digrediendi locus, vel argumentis nostris confirmatis vel contrariis refutatis vel utroque loco vel omnibus, si habet eam causa dignitatem atque copiam, recte id fieri potest ; eæque causæ sunt ad augendum et ad ornandum gravissimæ atque plenissimæ, quæ plurimos exitus dant ad ejusmodi digressionem, ut eis locis uti liceat, quibus animorum impetus eorum qui audiunt aut impellantur aut reflectantur. [313] Atque etiam in illo reprehendo eos qui, quæ minime firma sunt, ea prima collocant. In quo illos quoque errare arbitror qui, si quando (id quod mihi nunquam placuit) plures adhibent patronos, ut in quoque eorum minimum putant esse, ita eum primum volunt dicere. Res enim hoc postulat, ut eorum exspectationi qui audiunt quam celerrime occurratur ; cui si initio satisfactum non sit, multo plus sit in reliqua causa laborandum. Male enim se res habet quæ non statim ut dici cœpta est melior fieri videtur. [314] Ergo ut in oratore optimus quisque, sic in oratione firmissimum quodque sit primum — dum illud tamen in utroque teneatur, ut ea quæ excellent serventur etiam ad perorandum ; si quæ erunt mediocria (nam vitiosis nusquam esse oportet locum), in mediam turbam atque in gregem conjicientur. [315] Hisce omnibus rebus consideratis, tum denique id quod primum est dicendum postremum soleo cogitare, quo utar exordio. Nam si quando id primum invenire volui, nullum mihi occurrit nisi aut exile aut nugatorium aut vulgare aut commune. |
LXXVII. [310] “Since, too, as I have often observed, we bring over people in general to our opinions by three methods, by instructing their understandings, conciliating their benevolence, or exciting their passions, one only of these three methods is to be professed by us, so that we may appear to desire nothing else but to instruct; the other two, like blood throughout the body, ought to be diffused through the whole of our pleading; for both the beginning, and the other parts a speech, on which we will by-and-by say a few words, ought to have this power in a great degree, so that they may penetrate the minds of those before whom we plead, in order to excite them. [311] But in those parts of the speech which, though they do not convince by argument, yet by solicitation and excitement produce great effect, though their proper place is chiefly in the exordium and the peroration, still, to make a digression from what you have proposed and are discussing, for the sake of exciting the passions, is often advantageous. [312] Since, after the statement of the case has been made, an opportunity often presents itself of making a digression to rouse the feelings of the audience; or this may be properly done after the confirmation of our own arguments, or the refutation of those on the other side, or in either place, or in all, if the cause has sufficient copiousness and importance; and those causes are the most considerable, and most pregnant with matter for amplification and embellishment, which afford the most frequent opportunities for that kind of digression in which you may descant on those points by which the passions of the audience are either excited or calmed. [313] In touching on this matter, I cannot but blame those who place the arguments to which they trust least in the front; and, in like manner, I think that they commit an error, who, if ever they employ several advocates, (a practice which never had my approbation,) will have him to speak first in whom they confide least,. and rank the others also according to their abilities.133 For a cause requires that the expectations of the audience should be met with all possible expedition; and if nothing to satisfy them be offered in the commencement, much more labor is necessary in the sequel; for that case is in a bad condition which does not at the commencement of the pleading at once appear to be the better. [314] For this reason, as, in regard to pleaders,134 he who is the most able should speak first, so in, regard to a speech, let the arguments of most weight be put foremost; yet so that this rule be observed with respect to both, that some of superior efficiency be reserved for the peroration; if any are but of moderate strength, (for to the weak no place should be given at all,) they may be thrown into the main body and into the midst of the group. [315] All these things being duly considered, it is then my custom to think last of that which is to be spoken first, namely, what exordium I shall adopt. For whenever I have felt inclined to think of that first, nothing occurs to me but what is jejune, or nugatory, or vulgar and ordinary. |
[LXXVIII] Principia autem dicendi semper quum accurata et acuta et instructa sententiis, apta verbis, tum vero causarum propria esse debent. Prima est enim quasi cognitio et commendatio orationis in principio, quæque continuo eum qui audit permulcere atque allicere debet. [316] In quo admirari soleo non equidem istos qui nullam huic rei operam dederunt, sed hominem imprimis disertum atque eruditum — Philippum, qui ita solet surgere ad dicendum ut, quod primum verbum habiturus sit, nesciat, et ait idem, quum bracchium concalfecerit, tum se solere pugnare ; neque attendit eos ipsos, unde hoc simile ducat, primas illas hastas ita jactare leniter, ut et venustati vel maxime serviant et reliquis viribus suis consulant. [317] Nec est dubium, quin exordium dicendi vehemens et pugnax non sæpe esse debeat ; sed si in ipso illo gladiatorio vitæ certamine quo ferro decernitur, tamen ante congressum multa fiunt, quæ non ad vulnus, sed ad speciem valere videantur, ¡quanto hoc magis in oratione exspectandum est, in qua non vis potius quam delectatio postulatur! Nihil est denique in natura rerum omnium, quod se universum profundat et quod totum repente evolet. Sic omnia quæ fiunt quæque aguntur acerrime, lenioribus principiis natura ipsa prætexuit. [318] Hæc autem in dicendo non extrinsecus alicunde quærenda, sed ex ipsis visceribus causæ, sumenda sunt. Idcirco tota causa pertemptata atque perspecta, locis omnibus inventis atque instructis, considerandum est quo principio sit utendum. [319] Sic et facile reperietur ; sumetur enim ex eis rebus quæ erunt uberrimæ vel in argumentis vel in eis partibus ad quas dixi a causa digredi sæpe oportere ; ita et momenti aliquid afferent, quum erunt pæne ex intima defensione depromptæ, et apparebit eas non modo non esse communes nec in alias causas posse transferri, sed penitus ex ea causa quæ tum agatur, effloruisse. |
LXXVIII. “The beginnings of speeches ought always to be accurate and judicious, well furnished with thoughts, and happy in expression, as well as peculiarly suited to their respective causes. For our earliest acquaintance with a speech as it were, and the first recommendation of it to our notice, is at the commencement; which ought at once to propitiate and attract the audience. [316] In regard to this point, I cannot but feel astonished, not indeed at such as have paid no attention to the art, but at a man of singular eloquence and erudition, I mean Philippus, who generally rises to speak with so little preparation, that he knows not what word he shall utter first; and he says, that when he has warmed his arm, then it is his custom to begin to fight; but he does not consider that those from whom he takes this simile hurl their first lances gently, so as to preserve the utmost grace in their action, and at the same time to husband their strength. [317] Nor is there any doubt, but that the beginning of a speech ought very seldom to be vehement and pugnacious; but if even in the combat of gladiators for life, which is decided by the sword, many passes are made previous to the actual encounter, which appear to be intended, not for mischief, but for display, how much more naturally is such prelude to be expected in a speech, in which an exhibition of force is not more required than gratification? Besides, there is nothing in the whole nature of things that is all produced at once, and that springs entire into being in an instant; and nature herself has introduced everything that is done and accomplished most energetically with a moderate beginning. [318] Nor is the exordium of a speech to be sought from without, or from anything unconnected with the subject, but to be derived from the very essence of the cause. It is, therefore, after the whole cause has been considered and examined, and after every argument has been excogitated and prepared, that you must determine what sort of exordium to adopt; [319] for thus it will easily be settled,135 as it will be drawn from those points which are most fertile in arguments, or in those matters on which I said136 you ought often to make digressions. Thus our exordia will give additional weight, when they are drawn from the most intimate parts of our defence; and it will be shown that they are not only not common, and cannot be transferred to other causes, but that they have wholly grown out of the cause under consideration. |
[LXXIX] [320] Omne autem principium aut rei totius quæ agetur significationem, habere debebit, aut aditum ad causam et communitionem, aut quoddam ornamentum et dignitatem. Sed oportet, ut ædibus ac templis vestibula et aditus, sic causis principia pro portione rerum præponere. Itaque in parvis atque infrequentibus causis, ab ipsa re est exordiri sæpe commodius. [321] Sed quum erit utendum principio (quod plerumque erit), aut ex reo aut ex adversario aut ex re aut ex eis apud quos agetur, sententias duci licebit.
|
LXXIX. [320] “But every exordium ought either to convey an intimation of the whole matter in hand, or some introduction and support to the cause, or something of ornament and dignity. But, like vestibules and approaches to houses and temples, so the introductions that we prefix to causes should be suited to the importance of the subjects. In small and unimportant137 causes, therefore, it is often more advisable to commence with the subject-matter itself without any preface. [321] But, when we are to use an exordium, (as will generally be the case,) our matter for it may be derived either from the suitor, from the adversary, from the subject, or from those before whom we plead. From the suitor (I call all those suitors whom a suit concerns) we may deduce such particulars as characterise a worthy, generous, or unfortunate man, or one deserving of compassion; or such particulars as avail against a false accusation. From the adversary we may deduce almost the contrary particulars from the same points. [322] From the subject, if the matter under consideration be cruel, or heinous, or beyond expectation, or undeserved, or pitiable, or savouring of ingratitude or indignity, or unprecedented, or not admitting restitution or satisfaction. From those before whom we plead we may draw such considerations, as to procure their benevolence and good opinion; an object better attained in the course of pleading than by direct entreaty. This object indeed is to be kept in view throughout the whole oration, and especially in the conclusion; but many exordia, however, are wholly based upon it; [323] for the Greeks recommend us to make the judge, at the very commencement, attentive and desirous of information; and such hints are useful, but not more proper for the exordium than for other parts; but they are indeed easier138 to be observed in the beginning, because the audience are then most attentive, when they are in expectation of the whole affair, and they may also, in the commencement, be more easily informed, as the particulars stated in the outset are generally of greater perspicuity than those which are spoken by way of argument, or refutation, in the body of the pleading. [324] But we shall derive the greatest abundance and variety of matter for exordia, either to conciliate or to arouse the judge, from those points in the cause which are adapted to create emotion in the mind; yet the whole of these ought not to be brought forward in the exordium; the judge should only receive a slight impulse at the outset, so that the rest of our speech may come with full force upon him when he is already impressed in our favor. |
[LXXX] [325] Connexum autem ita sit principium consequenti orationi, ut non tanquam citharœdi proœmium affictum aliquid, sed cohærens cum omni corpore membrum esse videatur. Nam nonnulli, quum illud meditati ediderunt, sic ad reliqua transeunt, ut audientiam fieri sibi vix velle videantur. Atque ejusmodi illa prolusio debet esse, non ut Samnitium, qui vibrant hastas ante pugnam, quibus in pugnando nihil utuntur, sed ut ipsis sententiis, quibus proluserint, vel pugnare possint. |
LXXX. [325] “Let the exordium, also, be so connected with the sequel of the speech, that it may not appear, like a musician’s prelude, to be something attached merely from imagination, but a coherent member of the whole body; for some speakers, when they have delivered their premeditated exordium, make such a transition to what is to follow, that they seem positively unwilling to have an audience. But a prolusion of that kind ought not to be like that of gladiators,139 who brandish spears before the fight, of which they make no use in the encounter; but should be such, that speakers may even use as weapons the thoughts which they advanced in the prelude. |
[326] Narrare vero rem, quod breviter jubent : si brevitas appellanda est, quum verbum nullum redundat, brevis est L. Crassi oratio. Sin tum est brevitas, quum tantum est verborum quantum necesse est : aliquando id opus est, sed sæpe obest, vel maxime in narrando, non solum quod obscuritatem affert, sed etiam quod eam virtutem quæ narrationis est maxima — ut jucunda et ad persuadendum accommodata sit — tollit. Viden illa: in ignem imposita’st, fletur, |
[326] “But as to the directions which they give to consult brevity in the narration, if that is to be called brevity where there is no word redundant, the language of Lucius Crassus is distinguished by brevity; but if that kind of brevity is intended, when only just so many words are used as are absolutely necessary, such conciseness is indeed sometimes proper; but it is often prejudicial, especially in narration; not only as it produces obscurity, but also because it destroys that which is the chief excellence of narration, that it be pleasing and adapted to persuade. For instance, the narrative, For he, as soon as he became of age, &c.140 how long is it! [327] The manners of the youth himself, the inquiries of the servant, the death of Chrysis, the look, figure, and affliction of the sister, and the other circumstances, are told with the utmost variety and agreeableness. But if he had been studious of such brevity as this, She’s carried forth; we go; we reach the place Of sepulture; she’s laid upon the pile, he might have comprised the whole in ten lines: although ‘She’s carried forth, we go,’ is only so far concise, as to consult, not absolute brevity, but elegance; [328] for if there had been nothing expressed but ‘she’s laid upon the pile,’ the whole matter would have been easily comprehended. But a narration referring to various characters, and intersected by dialogue, affords much gratification; and that becomes more probable which you report to have been done, when you describe the manner in which it was done; and it is much more clearly understood if you sometimes pause for that purpose, and do not hurry over it with affected brevity. [329] For the narrative parts of a speech, as well as the other parts, ought to be perspicuous, and we ought to take the more pains with that part, because it is more difficult not to be obscure in stating a case, than either in an exordium, in argumentation, in refuting of an accusation, or in a peroration: and obscurity in this part of a speech is attended with greater danger than in other parts; both because, if anything be obscurely expressed in any other part, only that is lost which is so expressed; but obscurity in the narrative part spreads darkness over the whole speech; and because, as to other parts, if you have expressed anything obscurely in one place, you may explain it more clearly in another; while for the narrative part of a speech there is but one place. But your narrative will be clear, if it be given in ordinary language, with adherence to the order of time and without interruption. |
[LXXXI] [330] Sed quando utendum sit aut non sit narratione, id est consilii. Neque enim si nota res est nec dubium quid gestum sit, narrare oportet, nec si adversarius narravit, nisi si refellemus. Ac si quando erit narrandum, ne illa quæ suspicionem et crimen efficient contraque nos erunt acriter persequamur — et quicquid potuerit, detrahamus —, ne illud quod Crassus (si quando fiat) perfidia, non stultitia fieri putat — ut causæ noceamus — accidat. Nam ad summam totius causæ pertinet, caute an contra, demonstrata res sit ; quod omnis orationis reliquæ fons est narratio. |
LXXXI. [330] “But when we ought to introduce a statement of facts, and when we ought not, requires judicious consideration. For we ought to make no such statement, either if the matter is notorious, or if the circumstances are free from doubt, or if the adversary has related them, unless indeed we wish to confute his statement; and whenever we do make a statement of facts, let us not insist too eagerly upon points which may create suspicion and ill-feeling, and make against us, but let us extenuate such points as much as possible; lest that should happen, which, whenever it occurs, Crassus thinks is done through treachery, not through folly, namely, that we damage our own cause; for it concerns the fortune of the whole cause, whether the case is stated with caution, or otherwise, because the statement of the case is the foundation of all the rest of the speech. |
[331] Sequitur ut causa ponatur in quo videndum est quid in controversiam veniat. Tum suggerenda sunt firmamenta causæ, conjuncte et infirmandis contrariis et tuis confirmandis. Namque una in causis ratio quædam est ejus orationis quæ ad probandam argumentationem valet ; ea autem et confirmationem et reprehensionem quærit. Sed quia neque reprehendi quæ contra dicuntur possunt, nisi tua confirmes, neque hæc confirmari, nisi illa reprehendas, idcirco hæc et natura et utilitate et tractatione conjuncta sunt. [332] Omnia autem concludenda sunt plerumque, rebus augendis vel inflammando judice vel mitigando ; omniaque — quum superioribus orationis locis tum maxime extremo — ad mentes judicum quam maxime permovendas et ad utilitatem nostram vocandas conferenda sunt. |
[331] “What follows is, that the matter in question be laid down, when we must settle what is the point that comes under dispute; then the chief grounds of the cause are to be laid down conjunctively, so as to weaken your adversary’s supports, and to strengthen your own; for there is in causes but one method for that part of your speech, which is of efficacy to prove your arguments; and that needs both confirmation and refutation; but because what is alleged on the other side cannot be refuted unless you confirm your own statements, and your own statements cannot be confirmed unless you refute the allegations on the opposite side, these matters are in consequence united both by their nature, by their object, and by their mode of treatment. [332] The whole speech is then generally brought to a conclusion by some amplification on the different points, or by exciting or mollifying the judge; and every particular, not only in the former parts of the speech, but more especially towards the conclusion, is to be adapted to excite as much as possible the feelings of the judges, and to incline them in our favor. |
[333] Neque sane jam causa videtur esse cur secernamus ea præcepta quæ de suasionibus tradenda sunt aut laudationibus ; sunt enim pleraque communia. Sed tamen suadere aliquid aut dissuadere, gravissimæ mihi videtur esse personæ ; nam et sapientis est, consilium explicare suum de maximis rebus — et honesti et diserti —, ut mente providere, auctoritate probare, oratione persuadere possis. |
[333] “Nor does there now appear to be any reason, indeed, why we should make a distinct head of those precepts which are given concerning suasory or panegyrical speeches; for most of them are common to all kinds of oratory; yet, to speak in favor of any important matter, or against it, seems to me to belong only to the most dignified character; for it is the part of a wise man to deliver his opinion on momentous affairs, and that of a man of integrity and eloquence, to be able to provide for others by his prudence, to confirm by his authority, and to persuade by his language. |
[LXXXII] Atque hæc in Senatu, minore apparatu agenda sunt ; sapiens enim est consilium, multisque aliis dicendi relinquendus locus ; vitanda etiam ingenii ostentationis suspicio. [334] Contio capit omnem vim orationis, et gravitatem varietatemque desiderat. Ergo in suadendo nihil est optabilius quam dignitas ; nam qui utilitatem petit, non quid maxime velit suasor, sed quid interdum magis sequatur, videt. Nemo est enim — præsertim in tam clara civitate — quin putet expetendam maxime dignitatem ; sed vincit utilitas plerumque quum subest ille timor, ea neglecta ne dignitatem quidem posse retineri. [335] Controversia autem inter hominum sententias aut in illo est, utrum sit utilius, aut etiam — quum id convenit — certatur, utrum honestati potius an utilitati consulendum sit. Quæ quia pugnare sæpe inter se videntur, qui utilitatem defendit enumerabit commoda pacis, opum, potentiæ, pecuniæ, vectigalium, præsidii militum, utilitates ceterarum rerum quarum fructum utilitate metimur, itemque incommoda contrariorum. Qui ad dignitatem impellit, majorum exempla, quæ erant vel cum periculo gloriosa, colliget, posteritatis immortalem memoriam augebit ; utilitatem ex laude nasci defendet, semperque eam cum dignitate esse conjunctam. [336] Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit, quidque etiam sit necesse aut non sit, in utraque re maxime est quærendum. Inciditur enim omnis jam deliberatio, si intellegitur non posse fieri aut si necessitas affertur ; et qui id docuit, non videntibus aliis, is plurimum vidit. [337] Ad consilium autem de republica dandum, caput est nosse rempublicam ; ad dicendum vero probabiliter, nosse mores civitatis ; qui quia crebro mutantur, genus quoque orationis est sæpe mutandum. Et quanquam una fere vis est eloquentiæ, tamen, quia summa dignitas est populi, gravissima causa reipublicæ, maximi motus multitudinis, genus quoque dicendi grandius quoddam et illustrius esse adhibendum videtur ; maximaque pars orationis admovenda est ad animorum motus nonnunquam, aut cohortatione aut commemoratione aliqua, aut in spem aut in metum aut ad cupiditatem aut ad gloriam concitandos, sæpe etiam a temeritate, iracundia, spe, injuria, invidia, crudelitate revocandos. |
LXXXII. “Speeches are to be made in the senate with less display; for it is an assembly of wise men;141 and opportunity is to be left for many others to speak. All suspicion, too, of ostentation of ability is to be avoided. [334] A speech to the people, on the other hand, requires all the force, weight, and various coloring of eloquence. For persuading, then, nothing is more desirable than worth; for he who thinks that expediency is more desirable, does not consider what the counsellor chiefly wishes, but what he prefers upon occasion to follow; and there is no man, especially in so noble a state as this, who does not think that worth ought chiefly to be regarded; but expediency commonly prevails, there being a concealed fear, that even worth cannot be supported if expediency be digregarded. [335] But the difference between the opinions of men lies either in this question, ‘which of two things is of the greater utility?’ or, if that point is agreed, it is disputed ‘whether honor or expediency ought rather to be consulted.’ As these seem often to oppose each other, he who is an advocate for expediency, will enumerate the benefits of peace, of plenty, of power, of riches, of settled revenues, of troops in garrison, and of other things, the enjoyment of which we estimate by their utility; and he will specify the disadvantages of a contrary state of things. He who exhorts his audience to regard honor, will collect examples from our ancestors, which may be imitated with glory, though attended with danger; he will expatiate on immortal fame among posterity; he will maintain that advantage arises from the observance of honor, and that it is always united with worth. [336] But what is possible, or impossible; and what is necessary or unnecessary, are questions of the greatest moment in regard to both; for all debate is at an end, if it is understood that a thing is impossible, or if any necessity for it appears; and he who shows what the case is, when others have overlooked it, sees furthest of all. [337] But for giving counsel in civil affairs the chief qualification is a knowledge of the constitution; and, to speak on such matters so as to be approved, an acquaintance with the manners of the people is required; and, as .these frequently vary, the fashion of speaking must often be varied; and, although the power of eloquence is mostly the same, yet, as the highest dignity is in the people, as the concerns of the republic are of the utmost importance, and as the commotions of the multitude are of extraordinary violence, a more grand and imposing manner of addressing them seems necessary to be adopted; and the greatest part of a speech is to be devoted to the excitement of the feelings, either by exhortation, or the commemoration of some illustrious action, or by moving the people to hope, or to fear, or to ambition, or desire of glory; and often also to dissuade them from temerity, from rage, from ardent expectation, from injustice, from envy, from cruelty. |
[LXXXIII] [338] Fit autem ut, quia maxima quasi oratoris scæna videatur contionis esse, natura ipsa ad ornatius dicendi genus excitemur. Habet enim multitudo vim quandam talem ut, quemadmodum tibicen sine tibiis canere, sic orator sine multitudine audiente eloquens esse non possit. [339] Et quum sint populares multi variique lapsus, vitanda est acclamatio adversa populi :
|
LXXXIII. [338] “But it happens that, because a popular assembly appears to the orator to be his most enlarged scene of action,142 he is naturally excited in it to a more magnificent species of eloquence; for a multitude has such influence, that, as the flute-player cannot play without his flutes, so the orator cannot be eloquent without a numerous audience. [339] And, as the inclinations of popular assemblies take many and various turns, an unfavorable expression of feeling from the whole people must not be incurred; an expression which may be excited by some fault in the speech, if anything appears to have been spoken with harshness, with arrogance, in a base or mean manner, or with any improper feeling whatever; or it may proceed from some offence taken, or ill-will conceived, at some particular individuals, which is either just, or arising from some calumny or bad report; or it may happen if the subject be displeasing; or if the multitude be swayed by any impulse from their own hopes or fears. To those four causes as many remedies may be applied: the severity of rebuke, if you have sufficient authority for it; admonition, which is a milder kind of rebuke; an assurance, that if they will give you a hearing, they will approve what you say; and entreaty, which is the most condescending method, but sometimes very advantageous. [340] But on no occasion is facetiousness and ready wit143 of more effect, and any smart saying that is consistent with dignity and true jocularity; for nothing is so easily diverted from gloom, and often from rancour, as a multitude, even by a single expression uttered opportunely, quickly, smartly, and with good humor. |
[LXXXIV] Exposui fere, ut potui, vobis in utroque genere causarum, quæ sequi solerem, quæ fugere, quæ spectare, quaque omnino in causis ratione versari. [341] Nec illud tertium laudationum genus est difficile, quod ego initio quasi a præceptis nostris secreveram ; sed et quia multa sunt orationum genera — et graviora et majoris copiæ — de quibus nemo fere præciperet, et quod nos laudationibus non ita multum uti soleremus, totum hunc segregabam locum. Ipsi enim Græci magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis alicujus ornandi, quam utilitatis hujus forensis causa, laudationes scriptitaverunt ; quorum sunt libri quibus Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander aliique laudantur ; nostræ laudationes, quibus in foro utimur, aut testimonii brevitatem habent nudam atque inornatam, aut scribuntur ad funebrem contionem — quæ ad orationis laudem minime accommodata est. Sed tamen, quoniam est utendum aliquando — nonnunquam etiam scribendum (vel ut Q. Tuberoni Africanum avunculum laudanti scripsit C. Lælius, vel ut nosmet ipsi, ornandi causa, Græcorum more, si quos velimus laudare possimus) —, sit a nobis quoque tractatus etiam hic locus. [342] Perspicuum est igitur, alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda : genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiæ, ceteraque quæ fortuna det aut extrinsecus aut corpori, non habent in se veram laudem, quæ deberi virtuti uni putatur ; sed tamen, quod ipsa virtus in earum rerum usu et moderatione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam hæc sunt naturæ et fortunæ bona — in quibus est summa laus non extulisse se in potestate, non fuisse insolentem in pecunia, non se prætulisse aliis propter abundantiam fortunæ, ut opes et copiæ non superbiæ videantur ac libidini, sed bonitati ac moderationi facultatem et materiam dedisse. [343] Virtus autem, quæ est per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliæ virtutes quæ videntur in moribus hominum et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positæ ; aliæ, quæ in ingenii aliqua facultate aut animi magnitudine ac robore. Nam clementia, justitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus jucunda est auditu in laudationibus ; [344] omnes enim hæ virtutes non tam ipsis qui eas habent quam generi hominum fructuosæ putantur. Sapientia et magnitudo animi, qua omnes res humanæ tenues ac pro nihilo putantur, et in excogitando vis quædam ingenii — et ipsa eloquentia — admirationis habet non minus, jucunditatis minus ; ipsos enim magis videntur quos laudamus, quam illos apud quos laudamus, ornare ac tueri. Sed tamen in laudando jungenda sunt etiam hæc genera virtutum ; ferunt enim aures hominum quum illa quæ jucunda et grata tum etiam illa quæ mirabilia sunt in virtute, laudari. |
LXXXIV. “I have now stated to you generally, to the best of my abilities, what it is my practice, in both kinds of causes, to pursue, what to avoid, what to keep in view, and to what method I ordinarily adhere in my pleadings. [341] Nor is that third kind, panegyric, which I in the commencement excluded, as it were, from my rules, attended with any difficulty; but it was because there are many departments of oratory both of greater importance and power, concerning which hardly any author has given particular rules, and because we of this country are not accustomed to deal much in panegyric, that I set this topic entirely apart. For the Greek authors themselves, who are the most worthy of being read, wrote their panegyrics either for amusement, or to compliment some particular person, rather than with any desire to promote forensic eloquence; and books of their composition are extant, in which Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philip, Alexander, and others, are the subjects of praise. Our laudatory speeches, which we deliver in the forum, have either the simple and unadorned brevity of testimony, or are written as funeral orations, which are by no means suitable for the pomp of panegyric. But as we must sometimes attempt that department, and must occasionally write panegyrics, as Caius Laelius wrote one for Publius Tubero, when he wished to praise his uncle Africanus, and in order that we ourselves may be enabled to praise, after the manner of the Greeks, such persons as we may be inclined to praise, let that subject also form part of our discourse. [342] It is clear, then, that some qualities in mankind are desirable, and some praiseworthy. Firth, beauty, strength, power, riches, and other things which fortune bestows, either amid external circumstances, or as personal endowments, carry with them no real praise, which is thought to be due to virtue alone; but, as virtue itself becomes chiefly conspicuous in the use and management of such things, these endowments of nature and of fortune are also to be considered in panegyrics; in which it is mentioned as the highest praise for a person not to have been haughty in power, or insolent in wealth, or to have assumed a preeminence over others from the abundance of the blessings of fortune; so that his riches and plenty seem to have afforded means and opportunities, not for the indulgence of pride and vicious appetites, but for the cultivation of goodness and moderation. [343] Virtue, too, which is of itself praiseworthy, and without which nothing can be deserving of praise, is distinguished, however, into several species, some of which are more adapted to panegyric than others; for there are some virtues which are conspicuous in the manners of men, and consist in some degree in affability and beneficence; and there are others which depend on some peculiar natural genius, or superior greatness and strength of mind. Clemency, justice, benignity, fidelity, fortitude in common dangers, are subjects agreeable to the audience in panegyric; [344] for all such virtues are thought beneficial, not so much to the persons who possess them, as to mankind in general;) while wisdom, and that greatness of soul by which all human affairs are regarded as mean and inconsiderable, eminent power of thought, and eloquence itself, excite indeed no less admiration, but not equal delight; for they appear to be an ornament and support rather to the persons themselves whom we commend, than to those before whom we commend them; yet, in panegyric, these two kinds of virtues must be united; for the ears of men tolerate the praises not only of those parts of virtue which are delightful and agreeable, but of those which excite admiration. |
[LXXXV] [345] Et, quoniam singularum virtutum sunt certa quædam officia ac munera, et sua cuique virtuti laus propria debetur, erit explicandum in laude justitiæ, quid cum fide, quid cum æquabilitate, quid cum ejusmodi aliquo officio is qui laudabitur fecerit ; itemque in ceteris, res gestæ ad cujusque virtutis genus et vim et nomen accommodabuntur. [346] Gratissima autem laus eorum factorum habetur, quæ suscepta videntur a viris fortibus sine emolumento ac præmio ; quæ vero etiam cum labore ac periculo ipsorum, hæc habent uberrimam copiam ad laudandum, quod et dici ornatissime possunt et audiri facillime. Ea enim denique virtus esse videtur præstantis viri, quæ est fructuosa aliis, ipsi aut laboriosa aut periculosa aut certe gratuita. Magna etiam illa laus, et admirabilis, videri solet tulisse casus sapienter adversos, non fractum esse Fortuna, retinuisse in rebus asperis dignitatem. [347] Neque tamen illa non ornant habiti honores, decreta virtutis præmia, res gestæ judiciis hominum comprobatæ ; in quibus etiam felicitatem ipsam deorum immortalium judicio tribui laudationis est. Sumendæ autem res erunt aut magnitudine præstabiles, aut novitate primæ, aut genere ipso singulares. Neque enim parvæ neque usitatæ neque vulgares admiratione aut omnino laude dignæ videri solent. [348] Est etiam cum ceteris præstantibus viris comparatio in laudatione præclara. De quo genere libitum mihi est paulo plura quam ostenderam dicere, non tam propter usum forensem (qui est a me in omni hoc sermone tractatus), quam ut hoc videretis, si laudationes essent in oratoris officio (quod nemo negat), oratori virtutum omnium cognitionem — sine qua laudatio effici non possit — esse necessariam. [349] Jam vituperandi præcepta contrariis ex vitiis sumenda esse perspicuum est ; simul est illud ante oculos, nec bonum virum proprie et copiose laudari sine virtutum, nec improbum notari ac vituperari sine vitiorum cognitione satis insignite atque aspere posse. Atque his locis et laudandi et vituperandi sæpe nobis est utendum in omni genere causarum. [350] Habetis de inveniendis rebus disponendisque quid sentiam. Adjungam etiam de memoria, ut labore Crassum levem, neque ei quicquam aliud de quo disserat relinquam nisi ea quibus hæc exornentur.” |
LXXXV. [345] “Since, also, there are certain offices and duties belonging to every kind of virtue, and since to each virtue its peculiar praise is due, it will be necessary to specify, in a panegyric on justice, what he who is praised performed with fidelity, or equanimity, or in accordance with any other moral duty. In other points, too, the praise of actions must be adapted to the nature, power, and name of the virtue under which they fall. [346] The praise of those acts is heard with the greatest pleasure, which appear to have been undertaken by men of spirit, without advantage or reward; but those which have been also attended with toil and danger to themselves afford the largest scope for panegyric, because they may be set forth with the greatest ornaments of eloquence, and the account of them may be heard with the utmost satisfaction; for that appears the highest virtue in a man of eminence, which is beneficial to others, but attended with danger or toil, or at least without advantage, to himself. It is commonly regarded, too, as a great and admirable merit, to have borne adversity with wisdom, not to have been vanquished by fortune, and to have maintained dignity in the worst of circumstances. [347] It is also an honor to a man that distinctions have been bestowed upon him, rewards decreed to his merit, and that his achievements have been approved by the judgment of mankind; and, on such subjects, to attribute success itself to the judgment of the immortal gods, is a part of panegyric. But such actions should be selected for praise as are either of extraordinary greatness, or unprecedented novelty, or singular in their kind; for such as are trivial, or common, or ordinary, generally appear to deserve no admiration or even commendation. [348] A comparison also with other great men has a noble effect in panegyric. “On this species of eloquence I have felt inclined to say something more than I had proposed, not so much for the improvement of pleading in the forum, which has been kept in view by me through this whole discourse, as that you might see that, if panegyric be a part of the orator’s business, and nobody denies that it is, a knowledge of all the virtues, without which panegyric cannot be composed, is necessary to the orator. [349] As to the rules for censuring, it is clear that they are to be deduced from the vices contrary to these virtues; and it is also obvious, that neither can a good man be praised with propriety and copiousness of matter, without a knowledge of the several virtues, nor a bad man be stigmatized and branded with sufficient distinction and asperity, without a knowledge of the opposite vices. On these topics of panegyric and satire we must often touch in all kinds of causes. [350] “You have now heard what I think about the invention and arrangement of matter. I shall add some observations on memory, with a view to lighten the labor of Crassus, and to leave nothing for him to discuss, but the art of embellishing those departments of eloquence which I have specified.” |
[LXXXVI] “Perge vero,” inquit Crassus ; “libenter enim te cognitum jam artificem aliquandoque evolutum illis integumentis dissimulationis tuæ nudatumque perspicio ; et quod mihi nihil aut non multum relinquis, percommode facis, estque mihi gratum.” [351] “Jam istuc quantum tibi ego reliquerim,” inquit Antonius, “erit in tua potestate. Si enim vere agere volueris, omnia tibi relinquo ; sin dissimulare, tu, quemadmodum his satisfacias, videris. Sed, ut ad rem redeam, non sum tanto ego,” inquit, “ingenio, quanto Themistocles fuit, ut oblivionis artem quam memoriæ malim ; gratiamque habeo Simonidi illi Cio, quem primum ferunt artem memoriæ protulisse. [352] Dicunt enim, quum cenaret Crannone in Thessalia Simonides apud Scopam, fortunatum hominem et nobilem, cecinissetque id carmen quod in eum scripsisset, in quo multa ornandi causa poëtarum more in Castorem scripta et Pollucem fuissent, nimis illum sordide Simonidi dixisse se dimidium ejus ei quod pactus esset pro illo carmine daturum ; reliquum a suis Tyndaridis quos æque laudasset peteret, si ei videretur. [353] Paulo post esse ferunt nuntiatum Simonidi, ut prodiret — juvenes stare ad januam duo quosdam, qui eum magnopere evocarent ; surrexisse illum ipsum, prodisse, vidisse neminem. Hoc interim spatio conclave illud — ubi epularetur Scopas — concidisse ; ea ruina ipsum cum cognatis oppressum suis interisse. Quos quum humare vellent sui, neque possent obtritos internoscere ullo modo, Simonides dicitur ex eo quod meminisset quo eorum loco quisque cubuisset, demonstrator uniuscujusque sepeliendi fuisse. Hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxime qui memoriæ lumen afferret. [354] Itaque eis qui hanc partem ingenii exercerent locos esse capiendos, et ea quæ memoria tenere vellent effingenda animo, atque in eis locis collocanda ; sic fore, ut ordinem rerum locorum ordo conservaret, res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret, atque ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris uteremur. |
LXXXVI. “Proceed,” said Crassus; “for I feel pleasure in seeing you appear as a professed artist, stripped of the disguises of dissimulation, and fairly exposed to view; and, in leaving nothing for me to do or but little, you consult my convenience, and confer a favor upon me.” [351] “How much I leave you to do,” said Antonius, “will be in your own power; for if you are inclined to act fairly, I leave you everything to do; but if you wish to shrink from any portion of your undertaking, you must consider how you can give this company satisfaction. But to return to the point; I am not,” he continued, “possessed of such intellectual power as Themistocles had, that I had rather know the art of forgetfulness than that of memory; and I am grateful to the famous Simonides of Ceos, who, as people say, first invented an art of memory. [352] For they relate, that when Simonides was at Crannon in Thessaly, at an entertainment given by Scopas, a man of rank and fortune, and had recited a poem which he had composed in his praise, in which, for the sake of embellishment, after the manner of the poets, there were many particulars introduced concerning Castor and Pollux, Scopas told Simonides, with extraordinary meanness, that he would pay him half the sum which he had agreed to give for the poem, and that he might ask the remainder, if he thought proper, from his Tyndaridae, to whom he had given an equal share of praise. [353] A short time after, they say that a message was brought in to Simonides, to desire him to go out, as two youths were waiting at the gate who earnestly wished him to come forth to them; when he arose, went forth, and found nobody. In the meantime the apartment in which Scopas was feasting fell down, and he himself, and his company, were overwhelmed and buried in the ruins; and when their friends were desirous to inter their remains, but could not possibly distinguish one from another, so much crushed were the bodies, Simonides is said, from his recollection of the place in which each had sat, to have given satisfactory directions for their interment. Admonished by this occurrence, he is reported to have discovered, that it is chiefly order that gives distinctness to memory; [354] and that by those, therefore, who would improve this part of the understanding, certain places must be fixed upon, and that of the things which they desire to keep in memory, symbols must be conceived in the mind, and ranged, as it were, in those places; thus the order of places would preserve the order of things, and the symbols of the things would denote the things themselves; so that we should use the places as waxen tablets, and the symbols as letters. |
[LXXXVII] [355] Qui sit autem oratori memoriæ fructus, quanta utilitas, quanta vis — ¿quid me attinet dicere? ¿Tenere quæ didiceris in accipienda causa, quæ ipse cogitaris? ¿Omnes fixas esse in animo sententias? ¿Omnem discriptum verborum apparatum? ¿Ita audire vel eum unde discas, vel eum cui respondendum sit, ut illi non infundere in aures tuas orationem, sed in animo videantur inscribere? Itaque soli qui memoria vigent, sciunt quid et quatenus et quomodo dicturi sint, quid responderint, quid supersit ; iidemque multa ex aliis causis aliquando a se acta, multa ab aliis audita meminerunt. [356] Quare confiteor equidem hujus boni naturam esse principem (sicut earum rerum de quibus ante locutus sum omnium). Sed hæc ars tota dicendi (sive artis imago quædam est, et similitudo) habet hanc vim, non ut totum aliquid, cujus in ingeniis nostris pars nulla sit, pariat et procreet, verum ut ea quæ sunt orta jam in nobis et procreata, educet atque confirmet. [357] Verum tamen neque tam acri memoria fere quisquam est, ut — non dispositis notatisque rebus — ordinem verborum omnium aut sententiarum complectatur, neque vero tam hebeti, ut nihil hac consuetudine et exercitatione adjuvetur. Vidit enim hoc prudenter sive Simonides, sive alius quis invenit, ea maxime animis effingi nostris, quæ essent a sensu tradita atque impressa ; acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris sensibus esse sensum videndi ; quare facillime animo teneri posse ea quæ perciperentur auribus aut cogitatione, si etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur ; ut res cæcas et ab aspectus judicio remotas conformatio quædam, et imago et figura, ita notaret, ut ea quæ cogitando complecti vix possemus, intuendo quasi teneremus. [358] His autem formis atque corporibus, sicut omnibus quæ sub aspectum veniunt, sede opus est — etenim corpus intellegi sine loco non potest. Quare (ne in re nota et pervulgata multus et insolens sim), locis est utendum multis, illustribus, explicatis, modicis intervallis, imaginibus autem agentibus, acribus, insignitis, quæ occurrere celeriter, quæ percutere animum possint. Quam facultatem et exercitatio dabit, ex qua consuetudo gignitur, et similium verborum conversa et immutata casibus, aut traducta ex parte ad genus, notatio — et unius verbi imagine totius sententiæ informatio, pictoris cujusdam summi ratione et modo formarum varietate locos distinguentis. |
LXXXVII. [355] “How great the benefit of memory is to the orator, how great the advantage, how great the power, what need is there for me to observe? Why should I remark how excellent a thing it is to retain the instructions which you have received with the cause, and the opinion which you have formed upon it? to keep all your thoughts upon it fixed in your mind, all your arrangement of language marked out there? to listen to him from whom you receive any information, or to him to whom you have to reply, with such power of retention, that they seem not to have poured their discourse into your ears, but to have engraven it on your mental tablet? They alone accordingly, who have a vigorous memory, know what, and how much, and in what manner they are about to speak; to what they have replied, and what remains unanswered; and they also remember many courses that they have formerly adopted in other cases, and many which they have heard from others. [356] I must, however, acknowledge that nature is the chief author of this qualification, as of all those of which I have previously spoken; (but this whole art of oratory, or image and resemblance of an art, has the power, not of engendering and producing anything entirely of itself, of which no part previously existed in our understandings, but of being able to give education and strength to what has been generated, and has had its birth there;) [357] yet there is scarcely any one of so strong a memory as to retain the order of his language and thoughts without a previous arrangement and observation of heads; nor is any one of so weak a memory as not to receive assistance from this practice and exercise. For Simonides, or whoever else invented the art, wisely saw, that those things are the most strongly fixed in our minds, which are communicated to them, and imprinted upon them, by the senses; that of all the senses that of seeing is the most acute; and that, accordingly, those things are most easily retained in our minds which we have received from the hearing or the understanding, if they are also recommended to the imagination by means of the mental eye; so that a kind of form, resemblance, and representation might denote invisible objects, and such as are in their nature withdrawn from the cognisance of the sight, in such a manner, that what we are scarcely capable of comprehending by thought we may retain as it were by the aid of the visual faculty. [358] By these imaginary forms and objects, as by all those that come under our corporeal vision, our memory is admonished and excited; but some place for them must be imagined; as bodily shape cannot be conceived without a place for it. That I may not, then, be prolix and impertinent upon so well-known and common a subject, we must fancy many plain distinct places, at moderate distances; and such symbols as are impressive, striking, and well-marked, so that they may present themselves to the mind, and act upon it with the greatest quickness. This faculty of artificial memory practice will afford, (from which proceeds habit,) as well as the derivation of similar words converted and altered in cases, or transferred from particulars to generals, and the idea of an entire sentence from the symbol of a single word, after the manner and method of any skilful painter, who distinguishes spaces by the variety of what he depicts. |
[LXXXVIII] [359] Sed verborum memoria, quæ minus est nobis necessaria, majore imaginum varietate distinguitur. Multa enim sunt verba quæ quasi articuli connectunt membra orationis — quæ formari similitudine nulla possunt ; eorum fingendæ sunt nobis imagines quibus semper utamur. Rerum memoria propria est oratoris ; eam singulis personis bene positis notare possimus, ut sententias imaginibus, ordinem locis comprehendamus. [360] Neque verum est (quod ab inertibus dicitur), opprimi memoriam imaginum pondere et obscurari etiam id quod per se natura ipsa tenere potuisset. Vidi enim ego summos homines et divina prope memoria, Athenis Charmadam, in Asia (quem vivere hodie ajunt), Scepsium Metrodorum, quorum uterque tanquam litteris in cera, sic se ajebat imaginibus in eis locis quos haberet, quæ meminisse vellet, perscribere. Quare hac exercitatione non eruenda memoria est, si est nulla naturalis ; sed certe, si latet, evocanda est. |
LXXXVIII. [359] “But the memory of words, which, however, is less necessary for us,144 is to be distinguished by a greater variety of symbols; for there are many words which, like joints, connect the members of our speech, that cannot possibly be represented by anything similar to them; and for these we must invent symbols that we may invariably use. The memory of things is the proper business of the orator; this we may be enabled to impress on ourselves by the creation of imaginary figures, aptly arranged, to represent particular heads, so that we may recollect thoughts by images, and their order by place. [360] Nor is that true which is said by people unskilled in this artifice, that the memory is oppressed by the weight of these representations, and that even obscured which unassisted nature might have clearly kept in view; for I have seen men of consummate abilities, and an almost divine faculty of memory, as Charmadas at Athens, and Scepsius Metrodorus in Asia, who is said to be still living, each of whom used to say that, as he wrote with letters on wax, so he wrote with symbols as it were, whatever he wished to remember, on these places which he had conceived in imagination. Though, therefore, a memory cannot be entirely formed by this practice, if there is none given by nature; yet certainly, if there is latent natural faculty, it may be called forth. |
[361] Habetis sermonem bene longum hominis, utinam non impudentis — illud, quidem, certe non nimis verecundi —, qui quidem, quum te, Catule, tum etiam L. Crasso, audiente, de dicendi ratione tam multa dixerim. Nam istorum ætas minus me fortasse movere debuit. Sed mihi ignoscetis profecto, si modo, quæ causa me nunc ad hanc insolitam mihi loquacitatem impulerit, acceperitis.” |
[361] “You have now had a very long dissertation from a person whom I wish you may not esteem impudent, but who is certainly not over-modest, in having spoken, so copiously as I have done, upon the art of eloquence, in your hearing, Catulus, and that of Lucius Crassus; for of the rest of the company the age might perhaps reasonably make less impression upon me; but you will certainly excuse me, if you but listen to the motive which impelled me to loquacity so unusual with me.” |
[LXXXIX] [362] “Nos vero,” inquit Catulus, “— etenim pro me hoc et pro meo fratre respondeo — non modo tibi ignoscimus, sed te diligimus magnamque tibi habemus gratiam ; et quum humanitatem et facilitatem agnoscimus tuam, tum admiramur istam scientiam et copiam. Equidem etiam hoc me assecutum puto, quod magno sum levatus errore et illa admiratione liberatus, quod multis cum aliis semper admirari solebam, unde esset illa tanta tua in causis divinitas. Nec enim te ista attigisse arbitrabar quæ diligentissime cognosse et undique collegisse, usuque doctum, partim correxisse video, partim comprobasse. [363] Neque eo minus eloquentiam tuam et multo magis virtutem et diligentiam admiror et simul gaudeo judicium animi mei comprobari, quod semper statui neminem sapientiæ laudem et eloquentiæ sine summo studio et labore et doctrina consequi posse. Sed tamen, ¿quidnam est id quod dixisti, fore ut tibi ignosceremus si cognossemus, quæ te causa in sermonem impulisset? ¿Quæ est enim alia causa, nisi quod nobis et horum adulescentium studio, qui te attentissime audierunt, morem gerere voluisti?” [364] Tum ille, “Adimere,” inquit, “omnem recusationem Crasso volui, quem ego paulo sciebam vel pudentius vel invitius — nolo enim dicere de tam suavi homine fastidiosius — ad hoc genus sermonis accedere. ¿Quid enim poterit dicere? ¿Consularem se hominem et censorium? Eadem nostra causa est. ¿An ætatem afferet? Quadriennio minor est. ¿An se hæc nescire? Quæ ego sero, quæ cursim arripui, quæ subsicivis operis (ut ajunt) — iste a puero, summo studio, doctoribus. Nihil dicam de ingenio, cui par nemo fuit. Etenim me dicentem qui audiret, nemo unquam tam sui despiciens fuit qui desperaret aut melius aut eodem modo se posse dicere ; Crasso dicente nemo tam arrogans, qui similiter se unquam dicturum esse confideret. Quamobrem, ne frustra hi tales viri venerint, te aliquando, Crasse, audiamus.” |
LXXXIX. [362] “We indeed,” said Catulus, “(for I make this answer for my brother and myself,) not only excuse you, but feel love and great gratitude to you for what you have done; and, as we acknowledge your politeness and good-nature, so we admire your learning and copious store of matter. Indeed I think that I have reaped this benefit, that I am freed from a great mistake, and relieved from that astonishment which I used always to feel, in common with many others, as to the source from which that divine power of yours in pleading was derived; for I never imagined that you had even slightly touched upon those matters, of which I now perceive that you possess an exact knowledge, gathered from all quarters, and which, taught by experience, you have partly corrected and partly approved. [363] Nor have I now a less high opinion of your eloquence, while I have a far higher one of your general merit and diligence; and I am pleased, at the same time, that my own judgment is confirmed, inasmuch as I always laid it down as a maxim, that no man can attain a character for wisdom and eloquence without the greatest study, industry, and learning. But what was it that you meant, when you said that we should excuse you if we knew the motive which had impelled you to this discourse? What other motive could there be but your inclination to oblige us, and to satisfy the desire of these young gentlemen, who have listened to you with the utmost attention?” [364] “I was desirous,” replied Antonius, “to take away from Crassus every pretence for refusal, who would, I was sure, engage in such a kind of dissertation either a little too modestly, or too reluctantly, for I would not apply the word disdainfully to a man of his affability. But what excuse will he now be able to make ‘That he is a person of consular and censorial dignity? I might have made the same excuse. Will he plead his age? He is four years younger than I. Can he say that he is ignorant of these matters, of which I indeed have snatched some knowledge late in life, cursorily, and, as people say, at spare times, while he has applied to them from his youth with the most diligent study, under the most able masters? I will say nothing of his genius, in which no man was ever his equal; for no one that hears me speak, has so contemptible an opinion of himself, as not to hope to speak better, or at least as well; but while Crassus is speaking, no one is so conceited as to have the presumption to think that he shall ever speak like him. Lest persons, therefore, of so much dignity as the present company, should have come to you in vain, let us at length, Crassus, hear you speak.” |
[XC] [365] Tum ille, “Ut ita ista esse concedam,” inquit, “Antoni (quæ sunt longe secus), ¿quid mihi tu tandem hodie — aut cuiquam homini —, quod dici possit, reliquisti? Dicam enim vere, amicissimi homines, quod sentio. Sæpe ego doctos homines — ¿quid dico sæpe? Immo nonnunquam ; ¿sæpe enim qui potui? — qui puer in forum venerim neque inde unquam diutius quam quæstor afuerim. Sed tamen audivi, ut heri dicebam, et Athenis quum essem, doctissimos viros, et in Asia istum ipsum Scepsium Metrodorum, quum de his ipsis rebus disputaret. Neque vero mihi quisquam copiosius unquam visus est, neque subtilius, in hoc genere dicendi quam iste hodie esse versatus. Quod si esset aliter, et aliquid intellegerem ab Antonio prætermissum, non essem tam inurbanus et pæne inhumanus, ut in eo gravarer quod vos cupere sentirem.” [366] Tum Sulpicius, “An ergo,” inquit, “oblitus es, Crasse, Antonium ita partitum esse tecum, ut ipse instrumentum oratoris exponeret, tibi ejus distinctionem atque ornatum relinqueret?” Hic ille, “Primum, ¿quis Antonio permisit,” inquit, “ut et partes faceret et, utram vellet, prior ipse sumeret? Deinde, ego si recte intellexi — quum valde libenter audirem —, mihi conjuncte est visus de utraque re dicere.” “Ille vero,” inquit Cotta, “ornamenta orationis non attigit, neque eam laudem ex qua eloquentia nomen ipsum invenit.” “Verba igitur,” inquit Crassus, “mihi reliquit Antonius, rem ipse sumpsit.” [367] Tum Cæsar, “☺ Si quod difficilius est id tibi reliquit, est nobis,” inquit, “causa cur te audire cupiamus ; sin quod facilius, tibi causa non est cur recuses. ☺” Et Catulus, “¿Quid? Quod dixisti,” inquit, “Crasse, si hic hodie apud te maneremus, te morem nobis esse gesturum, ¿nihilne ad fidem tuam putas pertinere?” Tum Cotta ridens, “Possem tibi,” inquit, “Crasse, concedere : sed vide ne quid Catulus attulerit religionis : ¡opus hoc censorium est! Id autem committere vides quam sit homini turpe censorio.” “Agite vero,” inquit, “ut vultis. Sed nunc quidem, quoniam est id temporis, surgendum censeo et requiescendum ; post meridiem, si ita vobis est commodum, loquemur aliquid, nisi forte in crastinum differre mavultis.” Omnes se vel statim vel si ipse post meridiem mallet, quam primum tamen audire velle dixerunt. |
XC. [365] “If I should grant you, Antonius.” replied Crassus, “that these things are so, which however are far otherwise, what have you left for me this day, or for any man, that he can possibly say? For I will speak, my dearest friends, what I really think: I have often heard men of learning, (why do I say often? I should rather say sometimes; for how could I have that opportunity often, when I entered the forum quite a youth, and was never absent from it longer than during my quaestorship?) but I have heard, as I said yesterday, both while I was at Athens, men of the greatest learning, and in Asia that famous rhetorician Scepsius Metrodorus, discoursing upon these very subjects; but no one of them ever appeared to me to have engaged in such a dissertation with greater extent of knowledge, or greater penetration, than our friend has shown to-day; but if it were otherwise, and if I thought anything had been omitted by Antonius, I should not be so impolite, nay so almost churlish, as to think that a trouble which I perceived to be your desire.” [366] “Have you then forgotten, Crassus,” said Sulpicius, “that Antonius made such a division with you, that he should explain the equipment and implements of the orator, and leave it to you to speak of decoration and embellishment?” “In the first place,” rejoined Crassus, “who gave Antonius leave either to make such a partition, or to choose first that part which he liked best? In the next, if I rightly comprehended what I heard with the utmost pleasure, he seemed to me to treat of both these matters in conjunction.” “But,” observed Cotta, “he said nothing of the embellishments of language, or on that excellence from which eloquence derives its very name.” “Antonius then,” said Crassus, “left me nothing but words, and took the substance for himself.” [367] “Well,” remarked Caesar, “if he has left you the more difficult part, we have reason to desire to hear you; if that which is the easier, you have no reason to refuse.” “And in regard to what you said, Crassus,” interposed Catulus, “that if we would stay and pass the day with you here, you would comply with our wishes, do you not think it binding on your honour?” Cotta then smiled, and said, “I might, Crassus, excuse you; but take care that Catulus has not made it a matter of religious faith; it is a point for the censor’s cognisance; and you see how disgraceful it would be for a person of censorial dignity145 to render himself obnoxious to such censure.” “Do as you please, then,” replied Crassus; “but for the present, as it is time, I think we must rise, and take some repose; in the afternoon, if it is then agreeable to you, I will say something on these points, unless perchance you may wish to put me off till tomorrow.” They all replied that they were ready to hear him either at once, or in the afternoon if he preferred; as soon however as possible. |
Notes to Book 21 The words quum essemus ejusmodi in this parenthesis, which all commentators regard as corrupt, are left untranslated. 2 Multos et ingeniis et magna laude dicendi. This passage, as Ellendt observes, is manifestly corrupt. He proposes ingeniis magnos et laude dicendi; but this seems hardly Ciceronian. Aldus Manutius noticed that an adjective was apparently wanting to ingeniis, but other editors have passed the passage in silence. 3 See Brut. c. 43, 44. 4 Spe aggredior majore ad probandum. That ad probandum is to be joined with spe, not with aggredior it shown by Ellendt on b. i. c. 4. 5 The second hour of the morning, answering to our eight o’clock. 6 The same that was consul with Cajus Marius, when they obtained, in conjunction, the famous victory over the Cimbri. 7 He was the brother of Quintus Catulus, by the mother’s side, and about twenty years his junior. Their mother’s name was Popilia. Ellendt. See c. 11. He was remarkable for wit, but his oratory is said to have wanted nerve. Brut. c. 48. Cicero with great propriety makes Sulpicius sit with Crassus, and Cotta walk with Antonius; for Sulpicius wished to resemble Crassus in his style of oratory; Cotta preferred the manner of Antonius. Brutus, c. 55. 8 In the speech which he made on behalf of Curius, on the occasion mentioned in book i. c. 39. Proust. 9 A learned orator, who wrote in the time cf the Gracchi, and who is mentioned by Cicero, Brut. c. 26. Proust. Of Decimus nothing is known. Ellendt. 10 Navasse operam; that is, bene collocasse. Ernesti. 11 Ironically spoken. 12 Quae ad scientiam non saepe perveniat. Ellendt encloses these words in brackets as spurious, regarding them as a gloss on the preceding phrase that has crept into the text. Their absence is desirable. 13 The reader will observe that the construction in the text is multi omnium generum atque artium, as Ellendt observes, referring to Matthiae. 14 iii. 2, 7. 15 See b. i. c. 62. 16 The writer of Comedies, Vincere Caecilius gravitate, Terentius arte. Hor. 17 I wished to refute you yesterday, that I might draw Scaevola and Cotta from you. This is spoken in jest. Proust. 18 B. i. c. 31. 19 Rhet. i. 3, 1. 20 See note on c. 3. 21 Domitius Ahenobarbus. Plin. H. N. xvii. 1. 22 A tribune of the people, A.U.C. 655, whom Antonius opposed about the Agrarian law. He is mentioned also in c. 66, and appears to be the same that is said to have played vigorously at ball, ii. 62, iii 23. Ellendt. See also Cic. Brut. c. 62. 23 Of these, Acusilas or Acusilaus, a native of Argos, was the most ancient, according to Suidas. Ellendt. The others are better known. 24 Lucius Coelius Antipater published a history of the Punic Wars, as Cicero says in his Orator, and was the master of Crassus, the speaker in these dialogues, as appears from Cic. Brut. c. 26. Proust. 25 Aptus et pressus. A scriptor, or orator aptus, will be one “structa et rotunda compositione verborum utens”; and pressus will be, “in verborum circuitione nec superfluens nec claudicans.” Ellendt. 26 He is called Pusillus Thucydides by Cicero, Ep. ad Q. Fratr. xii. 27 A promontory of Campania, where Antonius had a country house. 28 Ruhnken, in a note on Timaeus’s Lex. p. 78, expresses a suspicion that Cicero, when he wrote this, was thinking of a passage in Plato’s Letters, Ep. vii. p. 718, F. Greenwood. Orellius very judiciously inserts tactu, the conjecture of Ernesti, in his text, instead of the old reading cantu, which, though Ellendt retains and attempts to defend it, cannot be made to give any satisfactory sense. 29 Cicero means orators. The speeches which historians have written are not given as their own, but put into the mouths of others. Ellendt. 30 Reorum,. This reading is very properly adopted by Oreliius and Ellendt, in place of the old rerum. Ellendt refers to c. 43 and 79 for the sense of reus. 31 Cato defined an orator vir bonus dicendi peritus. Cicero in this passage, under the character of Antonius, and in his own person, De Inv. i. 3, 4, signifies that though he thinks a good character of great importance in an orator, he does not deny that much eloquence may at times be found in a man of bad character. Cato and Cicero spoke each according to the character of his own age. Quintilian, xii. 1, goes back to the opinion of Cato. Aristotle had previously required good morals in an orator, Rhet. i. 2, 4; ii. 1. 6i5. Ellendt. 32 See c. 47. 33 Cicero, Brut. c. 7, says that some compositions were in circulation under the name of Pericles; and Quintilian, iii. 1, 12, looking to that observation of Cicero, tacitly assents to those who denied the genuineness of those compositions. See also Quint, x. 2, 22; 10, 49. Ellendt. 34 That Alcibiades left nothing in writing, though he had great reputation as a speaker, seems to be rightly inferred by Ruhnken from Demosth. De Cor. c. 40. Thucydides is here mentioned among orators, on account of the orations which he inserted in his history. Ellendt. 35 He wrote not only orations, which are mentioned by Dionys. Halicarn. de Lysia iud. c. 2, cf. de Isaeo, c. 2, by Phrynichus, ap. Phot, cod. 158, and by others, but also tragedies, elegies, and other works. That he was eloquent and learned we are told by Cicero, De Or. iii. 34, Brut. c. 7. Henrichsen. The remains of his writings were collected by Bach, 1827. Ellendt. 36 The eloquence of Theramenes is mentioned by Cicero, iii. 16, Brut. c. 7. The writings which Suidas enumerates as being his were doubtless spurious. See Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. p. xl. Ellendt. 37 The words magister istorum omnium, which, though retained by Orellius, are pronounced spurious by Lambinus, Ernesti, Ruhnken, Schutz, and Ellendt, are left untranslated. “They cannot be Cicero’s words,” says Ellendt, “even though they are found quoted by Nonius, p. 344.” 38 Henrichsen and Ellendt read Philisci. Philistus, apparently, from the way in which he is mentioned in c. 13, has, as Ellendt observes, no place here. “Philiscus of Miletus, a disciple of Isocrates (see Anon. Vit. Isocr.), and master of Timaeus the historian (see Suidas, under Philiscus and Timaeus), wrote a treatise on rhetoric, orations, and a life of Lycurgus, noticed by Olympiodorus in Comment. ad Plat. Gorg. and other works. See Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Gr. Or. p. lxxxiii. Goell. de Situ et Orig. Syracus. p. 114.” Henrichsen. 39 Naucrates, a native of Erythrae, called Isokratous hetairos by Dionysius Halicarnassensis, Rhet. vi. 1, was distinguished for the composition of funeral orations. He seems also to have written on rhetoric. See Cicero, De Orat. iii. 44; Brut. 51; Quintil. iii. 6, 3; also Taylor, Lectt. Lys. c. 3, p. 232; Ruhnk. Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. p. lxxxiv. Henrichsen. 40 This is one of Virgil’s directions to the farmer in the first Georgic, where he gives the reason for it, 41 Magna offensio vel negligentiae, susceptis rebus, vel perfidiae, receptis. Recipere is used with a reference to others, by whom we allow some duty to be laid upon us; suscipere regards only ourselves. Ellendt. 42 Inertia. This passage puzzled Lambinus and others, who did not see how the reproach of inertia in an orator could be greater than that of tarditas, or stupidity. But inertia here signifies artis ignorantia, ignorance of his art, which is doubtless the greatest fault in an orator Verburg. 43 Because he was then attached to the party of the Gracchi. Proust. 44 A law of Lucius Apulejus Saturninus, tribune of the people, A.U.C. 652. It is also mentioned in c. 49, But neither the cause nor subject of it is at all known. Ellendt. 45 Superioris generis causa duplicatur. Ellendt explains these words thus: “in the same cause, the allegations of the two parties are judged as two separate questions of the same kind.” 46 Which shows what a speaker ought to say, and what is effective is persuading an audience. Proust. 47 Martius Aquilius, who, after the termination of the servile war in Sicily, was brought to trial on a charge of extortion. As he was unwilling to entreat the pity of the judges, Antonius, who pleaded for him, tore open his tunic in front, and showed the scars of the honourable wounds which he had received in battle. He was acquitted. Livy, Epit. Proust. 48 Norbanus the tribune. See note on c. 47. Ellendt. 49 He was consul with Publius Rutilius, A.U.C. 649; and having refused to unite his troops with those of Quintus Caepio, the proconsul, was defeated by the Cimbri, and lost his army. Livy, Ep. lxvii. For this miscarriage he was, with Caepio, brought to trial, and must have been defended by Antonius. Ellendt. 50 Of the trial of Quintus Marcius Rex nothing is known. Ellendt. 51 He was accused of having been bribed to bring Opimius to trial for having caused the death of Cajus Gracchus. See Smith’s Dict. of Biog. and Mythol. Art. Decius, n. 4. 52 Innumerable accusations may be brought against a person, as against Verres by Cicero; but the loci, common topics or grounds, on which the attack or defence will rest, (respecting, for instance, avarice, luxury, violence, treason,) will be but few. Ellendt. 53 See i. 40. 54 See i. 39. 55 See i. 45; also iii. 33; ii 55; and De Legg. i. 3. 56 The words in brackets are regarded by all the best critics as the production of some interpolator. 57 That the allusion is to the islands of the Sirens, who tried to allure Ulysses to listen to their song, the commentators have already observed. Ellendt. 58 Quum erat in hac gente Magna illa Graecia, “when Great Greece was in (or among) this people.” In hac gente, i.e. in Italis, among the Italians, or in Italy. Ellendt. 59 In one of the tragedies of Pacuvius were represented two brothers, Amphion and Zethus, the former fond of philosophy, music, and the refined arts, the other of a rougher disposition, addicted to war and despising science. To this story Horace also alludes, Ep. i. 18. 41: 60 In this passage I adopt the correction, or rather restoration, of Ellendt, Nam et omne, quod eloquimur, fit, ut id aut esse dicamus aut non esse. All other modern editions for fit have sic. 61 Diogenes, and other Stoics like him. Proust. 62 Terence, Andr. i. 1. 83. Colman’s Translation. 63 I follow Ellendt’s text: Sic has ego argumentorum volui notas quaerenti demonstrare ubi sint. Orellius and most other editors have Sic has ego argumentorum novi notas, quae ilia mihi quaerenti demonstrant, “sententia perinepta,” as Ellendt observes; for it was not what Antonius himself knew that was to be specified, but how he wished learners to be assisted. 64 Pacuvius in his Hermione, as appears from Nonius v. flexanima. The thought is borrowed from Euripides, Hec. 816. Ellendt. 65 See note on c. 28. 66 See note on c. 47. 67 The forefinger, which Crasaus is said to hare pointed with wonderful effect. See Quintilian, xi. 3. 94. 68 Spondalia. For this word I have given “verses.” “That it is corrupt,” says Ellendt, “all the commentators agree.” Hermann, Opusc. i. p. 304, conjectures è sponda illa, “from that couch,” on which he upposes Telamon may have been reclining. 69 Quintus Servilius Csepio, in his consulship, says Henrichsen, had embezzled a large portion of the gold taken at the capture of Toulouse, A.U.C. 648. In the following year, when, through the disagreement between him and the consul Manlius, the Romans were defeated in two battles by the Cimbri, his property was confiscated, and his command taken from him. Some years afterwards, A.U.C. 659, when Crassus and Scaevola were consuls, Cajus Norbanus, then tribune of the people, brought Caepio to trial, as it appears, for the embezzlement of the gold at Toulouse, and for exciting sedition in the city. The senate, to whom Caepio, in his consulship, had tried to restore the judicial power, exerted themselves strongly in his behalf; but Norbanus, after exciting a great tumult, carried his point by force, and Caepio went into banishment at Smyrna. 70 As Caepio had tried to take it out of the hands of the knights, and to restore it to the senate. 71 Since public or common fear must affect individuals. 72 Quae si inflammanda sunt. An elegant mode of expression, for “si ad animos invidia inflammandos adhibenda sunt tanquam faces.” Ernesti. 73 Exitus spissi et producti esse debent. “Non abrupti, sed lenti” Ellendt. “Vehementes et longiores.” Proust. 74 Simul atque intuleris. Rem sc. “As soon as you have introduced the subject.” 75 Orellius’s text has inferenda; many others, efferenda. There have been various conjectures offered, as infirmamda, evertenda, elevanda, infringenda. The reader may take his choice. 76 Cavillatio. Ironical or satirical humor seems to be meant. 77 Quippe; leve enim, &c. Quippe is equivalent to the Greek eikotos. Ellendt. 78 Ne in rutis quidem et caesis. Ruta were such things as could be removed from houses and other premises without pulling down or damaging any portion of them; caesa, as Proust remarks, refers to the cutting down of trees. 79 Cnejus Domitius Ahenobarbus, in his tribuneship, A.U.C. 651, was hostile to the pontifices, because they had not chosen him in the place of his father, and proposed a law that those who were chosen by the pontifices into their body should not be appointed till their choice was sanctioned by the people. Veil. Pat. ii. 12; Suet. Ner. 2; Cic. Rull, ii. 7. He had some ability in speaking, but was not numbered among eminent orators. Cic. Brut. 45. Henrichsen. 80 An allusion to the proverb Sus Minervam. 81 He signified that other pleaders were mere brute animals in comparison with Crassus, and therefore to be fed upon hay. Turnebus. 82 The same that is mentioned by Sallust, as having accused Calpurniua Bestia. 83 Lacerat Lacertum Largi Mordax Memmius. The writer of the article “Memmius” in Dr. Smith’s Biog. Dict. thinks that Memmius had from some cause the nickname of Mordax. The story of his having eaten or bitten Largius’s arm, appears, from what Cicero says, to have been a mere invention of Crassus. We do not half understand the joke. 84 This jest is from a speech of Crassus against Domitius. The gens Domitia, a family of great nobility, had produced many patricians remarkable, as well for other vices, as for vanity. Ellendt. 85 These words are from some play now lost. 86 Quaesitor. The magistrate who presided at a quaestio capitalis, whether the praetor or any other. See Cic. Verr. i. 10; Vatin. 14; Sall. Jug. 40. Henrichsen. 87 Whether the joke was directed against him as being unclean, or as being dishonest, is uncertain. Ellendt. 88 Probably taken from the apophthegms of Cato, and probably, also, a saying of Cajus Claudius Nero, who was consul with Marcus Livius, A.U.C. 547, and defeated Hannibal at Sena. Liv. xxvii. 34. Ellendt. 89 The original is, Num claudicat? at hic clodicat. “What, is he lame? No; but he favors Clodius.” The reader easily sees that the force of the pun, which is bad enough at the first hand, is entirely lost by a literal translation. I have been forced to coin two English words from the Latin to convey some idea of it. Had Clodius lived in this country, and his name been Greville, I had been as happy as Glaucia; for then I could have said, “Where is the old proverb, What, is he gravelled? No; but he is Grevilled. B. Num claudicat is thought by Strebaeus to have been a common question with regard to a man suspected of want of judgment or honesty. 90 Quid hoc Naevio ignavius? It is thought to have been a joke of Publius Africanus Major, who, according to some, was accused by the Petilii, tribunes of the people, or, according to others, by a certain Marcus Naevius. See Liv. xxxviii. 50, 56; Val. Max. iii. 7; A. Gell. iv. 18. But it might have been said by Africanus the younger in reference to some other man. Ellendt. 91 Video me a te circumveniri. Toup, in his Appendix to Theocritus, suggests that we should read Video me a te non circum, sed hircumveniri, referring to a similar joke of Aristophanes, Acharn. 850. 92 Calvus satis est, quod dicit parum. The meaning is by no means clear, and no change in the punctuation elucidates it. […] Pearce supposes that it is said of a bad orator: “If he were to say more, he would give less satisfaction; what he has said is so far satisfactory, as it is brief.” [...] Henrichsen thinks that calvus might be used metaphorically, as calva oratio for jejuna; and that the joke is on the ambiguity of the word. To me the passage seems inexplicable. Ellendt. Whether calvus in the text be a proper name or not, is a matter of uncertainty; Turnebus thinks it is not. 93 Sannio. The sanniones were so called from sanna, a grimace, and personated ridiculous characters, like the Arlecchini or Pulcinelli of the Italians. Ellendt. 94 This verse of Lucilius would be unintelligible to us, even if we were certain that the reading of it is sound. Heusinger thinks that Lucilius referred to the game played with nuts, which the author of the elegy entitled “Nux “mentions: Quas puer aut rectus certo dilaminat ictu. Others think that confixum facere signifies merely configere. Ernesti supposes that a sort of dish, made of pieces of flesh, fricasee, is meant. Schutz suggests that, if this be the meaning of confixum, some kind of eatable must be intended by nucula. But this profits us nothing. Ellendt. 95 Non esse sextantis. A phrase applied either to anything worth more than a sextans, and therefore perhaps of great value, or to anything worth less than a sextans, or of no value at all. Turnebus. 96 See c. 54. 97 Marcus Fulvius Nobilior. Cato had accused him of having taken poets with him into his province, and called him Mobilior, to denote his levity, which, among the Romans, who were fond of gravity and steadiness, was a great crime. Turnebus. See Cic. Tusc. Quaest. i. 2. He had also built a temple to the Muses. Cic. ib. et Arch. c. 11; Brut. c. 20; Plin. H. N. xxxv. 36. Ellendt. 98 This appears to us moderns a very poor joke. No translation can make it intelligible to those who do not understand the original. 99 Divisorem. Divisores were those who distributed money among the tribes, in the name of the candidates, as bribes for their votes. Sea Cie. Verr. i. 8; Planc. 19. Ellendt. 100 The Lex Licinia Mucia de civibus regendis, A.U.C. 659, by which it was provided that no one should be accounted a citizen who was not really a citizen. Cic. Off. iii. 11. Ellendt. 101 Turnebus thinks that the reference is to the Greek proverb, Ei me dunaio boun, elaune onon, “If you cannot drive an ox, drive an ass,” (see Apostol. Prov. vii. 53; Zenob. iii. 54; ) but that proverb seems inapplicable to this passage. Talaeus and Lambinus suppose, with more probability, that something like this must be understood: Agas asellum, cursum non docebitur. Asellus is again mentioned in c. 66. Ellendt. 102 Nothing is recorded of that actor in pantomime. Ellendt. 103 This passage is corrupt, but as no emendation of it can be trusted, it will be sufficient to enclose Porcius in brackets. Orellius. 104 Ex tui animi sententia tu uxorem habes? The words ex animi sen-teniia had two significations: they were used by the censors in putting questions in the sense of “truly, sincerely;” but they were used in common conversation in the sense of “to a person’s satisfaction.” From the ambiguity of the phrase proceeds the joke. 105 C. 63. 106 C. 61. 107 Verba relata contrarie. Which the Greeks call antitheta, when contrariis opponuntur contraria. Cic. Or. 50. 108 Villam in Tiburte habes, cortem in Palatio. Cora or chors meant a coop, pen, or moveable sheep-fold. Schutz and Strebaeus, therefore, suppose that Glaucia intended to designate the companions of Metellus as cattle, for which he had a pen on the Palatine. 109 C. 61. 110 C. 59. 111 C. 11. 112 Antonius impudicos hominis mores insectatur, quum Cassandrae ab Aiace post expugnatam Troiam vim illatam fuisse constet. Ellendt. 113 Of Magius nothing is known. Ellendt. 114 The grandfather of the orator, as is clearly shown by Corradus in Quaest. Ernesti. 115 Sub Novis. Understand Tabernis argentariis. See P. Fabr. ad Quaest. Acad. iv. 22; Drakenborch ad Liv. xxvi. 27; xliv. 17. Ernesti. 116 Quintus Metellus Macedonicus, as Plutarch relates in his treatise De Fortuna Romanwum, had four sons, whose abilities were in proportion to their ages, the youngest being the least gifted. Proust. 117 The same anecdote is noticed by Cicero, De Senect. c. 4; and Livy speaks of the occurrence at some length, xxvi. 25. But that the Marcus Livius there mentioned had not the cognomen of Salinator, but of Macatus, is shown by P. Wesseling, Obss. ii. 5; and there seems little doubt that Cicero made a mistake here, as in some other places. Ellendt. 118 We may suppose, says Strebaeus, the woman to have been deformed, and some one to have asked the man, “What relation is that woman to you? your sister?” When the man answered, “My wife,” the questioner would exclaim, “And yet, how like you she is! I should have taken her for your sister;” wittily indicating the deformity of the man. 119 The joke, says Schutz, is in the word never, as if it were possible that a man might die several times. 120 A reflection, says Turnebus, on the extraordinary size and magnificence of the building. 121 Which Scaurus required to be produced on the trial. 122 Texts vary greatly in this passage. I adhere strictly to that of Orellius. “It appears,” says Pearce, “that Scaevola was accused of extortion, as Cicero says in his Brutus, and in the first book De Finibus, and that Albucius, to prove the accusation, brought forward some writing of Granius, who, when judgment was given in favor of Scaevola, did not understand that it was at the same time given against his own writing.” 123 He is called the elder, because he had a brother of the same name, the father of Publius Clodius, the enemy of Cicero. Proust. 124 A species of ridicule expressed in a pithy sentence. The example produced requires that we should explain the Cincian law. This cannot be done better than in the words of Dr. Middleton. The business of pleading, says he, though a profession of all others the most laborious, yet was not among the Romans mercenary, or undertaken for any pay; for it was illegal to take money, or to accept even a present for it; but the richest, the greatest, and the noblest of Rome freely offered their talents to the service of their citizens, as the common guardians and protectors of the innocent and distressed. This was an institution as old as Romulus, who assigned the patronage of the people to the patricians or senators, without fee or reward; but in succeeding ages, when, through the avarice of the nobles, it had become a custom for all clients to make annual presents to their patrons, by which the body of the citizens was made tributary as it were to the senate, M. Cincius, a tribune, published a law prohibiting all senators to take money or gifts on any account, and especially for pleading causes. This Cincian law was made in the year of Rome 549; and recommended to the people, as Cicero tells us, (De Senect. 4,) by Quintus Fabius Maximus, in the extremity of his age. Cajus Cento was one of the orators who opposed it. Livy, xxxiv. 4, gives us the reason for passing this law, “Quid legem Cinciam de donis et muneribus, nisi quia vectigalis iam et stipendiaria plebs esse senatui caeperat? “It is also mentioned by Tacitus, Annal. xi. 5: “Consurgunt patres legemque Cinciam flagitant, qua cavetur antiquitus ne quis ob causam orandam pecuniam donumve accipiat.” We also find from the same author, (xi. 7,) that this law was not well observed in Cicero’s time: “prompta sibi exempla quantis mercedibus P. Clodius aut C. Curio concionari soliti sint;” so the emperor Claudius confined the fees to be allowed not to exceed a certain sum, which amounted to 801. 14s. 7d. of our money, “Capiendia pecuniis posuit modum usque ad dena sestertia, quem egressi repetundarum tenerentur.” The Cincian law, says Dr. Taylor, has been well commented upon by several of the moderns, as Ranchinus ii.; Var. vii.; Burgius i.; Elect, xviii.; and Brummerus. B. Turnebus understands the sense of the repartee to be, that patrons were not to expect thenceforward to live upon gifts from their clients, but must buy whatever they wished to have. 125 He wishes that labor were as easy as ease. 126 Excluding him from the number of the knights, to whom a horse was given at the public expense. 127 That is says Proust, was so reported by those who wished to favor him. 128 C. 57. 129 Antonius returns to the point from which he had digressed at c. 57. 130 Dissimulatum…obruatur. The word ante, which is retained by Oreliius, but is wanting in several manuscripts, I leave untranslated. 131 Antonius mentions seven ways by which the indiscretion of the orator may be of prejudice to the cause, to illustrate his last observation: 1. By irritating a witness, who would not have injured his client without provocation. 2. By not giving way when the arguments press too hard upon him, he may lose his cause. 3. By extolling those qualities in his client which ought to be extenuated, he may do mischief. 4. By throwing invectives upon those who are entitled to the esteem and favor of the judges. 5. By upbraiding his adversary with the same defects that are in some of the judges; of which Philip’s derision of a dwarfish evidence, before Lucius Aurifex, who was still lower in stature, was an instance mentioned before. 6. He may plead his own cause rather than that of his client; which blame Cicero seems to have incurred in his oration for Publius Sextius, a cause in which he was warmly and specially interested. Whoever has any inclination to read the history of that trial, may find it in Dr. Middleton’s Life of Cicero, vol. ii. p. 45, &c. 7. By the use of false or repugnant arguments, or such v are foreign to the usage of the bar and judicial proceedings. B. 132 Quod ministratorem peteres, non adversarium. The ministrator was a witness, from whose evidence Antonius had drawn arguments. Ellendt. Whether by adversarius he meant Antonius or not, is, as Henrichsen says, uncertain. Ellendt thinks that Antonius is not meant. I have however differed from him, as the context seems t indicate that Antonius is meant. 133 Ut in quoque eorum minimum putant esse, ita eum primum volunt dicere. “As in each of them they think that there is least, so they wish him to speak first.” 134 Ut in oratore. Schutz conjectures in oratoribus, but he had better, as Ellendt observes, have conjectured ex oratoribus. But the text may be correct. 135 Reperientur…sumentur. These words are plural in Orellius’s text, but Ellendt and others seem rightly to determine that they should be singular. 136 C. 77. 137 Infrequentibus causis. Infrequens causa is a cause at the pleading of which few auditors are likely to attend. Ernesti. 138 Faciliora etiam in principiis. Ellendt justly observes that etiam must be corrupt, and that autem should probably be substituted for it. 139 Samnitium. A kind of gladiators so called, that fought with Samnite arms. They had their origin among the Campanians. Liv. ix. 40. 140 Terence, Andr. Act I. Sc. 1. 141 Sapiens enim est consilium. These words I regard as a scholium that has crept into the text. Ernesti. 142 Quid maxima quasi oratori scena videlur concionis. “Because the greatest stage, as it were, for an orator, appears [to be that] of a public assembly.” 143 Celeritas. The same word is used in c. 54: hoc quod in celeritate atque dicto est. Schutz conjntured hilaritas. 144 Because words are at the command of the practised orator, and, when matter is supplied, easily occur. Ernesti. 145 A man who has been censor, as you have been. Proust. |
Liber Tertius
[I] [1] Instituenti mihi, Quinte frater, eum sermonem referre et mandare huic tertio libro, quem post Antonii disputationem Crassus habuisset, acerba sane recordatio veterem animi curam molestiamque renovavit. Nam illud immortalitate dignum ingenium, illa humanitas, illa virtus L. Crassi morte exstincta subita est vix diebus decem post eum diem qui hoc et superiore libro continetur. [2] Ut enim Romam rediit extremo ludorum scænicorum die, vehementer commotus oratione ea quæ ferebatur habita esse in contione a Philippo, quem dixisse constabat videndum sibi aliud esse consilium ; illo Senatu se rempublicam gerere non posse, mane Idibus Septembribus et ille et Senatus frequens vocatu Drusi in curiam venit. Ibi quum Drusus multa de Philippo questus esset, rettulit ad Senatum de illo ipso quod in eum ordinem consul tam graviter in contione esset invectus. [3] Hic — ut sæpe inter homines sapientissimos constare vidi — quanquam hoc Crasso, quum aliquid accuratius dixisset, semper fere contigisset, ut nunquam dixisse melius putaretur, tamen omnium consensu sic esse tum judicatum, ceteros a Crasso semper omnes, illo autem die etiam ipsum a se esse superatum. Deploravit enim casum atque orbitatem Senatus, cujus ordinis a consule, qui quasi parens bonus aut tutor fidelis esse deberet, tanquam ab aliquo nefario prædone diriperetur patrimonium dignitatis ; neque vero esse mirandum, si, quum suis consiliis rempublicam profligasset, consilium Senatus a republica repudiaret. [4] Hic quum homini et vehementi et diserto et imprimis forti ad resistendum Philippo quasi quasdam verborum faces admovisset, non tulit ille, et graviter exarsit, pigneribusque ablatis, Crassum instituit coërcere. Quo quidem ipso in loco multa a Crasso divinitus dicta efferebantur, quum sibi illum consulem esse negaret, cui senator ipse non esset. “An tu, quum omnem auctoritatem universi ordinis pro pignere putaris eamque in conspectu populi Romani concideris, me his pigneribus existimas posse terreri? Non tibi illa sunt cædenda, si L. Crassum vis coërcere ; hæc tibi est excidenda lingua, qua vel evulsa spiritu ipso libidinem tuam libertas mea refutabit.” |
I. [1] WHEN I proceeded to execute my design, brother Quintus, of relating and committing to writing in this third book, the remarks which Crassus made after the dissertation of Antonius, bitter remembrance renewed in my mind its former concern and regret; for the genius worthy of immortality, the learning, the virtue that were in Lucius Crassus, were all extinguished by sudden death, within ten days from the day which is comprised in this and the former book. [2] When he returned to Rome on the last day of the theatrical entertainments,1 he was put into a violent emotion by that oration which was reported to have been delivered in an assembly of the people by Philippus, who, it was agreed, had declared, “that he must look for another council, as he could not carry on the government with such a senate;” and on the morning of the thirteenth of September, both Crassus and a full senate came into the house on the call of Drusus. There, when Drusus had made many complaints against Philippus, he brought formally before the senate the fact that the consul had thrown such grievous obloquy on that order, in his speech to the people. [3] Here, as I have often heard it unanimously said by men of the greatest judgment, although indeed it continually happened to Crassus, whenever he had delivered a speech more exquisite than ordinary, that he was always thought never to have spoken better, yet by universal consent it was then determined, that all other orators had always been excelled by Crassus, but that on that day he had been excelled by himself; for he deplored the misfortune and unsupported condition of the senate; an order whose hereditary dignity was then being torn from it by a consul, as by some lawless ruffian, a consul whose duty it was to act the part of a good parent or trusty guardian towards it; but said that it was not surprising, if, after he had ruined the commonwealth by his own counsels, he should divorce the counsels of the senate from the commonwealth. [4] When he had applied these expressions, which were like firebrands, to Philippus, who was a man of violence, as well as of eloquence, and of the utmost vigor to resist opposition, he could not restrain himself, but burst forth into a furious flame, and resolved to bind Crassus to good behaviour, by forfeiting his securities.2 On that occasion, many things are reported to have been uttered by Crassus with a sort of divine sublimity, refusing to acknowledge as a consul him who would not allow him to possess the senatorial dignity: Do you, said he, who, when you thought the general authority of the whole senatorial order entrusted to you as a pledge, yet perfidiously annulled it in the view of the Roman people, imagine that I can be terrified by such petty forfeitures as those? It is not such pledges that are to be forfeited, if you would bind Lucius Crassus to silence; for that purpose you must cut out this tongue; and even if it be torn out, the freedom in my very breath will confound your audacity. |
[II] [5] Permulta tum vehementissima contentione animi, ingenii, virium ab eo dicta esse constabat, sententiamque eam, quam Senatus frequens secutus est ornatissimis et gravissimis verbis, “Ut populo Romano satisfieret, nunquam Senatus neque consilium reipublicæ neque fidem defuisse” ab eo dictam, et eundem — id quod in auctoritatibus perscriptis exstat — scribendo affuisse. [6] Illa tanquam cycnea fuit divini hominis vox et oratio, quam quasi exspectantes post ejus interitum veniebamus in curiam, ut vestigium illud ipsum, in quo ille postremum institisset, contueremur. Namque tum latus ei dicenti condoluisse, sudoremque multum consecutum esse audiebamus ; ex quo quum cohorruisset, cum febri domum rediit dieque septimo lateris dolore consumptus est. [7] ¡O fallacem hominum spem fragilemque fortunam et inanes nostras contentiones, quæ medio in spatio sæpe franguntur et corruunt aut ante, in ipso cursu, obruuntur, quam portum conspicere potuerunt! Nam quamdiu Crassi fuit ambitionis labore vita districta, tamdiu privatis magis officiis et ingenii laude floruit quam fructu amplitudinis aut reipublicæ dignitate. Qui autem annus ei primus ab honorum perfunctione aditum omnium concessu ad summam auctoritatem dabat, is ejus omnem spem atque omnia vitæ consilia morte pervertit. [8] Fuit hoc luctuosum suis, acerbum patriæ, grave bonis omnibus ; sed ii tamen rempublicam casus secuti sunt, ut mihi non erepta L. Crasso a dis immortalibus vita, sed donata mors esse videatur. Non vidit flagrantem Italiam bello, non ardentem invidia Senatum, non sceleris nefarii principes civitatis reos, non luctum filiæ, non exilium generi, non acerbissimam C. Marii fugam, non illam post reditum ejus cædem omnium crudelissimam, non denique in omni genere deformatam eam civitatem in qua ipse florentissima, multum omnibus gloria præstitisset. |
II. [5] It appeared that a multitude of other expressions were then uttered by him with the most vehement efforts of mind, thought, and spirits; and that that resolution of his, which the senate adopted in a full house, was proposed by him with the utmost magnificence and dignity of language, That the counsel and fidelity of the senate had never been wanting to the commonwealth, in order to do justice to the Roman people; and he was present (as appears from the names entered in the register) at the recording of the resolution. [6] This however was the last swan-like note and speech of that divine orator; and, as if expecting to hear it again, we used, after his death, to go into the senate-house, that we might contemplate the spot on which he had last stood to speak; for we heard that he was seized at the time with a pain in his side while he was speaking, and that a copious perspiration followed; after which he was struck with a chillness, and, returning home in a fever, died the seventh day after of pleurisy. [7] O how fallacious are the hopes of mortals, how frail is our condition, and how insignificant all our ambitious efforts, which are often broken and thrown down in the middle of their course, and overwhelmed as it were in their voyage, even before they gain a sight of the harbour! For as long as the life of Crassus was perplexed with the toils of ambition, so long was he more distinguished for the performance of private duties, and the praises due to his genius, than for any benefit that he reaped from his greatness, or for the dignified rank which he bore in the republic; but the first year which, after a discharge of all the honourable offices of the state, opened to him the entrance to supreme authority by universal consent, overthrew all his hopes, and all his future schemes of life, by death. [8] This was a melancholy occurrence to his friends, a grievous calamity to his country, and a heavy affliction to all the virtuous part of mankind; but such misfortunes afterwards fell upon the commonwealth, that life does not appear to me to have been taken away from Lucius Crassus by the immortal gods as a privation, but death to have been bestowed on him as a blessing. He did not live to behold Italy blazing with war, or the senate overwhelmed with popular odium, or the leading men of the state accused of the most heinous crimes, or the affliction of his daughter, or the banishment of his son-at-law,3 or the most calamitous flight of Caius Marius, or that most atrocious of all daughters after his return, or, finally, that republic in every way disgraced, in which, while it continued most flourishing, he had by far the preeminence over all other men in glory. |
[III] [9] Sed quoniam attigi cogitatione vim varietatemque fortunæ, non vagabitur oratio mea longius, atque eis fere ipsis definietur viris qui hoc sermone quem referre suscepimus continentur. ¿Quis enim non jure beatam L. Crassi mortem illam, quæ est a multis sæpe defleta, dixerit, quum horum ipsorum sit, qui tum cum illo postremum fere collocuti sunt, eventum recordatus? Tenemus enim memoria Q. Catulum, virum omni laude præstantem, quum sibi non incolumem fortunam, sed exilium et fugam deprecaretur, esse coactum, ut vita se ipse privaret. [10] Jam M. Antonii in eis ipsis rostris, in quibus ille rempublicam constantissime consul defenderat, quæque censor imperatoriis manubiis ornarat, positum caput illud fuit, a quo erant multorum civium capita servata. Neque vero longe ab eo C. Julii caput, hospitis Etrusci scelere proditum, cum L. Julii fratris capite jacuit, ut ille, qui hæc non vidit, et vixisse cum republica pariter et cum illa simul exstinctus esse videatur. Neque enim propinquum suum, maximi animi virum, P. Crassum, suapte interfectum manu, neque collegæ sui, pontificis maximi, sanguine simulacrum Vestæ respersum esse vidit ; cui mærori — qua mente ille in patriam fuit — etiam C. Carbonis, inimicissimi hominis, eodem illo die mors fuisset nefaria. [11] Non vidit eorum ipsorum, qui tum adulescentes Crasso se dicarant, horribiles miserosque casus. Ex quibus C. Cotta, quem ille florentem reliquerat, paucis diebus post mortem Crassi, depulsus per invidiam tribunatu, non multis ab eo tempore mensibus ejectus est e civitate ; Sulpicius autem, qui in eadem invidiæ flamma fuisset, quibuscum privatus conjunctissime vixerat, hos in tribunatu spoliare instituit omni dignitate ; cui quidem, ad summam gloriam eloquentiæ efflorescenti, ferro erepta vita est, et pœna temeritatis non sine magno reipublicæ malo constituta. [12] Ego vero te, Crasse, quum vitæ flore tum mortis opportunitate divino consilio et ornatum et exstinctum esse arbitror. Nam tibi aut pro virtute animi constantiaque tua civilis ferri subeunda fuit crudelitas aut, si qua te fortuna ab atrocitate mortis vindicasset, eadem esse te funerum patriæ spectatorem coëgisset ; neque solum tibi improborum dominatus, sed etiam, propter admixtam civium cædem, bonorum victoria mærori fuisset. |
III. [9] But led away as I am by my reflections to touch upon the power and vicissitudes of fortune, my observations shall not expatiate too widely, but shall be confined almost to the very personages who are contained in this dialogue, which I have begun to detail. For who would not call the death of Lucius Crassus, which has been so often lamented by multitudes, a happy one, when he calls to mind the fate of those very persons who were almost the last that held discourse with him? For we ourselves remember, that Quintus Catulus, a man distinguished for almost every species of merit, when he entreated, not the security of his fortunes, but retreat into exile, was reduced to deprive himself of life. [10] It was then, too, that that illustrious head of Marcus Antonius, by whom the lives of so many citizens had been preserved, was fixed upon the very rostra on which he had so strenuously defended the republic when consul, and which he had adorned with imperial trophies when censor. Not far from his was exposed the head of Caius Julius, (who was betrayed by his Tuscan host,) with that of Lucius Julius his brother; so that he who did not behold such atrocities may justly be thought to have prolonged his life during the existence of the constitution, and to have expired together with it. He neither beheld his near relation, Publius Crassus, a man of the greatest magnanimity, slain by his own hand, nor saw the image of Vesta sprinkled with the blood of the pontifex, his colleague; and (such were his feelings towards his country) even the cruel death of Caius Carbo, his greatest enemy, that occurred on the same day, would have caused additional grief to him. [11] He did not behold the horrible and miserable fate of those young men who had devoted themselves to him; of whom Caius Cotta, whom he had left in a promising condition, was expelled, through popular prejudice, from his office of tribune, a few days after the death of Crassus, and, not many months afterwards, driven from the city. And Sulpicius, who had been involved in the same popular fury, attempted in his tribuneship to spoil of all their honors those with whom, as a private individual, he had lived in the greatest familiarity; but when he was shooting forth into the highest glory of eloquence, his life was taken from him by the sword, and punishment was inflicted on his rashness, not without great damage to the republic. [12] I am indeed of opinion that you, Crassus, received as well your birth as your death from the peculiar appointment of divine providence, both on account of the distinction of your life and the season of your death; for, in accordance with your virtue and firmness of mind, you must either have submitted to the cruelty of civil slaughter; or if any fortune had rescued you from so barbarous a death, the same fortune would have compelled you to be a spectator of the ruins of your country; and not only the dominion of ill-designing men, but even the victory of the honourable party, would, on account of the civil massacres intermingled with it, have been an affliction to you. |
[IV] [13] Mihi quidem, Quinte frater, et eorum casus de quibus ante dixi, et ea quæ nosmet ipsi ob amorem in rempublicam incredibilem et singularem pertulimus ac sensimus, cogitanti, sententia sæpe tua vera ac sapiens videri solet, qui propter tot tantos tam præcipitesque casus clarissimorum hominum atque optimorum virorum me semper ab omni contentione ac dimicatione inani revocasti. [14] Sed quoniam hæc jam neque in integro nobis esse possunt et summi labores nostri magna compensati gloria mitigantur, pergamus ad ea solacia, quæ non modo sedatis molestiis jucunda, sed etiam hærentibus salutaria nobis esse possint, sermonemque L. Crassi reliquum ac pæne postremum memoriæ prodamus, atque ei, si nequaquam parem illius ingenio, at pro nostro tamen studio meritam gratiam debitamque referamus. [15] Neque enim quisquam nostrum, quum libros Platonis mirabiliter scriptos legit, in quibus omnibus fere Socrates exprimitur, non, quanquam illa sunt scripta divinitus, tamen majus quiddam de illo de quo scripta sunt suspicatur ; quod item nos postulamus non a te quidem qui nobis omnia summa tribuis, sed a ceteris qui hæc in manus sument, majus ut quiddam de L. Crasso, quam quantum a nobis exprimetur, suspicentur. [16] Nos enim, qui ipsi sermoni non interfuissemus, et quibus C. Cotta tantummodo locos ac sententias hujus disputationis tradidisset, quo in genere orationis utrumque oratorem cognoveramus, id ipsum sumus in eorum sermone adumbrare conati. Quod si quis erit, qui ductus opinione vulgi aut Antonium jejuniorem aut Crassum pleniorem fuisse putet, quam quomodo a nobis uterque inductus est, is erit ex eis, qui aut illos non audierit aut judicare non possit. Nam fuit uterque, ut exposui antea, quum studio atque ingenio et doctrina præstans omnibus, tum in suo genere perfectus, ut neque in Antonio deesset hic ornatus orationis neque in Crasso redundaret. |
IV. [13] Indeed, when I reflect, brother Quintus, upon the calamities of these great men, (whose fates I have just mentioned,) and those which we ourselves have felt and experienced from our extraordinary and eminent love for our country, your opinions appear to me to be founded on justice and wisdom, as you have always, on account of such numerous, such violent, and such sudden afflictions as have happened to the most illustrious and virtuous men, dissuaded me from all civil contention and strife. [14] But, because we cannot put affairs into the same state as if nothing had occurred, and because our extreme toils are compensated and mitigated by great glory, let us apply ourselves to those consolations, which are not only pleasant to us when troubles have subsided, but may also be salutary while they continue; let us deliver as a memorial to posterity the remaining and almost the last discourse of Lucius Crassus; and let us express the gratitude to him which he so justly merited, although in terms by no means equal to his genius, yet to the best of our endeavours; [15] for there is not any of us, when he reads the admirably written dialogues of Plato, in almost all of which the character of Socrates is represented, who does not, though what is written of him is written in a divine spirit, conceive something still greater of him about whom it is written: and it is also my request, not indeed to you, my brother, who attribute to me perfection in all things, but to others who shall take this treatise into their hands, that they would entertain a nobler conception of Lucius Crassus than any that is expressed by me. [16] For I, who was not present at this dialogue, and to whom Caius Cotta communicated only the topics and heads of the dissertation, have endeavoured to shadow forth in the conversation of the speakers those peculiar styles of oratory, in which I knew that each of them was conspicuous. But if any person shall be induced by the common opinion, to think either that Antonius was more jejune, or Crassus more exuberant in style, than they have been respectively described by me, he will be among the number of those who either never heard these great men, or who have not abilities to judge; for each of them was (as I have explained before) superior to all other speakers, in application, and genius, and learning, as well as excellent in his particular style, so that embellishment in language was not wanting in Antonius, nor redundant in Crassus. |
[V] [17] Ut, igitur, ante meridiem discesserunt, paulumque requierunt, imprimis hoc a se Cotta animadversum esse dicebat, omne illud tempus meridianum Crassum in acerrima atque attentissima cogitatione posuisse ; seseque, qui vultum ejus quum ei dicendum esset obtutumque oculorum in cogitando probe nosset, atque in maximis causis sæpe vidisset, tum dedita opera, quiescentibus aliis, in eam exedram venisse in qua Crassus posito lectulo recubuisset ; quumque eum defixum esse in cogitatione sensisset, statim recessisse atque in eo silentio duas horas fere esse consumptas. Deinde quum omnes — inclinato jam in pomeridianum tempus die — venissent ad Crassum, “¿Quid est, Crasse?” inquit Julius, “Imusne sessum? Etsi admonitum venimus te, non flagitatum.” [18] Tum Crassus, “An me tam impudentem esse existimatis, ut vobis hoc præsertim munus putem me diutius posse debere?” “¿Quinam igitur,” inquit ille, “locus? ¿An in media silva placet? Est enim is maxime et opacus et frigidus.” “Sane,” inquit Crassus, “etenim est in eo loco sedes huic nostro non importuna sermoni.” Quum placuisset idem ceteris, in silvam venitur et ibi magna cum audiendi exspectatione considitur. |
V. [17] As soon therefore as they had withdrawn before noon, and reposed themselves a little, Cotta said that he particularly observed that Crassus employed all the time about the middle of the day in the most earnest and profound meditation; and that he himself, who was well acquainted with the countenance which he assumed whenever he was going to speak in public, and the nature of his looks when he was fixed in contemplation, and had often remarked them in causes of the greatest importance, came on purpose, while the rest were asleep, into the room in which Crassus had lain down on a couch prepared for him, and that, as soon as he perceived him to be settled in a thoughtful posture, he immediately retired; and that almost two hours passed in that perfect stillness. Afterwards, when they all, as the day was now verging to the afternoon, waited upon Crassus, Caesar said, “Well, Crassus, shall we go and take our seats? though w only come to put you in mind of your promise, and not to demand the performance of it.” [18] Crassus then replied, “Do you imagine that I have the assurance to think that I can continue longer indebted to such friends as you, especially in an obligation of this nature?” “What place then will suit you?” said Caesar; “a seat in the middle of the wood, for that is the most shady and cool?” “Very well,” replied Crassus, “for there is in that spot a seat not at all unsuited for this discourse of ours.” This arrangement being agreeable to the rest of the company, they went into the wood, and sat down there with the most earnest desire to listen. |
[19] Tum Crassus, “Quum auctoritas atque amicitia vestra, tum Antonii facilitas eripuit,” inquit, “mihi in optima mea causa libertatem recusandi. Quanquam, in partienda disputatione nostra, quum sibi de eis quæ dici ab oratore oporteret sumeret, mihi autem relinqueret ut explicarem quemadmodum illa ornari oporteret, ea divisit quæ sejuncta esse non possunt. Nam quum omnis ex re atque verbis constet oratio, neque verba sedem habere possunt si rem subtraxeris, neque res lumen, si verba semoveris. [20] Ac mihi quidem veteres illi majus quiddam animo complexi plus multo etiam vidisse videntur, quam quantum nostrorum ingeniorum acies intueri potest, qui omnia hæc, quæ supra et subter, unum esse et una vi atque consensione naturæ constricta esse dixerunt. Nullum est enim genus rerum quod aut avulsum a ceteris per se ipsum constare, aut quo cetera si careant, vim suam atque æternitatem conservare possint. |
[19] Crassus then said, “Not only the influence of your authority and friendship, but also the ready compliance of Antonius, have taken from me all liberty of refusal, though I had an excellent pretext for refusing. In the partition, however, of this dissertation between us, Antonius, when he assumed to himself the part of speaking upon those matters which form the subject of the orator’s speech, and left to me to explain how they should be embellished, divided things which are in their nature incapable of separation; for as every speech consists of the matter and the language, the language can have no place if you take away the matter, nor the matter receive any illustration if you take away the language. [20] Indeed, the great men of antiquity, embracing something of superior magnificence in their ideas, appear to me to have seen further into the nature of things than the visual faculties of our minds can penetrate; as they said that all these things, above and below, formed one system, and were linked together in strict union by one and the same power, and one principle of universal harmony in nature; for there is no order of things which can either of itself, if forcibly separated from the rest, preserve a permanent existence, or without which the rest can maintain their power and eternal duration. |
[VI] [21] Sed si hæc major esse ratio videtur, quam ut hominum possit sensu aut cogitatione comprehendi, est etiam illa Platonis vera et tibi, Catule, certe non inaudita vox, omnem doctrinam harum ingenuarum et humanarum artium uno quodam societatis vinculo contineri. Ubi enim perspecta vis est rationis ejus qua causæ rerum atque exitus cognoscuntur, mirus quidam omnium quasi consensus doctrinarum concentusque reperitur. [22] Sed si hoc quoque videtur esse altius quam ut id nos humi strati suspicere possimus, illud certe tamen quod amplexi sumus, quod profitemur, quod suscepimus, nosse et tenere debemus. Una est enim — quod et ego hesterno die dixi et aliquot locis antemeridiano sermone significavit Antonius — eloquentia, quascunque in oras disputationis regionesve delata est. [23] Nam sive de cæli natura loquitur sive de terræ, sive de divina vi sive de humana, sive ex inferiore loco sive ex æquo sive ex superiore, sive ut impellat homines sive ut doceat sive ut deterreat, sive ut concitet sive ut reflectat, sive ut incendat sive ut leniat, sive ad paucos sive ad multos, sive inter alienos sive cum suis sive secum, rivis est diducta oratio, non fontibus ; et, quocunque ingreditur, eodem est instructu ornatuque comitata. [24] Sed quoniam oppressi jam sumus opinionibus non modo vulgi, verum etiam hominum leviter eruditorum, qui, quæ complecti tota nequeunt, hæc facilius divulsa et quasi discerpta contrectant, et qui tanquam ab animo corpus, sic a sententiis verba sejungunt, quorum sine interitu fieri neutrum potest, non suscipiam oratione mea plus quam mihi imponitur ; tantum significabo brevi neque verborum ornatum inveniri posse non partis expressisque sententiis, neque esse ullam sententiam illustrem sine luce verborum. [25] Sed priusquam illa conor attingere quibus orationem ornari atque illuminari putem, proponam breviter quid sentiam de universo genere dicendi. |
VI. [21] “But, if this reasoning appear to be too comprehensive to be embraced by human sense and understanding, yet that saying of Plato is true, and certainly not unknown to you, Catulus, ‘that all the learning of these liberal and polite departments of knowledge is linked together in one bond of union; for when the power of that reason, by which the causes and events of things are known, is once thoroughly discerned, a certain wonderful agreement and harmony, as it were, in all the sciences is discovered.’ [22] But, if this also appear to be too sublime a thought for us to contemplate who are prostrate on the earth, it, however, certainly is our duty to know and remember that which we have embraced, which we profess, which we have taken upon ourselves. Since eloquence, as I observed yesterday, and Antonius signified in some passages of his discourse this morning, is one and the same, into whatever tracts or regions of debate it may be carried: [23] for whether it discourses concerning the nature of the heavens or of the earth, whether of divine or human power, whether it speaks from a lower, or an equal, or a superior place, whether to impel an audience, or to instruct, or to deter, or to incite, or to dissuade, or to inflame, or to soothe, whether to a small or to a large assembly, whether to strangers, to friends, or alone, its language is derived through different channels, not from different sources; and, wherever it directs its course, it is attended with the same equipment and decoration. [24] But since we are overwhelmed by opinions, not only those of the vulgar, but those also of men imperfectly instructed, who treat of those things more easily when divided and torn asunder which they have not capacity to comprehend in a general view, and who sever the language from the thoughts like the body from the soul, neither of which separations can be ‘made without destruction, I will not undertake in this discourse more than that which is imposed upon me; I will only signify briefly, that neither can embellishments of language be found without arrangement and expression of thoughts, nor can thoughts be made to shine without the light of language. [25] But before I proceed to touch upon those particulars by which I think language is beautified and illumined, I will state briefly what I think concerning eloquence in general. |
[VII] Natura nulla est, ut mihi videtur, quæ non habeat in suo genere res complures dissimiles inter se, quæ tamen consimili laude dignentur. Nam et auribus multa percipimus, quæ etsi nos vocibus delectant, tamen ita sunt varia sæpe, ut id quod proximum audias jucundissimum esse videatur ; et oculis colliguntur pæne innumerabiles voluptates quæ nos ita capiunt, ut unum sensum dissimili genere delectent ; et reliquos sensus voluptates oblectant dispares, ut sit difficile judicium excellentis maxime suavitatis. [26] Atque hoc idem quod est in naturis rerum transferri potest etiam ad artes. Una fingendi est ars, in qua præstantes fuerunt Myro, Polyclitus, Lysippus — qui omnes inter se dissimiles fuerunt, sed ita tamen, ut neminem sui velis esse dissimilem ; una est ars ratioque picturæ, dissimillimique tamen inter se Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles, neque eorum quisquam est cui quicquam in arte sua deesse videatur. Et si hoc in his quasi ‘mutis’ artibus est mirandum — et tamen verum —, ¿quanto admirabilius in oratione atque in lingua? Quæ quum in eisdem sententiis verbisque versetur, summas habet dissimilitudines ; non sic ut alii laudandi, alii vituperandi sint, sed ut ii, quos constet esse laudandos, in dispari tamen genere laudentur. [27] Atque id primum in poëtis cerni licet (quibus est proxima cognatio cum oratoribus), quam sunt inter sese Ennius, Pacuvius Acciusque dissimiles, quam apud Græcos Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides — ¡quanquam omnibus par pæne laus in dissimili scribendi genere tribuatur! [28] Aspicite nunc eos homines atque intuemini, quorum de facultate quærimus quid intersit inter oratorum studia atque naturas. Suavitatem Isocrates, subtilitatem Lysias, acumen Hyperides, sonitum Æschines, vim Demosthenes habuit. ¿Quis eorum non egregius, tamen cujusquam nisi sui similis? Gravitatem Africanus, lenitatem Lælius, asperitatem Galba, profluens quiddam habuit Carbo et canorum. ¿Quis horum non princeps temporibus illis fuit? Et suo tamen quisque in genere princeps. |
VII. “There is no one of the natural senses, in my opinion, which does not include under its general comprehension many things dissimilar one to another, but which are still thought deserving of similar approbation; for we both perceive many things by the ear, which, although they all charm us with their sounds, are yet often so various in themselves, that that which we hear last appears to be the most delightful; and almost innumerable pleasures are received by the eye, which all captivate us in such a manner as to delight the same sense in different ways; and pleasures that bear no sort c f resemblance to each other charm the rest of the senses in such a manner that it is difficult to determine which affords the most exquisite enjoyment. [26] But the same observation which is to be made in regard to nature may be applied also to the different kinds of art. Sculpture is a single art, in which Myro, Polycletus, and Lysippus excelled; all of whom differed one from another, but so that you would not wish any one of them to be unlike himself. The art and science of painting is one, yet Zeuxis, Aglaophon, and Apelles are quite unlike one another in themselves, though to none of them does anything seem wanting in his peculiar style. And if this be wonderful, and yet true, in these, as it were, mute arts, how much more wonderful is’ it in language and speech? which, though employed about the same thoughts and words, yet admits of the greatest variations; and not so that some speakers are to be censured and others commended, but that those who are allowed to merit praise, merit it for different excellences. [27] This is fully exemplified in poets, who have the nearest affinity to orators: how distinct from each other are Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius; how distinct, among the Greeks, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides; though almost equal praise may be attributed to them all in different kinds of writing. [28] Then, behold and contemplate those whose art is the subject of our present inquiry; what a wide distinction there is between the accomplisliments and natural abilities of orators! Isocrates possessed sweetness, Lysias delicacy, Hyperides pointedness, Aeschines sound, and Demosthenes energy; and which of them was not excellent? yet which of them resembled any one but himself? Africanus had weight, Laelius smoothness, Galba asperity, Carbo something of fluency and harmony; but which of these was not an orator of the first rank in those times? and yet every one attained that rank by a style of oratory peculiar to himself. |
[VIII] [29] ¿Sed quid ego vetera conquiram, quum mihi liceat uti præsentibus exemplis atque vivis? ¿Quid jucundius auribus nostris unquam accidit hujus oratione Catuli? Quæ est pura sic, ut Latine loqui pæne solus videatur, sic autem gravis, ut in singulari dignitate omnis tamen assit humanitas ac lepos. ¿Quid multa? Istum audiens equidem sic judicare soleo, quicquid aut addideris aut mutaris aut detraxeris, vitiosius et deterius futurum. [30] ¿Quid? ¿Noster hic Cæsar nonne novam quandam rationem attulit orationis et dicendi genus induxit prope singulare? ¿Quis unquam res præter hunc tragicas pæne comice, tristes remisse, severas hilare, forenses scænica prope venustate tractavit atque ita, ut neque jocus magnitudine rerum excluderetur nec gravitas facetiis minueretur? [31] Ecce præsentes duo prope æquales Sulpicius et Cotta. ¿Quid jam inter se dissimile? ¿Quid tam in suo genere præstans? Limatus alter et subtilis, rem explicans propriis aptisque verbis. Hæret in causa semper et, quid judici probandum sit quum acutissime vidit, omissis ceteris argumentis in eo mentem orationemque defigit. Sulpicius autem fortissimo quodam animi impetu, plenissima et maxima voce, summa contentione corporis et dignitate motus, verborum quoque ea gravitate et copia est, ut unus ad dicendum instructissimus a natura esse videatur. |
VIII. [29] “But why should I search into antiquity for examples, when I can point to present and living characters? What was ever more pleasing to the ear than the language of our friend Catulus? language of such purity, that he appears to be almost the only orator that speaks pure Latin; and of such power, that with its peculiar dignity there is yet blended the utmost politeness and wit. In a word, when I hear him, I always think that whatever you should add, or alter, or take away, his language would be impaired and deteriorated. [30] Has not our friend Caesar here, too, introduced a new kind of oratory, and brought before us an almost peculiar style of eloquence? Who has ever, besides him, treated tragical subjects in an almost comic manner, serious subjects with pleasantry, grave subjects with gaiety, and subjects suited to the forum with a grace peculiar to the stage? in such a way that neither is the jocular style excluded by the importance of the subject, nor is the weight of the matter lessened by the humor with which it is treated. [31] Here are present with us two young men, almost of equal age, Sulpicius and Cotta; what things were ever so dissimilar as they are one to another? yet what is so excellent as they are in their respective styles? One is polished and refined, explaining things with the greatest propriety and aptitude of expression; he always adheres to his cause, and, when he has discovered, with his keen discernment, what he ought to prove to the judge, he directs his whole attention and force of oratory to that point, without regarding other arguments; while Sulpicius has a certain irresistible energy of mind, a most full and powerful voice, a most vigorous action, and consummate dignity of motion, united with such weight and copiousness of language, that he appears of all men the best qualified by nature for eloquence. |
[IX] [32] Ad nosmet ipsos jam revertor, quoniam sic fuimus semper comparati, ut hominum sermonibus quasi in aliquod contentionis judicium vocaremur. ¿Quid tam dissimile quam ego in dicendo et Antonius? Quum ille is sit orator, ut nihil eo possit esse præstantius, ego autem, quanquam memet mei pænitet, cum hoc maxime tamen in comparatione conjungar. ¿Videtisne, genus hoc quod sit Antonii? Forte, vehemens, commotum in agendo, præmunitum et ex omni parte causæ sæptum, acre, acutum, enucleatum, in sua quaque re commorans, honeste cedens, acriter insequens, terrens, supplicans, summa orationis varietate, nulla nostrarum aurium satietate. [33] Nos autem, quicunque in dicendo sumus (quoniam esse aliquo in numero vobis videmur), certe tamen ab hujus multum genere distamus ; quod quale sit, non est meum dicere, propterea quod minime sibi quisque notus est et difficillime de se quisque sentit ; sed tamen dissimilitudo intellegi potest et ex motus mei mediocritate, et ex eo quod, quibus vestigiis primum institi, in eis fere soleo perorare — et quod aliquanto me major in verbis quam in sententiis eligendis labor et cura torquet verentem ne, si paulo obsoletior fuerit oratio, non digna exspectatione et silentio fuisse videatur. [34] Quodsi, in nobis qui assumus, tantæ dissimilitudines, tam certæ res cujusque propriæ et in ea varietate fere, melius a deteriore, facultate magis quam genere distinguitur, atque omne laudatur quod in suo genere perfectum est, ¿quid censetis, si omnes qui ubique sunt aut fuerunt oratores amplecti voluerimus, nonne fore ut quot oratores, totidem pæne reperiantur genera dicendi? Ex qua mea disputatione forsitan occurrat illud, si pæne innumerabiles sint quasi formæ figuræque dicendi, specie dispares, genere laudabiles, non posse ea quæ inter se discrepant eisdem præceptis atque una institutione formari. [35] Quod non est ita, diligentissimeque hoc est eis, qui instituunt aliquos atque erudiunt, videndum, quo sua quemque natura maxime ferre videatur. Etenim videmus ex eodem quasi ludo summorum in suo cujusque genere artificum et magistrorum exisse discipulos dissimiles inter se ac tamen laudandos, quum ad cujusque naturam institutio doctoris accommodaretur. [36] Cujus est vel maxime insigne illud exemplum (ut ceteras artes omittamus) quod dicebat Isocrates doctor singularis, se calcaribus in Ephoro, contra autem in Theopompo frenis uti solere. Alterum enim exsultantem verborum audacia reprimebat, alterum cunctantem et quasi verecundantem incitabat. Neque eos similes effecit inter se, sed tantum alteri affinxit, de altero limavit, ut id conformaret in utroque quod utriusque natura pateretur. |
IX. [32] “I now return to ourselves; (because there has ever been such a comparison made between us, that we are brought, as it were, into judgment on account of rivalship, in the common conversation of mankind;) what two things can be more dissimilar than Antonius’s manner of speaking and my own 1 though he is such an orator that no one can possibly surpass him; and I, though I am altogether dissatisfied with myself, am yet in preference to others admitted to a comparison with him. Do you notice what the manner of Autonius is? It is bold, vehement, full of energy and action, fortified and guarded on every point of the cause, spirited, acute, explicit, dwelling upon every circumstance, retiring with honor, pursuing with eagerness, terrifying, supplicating, exhibiting the greatest variety of language, yet without satiety to the ear; but as to myself, whatever I am as a speaker (since I appear to you to hold some place among speakers), I certainly differ very greatly from his style. [33] What my talents are it becomes not me to say, because every ere is least known to himself, and it is extremely difficult for any person to form a judgment of his own capacity; but the dissimilitude may be easily perceived, both from the mediocrity of my action, and from the circumstance that I usually conclude in the same track in which I first set out; and that labor and care in choosing words causes me greater anxiety than choice of matter, being afraid that if my language should be a little obsolete, it may appear unworthy of the expectation and silent attention of the audience. [34] But if in us who are present there are such remarkable dissimilitudes, such decided peculiarities in each of us, and in all this variety the better is distinguished from the worse by difference in ability rather than by difference in kind, and everything is praiseworthy that is perfect in its nature, what do you imagine must be the case if we should take into consideration all the orators that anywhere exist, or ever existed? Would it not happen that almost as many kinds of eloquence as of orators would be found? But from this observation of mine, it may perhaps occur to you, that if there be almost innumerable varieties and characters of eloquence, dissimilar in species, yet laudable in their kind, things of so diversified a nature can never be formed into an art by the same precepts and one single method of instruction. [35] This is not the case; and it is to be attentively considered by those who have the conduct and education of others, in what direction the natural genius of each seems principally to incline him. For we see that from the same schools of artists and masters, eminent in their respective pursuits, there have gone forth pupils very unlike each other, yet all praiseworthy, because the instruction of the teacher has been adapted to each person’s natural genius; [36] a fact of which the most remarkable example (to say nothing of other sciences) is that saying of Isocrates, an eminent teacher of eloquence, that he used to apply the spur to Ephorus, but to put the rein on Theopompus; for the one, who overleaped all bounds in the boldness of his expressions, he restrained; the other, who hesitated and was bashful, as it were, he stimulated: nor did he produce in them any resemblance to each other, but gave to the one such an addition, and retrenched from the other so much superfluity, as to form in both that excellence of which the natural genius of each was susceptible. |
[X] [37] Hæc eo mihi prædicenda fuerunt ut, si non omnia quæ proponerentur a me ad omnium vestrum studium et ad genus id quod quisque vestrum in dicendo probaret adhærescerent, id a me genus exprimi sentiretis quod maxime mihi ipsi probaretur. |
X. [37] “I thought it necessary to premise these particulars that if every remark of mine did not exactly adapt itself to the inclinations of you all, and to that peculiar style of speaking which each of you most admired, you might be sensible that I described that character of eloquence of which I myself most approved. |
Ergo hæc et agenda sunt ab oratore quæ explicavit Antonius, et dicenda quodammodo. ¿Quinam igitur dicendi est modus melior (nam de actione post videro) quam Latine {①}, ut plane {②}, ut ornate {③}, ut ad id quodcunque agetur apte congruenterque {④} dicamus? [38] Atque eorum quidem quæ duo prima dixi rationem non arbitror exspectari a me puri dilucidique sermonis. Neque enim conamur docere eum dicere qui loqui nesciat ; nec sperare qui Latine non possit hunc ornate esse dicturum ; neque vero qui non dicat quod intellegamus, hunc posse quod admiremur dicere. Linquamus igitur hæc quæ cognitionem habent facilem, usum necessarium. Nam alterum traditur litteris doctrinaque puerili, alterum adhibetur ob eam causam, ut intellegatur quid quisque dicat — quod videmus ita esse necessarium, ut tamen eo minus nihil esse possit. [39] {①} Sed omnis loquendi elegantia, quanquam expolitur scientia litterarum, tamen augetur legendis oratoribus et poëtis. Sunt enim illi veteres — qui ornare nondum poterant ea quæ dicebant — omnes prope præclare locuti ; quorum sermone assuefacti qui erunt, ne cupientes quidem poterunt loqui nisi Latine. Neque tamen erit utendum verbis eis quibus jam consuetudo nostra non utitur, nisi quando ornandi causa parce — quod ostendam ; sed usitatis ita poterit uti, lectissimis ut utatur, is qui in veteribus erit scriptis studiose et multum volutatus. |
“Those matters, therefore, of which Antonius has treated so explicitly, are to be endowed with action and elocution by the orator in some certain manner. What manner of elocution can be better (for I will consider action by-and-by) than that of speaking in pure Latin, with perspicuity, with gracefulness, and with aptitude and congruity to the subject in question? [38] Of the two which I mentioned first, purity and clearness of language, I do not suppose that any account is expected from me; for we do not attempt to teach him to be an orator who cannot speak; nor can we hope that he who cannot speak grammatical Latin will speak elegantly; nor that he who cannot speak what we can understand, will ever speak anything for us to admire. Let us, therefore, omit these matters, which are easy of attainment, though necessary in practice; for the one is taught in school-learning and the rudiments of children; the other4 is cultivated for this reason, that what every person says may be understood, a qualification which we perceive indeed to be necessary, yet that none can be held in less estimation.5 [39] But all elegance of language, though it receive a polish from the science of grammar, is yet augmented by the reading of orators and poets; for those ancients, who could not then adorn what they expressed, had almost all a kind of nobleness of diction; and those who are accustomed to their style cannot express themselves otherwise than in pure Latin, even though they desire to do so. Yet we must not make use of such of their words as our modern mode of speaking does not admit, unless sometimes for the sake of ornament, and but sparingly, as I shall explain; but he who is studious and much conversant with ancient writers, will make such use of common expressions as always to adopt the most eligible. |
[XI] [40] Atque, ut Latine loquamur, non solum videndum est, ut et verba efferamus ea quæ nemo jure reprehendat, et ea sic et casibus et temporibus et genere et numero conservemus, ut ne quid perturbatum ac discrepans aut præposterum sit, sed etiam lingua et spiritus et vocis sonus est ipse moderandus. [41] Nolo exprimi litteras putidius, nolo obscurari neglegentius ; nolo verba exiliter exanimata exire, nolo inflata et quasi anhelata gravius. Nam de voce nondum ea dico quæ sunt actionis, sed hoc quod mihi cum sermone quasi conjunctum videtur. Sunt enim certa vitia, quæ nemo est quin effugere cupiat : mollis vox aut muliebris aut quasi extra modum absona atque absurda. [42] Est autem vitium quod nonnulli de industria consectantur : rustica vox et agrestis quosdam delectat, quo magis antiquitatem, si ita sonet, eorum sermo retinere videatur ; ut tuus, Catule, sodalis, L. Cotta, gaudere mihi videtur gravitate linguæ sonoque vocis agresti, et illud quod loquitur priscum visum iri putat, si plane fuerit rusticanum. Me autem tuus sonus et subtilitas ista delectat — omitto verborum, quanquam est caput, verum id affert ratio, docent litteræ, confirmat consuetudo et legendi et loquendi — sed hanc dico suavitatem quæ exit ex ore ; quæ quidem ut apud Græcos Atticorum, sic in Latino sermone hujus est urbis maxime propria. [43] Athenis jamdiu doctrina ipsorum Atheniensium interiit, domicilium tantum in illa urbe remanet studiorum quibus vacant cives, peregrini fruuntur capti quodammodo nomine urbis et auctoritate ; tamen eruditissimos homines Asiaticos quivis Atheniensis indoctus non verbis, sed sono vocis nec tam bene quam suaviter loquendo facile superabit. Nostri minus student litteris quam Latini. Tamen, ex istis — quos nostis — urbanis in quibus minimum est litterarum, nemo est quin litteratissimum togatorum omnium, Q. Valerium Soranum, lenitate vocis atque ipso oris pressu et sono facile vincat. |
XI. [40] “In order to speak pure Latin, we must take care not only to use words with which nobody can justly find fault, and preserve the construction by proper cases, and tenses, and genders, and numbers, so that there may be nothing confused, or incongruous, or preposterous; but also that the tongue, and the breath, and the tone of the voice come under proper regulation. [41] I would not have letters sounded with too much affectation, or uttered imperfectly through negligence; I would not have the words dropped out without expression or spirit; I would not have them puffed and, as it were, panted forth, with a difficulty of breathing; for I do not as yet speak of those things relating to the voice which belong to oratorical delivery, but merely of that which seems to me to concern pronunciation. For there are certain faults which every one is desirous to avoid, as a too delicate and effeminate tone of voice, or one that is extravagantly harsh and grating. [42] There is also a fault which some industriously strive to attain; a rustic and rough pronunciation is agreeable to some, that their language, if it has that tone, may seem to partake more of antiquity; as Lucius Cotta, an acquaintance of yours, Catulus, appears to me to take a delight in the broadness of his speech and the rough sound of his voice, and thinks that what he says will savour of the antique if it certainly savour of rusticity. But your harmony and sweetness delight me; I do not refer to the harmony of your words, which is a principal point, but one which method introduces, learning teaches, practice in reading and speaking confirms; but I mean the mere sweetness of pronunciation, which, as among the Greeks it was peculiar to the Athenians, so in the Latin tongue is chiefly remarkable in this city. [43] At Athens, learning among the Athenians themselves has long been entirely neglected; there remains in that city only the seat of the studies which the citizens do not cultivate, but which foreigners enjoy, being captivated in a manner with the very name and authority of the place; yet any illiterate Athenian will easily surpass the most learned Asiatics,6 not in his language, but in sweetness of tone, not so much in speaking well as in speaking agreeably. Our citizens7 pay less attention to letters than the people of Latium, yet among all the people that you know in the city, who have the least tincture of literature, there is not one who would not have a manifest advantage over Quintus Valerius of Sora,8 the most learned of all the Latins, in softness of voice, in conformation of the mouth, and in the general tone of pronunciation. |
[XII] [44] Quare, quum sit quædam certa vox Romani generis urbisque propria, in qua nihil offendi, nihil displicere, nihil animadverti possit, nihil sonare aut olere peregrinum, hanc sequamur neque solum rusticam asperitatem, sed etiam peregrinam insolentiam fugere discamus. [45] Equidem quum audio socrum meam Læliam — facilius enim mulieres incorruptam antiquitatem conservant, quod, multorum sermonis expertes, ea tenent semper quæ prima didicerunt — sed eam sic audio, ut Plautum mihi aut Nævium videar audire, sono ipso vocis ita recto et simplici est, ut nihil ostentationis aut imitationis afferre videatur ; ex quo sic locutum esse ejus patrem judico, sic majores ; non aspere, ut ille quem dixi, non vaste, non rustice, non hiulce, sed presse et æquabiliter et lēviter. [46] Quare Cotta noster, cujus tu illa lata, Sulpici, nonnunquam imitaris, ut Iota litteram tollas et E plenissimum dicas, non mihi oratores antiquos, sed messores videtur imitari.” Hic quum arrisisset ipse Sulpicius, “Sic agam vobiscum,” inquit Crassus, “ut, quoniam me loqui voluistis, aliquid de vestris vitiis audiatis.” “¡Utinam quidem!” inquit ille, “Id enim ipsum volumus, idque si feceris, multa, ut arbitror, hic hodie vitia ponemus.” [47] “At enim non sine meo periculo,” Crassus inquit, “possum, Sulpici, te reprehendere, quoniam Antonius mihi te simillimum dixit sibi videri.” Tum ille, “¡Tu vero! Quod monuit idem, ut ea quæ in quoque maxima essent imitaremur ; ex quo vereor ne nihil sim tui nisi supplosionem pedis imitatus et pauca quædam verba et aliquem, si forte, motum.” “Ergo ista,” inquit Crassus, “quæ habes a me non reprehendo ne me ipsum irrideam — sunt autem ea multo et plura et majora quam dicis — ; quæ autem sunt tua plane, aut imitatione ex aliquo expressa, de his te, si qui me forte locus admonuerit, commonebo. |
XII. [44] “As there is a certain tone of voice, therefore, peculiar to the Roman people and city, in which nothing can offend, or displease, nothing can be liable to animadversion, nothing sound or savour of what is foreign, let us cultivate that tone, and learn to avoid not only the asperity of rustic but the strangeness of outlandish pronunciation. [45] Indeed when I listen to my wife’s mother, Laelia,9 (for women more easily preserve the ancient language unaltered, because, not having experience of the conversation of a multitude of people, they always retain what they originally learned,) I hear her with such attention that I imagine myself listening to Plautus or Naevius; she has a tone of voice so unaffected and simple, that it seems to carry in it nothing of ostentation or imitation; from whence I judge that her father and forefathers spoke in like manner; not with a rough tone, as he whom I mentioned, nor with one broad, or rustic, or too open, but with one that was close and equable and smooth. [46] Our friend Cotta, therefore, whose broad manner of speaking you, Sulpicius, sometimes imitate, so as to drop the letter I and pronounce E as full as possible, does not seem to me to resemble the ancient orators, but the modern farmers.” As Sulpicius laughed at this, “I will act with you,” said Crassus, “in such a manner, that, as you oblige me to speak, you shall hear something of your own faults.” “I wish we may,” replied Sulpicius, “for that is what we desire; and if you do so, we shall to-day, I fancy, throw off many of our inelegances.” [47] “But,” said Crassus, “I cannot censure you, Sulpicius, without being in danger of censure myself; since Antouius has declared that he thinks you very similar to me.”10 “But,” rejoined Sulpicius, “as Antonius also recommended us to imitate those things which were most conspicuous in any one,11 I am afraid in consequence that I may have copied nothing from you but the stamping of your foot, and a few particular expressions, and perhaps something of your action.” “With what you have caught from me, then,” said Crassus, “I find no fault, lest I should ridicule myself; (but there are many more and greater faults of mine than you mention;) of faults, however, which are evidently your own, or taken by imitation from any third person, I shall admonish you whenever opportunity may remind me of them. |
[XIII] [48] Prætereamus igitur præcepta Latine loquendi quæ puerilis doctrina tradit, et subtilior cognitio ac ratio litterarum alit, aut consuetudo sermonis quotidiani ac domestici, libri confirmant et lectio veterum oratorum et poëtarum. Neque vero in illo altero diutius commoremur, ut disputemus quibus rebus assequi possimus, ut ea quæ dicamus intellegantur : [49] {②} Latine scilicet dicendo, verbis usitatis ac proprie demonstrantibus ea quæ significari ac declarari volemus, sine ambiguo verbo aut sermone, non nimis longa continuatione verborum, non valde productis eis quæ similitudinis causa ex aliis rebus transferuntur, non discerptis sententiis, non præposteris temporibus, non confusis personis, non perturbato ordine. ¿Quid multa? Tam facilis est tota res, ut mihi permirum sæpe videatur, quum difficilius intellegatur quid patronus velit dicere, quam si ipse ille qui patronum adhibet de re sua diceret. [50] Isti enim qui ad nos causas deferunt, ita nos plerumque ipsi docent, ut non desideres planius dici. Easdem res autem simulac Fufius aut vester æqualis Pomponius agere cœpit, non æque quid dicant, nisi admodum attendi, intellego ; ita confusa est oratio, ita perturbata, nihil ut sit primum, nihil ut secundum, tantaque insolentia ac turba verborum, ut oratio quæ lumen adhibere rebus debet, ea obscuritatem et tenebras afferat atque ut quodammodo ipsi sibi in dicendo obstrepere videantur. [51] Verum, si placet, quoniam hæc satis spero vobis quidem certe majoribus molesta et putida videri, ad reliqua aliquanto odiosiora pergamus.” |
XIII. [48] “Let us therefore pass over the rules for speaking the Latin tongue in its purity; which the teaching given to children conveys, which refined knowledge and method in study, or the habit of daily and domestic conversation cherishes, and which books and the reading of the ancient orators and poets confirm. Nor let us dwell long upon that other point, so as to discuss by what means we may succeed in making what we say understood; [49] an object which we shall doubtless effect by speaking good Latin, adopting words in common use, and such as aptly express what we wish to communicate or explain, without any ambiguous word or phrase, not making our sentences too long, not making such observations as are drawn from other subjects, for the sake of comparison, too prolix; avoiding all incoherency of thought, reversion of the order of time, all confusion of persons, all irregularity of arrangement whatever. In short, the whole matter is so easy, that it often appears astonishing to me, that what the advocate would express should be more difficult to understand, than he who employs the advocate would be, if he were to speak on his own business; [50] for the persons themselves who bring cases to us, give us in general such instructions, that you would not desire anything to be delivered in a plainer manner; but as soon as Fufius, or your equal in age Pomponius,12 proceeds to plead those cases, I do not find them equally intelligible, unless I give an extraordinary degree of attention; their speech is so confused and ill arranged that there is nothing first, and nothing second; there is such a jumble of strange words, that language, which ought to throw a light upon things, involves them in obscurity and darkness; and the speakers, in what they say, seem in a manner to contradict themselves. [51] But, if it is agreeable, since I think that these topics must appear troublesome and distasteful, at least to you of a more advanced age,13 let us proceed to other matters which may prove still more unsatisfactory.”14 |
[XIV] “Atqui vides,” inquit Antonius, “quam alias res agamus, quam te inviti audiamus — qui adduci possimus (de me enim conjicio) relictis ut omnibus rebus te sectemur, te audiamus ; ita de horridis rebus nitida, de jejunis plena, de pervulgatis nova quædam est oratio tua.” [52] “Faciles enim,” inquit, “Antoni, partes eæ fuerunt duæ quas modo percucurri — vel potius pæne præterii — Latine loquendi planeque dicendi ; reliquæ sunt magnæ, implicatæ, variæ, graves, quibus omnis admiratio ingenii, omnis laus eloquentiæ continetur. Nemo enim unquam est oratorem quod Latine loqueretur admiratus ; si est aliter, irrident, neque eum oratorem tantummodo sed hominem non putant. Nemo extulit eum verbis qui ita dixisset ut qui adessent intellegerent quid diceret, sed contempsit eum qui minus id facere potuisset. [53] ¿In quo igitur homines exhorrescunt? ¿Quem stupefacti dicentem intuentur? ¿In quo exclamant? ¿Quem deum, ut ita dicam, inter homines putant? {3} Qui distincte, qui explicate, qui abundanter, qui illuminate et rebus et verbis dicunt, et in ipsa oratione quasi quendam numerum versumque conficiunt — id est quod dico ‘ornate.’ {4} Qui idem ita moderantur, ut rerum, ut personarum dignitates ferunt, ii sunt in eo genere laudandi laudis quod ego ‘aptum et congruens’ nomino. [54] Qui ita dicerent, eos negavit adhuc se vidisse Antonius, et eis hoc nomen dixit eloquentiæ solis esse tribuendum. Quare, omnes istos, me auctore, deridete atque contemnite, qui se horum qui nunc ita appellantur rhetorum præceptis omnem oratoriam vim complexos esse arbitrantur, neque adhuc quam personam teneant aut quid profiteantur intellegere potuerunt. Vero enim oratori quæ sunt in hominum vita — quandoquidem in ea versatur orator atque ea est ei subjecta materies — omnia quæsita, audita, lecta, disputata, tractata, agitata esse debent. [55] Est enim eloquentia una quædam de summis virtutibus ; quanquam sunt omnes virtutes æquales et pares, sed tamen est specie alia magis aliā formosa et illustris ; sicut hæc vis quæ scientiam complexa rerum, sensa mentis et consilia sic verbis explicat, ut eos qui audiant quocunque incubuerit possit impellere ; quæ quo major est vis, hoc est magis probitate jungenda summaque prudentia ; quarum virtutum expertibus si dicendi copiam tradiderimus, non eos quidem oratores effecerimus, sed furentibus quædam arma dederimus. |
XIV. “You see,” said Antonius, “how inattentive we are, and how unwillingly we listen to you,15 when we might be induced (I judge from myself) to neglect all other concerns to follow you and give you our attention; so elegant are your remarks upon unpleasing, so copious upon barren, so new upon common subjects.” [52] “Those two parts indeed, Antonius,” continued Crassus, “which I have just run over, or rather have almost passed by, that of speaking in pure Latin, and with perspicuity, were easy to treat; those which remain are important, intricate, diversified, weighty, on which depends all the admiration bestowed upon ability and all the praise given to eloquence; for nobody ever admired an orator for merely speaking good Latin; if he speaks otherwise, they ridicule him; and not only do not think him an orator, but not even a man. Nor has any one ever extolled a speaker for merely speaking in such a manner that those who were present understood what he said; though every one has despised him who was not able to do so. Whom then do men regard with awe? [53] What speaker do they behold with astonishment? At whom do they utter exclamations? Whom do they consider as a deity, if I may use the expression, amongst mortals? Him who speaks distinctly, explicitly, copiously, and luminously, both as to matter and words; who produces in his language a sort of rhythm and harmony; who speaks, as I call it, gracefully. Those also who treat their subject as the importance of things and persons requires, are to be commended for that peculiar kind of merit, which I term aptitude and congruity. [54] Antonius said that he had never seen any who spoke in such a manner, and observed that to such only was to be attributed the distinguishing title of eloquence. On my authority, therefore, deride and despise all those who imagine that from the precepts of such as are now called rhetoricians they have gained all the powers of oratory, and have not yet been able to understand what character they hold, or what they profess; for indeed, by an orator everything that relates to human life, since that is the field on which his abilities are displayed, and is the subject for his eloquence, should be examined, heard, read, discussed, handled, and considered; [55] since eloquence is one of the most eminent virtues; and though all the virtues are in their nature equal and alike, yet one species is more beautiful and noble than another; as is this power, which, comprehending a knowledge of things, expresses the thoughts and purposes of the mind in such a manner, that it can impel the audience whithersoever it inclines its force; and, the greater is its influence, the more necessary it is that it should be united with probity and eminent judgment; for if we bestow the faculty of eloquence upon persons destitute of these virtues, we shall not make them orators, but give arms to madmen. |
[XV] [56] Hanc, inquam, cogitandi pronuntiandique rationem vimque dicendi veteres Græci ‘sapientiam’ nominabant. Hinc illi Lycurgi, hinc Pittaci, hinc Solones atque ab hac similitudine Coruncanii nostri, Fabricii, Catones, Scipiones fuerunt (non tam fortasse docti, sed impetu mentis simili et voluntate). Eadem autem alii prudentia, sed consilio ad vitæ studia dispari, quietem atque otium secuti, ut Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, a regendis civitatibus totos se ad cognitionem rerum transtulerunt ; quæ vita propter tranquillitatem et propter ipsius scientiæ suavitatem, qua nihil est hominibus jucundius, plures quam utile fuit rebuspublicis delectavit. [57] Itaque, ut ei studio se excellentissimis ingeniis homines dediderunt, ex ea summa facultate vacui ac liberi temporis, multo plura quam erat necesse doctissimi homines otio nimio et ingeniis uberrimis affluentes curanda sibi esse ac quærenda et investiganda duxerunt. Nam vetus quidem illa doctrina eadem videtur et recte faciendi et bene dicendi magistra ; neque dijuncti doctores, sed iidem erant vivendi præceptores atque dicendi, ut ille apud Homerum Phœnix, qui se a Peleo patre Achilli juveni comitem esse datum dicit ad bellum, ut illum efficeret ‘oratorem verborum actoremque rerum.’ [58] Sed ut homines labore assiduo et quotidiano assueti, quum tempestate ab opere prohibentur, ad pilam se aut ad talos aut ad tesseras conferunt aut etiam novum sibi ipsi aliquem excogitant in otio ludum, sic illi a negotiis publicis tanquam ab opere aut temporibus exclusi aut voluntate sua feriati, totos se alii ad poëtas, alii ad geometras, alii ad musicos contulerunt, alii etiam, ut dialectici, novum sibi ipsi studium ludumque pepererunt atque in his artibus quæ repertæ sunt ut puerorum mentes ad humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem, omne tempus atque ætates suas consumpserunt. |
XV. [56] “This faculty, I say, of thinking and speaking, this power of eloquence, the ancient Greeks denominated wisdom. Hence the Lycurgi, the Pittaci, the Solons; and, compared with them, our Coruncanii, Fabricii, Catos, and Scipios, were perhaps not so learned, but were certainly of a like force and inclination of mind. Others, of equal ability, but of dissimilar affection towards the pursuits of life, preferred ease and retirement, as Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras, and transferred their attention entirely from civil polity to the contemplation of nature; a mode of life which, on account of its tranquillity, and the pleasure derived from science, than which nothing is more delightful to mankind, attracted a greater number than was of advantage to public concerns. [57] Accordingly, as men of the most excellent natural talents gave themselves up to that study, in the enjoyment of the greatest abundance of free and unoccupied time, so men of the greatest learning, blessed with excess of leisure and fertility of thought, imagined it their duty to make more things than were really necessary the objects of their attention, investigation, and inquiry. That ancient learning, indeed, appeal’s to have been at the same time the preceptress of living rightly and of speaking well; nor were there separate masters for those subjects, but the same teachers formed the morals and the language; as Phoenix in Homer, who says that he was appointed a companion in war to the young Achilles by his father Peleus, to make him an orator in words, and a hero in deeds. [58] But as men accustomed to constant and daily employment, when they are hindered from their occupation by the weather, betake themselves to play at ball, or dice, or draughts, or even invent some new game of their own to amuse their leisure; so they, being either excluded from public employments, as from business, by the state of the times, or being idle from inclination, gave themselves up wholly, some to the poets, some to the geometers, some to music; ethers even, as the logicians, found out a new study and exercise for themselves, and consumed their whole time and lives in those arts which have been discovered to form the minds of youth to learning and to virtue. |
[XVI] [59] Sed quod erant quidam — iique multi — qui aut in republica propter ancipitem (quæ non potest esse sejuncta) faciendi dicendique sapientiam florerent (ut Themistocles, ut Pericles, ut Theramenes), aut qui minus ipsi in republica versarentur, sed hujus tamen ejusdem sapientiæ doctores essent (ut Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates), inventi sunt qui, quum ipsi doctrina et ingeniis abundarent, a re autem civili et a negotiis, animi quodam judicio abhorrerent, hanc dicendi exercitationem exagitarent atque contemnerent. [60] Quorum princeps Socrates fuit, is qui omnium eruditorum testimonio totiusque judicio Græciæ quum prudentia et acumine et venustate et subtilitate tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam- se -cunque in partem dedisset, omnium fuit facile princeps ; is eis qui hæc quæ nunc nos quærimus tractarent, agerent, docerent — quum nomine appellarentur uno quod omnis rerum optimarum cognitio, atque in eis exercitatio, ‘philosophia’ nominaretur —, hoc commune nomen eripuit, sapienterque sentiendi et ornate dicendi scientiam, re cohærentes, disputationibus suis separavit ; cujus ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, quum ipse litteram Socrates nullam reliquisset. [61] Hinc discidium illud exstitit quasi linguæ atque cordis, absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendendum, ut alii nos sapere, alii dicere docerent. Nam quum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatæ sunt quasi familiæ dissentientes inter se et multum dijunctæ et dispares, quum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur. |
XVI. [59] “But, because there were some, and those not a few, who either were eminent in public affairs, through their twofold excellence in acting and speaking, excellences which are indeed inseparable, as Themistocles, Pericles, Theramenes; or who, though they were not employed themselves in public affairs, were teachers of others in that science, as Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates; there appeared others who, being themselves men of abundant learning and ingenuity, but averse to political business and employments, derided and despised the exercise of oratory; [60] at the head of which party was Socrates. He, who, by the testimony of all the learned, and the judgment of all Greece, was the first of all men as well in wisdom and penetration, grace and refinement, as in eloquence, variety, and copiousness of language on whatever subject he took in hand, deprived of their common name those who handled, treated, and gave instruction in those matters which are the objects of our present inquiry, when they were previously comprised under one appellation; as all knowledge in the best arts and sciences, and all exercise in them, was denominated philosophy; and he separated in his discussions the ability of thinking wisely, and speaking gracefully, though they are naturally united; Socrates, I say, whose great genius and varied conversation Plato has in his Dialogues consigned to immortality, he himself having left us nothing in writing. [61] Hence arose that divorce as it were of the tongue from the heart, a division certainly absurd, useless, and reprehensible, that one class of persona should teach us to think, and another to speak, rightly: for, as many reasoners had their origin almost from Socrates, and as they caught up some one thing, some another, from his disputations, which were various, diversified, and diffusive upon all subjects, many sects as it were became propagated, dissenting one from another, and much divided and very dissimilar in opinions, though all the philosophers wished to be called, and thought that they were, Socratics. |
[XVII] [62] Ac primo ab ipso Platone
|
XVII. [62] “First from Plato himself came Aristotle and Xenocrates; the one of whom founded the Peripatetic sect, the other the Academy; and from Antisthenes, who was chiefly delighted with the patience and endurance recommended in the discourses of Socrates, sprung first the Cynics, afterwards the Stoics. Next, from Aristippus, for whom the dissertations on pleasure had greater charms, emanated the Cyreuaic philosophy, which he and his followers maintained in its simplicity; those who in our days measure all things by the standard of pleasure, while they act more modestly in this particular, neither satisfy that dignity which they are far from rejecting, nor adhere to that pleasure which they are inclined to embrace. There were also other sects of philosophers, who almost all in general called themselves the followers of Socrates; as those of the Eretrians, Herillians, Megarians, and Pyrrhonians; but these have long since been overthrown and extinguished by the superior arguments of the others. [63] Of those which remain, that philosophy which has undertaken the patronage of pleasure, however true it may appear to some, is very unsuitable for that personage of whom we are forming a conception, and whom we would have to be of authority in public councils, a leader in the administration of government, a consummate master of thought and eloquence, as well in the senate, as in popular assemblies, and in public causes. Yet no injury shall be done to that philosophy by us; for it shall not be repelled from the mark at which it wishes to aim, but shall repose quietly in its gardens, where it wishes, and where, reclining softly and delicately, it calls us away from the rostra, from the courts of justice, and from the senate, and perhaps wisely, especially in such times of the republic as these. [64] But my present inquiry is not which philosophy is the nearest to truth, but which is the best suited to the orator. Let us therefore dismiss those of this sect without any contumely; for they are well-meaning, and, as they seem so to themselves, happy; let us only admonish them to keep that maxim of theirs, though it be eminently true, secret however as a mystery, I mean their denial that it is the part of a wise man to concern himself with public affairs; for if they should convince us, and every man of eminent ability, of the truth of that maxim, they will be unable to remain, as they especially desire, in tranquillity. |
|
XVIII. [65] “The Stoics, too, whom I by no means disapprove, I notwithstanding dismiss; nor am I afraid that they will be angry, as they are proof against anger; and I feel grateful to them on this account, that they alone, of all the philosophers, have declared eloquence to be virtue and wisdom. But there are two peculiarities in their doctrine, which are quite unsuitable to that orator whom we are forming; one, that they pronounce all who are not wise, to be slaves, robbers, enemies, and madmen, and yet do not admit that any person is wise; (but it would be very absurd to trust the interests of an assembly of the people, or of the senate, or any other body of men, to one to whom none of those present would appear to be in their senses, none to be citizens, none to be freemen;) [66] the other, that they have a manner of speaking which is perhaps subtle, and certainly acute, but for an orator, dry, strange, unsuited to the ear of the populace, obscure, barren, jejune, and altogether of that species which a speaker cannot use to a multitude. Other citizens, or rather all other people, have very different notions of good and evil from the Stoics; their estimation of honor and ignominy, revels and punishments, is entirely different; whether justly or otherwise, is nothing to the present occasion; but if we should adopt their notions, we should never be able to expedite any business by speaking. [67] The remaining sects are the Peripatetic and the Academic; though of the Academics, notwithstanding there is but one name, there are two distinct systems of opinion; for Speusippus, Plato’s sister’s son, and Xenocrates, who had been a hearer of Plato, and Polemo, who had been a hearer of Xenocrates, and Grantor, differed in no great degree from Aristotle, who had also been a hearer of Plato; in copiousness and variety of diction, however, they were perhaps unequal to him. Arcesilas, who had been a hearer of Polemo, was the first who eagerly embraced the doctrine drawn from the various writings of Plato and the discourses of Socrates, that ‘there is nothing certain to be known, either by the senses or the understanding;’ he is reported to have adopted an eminently graceful manner of speaking, to have rejected all judgment of the mind and the senses, and to have established first che practice (though it was indeed greatly adopted by Socrates) of not declaring what he himself thought, but of disputing against whatever any other person said that he thought. [68] Hence the New Academy derived its origin, in which Carneades distinguished himself by a quickness of wit, that was in a manner divine, and a peculiar force of eloquence. I knew many at Athens who had been hearers of this philosopher, but I can refer for his character to two persons of undoubted authority, my father-in-law Scaevola, who heard him when a youth at Rome, and Quintus Metellus, the son of Lucius, my intimate friend, a man of high dignity, who informed me that in the early part of his life at Athens, he attended for many days the lectures of this celebrated philosopher, then almost broken with age.16 |
[XIX] [69] Hæc autem, ut ex Appennino fluminum, sic ex communi sapientiæ jugo sunt doctrinarum, facta divortia, ut philosophi tanquam in superum mare Ionium defluerent, Græcum quoddam et portuosum, oratores autem in inferum hoc Tuscum et barbarum, scopulosum atque infestum, laberentur, in quo etiam ipse Ulixes errasset. [70] Quare, si hac eloquentia atque hoc oratore contenti sumus qui sciat
|
XIX. [69] “But the streams of learning have flowed from the common summit of science,17 like rivers from the Apennines, in different directions, so that the philosophers have passed, as it were, into the Upper or Ionian sea, a Greek sea, abounding with harbours, but the orators have fallen into the Lower or Tuscan, a barbarian sea, infested with rocks and dangers, in which even Ulysses himself had mistaken his course. [70] If, therefore, we are content with such a degree of eloquence, and such an orator as has the common discretion to know that you ought either to deny the charge which is brought against you, or, if you cannot do that, to show that what he who is accused has committed, was either done justifiably, or through the fault or wrong of some other person, or that it is agreeable to law, or at least not contrary to any law, or that it was done without design, or from necessity; or that it does not merit the term given it in the accusation; or that the pleading is not conducted as it ought to have been or might have been; and if you think it sufficient to have learned the rules which the writers on rhetoric have delivered, which however Antonius has set forth with much more grace and fulness than they are treated by them; if, I say, you are content with these qualifications, and those which you wished to be specified by me, you reduce the orator from a spacious and immense field of action into a very narrow compass: [71] but if you are desirous to emulate Pericles, or Demosthenes, who is more familiar to us from his numerous writings; and if you are captivated with this noble and illustrious idea and excellence of a perfect orator, you must include in your minds all the powers of Carneades, or those of Aristotle. [72] For, as I observed before, the ancients, till the time of Socrates, united all knowledge and science in all things, whether they appertained to morality, to the duties of life, to virtue, or to civil government, with the faculty of speaking; but afterwards, the eloquent being separated by Socrates from the learned, (as I have already explained,) and this distinction being continued by all the followers of Socrates, the philosophers disregarded eloquence, and the orators philosophy; nor did they at all encroach upon each other’s provinces, except that the orators borrowed from the philosophers, and the philosophers from the orators, such things as they would have taken from the common stock if they had been inclined to remain in their pristine union. [73] But as the old pontiffs, on account of the multitude of religious ceremonies, appointed three officers called Epulones,18 though they themselves were instituted by Numa to perform the epulare sacrificium at the games; so the followers of Socrates excluded the pleaders of causes from their own body, and from the common title of philosophers, though the ancients were of opinion that there was a miraculous harmony between speaking and understanding. |
[XX] [74] Quæ quum ita sint, paululum equidem de me deprecabor et petam a vobis, ut ea quæ dicam non de memet ipso, sed de oratore dicere putetis. Ego enim sum is qui, quum summo studio patris in pueritia doctus essem et in forum ingenii tantum quantum ipse sentio (non tantum quantum forsitan vobis videar) detulissem, non possim dicere me hæc quæ nunc complector, perinde ut dicam discenda esse, didicisse — quippe qui omnium maturrime ad publicas causas accesserim annosque natus unum et viginti nobilissimum hominem et eloquentissimum in judicium vocarim ; cui disciplina fuerit forum, magister usus et leges et instituta Populi Romani mosque majorum. [75] Paululum, sitiens istarum artium de quibus loquor, gustavi, quæstor in Asia quum essem, æqualem fere meum ex Academia rhetorem nactus, Metrodorum illum (de cujus memoria commemoravit Antonius) et, inde decedens, Athenis (ubi ego diutius essem moratus nisi Atheniensibus, quod Mysteria non referrent, ad quæ biduo serius veneram, suscensuissem). Quare hoc, quod complector tantam scientiam vimque doctrinæ, non modo non pro me, sed contra me est potius (non enim quid ego, sed quid orator possit, disputo) — atque hos omnes qui artes rhetoricas exponunt perridiculos. Scribunt enim de litium genere et de principiis et de narrationibus. [76] Illa vis autem eloquentiæ tanta est, ut omnium rerum, virtutum, officiorum omnisque naturæ quæ mores hominum, quæ animos, quæ vitam continet, originem, vim mutationesque teneat, eadem mores, leges, jura describat, rempublicam regat, omniaque, ad quamcunque rem pertineant, ornate copioseque dicat. [77] In quo genere nos quidem versamur tantum quantum possumus, quantum ingenio, quantum mediocri doctrina, quantum usu valemus ; neque tamen istis qui in una philosophia quasi tabernaculum vitæ suæ collocarunt, multum sane in disputatione concedimus. |
XX. [74] “Such being the case, I shall crave some little indulgence for myself, and beg you to consider that whatever I say, I say not of myself, but of the complete orator. For I am a person, who, having been educated in my boyhood, with great care on the part of my father, and having brought into the forum such a portion of talent as I am conscious of possessing, and not so much as I may perhaps appear to you to have, cannot aver that I learned what I now comprehend, exactly as I shall say that it ought to be learned; since I engaged in public business most early of all men, and at one-and-twenty years of age brought to trial a man of the highest rank, and the greatest eloquence;19 and the forum has teen my school, and practice, with the laws and institutions of the Roman people, and the customs of our ancestors, my instructors. [75] I got a small taste of those sciences of which I am speaking, feeling some thirst for them, while I was quaestor in Asia; having procured a rhetorician about my own age from the Academy, that Metrodorus, of whose memory Antonius has made honourable mention; and, on my departure from Asia. at Athens, where I should have stayed longer, had I not been displeased with the Athenians, who would not repeat their mysteries, for which I came two days too late. The fact, therefore, that I comprise within my scheme so much science, and attribute so much influence to learning, makes not only not in my favor, but rather against me, (for I am not considering what I, but what a perfect orator can do,) and against all those who put forth treatises on the art of rhetoric, and who are indeed obnoxious to extreme ridicule; for they write merely about the several kinds of suits, about exordia, and statements of facts; [76] but the real power of eloquence is such, that it embraces the origin, the influence, the changes of all things in the world, all virtues, duties, and all nature, so far as it affects the manners, minds, and lives of mankind. It can give an account of customs, laws, and rights, can govern a state, and speak on everything relating to any subject whatsoever with elegance and force. [77] In this pursuit I employ my talents as well as I can, as far as I am enabled by natural capacity, moderate learning, and constant practice; nor do I conceive myself much inferior in disputation to those who have as it were pitched their tent for life in philosophy alone. |
[XXI] [78] ¿Quid enim meus familiaris C. Vellejus afferre potest, quamobrem voluptas sit summum bonum, quod ego non copiosius possim vel tutari, si velim, vel refellere ex illis locis quos exposuit Antonius, hac dicendi exercitatione in qua Vellejus est rudis, unus quisque nostrum versatus? ¿Quid est, quod aut Sex. Pompejus aut duo Balbi aut meus amicus qui cum Panætio vixit, M. Vigellius, de virtute — homines Stoici — possint dicere, qua in disputatione ego his debeam, aut vestrum quisquam, concedere? [79] Non est enim philosophia similis artium reliquarum. Nam ¿quid faciet in geometria qui non didicerit? ¿Quid in musicis? Aut taceat oportebit aut ne sanus quidem judicetur. Hæc vero quæ sunt in philosophia ingeniis eruuntur ad id quod in quoque verisimile est, eliciendum acutis atque acribus, eaque exercitata oratione poliuntur. Hinc hic noster vulgaris orator, si minus erit doctus ac, tamen, in dicendo exercitatus, hac ipsa exercitatione communi istos quidem verberabit, neque se ab eis contemni ac despici sinet. [80] Sin aliquis exstiterit aliquando qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque sententiam possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes præceptis illius cognitis explicare, aut hoc Arcesilæ modo et Carneadi contra omne quod propositum sit, disserat, quique ad eam rationem exercitationemque adjungat hunc usum moremque exercitationemque dicendi, is sit verus, is perfectus, is solus orator. Nam neque sine forensibus nervis satis vehemens et gravis, nec sine varietate doctrinæ satis politus et sapiens esse orator potest. [81] Quare Coracem istum veterem patiamur nos quidem pullos suos excudere in nido, qui evolent clamatores odiosi ac molesti, Pamphilumque nescio quem sinamus in infulis tantam rem tanquam pueriles delicias aliquas depingere, nosque ipsi hac tam exigua disputatione hesterni et hodierni diei totum oratoris munus explicemus, dummodo illa res tanta sit, ut omnibus philosophorum libris, quos nemo istorum unquam attigit, comprehensa esse videatur.” |
XXI. [78] “For what can my friend Caius Vellejus20 allege, to show why pleasure is the chief good, which I cannot either maintain more fully, if I were so inclined, or refute, with the aid of those common-places which Antonius has set forth, and that habit of speaking in which Vellejus himself is unexercised, but every one of us experienced? What is there that either Sextus Pompejus, or the two Balbi,21 or my acquaintance Marcus Vigellius, who lived with Panaetius, all men of the Stoic sect, can maintain concerning virtue, in such a manner that either I, or any one of you, should give place to them in debate? For philosophy is not like other arts or sciences; since what can he do in geometry, or in [79] music, who has never learned? He must be silent, or be thought a madman; but the principles of philosophy are discovered by such minds as have acuteness and penetration enough to extract what is most probable concerning any subject, and are elegantly expressed with the aid of exercise in speaking. On such topics, a speaker of ordinary abilities, if he has no great learning, but has had practice in declaiming, will, by virtue of such practice, common to others as well as to him, beat our friends the philosophers, and not suffer himself to be despised and held in contempt; [80] but if ever a person shall arise who shall have abilities to deliver opinions on both sides of a question on all subjects, after the manner of Aristotle, and, from a knowledge of the precepts of that philosopher, to deliver two contradictory orations on every conceivable topic, or shall be able, after the manner of Arcesilas or Carneades, to dispute against every proposition that can be laid down, and shall unite with those powers rhetorical skill, and practice and exercise in speaking, be will be the true, the perfect, the only orator. For neither without the nervous eloquence of the forum, can an orator have sufficient weight, dignity, and force; nor, without variety of learning, sufficient elegance and judgment. [81] Let us suffer that old Corax of yours,22 therefore, to hatch his young birds in the nest, that they may fly out disagreeable and troublesome bawlers; and let us allow Pamphilus, whoever he was,23 to depict a science of such consequence upon flags, as if for an amusement for children; while we ourselves describe the whole business of an orator, in so short a disputation as that of yesterday and today; admitting, however, that it is of such extent as to be spread through all the books of the philosophers, into which none of those rhetoricians24 has ever dipped.” |
[XXII] [82] Tum Catulus, “Haudquaquam hercule,” inquit, “Crasse, mirandum est esse in te tantam dicendi vel vim vel suavitatem vel copiam ; quem quidem antea natura rebar ita dicere, ut mihi non solum orator summus, sed etiam sapientissimus homo viderere ; nunc intellego illa te semper etiam potiora duxisse quæ ad sapientiam spectarent, atque ex his hanc dicendi copiam fluxisse. Sed tamen, quum omnes gradus ætatis recordor tuæ, quumque vitam tuam ac studia considero, neque quo tempore ista didiceris video, nec magnopere te istis studiis, hominibus, libris intellego deditum. Neque tamen possum statuere utrum magis mirer te illa quæ mihi persuades maxima esse adjumenta potuisse in tantis tuis occupationibus perdiscere an, si non potueris, posse isto modo dicere.” [83] Hic Crassus, “Hoc tibi,” inquit, “Catule, primum persuadeas velim, me non multo secus facere, quum de oratore disputem, ac facerem si esset mihi de histrione dicendum. Negarem enim posse eum satisfacere in gestu nisi palæstram, nisi saltare didicisset ; neque ea quum dicerem, me esse histrionem necesse esset, sed fortasse non stultum alieni artificii existimatorem. [84] Similiter nunc de oratore vestro impulsu loquor — summo scilicet. Semper enim, quacunque de arte aut facultate quæritur, de absoluta et perfecta quæri solet. Quare, si jam me vultis esse oratorem, si etiam sat bonum, si bonum denique, non repugnabo ; ¿quid enim nunc sim ineptus? Ita me existimari scio. Quod si ita est, summus tamen certe non sum. Neque enim apud homines res est ulla difficilior, neque major neque quæ plura adjumenta doctrinæ desideret. [85] Attamen, quoniam de oratore nobis disputandum est, de summo oratore dicam necesse est. Vis enim et natura rei, nisi perfecta ante oculos ponitur, qualis et quanta sit intellegi non potest. Me autem, Catule, fateor neque hodie in istis libris et cum istis hominibus vivere, nec vero — id quod tu recte commeministi — ullum unquam habuisse sepositum tempus ad discendum, ac tantum tribuisse doctrinæ temporis, quantum mihi puerilis ætas, forenses feriæ concesserint. |
XXII. [82] Catulus then said, “It is, indeed, by no means astonishing, Crassus, that there should appear in you either such energy, or such agreeableness, or such copiousness of language; though I previously supposed that it was merely from the force of natural genius that you spoke in such a way as to seem to me not only the greatest of orators, but the wisest of men; but I now understand that you have always given precedence to matters relating to philosophy, and your copious stream of eloquence has flowed from that source; and yet, when I recollect the different stages of your life, and when I consider your manner of living and pursuits, I can neither conceive at what time you acquired that learning, nor can I imagine you to be strongly addicted to those studies, or men, or writings; nor can I determine at which of these two things I ought most to feel surprised, that you could obtain a thorough knowledge of those matters which you persuade me are of the utmost assistance to oratory, amid such important occupations as yours, or that, if you could not do so, you can speak with such effect.” [83] Here Crassus rejoined, “I would have you first of all, Catulus, persuade yourself of this, that, when I speak of an orator, I speak not much otherwise than I should do if I had to speak of an, actor; for I should say that he could not possibly give satisfaction in his gesture unless he had learned the exercises of the palaestra, and dancing; nor would it be necessary that, when I said this, I should be myself a player, though it perhaps would be necessary that I should be a not unskilful critic in another man’s profession. [84] In like manner I am now, at your request, speaking of the orator, that is, the perfect orator; for, about whatever art or faculty inquiry is made, it always relates to it in its state of absolute perfection; and if, therefore, you now allow me to be a speaker, if even a pretty good one, or a positively good one, I will not contradict you; (for why should I, at my time of life, be so foolish 1 I know that I am esteemed such;) but, if it be so, I am certainly not perfect. For there is not among mankind any pursuit of greater difficulty or effort, or that requires more aids from learning; [85] but, since I have to speak of the orator, I must of necessity speak of the perfect orator; for unless the powers and nature of a thing be set before the eyes in their utmost perfection, its character and magnitude cannot be understood. Yet I confess, Catulus, that I do not at present live in any great familiarity with the writings or the professors of philosophy, and that, as you have rightly observed, I never had much leisure to set apart for the acquisition of such learning, and that I have only given to study such portions of time as my leisure when I was a youth, and vacations from the business of the forum, have allowed me. |
[XXIII] [86] Ac, si quæris, Catule, de doctrina ista quid ego sentiam, non tantum ingenioso homini et ei qui forum, qui curiam, qui causas, qui rempublicam spectet opus esse arbitror temporis, quantum sibi ii sumpserunt quos discentes vita defecit. Omnes enim artes aliter ab eis tractantur qui eas ad usum transferunt, aliter ab eis qui, ipsarum artium tractatu delectati, nihil in vita sunt aliud acturi. Magister hic Samnitium summa jam senectute est, et quotidie commentatur ; nihil enim curat aliud. At Q. Velocius puer addidicerat ; sed quod erat aptus ad illud, totumque cognorat, fuit (ut est apud Lucilium)
|
XXIII. [86] “But if, Catulus, you. inquire my sentiments on that learning, I am of opinion that so much time need not be spent on it by a man of ability, and one who studies with a view to the forum, to the senate, to causes, to civil administration, as those have chosen to give to it whom life has failed while they were learning. For all arts are handled in one manner by those who apply them to practice; in another by those who, taking delight in treating of the arts themselves, never intend to do anything else during the whole course of their lives. The master of the gladiators25 is now in the extremity of age, yet daily meditates upon the improvement of his science, for he has no other care; but Quintus Velocius26 had learned that exercise in his youth, and, as he was naturally formed for it, and had thoroughly acquired it, he was, as it is said in Lucilius, Though as a gladiator in the school Well skill’d, and bold enough to match with any, yet resolved to devote more attention to the duties of the forum, and of friendship, and to his domestic concerns. Valerius27 sung every day; for he was on the stage; what else was he to do? [87] But our friend Numerius Furius sings only when it is agreeable to him; for he is the head of a family, and of equestrian dignity; he learned when a boy as much as it was necessary for him to learn. The case is similar with regard to sciences of the greatest importance; we have seen Quintus Tubero,28 a man of eminent virtue and prudence, engaged in the study of philosophy night and day, but his uncle Africanus29 you could scarcely ever perceive paying any attention to it, though he paid a great deal. Such knowledge is easily gained, if you only get as much of it as is necessary, and have a faithful and able instructor, and know how to learn yourself. [88] But if you are inclined to do nothing else all your life, your very studies and inquiries daily give rise to something for you to investigate as an amusement at your leisure; thus it happens, that the investigation of particular points is endless, though general knowledge is easy, if practice establish learning once acquired, moderate exercise be devoted to it, and memory and inclination continue. But it is pleasant to be constantly learning, if we wish to be thoroughly masters of anything; as if I, for instance, had a desire to play excellently at backgammon, or had a strong attachment to tennis, though perhaps I should not attain perfection in those games; but others, because they excel in any performance, take a more vehement delight in it than the object requires, as Titius30 in tennis, Brulla in backgammon. [89] There is no reason, therefore, why any one should dread the extent of the sciences because he perceives old men still learning them; for either they were old men when they first applied to them, or have been detained in the study of them till they became old; or are of more than ordinary stupidity. And the truth in my opinion is, that a man can never learn thoroughly that which he has not been able to learn quickly.” |
[XXIV] [90] “Jamjam,” inquit Catulus, “intellego, Crasse, quid dicas ; et hercule assentior. Satis video tibi, homini ad perdiscendum acerrimo ad ea cognoscenda quæ dicis, fuisse temporis.” “¿Pergisne,” inquit Crassus, “me quæ dicam, de me — non de re —, putare dicere? Sed jam, si placet, ad instituta redeamus.” |
XXIV. [90] “Now, now,” exclaimed Catulus, “I understand, Crassus, what you say, and readily assent to it; I see that there has been time enough for you, a man of vigor and ability to learn, to acquire a knowledge of what you mention.” “Do you still persist,” rejoined Crassus, “to think that I say what I say of myself, and not of my subject? But, if it be agreeable to you, let us now return to our stated business.”To me,” said Catulus, “it is very agreeable.” |
[91] Tum Crassus, “¿Quorsum igitur hæc spectat,” inquit, “tam longa et tam alte repetita oratio? Hæ duæ partes quæ mihi supersunt — illustrandæ orationis ac totius eloquentiæ cumulandæ, quarum altera dici postulat ornate {③}, altera apte {④} — hanc habent vim, ut sit quam maxime jucunda, quam maxime in sensus eorum qui audiunt influat, et quam plurimis sit rebus instructa. [92] Instrumentum autem hoc forense, litigiosum, acre, tractum ex vulgi opinionibus, exiguum saneque mendicum est. Illud rursus ipsum, quod tradunt isti qui profitentur se dicendi magistros, non multum est majus quam illud vulgare ac forense. Apparatu nobis opus est et rebus exquisitis, undique et collectis, arcessitis, comportatis, ut tibi, Cæsar, faciendum est ad annum, ut ego in ædilitate laboravi, quod quotidianis et vernaculis rebus satisfacere me posse huic populo non putabam. [93] Verborum eligendorum et collocandorum et concludendorum facilis est vel ratio vel sine ratione ipsa exercitatio. Rerum est silva magna, quam quum Græci jam non tenerent ob eamque causam juventus nostra dedisceret pæne discendo, etiam Latini, si dis placet, hoc biennio magistri dicendi exstiterunt, quos ego censor edicto meo sustuleram, non quo (ut nescio quos dicere ajebant) acui ingenia adulescentium nollem, sed contra, ingenia obtundi nolui, corroborari impudentiam. [94] Nam apud Græcos, cuicuimodi essent, videbam tamen esse, præter hanc exercitationem, linguæ doctrinam aliquam et humanitate dignam scientiam ; hos vero novos magistros nihil intellegebam posse docere, nisi ut auderent ; quod etiam cum bonis rebus conjunctum per se ipsum est magnopere fugiendum. Hoc quum unum traderetur, et quum impudentiæ ludus esset, putavi esse censoris, ne longius id serperet, providere. [95] Quanquam, non hæc ita statuo atque decerno, ut desperem Latine ea de quibus disputavimus tradi ac perpoliri posse ; patitur enim et lingua nostra et natura rerum veterem illam excellentemque prudentiam Græcorum ad nostrum usum moremque transferri ; sed hominibus opus est eruditis — qui adhuc in hoc quidem genere nostri nulli fuerunt ; sin quando exstiterint, etiam Græcis erunt anteponendi. |
[91] “To what end, then,” continued Crassus, “does this discourse, drawn out to so great a length, and brought from such deep sources, tend? The two parts which remain for me, that of adorning language, and contemplating eloquence in general in its highest perfection, one of which requires that we should speak gracefully, the other aptly, have this influence, that eloquence is rendered by their means productive of the utmost delight, made to penetrate effectually into the inmost hearts of the audience, and furnished with all possible variety of matter. [92] But the speech which we use in the forum, adapted for contest, full of acrimony, formed to suit the taste of the vulgar, is poor indeed and beggarly; and, on the other hand, even that which they teach who profess themselves masters of the art of speaking, is not of much more dignity than the common style of the forum. We have need of greater pomp,31 of choice matter collected, imported, and brought together from all parts; such a provision as must be made by you, Caesar, for the next year,32 with such pains as I took in my aedileship, because I did not suppose that I could satisfy such a people as ours with ordinary matters, or those of their own country. [93] “As for choosing and arranging words, and forming them into proper periods, the art is easy, or, I may say, the mere practice without any art at all. Of matter, the quantity and variety are infinite; and as the Greeks33 were not properly furnished with it, and our youth in consequence almost grew ignorant while they were learning, even Latin teachers of rhetoric, please the gods, have arisen within the last two years; a class of persons whom I had suppressed by my edict,34 when I was censor, not because I was unwilling (as some, I know not who, asserted,) that the abilities of cur youth should be improved, but because I did not wish that their understandings should be weakened and their impudence strengthened. [94] For among the Greeks, whatever was their character, I perceived that there was, besides exercise of the tongue, some degree of learning, as well as politeness suited to liberal knowledge; but I knew that these new masters could teach youth nothing but effrontery, which, even when joined with good qualities, is to be avoided, and, in itself, especially so; and as this, therefore, was the only thing that was taught by the Latins, their school being indeed a school of impudence, I thought it became the censor to take care that the evil should not spread further. [95] I do not, however, determine and decree on the point, as if I despaired that the subjects which we are discussing can be delivered, and treated with elegance, in Latin; for both our language and the nature of things allows the ancient and excellent science of Greece to be adapted to our customs and manners; but for such a work are required men of learning, such as none of our countrymen have been in this department; but if ever such arise, they will be preferable to the Greeks themselves. |
[XXV] [96] Ornatur igitur oratio genere primum et quasi colore quodam et suco suo. Nam ut gravis, ut suavis, ut erudita sit, ut liberalis, ut admirabilis, ut polita, ut sensus, ut doloris habeat quantum opus sit, non est singulorum articulorum ; in toto spectantur hæc corpore. Ut porro conspersa sit quasi verborum sententiarumque floribus, id non debet esse fusum æquabiliter per omnem orationem, sed ita distinctum, ut sint quasi in ornatu disposita quædam insignia et lumina. [97] Genus igitur dicendi est eligendum, quod maxime teneat eos qui audiant, et quod non solum delectet, sed etiam sine satietate delectet. (Non enim a me jam exspectari puto, ut moneam, ut caveatis, ne exilis, ne inculta sit vestra oratio, ne vulgaris, ne obsoleta ; aliud quiddam majus et ingenia me hortantur vestra et ætates.) [98] Difficile enim dictu est, quænam causa sit, cur ab eis rebus quæ maxime sensus nostros impellunt voluptate, et specie prima acerrime commovent, celerrime fastidio quodam et satietate abalienemur. ¡Quanto colorum pulcritudine et varietate floridiora sunt in picturis novis pleraque quam in veteribus! Quæ tamen, etiamsi primo aspectu nos ceperunt, diutius non delectant — quum iidem nos in antiquis tabulis illo ipso horrido obsoletoque teneamur. ¡Quanto molliores sunt et delicatiores in cantu flexiones et falsæ voculæ quam certæ et severæ! Quibus tamen non modo austeri, sed, si sæpius fiunt, multitudo ipsa reclamat. [99] Licet hoc videre in reliquis sensibus ; unguentis minus diu nos delectari summa et acerrima suavitate conditis quam his moderatis, et magis laudari quod ceram quam quod crocum sapere videatur ; in ipso tactu esse modum et mollitudinis et lēvitatis. Quin etiam gustatus, qui est sensus ex omnibus maxime voluptarius quique dulcitudine præter ceteros sensus commovetur, ¡quam cito id quod valde dulce est, aspernatur ac respuit! ¿Quis potione uti aut cibo dulci diutius potest? Quum utroque in genere ea quæ leviter sensum voluptate moveant facillime fugiant satietatem. [100] Sic omnibus in rebus voluptatibus maximis fastidium finitimum est ; quo hoc minus in oratione miremur in qua vel ex poëtis vel ex oratoribus possumus judicare concinnam, distinctam, ornatam, festivam, sine intermissione, sine reprehensione, sine varietate — quamvis claris sit coloribus picta vel poësis vel oratio —, non posse in delectatione esse diuturna. Atque eo citius in oratoris aut in poëtæ cincinnis ac fuco offenditur, quod sensus in nimia voluptate natura, non mente satiantur, in scriptis et in dictis non aurium solum, sed animi judicio etiam magis, infucata vitia noscuntur. |
XXV. [96] “A speech, then, is to be made becoming in its kind, with a sort of complexion and substance of its own; for that it be weighty, agreeable, savouring of erudition and liberal knowledge, worthy of admiration, polished, having feeling and passion in it, as far as is required, are qualities not confined to particular members, but are apparent in the whole body; but that it be, as it were, strewed with flowers of language and thought, is a property which ought not to be equally diffused throughout the whole speech, but at such intervals, that, as in the arrangement of ornaments,35 there may be certain remarkable and luminous objects disposed here and there. [97] Such a kind of eloquence, therefore, is to be chosen, as is most adapted to interest the audience, such as may not only delight, but delight without satiety; (for I do not imagine it to be expected of me, that I should admonish you to beware that your language be not poor, or rude, or vulgar, or obsolete: both your age and your geniuses encourage me to something of a higher nature;) [98] for it is difficult to toll what the cause is why, from those objects which most strongly strike our senses with pleasure, and occasion the most violent emotions at their first appearance, we should soonest turn away with a certain loathing and satiety. How much more florid, in the gaiety and variety of the coloring, are most objects in modern pictures than in ancient ones; which, however, though they captivate us at first sight, do not afford any lasting pleasure; whereas we are strongly attracted by rough and faded coloring in the paintings of antiquity. How much softer and more delicate are fanciful36 modulations and notes in music, than those which are strict and grave; and yet if the former are often repeated, not only persons of an austere character, but even the multitude, raise an outcry against them. [99] We may perceive, too, in regard to the other senses, that we take a less permanent delight in perfumes composed of the sweetest and most powerful odours, than in those of a more moderate scent; that that is more commended which appears to smell like wax, than that which is as strong as saffron; and that, in the sense of feeling itself, there is a limit required both to softness and smoothness. How soon does even the taste, which of all our senses is the most desirous of gratification, and is delighted with sweetness beyond the others, nauseate and reject that which is too luscious! Who can take sweet drinks and meats long together? while, in both kinds of nutriment, such things as affect the sense with but a slight pleasure are the furthest removed from that satiating quality; [100] and so, in all ether things, loathing still borders upon the most exquisite delights; and therefore we should the less wonder at this effect in language, in which we may form a judgment, either from the poets or the orators, that a style elegant, ornate, embellished, and sparkling, without intermission, without restraint, without variety, whether it be prose or poetry, though painted with the brightest colors, cannot possibly give lasting pleasure. And we the sooner take offence at the false locks and paint of the orator or poet, for this cause, that the senses, when affected with too much pleasure, are satiated, not from reason, but constitutionally; in writings and in speeches these disguised blemishes are even more readily noticed, not only from the judgment of the ear, but from that of the understanding. |
[XXVI] [101] Quare, “bene” et “præclare” quamvis nobis sæpe dicatur ; “belle” et “festive” nimium sæpe nolo. Quanquam illa ipsa exclamatio “non potest melius” sit velim crebra, sed habeat tamen illa in dicendo admiratio ac summa laus umbram aliquam et recessum quo magis id quod erit illuminatum exstare atque eminere videatur. [102] Nunquam agit hunc versum Roscius eo gestu quo potest : |
XXVI. [101] “Though such expressions of applause, therefore, as ‘very well,’ ‘excellent,’ may be often repeated to me, I would not have ‘beautifully,’ ‘pleasantly,’ come too often; yet 1 would have the exclamation Nothing can be better, very frequent. But this high excellence and merit in speaking Bhould be attended with some portions of shade and obscurity, that the part on which a stronger light is thrown may seem to stand out, and become more prominent. [102] Roscius never delivers this passage with all the spirit that he can, The wise man seeks for honor, not for spoil, As the reward of virtue; but rather in an abject manner, that into the next speech, What do I see? the steel-girt soldier holds The sacred seats, he may throw his whole powers, may gaze, may express wonder and astonishment. How does the other great actor37 utter What aid shall I solicit? How gently, how sedately, how calmly! For he proceeds with father! my country! House of Priam! in which so much action could not be exerted if it had been consumed and exhausted by any preceding emotion. Nor did the actors discover this before the poets themselves, or, indeed, before even those who composed the music, by both of whom their tone is sometimes lowered, sometimes heightened, sometimes made slender, sometimes full, with variation and distinction. [103] Let our orator, then, be thus graceful and delightful (nor can he indeed be so otherwise); let him have a severe and solid grace, not a luscious and delicious sweetness; for the precepts relative to the ornament of eloquence, which are commonly given, are of such a nature that even the worst speaker can observe them. It is first of all necessary, therefore, as I said before, that a stock of matter and thoughts be got together; a point on which Antonius has already spoken; these are to be interwoven into the very thread and essence of the oration, embellished by words, and diversified by illustrations. |
[104] Summa autem laus eloquentiæ est amplificare rem ornando, quod valet non solum ad augendum aliquid et tollendum altius dicendo, sed etiam ad extenuandum atque abjiciendum. |
“But the greatest glory of eloquence is to exaggerate a subject by embellishment; which [104] has effect not only in amplifying and extolling anything in a speech to an extraordinary degree, but also in extenuating it, and making it appear contemptible. |
[XXVII] Id desideratur omnibus eis in locis, quos ad fidem orationis faciendam adhiberi dixit Antonius, vel quum explanamus aliquid, vel quum conciliamus animos, vel quum concitamus. [105] Sed in hoc quod postremum dixi, amplificatio potest plurimum, eaque una laus oratoris est propria maxime. Tanto major est illa exercitatio quam extremo sermone instruxit Antonius, primo rejiciebat : laudandi et vituperandi. Nihil est enim ad exaggerandam et amplificandam orationem accommodatius quam utrumque horum cumulatissime facere posse. [106] Consequentur etiam illi loci qui, quanquam proprii causarum et inhærentes in earum nervis esse debent, tamen quia de universa re tractari solent, ‘communes’ a veteribus nominati sunt ; quorum partim habent vitiorum et peccatorum acrem quandam cum amplificatione incusationem aut querelam, contra quam dici nihil solet nec potest, ut in depeculatorem, in proditorem, in parricidam ; quibus uti confirmatis criminibus oportet, aliter enim jejuni sunt atque inanes ; [107] alii autem habent deprecationem aut miserationem ; alii vero ancipites disputationes, in quibus de universo genere in utramque partem disseri copiose licet. Quæ exercitatio nunc propria duarum philosophiarum de quibus ante dixi putatur ; apud antiquos erat eorum a quibus omnis de rebus forensibus dicendi ratio et copia petebatur. De virtute enim, de officio, de æquo et bono, de dignitate, utilitate, honore, ignominia, præmio, pœna similibusque de rebus in utramque partem dicendi etiam nos vim et artem habere debemus. [108] Sed quoniam de nostra possessione depulsi in parvo et eo litigioso prædiolo relicti sumus, et aliorum patroni nostra tenere tuerique non potuimus, ab eis (quod indignissimum est) qui in nostrum patrimonium irruperunt, quod opus est, nobis mutuemur. |
XXVII. This is required on all those points which Antonius said must be observed in order to gain credit to our statements, when we explain anything, or when we conciliate the feelings, or when we excite the passions of our audience; [105] but in the particular which I mentioned last, amplification is of the greatest effect; and excellence in it the peculiar and appropriate praise of the orator. Even that exercise is of more than ordinary importance which Antonius illustrated38 in the latter part of his dissertation, (in the beginning39 he set it aside,) I mean that of panegyric and satire; for nothing is a better preparative for exaggeration and amplification in a speech than the talent of performing both these parts in a most effective manner. [106] Consequently, even those topics are of use which, though they ought to be proper to causes, and to be inherent in their very vitals, yet, as they are commonly applied to general subjects, have been by the ancients denominated common places; of which some consist in bitter accusations and complaints against vices and crimes, with a certain amplification, (in opposition to which nothing is usually said, or can be said,) as against an embezzler of the public money, or a traitor, or a parricide; remarks which we ought to introduce when the charges have been proved, for otherwise they sire jejune and trifling; [107] others consist in entreaty or commiseration; others relate to contested points of argument, whence you may be enabled to speak fully on either side of any general question, an exercise which is now imagined to be peculiar to those two sects of philosophy40 of which I spoke before; among those of remote antiquity it belonged to those from whom all the art and power of speaking in forensic pleadings was derived;41 for concerning virtue, duty, justice and equity, dignity, utility, honor, ignominy, rewards and punishments, and similar subjects, we ought to possess the spirit, and talent, and address, to speak on either side of the question. [108] But since, being driven from our own possessions, we are left in a poor little farm, and even that the subject of litigation, and since, though the patrons of others, we have not been able to preserve and protect our own property, let us borrow what is requisite for us (which is a notable disgrace) from those42 who have made this irruption into our patrimony. |
[XXVIII] [109] Dicunt igitur nunc quidem illi — qui ex particula parva urbis ac loci nomen habent, et Peripatetici philosophi aut Academici nominantur, olim autem qui propter eximiam rerum maximarum scientiam, a Græcis ‘politici’ philosophi appellati, universarum rerumpublicarum nomine vocabantur — omnem civilem orationem in horum alterutro genere versari,
|
XXVIII. [109] “Those, then, who take their name from a very small portion43 of Athens and its neighbourhood, .and are denominated Peripatetic or Academic philosophers, but who formerly, on account of their eminent knowledge in important affairs, were by the Greeks called political philosophers, being distinguished by a name relating to all public administration, say that every speech on civil affairs is employed on one or other of these two kinds of questions, either that of a definite controversy limited to certain times and parties; as, ‘Whether is it proper that our captives be recovered from the Carthaginians by the restitution of theirs?’ or on an indefinite question, inquiring about a subject generally; as, ‘What should be determined or considered concerning captives in general? ‘Of these, they term the former kind a cause or controversy, and limit it to three things, law-suits, deliberations, and panegyric; but the other kind of question, or proposition as it were, the indefinite, is denominated a consultation.44 So far they instruct us. [110] The rhetoricians, however, use this division in their instructions, but not so that they seem to recover a lost possession by right, by a decision in their favor, or by force, but appear, according to the practice of the civil law, to assert their claim to the premises by breaking off a branch;45 for they keep possession of that former kind which is restricted to certain times, places, and parties, and that as it were by the hem of the garment;46 for at this present time, under Philo,47 who flourishes, I hear, as chief of the Academy, the knowledge and practice of even these causes is much observed; as to the latter kind, they only mention it in delivering the first principles of the art, and say that it belongs to the orator; but neither explain its powers, nor its nature, nor its parts, nor general heads, so that it had better have been passed over entirely, than left when it was once attempted; for they are now understood to say nothing about it for want of something to say; in the other case, they would have appeared to be silent from judgment. |
[XXIX] [111] Omnis igitur res eandem habet naturam ambigendi de qua quæri et disceptari potest, sive in infinitis consultationibus disceptatur, sive in eis causis quæ in civitate et forensi disceptatione versantur ; neque est ulla quæ non ad cognoscendi aut ad agendi vim rationemque referatur.
|
XXIX. [111] “Every subject, then, has the same susceptibleness of ambiguity, concerning which it may be inquired and disputed; whether the discussion relate to consultations on indefinite points, or to those causes which are concerned with civil affairs and contests in the forum; nor is there any that may not be referred either to the nature and principles of knowledge or of action. [112] For either the knowledge itself and acquaintance with any affair is the object of inquiry; as, ‘Whether virtue be desirable on account of its own intrinsic worth, or for the sake of some emolument attending it?’ or counsel with regard to an act is sought; as, ‘Whether a wise man ought to concern himself in the administration of government?’ [113] And of knowledge there are three kinds, that which is formed by conjecture, that which admits of certain definition, and that which is (if I may so term it) consequential. For whether there be anything in any other thing, is inquired by conjecture; as, ‘Whether there is wisdom in mankind?’ But what nature anything has, a definition explains; as if the inquiry be, ‘What is wisdom? ‘And consequential knowledge is the subject treated of, when the question is, ‘What peculiarity attends on anything?’ as, ‘Whether it be the part of a good man to tell a falsehood on any occasion?’ [114] But to conjecture they return again, and divide it into four kinds; for the question is either, ‘What a thing is,’ as, ‘Whether law among mankind is from nature or from opinions?’ or, ‘What the origin of a thing is,’ as, ‘What is the foundation of civil laws and governments? ‘or the cause and reason of it; as if it is asked, ‘Why do the most learned men differ upon points of the greatest importance? or as to the possible changes in anything; as if it is disputed, ‘Whether virtue can die in men, or whether it be convertible into vice?’ [115] With regard to definition, disputes arise, either when the question is, ‘What is impressed, as it were, on the common understanding?’ as if it be considered, ‘Whether that be right which is advantageous to the greater number?’ or when it is inquired, ‘What is the peculiar property of any character?’ as, ‘Whether to speak elegantly be peculiar to the orator, or whether any one else can do so?’ or when a thing is distributed into parts; as if the question be, ‘How many kinds of desirable things there are?’ and, ‘Whether there be three, those of the body, those of the mind, and external things?’ or when it is described what is the form or, as it were, natural characteristic of any person; as if it be inquired, ‘What is the exact representation of an avaricious, a seditious, or a vain-glorious man?’ [116] Of the consequential, two principal kinds of questions are proposed; for the question is either simple, as if it be disputed, ‘Whether glory be desirable? ‘or comparative, ‘Whether praise or wealth is more to be coveted? ‘But of such simple questions there are three sorts, as to things that are to be desired or avoided; as, ‘Whether honors are desirable?’ ‘Whether poverty is to be avoided?’ as to right and wrong; as, ‘Whether it be right to revenge injuries, even those of relations?’ as to honor and ignominy; as, ‘Whether it be honourable to suffer death for the sake of glory?’ [117] Of the comparative also there are two sorts: one, when the question is whether things are the same, or there be any difference betwixt them; as betwixt fear and reverence, a king and a tyrant, a flatterer and a friend; the other, when the inquiry is, ‘Which of two things is preferable?’ as, ‘Whether wise men are led by the approbation of the most worthy, or by popular applause?’ Thus are the controversies which relate to knowledge described, for the most part, by men of the greatest learning. |
XXX.
[119] Explicatis igitur his generibus ac modis disceptationum omnium, nihil sane ad rem pertinet, si qua in re discrepuit ab Antonii divisione nostra partitio. Eadem enim sunt membra in utriusque disputatione, sed paulo secus a me atque ab illo partita ac tributa. Nunc ad reliqua progrediar, meque ad meum munus pensumque revocabo. Nam ex illis locis quos exposuit Antonius, omnia sunt ad quæque genera quæstionum argumenta sumenda ; sed aliis generibus alii loci magis erunt apti ; de quo non tam quia longum est quam quia perspicuum est, dici nihil est necesse. [120] Ornatissimæ sunt igitur orationes eæ quæ latissime vagantur, et a privata ac singulari controversia se ad universi generis vim explicandam conferunt et convertunt, ut ii qui audiant — natura et genere et universa re cognita — de singulis reis et criminibus et litibus statuere possint. [121] Hanc ad consuetudinem exercitationis vos, adulescentes, est cohortatus Antonius atque a minutis angustisque concertationibus ad omnem vim varietatemque vos disserendi traducendos putavit. Quare non est paucorum libellorum hoc munus, ut qui scripserunt de dicendi ratione arbitrantur, neque Tusculani atque hujus ambulationis antemeridianæ aut nostræ pomeridianæ sessionis. Non enim solum acuenda nobis neque procudenda lingua est, sed onerandum complendumque pectus maximarum rerum et plurimarum suavitate, copia, varietate. |
XXX. [118] “But those which relate to action, either concern controverted points of moral duty, under which head it may be inquired, ‘What is right and to be practised;’ of which head the whole train of virtues and of vices is the subject-matter; or refer to the excitement, or alleviation, or removal of some emotion f the mind. Under this head are included exhortation, reproof, consolation, compassion, and all that either gives impulse to any emotion of the mind, or, if it so happen, mitigates it. [119] These kinds, then, and modes of all questions being explained, it is of no consequence if the partition of Antonius in any particular disagrees with my division; for there are the same parts in both our dissertations, though divided and distributed by me a little otherwise than by him. Now I will proceed to the sequel, and recall myself to my appointed task and business. For the arguments for every kind of question are to be drawn from those common places which Antonius enumerated; but some common places will be more adapted to some kinds than to others; concerning which there is no necessity for me to speak, not because it is a matter of any great length, but of sufficient perspicuity. [120] “Those speeches, then, are the most ornate which spread over the widest field, and, from some private and single question, apply and direct themselves to show the nature of such questions in general, so that the audience, from understanding its nature, and kind, and whole bearing, may determine as to particular individuals, and as to all suits criminal and civil. [121] Antonius has encouraged you, young men, to perseverance in this exercise, and intimated that you were to be conducted by degrees from small and confined questions to all the power and varieties of argument. Such qualifications are not to be gained from a few small treatises, as they have imagined who have written on the art of speaking; nor are they work merely for a Tusculan villa, or for a morning walk and afternoon sitting, such as these of ours; for we have not only to point and fashion the tongue, but have to store the mind with the sweetness, abundance, and variety of most important and numerous subjects. |
[XXXI] [122] Nostra est enim — si modo nos oratores, si in civium disceptationibus, si in periculis, si in deliberationibus publicis adhibendi auctores et principes sumus — nostra est, inquam, omnis ista prudentiæ doctrinæque possessio, in quam homines quasi caducam atque vacuam, abundantes otio, nobis occupatis, involaverunt, atque etiam aut irridentes oratorem, ut ille in Gorgia Socrates, cavillantur, aut aliquid de oratoris arte paucis præcipiunt libellis, eosque ‘rhetoricos’ inscribunt — quasi non illa sint propria oratorum quæ ab eisdem de justitia, de officio, de civitatibus instituendis et regendis, de omni vivendi — denique etiam de naturæ — ratione dicuntur. [123] Quæ, quoniam jam aliunde non possumus, sumenda sunt nobis ab eis ipsis a quibus expilati sumus, dummodo illa ad hanc civilem scientiam, quo pertinent et quam intuentur, transferamus, neque (ut ante dixi) omnem teramus in his discendis rebus ætatem ; sed quum fontes viderimus (quos nisi qui celeriter cognorit, nunquam cognoscet omnino), tum quotienscunque opus erit, ex eis tantum quantum res petet hauriemus. [124] Nam neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam nisi monstratas possit videre, neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo aspexerit. In hoc igitur tanto tam immensoque campo quum liceat oratori vagari libere, atque ubicunque constiterit, consistere in suo, facile suppeditat omnis apparatus ornatusque dicendi. [125] Rerum enim copia verborum copiam gignit ; et, si est honestas in rebus ipsis de quibus dicitur, exsistit ex re naturalis quidam splendor in verbis. Sit modo is qui dicet aut scribet et institutus liberaliter educatione doctrinaque puerili, et flagret studio, et a natura adjuvetur, et in universorum generum infinitis disceptationibus exercitatus, ornatissimos scriptores oratoresque ad cognoscendum imitandumque delegerit, ne, ille haud sane, quemadmodum verba struat et illuminet, a magistris istis requiret. Ita facile in rerum abundantia ad orationis ornamenta sine duce, natura ipsa (si modo est exercitata) delabitur.” |
XXXI. [122] “For ours is the possession (if we are indeed orators, if we are to be consulted as persons of authority and leaders in the civil contests and perils of the citizens and in public councils), ours, I say, is the entire possession of all that wisdom and learning, upon which, as if it were vacant and had fallen in to them, men abounding in leisure have seized, taking advantage of us, and either speak of the orator with ridicule and sarcasm, as Socrates in the Gorgias, or write something on the art of oratory in a few little treatises, and call them books on rhetoric; as if all those things did not equally concern the orator, which are taught by the same philosophers on justice, on the duties of life, on the establishment and administration of civil government, and on the whole systems of moral and even natural philosophy. [123] These matters, since we cannot get them elsewhere, we must now borrow from those very persons by whom we have been pillaged; so that we apply them to the knowledge of civil affairs, to which they belong, and have a regard; nor let us (as I observed before) consume all our lives in this kind of learning, but, when we have discovered the fountains, (which he who does not find out immediately will never find at all,) let us draw from them as much as occasion may require, as often as we need. For neither is there so sharp a discernment in the nature and understanding of man, that any one can descry things of such importance, unless they are pointed out; [124] nor yet is there so much obscurity in the things, that a man of penetrating genius cannot obtain an insight into them, if he only direct his view towards them. As the orator therefore has liberty to expatiate in so large and immense a field, and, wherever he stops, can stand upon his own territory, all the furniture and embellishments of eloquence readily offer themselves to him. [125] For copiousness of matter produces copiousness of language; and, if there be an inherent dignity in the subjects on which he speaks, there must be, from the nature of the thing, a certain splendor in his expression. If the speaker or writer has but been liberally instructed in the learning proper for youth, and has an ardent attachment to study, and is assisted by natural endowments, and exercised in those indefinite questions on general subjects, and has chosen, at the same time, the most elegant writers and speakers to study and imitate, he will never, be assured, need instruction from such preceptors how to compose or embellish his language; so readily, in an abundance of matter, will nature herself, if she be but stimulated, fall without any guide into all the art of adorning eloquence.” |
[XXXII] [126] Hic Catulus, “¡Di immortales!” inquit, “¡Quantam rerum varietatem, quantam vim, quantam copiam, Crasse, complexus es, quantisque ex angustiis oratorem educere ausus es et in majorum suorum regno collocare! Namque illos veteres doctores auctoresque dicendi nullum genus disputationis a se alienum putasse accepimus, semperque esse in omni orationis ratione versatos. [127] Ex quibus Elius Hippias, quum Olympiam venisset maxima illa quinquennali celebritate ludorum, gloriatus est, cuncta pæne audiente Græcia, nihil esse ulla in arte rerum omnium quod ipse nesciret ; nec solum has artes quibus liberales doctrinæ atque ingenuæ continerentur — geometriam, musicam, litterarum cognitionem et poëtarum, atque illa quæ de naturis rerum, quæ de hominum moribus, quæ de rebuspublicis dicerentur —, sed anulum quem haberet, pallium quo amictus, soccos quibus indutus esset, se sua manu confecisse. [128] Scilicet nimis hic quidem est progressus, sed ex eo ipso est conjectura facilis, quantum sibi illi oratores de præclarissimis artibus appetierint, qui ne sordidiores quidem repudiarint. ¿Quid de Prodico Cio, de Thrasymacho Calchedonio, de Protagora Abderita loquar? Quorum unus quisque plurimum temporibus illis etiam de natura rerum et disseruit et scripsit. [129] Ipse ille Leontinus Gorgias, quo patrono, (ut Plato voluit) philosopho succubuit orator — qui aut non est victus unquam a Socrate neque sermo ille Platonis verus est aut, si est victus, eloquentior videlicet fuit et disertior Socrates et (ut tu appellas) copiosior et melior orator…. Sed hic in illo ipso Platonis libro de omni re, quæcunque in disceptationem quæstionemque vocaretur, se copiosissime dicturum esse profitetur ; isque — princeps ex omnibus — ausus est in conventu poscere qua de re quisque vellet audire ; cui tantus honos habitus est a Græcia, soli ut ex omnibus Delphis non inaurata statua sed aurea statueretur. [130] Sed ii quos nominavi multique præterea summique dicendi doctores uno tempore fuerunt ; ex quibus intellegi potest ita se rem habere ut tu, Crasse, dicis — oratorisque nomen apud antiquos in Græcia majore quadam vel copia vel gloria floruisse. [131] Quo quidem magis dubito, tibine plus laudis an Græcis vituperationis, statuam esse tribuendum ; quum tu, in alia lingua ac moribus natus, occupatissima in civitate, vel privatorum negotiis pæne omnibus vel orbis terræ procuratione ac summi imperii gubernatione districtus, tantam vim rerum cognitionemque comprenderis — eamque omnem cum ejus, qui consilio et oratione in civitate valeat, scientia atque exercitatione sociaris, illi, nati in litteris, ardentes his studiis, otio vero diffluentes, non modo nihil acquisierint, sed ne relictum quidem et traditum et suum conservarint.” |
XXXII. [126] Catulus here observed, “Ye immortal gods, what an infinite variety, force, and extent of matter have you, Crassus, embraced, and from how narrow a circle have you ventured to lead forth the orator, and to place him in the domains of his ancestors! For we have understood that those ancient masters and authors of the art of speaking considered no kind of disputation to be foreign to their profession, but were always exercising themselves in every branch of oratory. [127] Of which number was Hippias of Elis, who, when he came to Olympia, at the time of the vast concourse at the games celebrated every fifth year, boasted, in the hearing of almost all Greece, that there was no subject in any art or science of which he was ignorant; as he understood not only those arts in which all liberal and polite learning is comprised, geometry, music, grammar, and poetry, and whatever is said on the natures of things, the moral duties of men, and the science of government, but that he had himself made, with his own hand, the ring which he wore, and the cloak and shoes which he had on.48 [128] He indeed went a little too far; but, even from his example, we may easily conjecture how much knowledge those very orators desired to gain in the most noble arts, when they did not shrink from learning even the more humble. Why need I allude to Prodicus of Chios, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, or Protagoras of Abdera? every one of whom in those days disputed and wrote much even on the nature of things. [129] Even Gorgias the Leontine himself, under whose advocacy (as Plato represented) the orator yielded to the philosopher;49 who was either never defeated in argument by Socrates, (and then the Dialogue of Plato is wholly fictitious,) or, if he was so defeated, it was because Socrates was the more eloquent and convincing, or, as you term it, the more powerful and better orator; but this Gorgias, in that very book of Plato, offers to speak most copiously on any subject whatever, that could be brought under discussion or inquiry; and he was the first of all men that ventured to demand, in a large assembly, on what subject any one desired to hear him speak; and to whom such honors were paid in Greece, that to him alone, of all great men, a statue was erected at Delphi, not gilded, but of solid gold. [130] Those whom I have named, and many other most consummate masters in the art of speaking, flourished at the same time; from whose examples it may be understood, that the truth is really such as you, Crassus, have stated, and that the name of the orator was distinguished among the ancients in Greece in a more extensive sense, and with greater honor than among ourselves. [131] I am therefore the more in doubt whether I should attribute a greater degree of praise to you, or of blame to the Greeks; since you, born under a different language and manners, in the busiest of cities, occupied either with almost all the private causes of the people, or with the government of the world and the direction of the mightiest of empires, have mastered such numbers of subjects, and acquired so extensive a knowledge, and have united all this with the science and practice of one who is of authority in the republic by his counsels and eloquence; whilst they, born in an atmosphere of learning, ardently attached to such studies, but dissolved in idleness, have not only made no acquisitions, but have not even preserved as their own that which was left and consigned to them.” |
[XXXIII] [132] Tum Crassus, “Non in hac,” inquit, “una, Catule, re, sed in aliis etiam compluribus distributione partium ac separatione magnitudines sunt artium deminutæ. ¿An tu existimas, quum esset Hippocrates ille Cous, fuisse tum alios medicos qui morbis, alios qui vulneribus, alios qui oculis mederentur? ¿Num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, num musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante, tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus universum complecteretur, atque ut alius aliam sibi partem in qua elaboraret seponeret? [133] Equidem sæpe hoc audivi de patre et de socero meo, nostros quoque homines qui excellere sapientiæ gloria vellent, omnia quæ quidem tum hæc civitas nosset solitos esse complecti. Meminerant illi Sex. Ælium ; M’. vero Manilium nos etiam vidimus transverso ambulantem foro ; quod erat insigne, eum qui id faceret facere civibus suis omnibus consilii sui copiam ; ad quos olim et ita ambulantes et in solio sedentes domi sic adibatur, non solum ut de jure civili ad eos, verum etiam de filia collocanda, de fundo emendo, de agro colendo, de omni denique aut officio aut negotio referretur. [134] Hæc fuit P. Crassi illius veteris, hæc Ti. Coruncani, hæc proavi generi mei Scipionis prudentissimi hominis sapientia, qui omnes pontifices maximi fuerunt, ut ad eos de omnibus divinis atque humanis rebus referretur ; iidemque in Senatu et apud populum et in causis amicorum et domi et militiæ consilium suum fidemque præstabant. [135] ¿Quid enim M. Catoni præter hanc politissimam doctrinam transmarinam atque adventiciam defuit? ¿Num, quia jus civile didicerat, causas non dicebat? ¿Aut quia poterat dicere, juris scientiam neglegebat? Utroque in genere et elaboravit et præstitit. ¿Num propter hanc e privatorum negotiis collectam gratiam tardior in republica capessenda fuit? Nemo apud populum fortior, nemo melior senator, et idem facile optimus imperator ; denique nihil in hac civitate temporibus illis sciri discive potuit, quod ille non, quum investigarit et scierit, tum etiam conscripserit. [136] Nunc contra, plerique ad honores adipiscendos et ad rempublicam gerendam nudi veniunt atque inermes, nulla cognitione rerum, nulla scientia ornati. Sin aliquis excellit unus e multis, effert se, si unum aliquid affert, aut bellicam virtutem aut usum aliquem militarem (quæ sane nunc quidem obsoleverunt), aut juris scientiam (ne ejus quidem universi, nam pontificium quod est conjunctum, nemo discit), aut eloquentiam quam in clamore et in verborum cursu positam putant ; omnium vero bonarum artium, denique virtutum ipsarum, societatem cognationemque non norunt. |
XXXIII. [132] Crassus then said, “Not only in this particular, Catulus, but in many others, the grandeur of the sciences has been diminished by the distribution and separation of their parts. Do you imagine, that when the famous Hippocrates of Cos flourished, there were then some of the medical faculty who cured diseases, others wounds, and a third class the eyes 1 Do you suppose that geometry under Euclid and Archimedes, that music under Damon and Aristoxenus, that grammar itself when Aristophanes and Callimachus treated of it, were so divided into parts, that no one comprehended the universal system of any of those sciences, but different persons selected different parts on which they meant to bestow their labor? [133] I have, indeed, often heard from my father and father-in-law, that even our own countrymen, who were ambitious to excel in renown for wisdom, were wont to comprehend all the objects of knowledge which this city had then learned. They mentioned, as an instance of this, Sextus Aelius; and we ourselves have seen Manius Manilius walking across the forum; a signal that he who did so, gave all the citizens liberty to consult him upon any subject; and to such persons, when thus walking or sitting at home upon their seats of ceremony, all people had free access, not only to consult them upon points of civil law, but even upon the settlement of a daughter in marriage, the purchase of an estate, or the cultivation of a farm, and indeed upon any employment or business whatsoever. [134] Such was the wisdom of the well-known elder Publius Crassus, such that of Titus Coruncanius, such that of the great-grandfather of Scipio, my son-in-law, a person of great judgment; all of whom were supreme pontiffs, so that they were consulted upon all affairs, divine and human; and the same men gave their counsel and discharged their duty in the senate, before the people, and in the private causes of their friends, in civil and military service, both at home and abroad. [135] What was deficient in Marcus Cato, except the modern polish of foreign and adventitious learning? Did he, because he was versed in the civil law, forbear from pleading causes? or, because he could speak, neglect the study of jurisprudence? He labored in both these kinds of learning, and succeeded in both. Was he, by the popularity which he acquired by attending to the business of private persons, rendered more tardy in the public service of the state? No man spoke with more courage before the people, none was ever a better senator; he was at the same time a most excellent commander-in-chief; and indeed nothing in those days could possibly be known or learned in this city which he did not investigate and thoroughly understand, and on which he did not also write. [136] Now, on the contrary, men generally come to assume offices and the duties of public administration unarmed and defenceless; prepared with no science, nor any knowledge of business. But if any one happen to excel the multitude, he is elevated with pride by the possession of any single talent, as military courage, or a little experience in war, (which indeed has now fallen into decay,50) or a knowledge of the law, (not of the whole law, for nobody studies the pontifical law, which is annexed to civil jurisprudence,51) or eloquence, (which they imagine to consist in declamation and a torrent of words,) while none have any notion of the alliance and affinity that connects all the liberal arts and sciences, and even the virtues themselves. |
[XXXIV] [137] Sed ut ad Græcos referam orationem, quibus carere in hoc quidem sermonis genere non possumus — nam ut virtutis a nostris, sic doctrinæ sunt ab illis, exempla repetenda — septem fuisse dicuntur uno tempore qui ‘sapientes’ et haberentur et vocarentur. Hi omnes, præter Milesium Thalem, civitatibus suis præfuerunt. ¿Quis doctior eisdem illis temporibus, aut cujus eloquentia litteris instructior traditur fuisse quam Pisistrati? Qui primus Homeri libros confusos antea sic disposuisse dicitur, ut nunc habemus. Non fuit ille quidem civibus suis utilis, sed ita eloquentia floruit, ut litteris doctrinaque præstaret. [138] ¿Quid Pericles? De cujus dicendi copia sic accepimus ut, quum contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriæ severius, tamen id ipsum quod ille contra populares homines doceret, populare omnibus et jucundum videretur ; cujus in labris veteres comici, etiam quum illi male dicerent (quod tum Athenis fieri licebat), leporem habitasse dixerunt tantamque in eodem vim fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus qui audissent quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret. At hunc non declamator aliqui ad clepsydram latrare docuerat sed, ut accepimus, Clazomenius ille Anaxagoras, vir summus in maximarum rerum scientia. Itaque hic doctrina, consilio, eloquentia excellens, quadraginta annis præfuit Athenis et urbanis eodem tempore et bellicis rebus. [139] ¿Quid Critias? ¿Quid Alcibiades? Civibus quidem suis non boni, sed certe docti atque eloquentes, ¿nonne Socraticis erant disputationibus eruditi? ¿Quis Dionem Syracusium doctrinis omnibus expolivit? ¿Non Plato? Atque eum idem ille non linguæ solum, verum etiam animi ac virtutis magister ad liberandam patriam impulit, instruxit, armavit. ¿Aliisne igitur artibus hunc Dionem instituit Plato, aliis Isocrates clarissimum virum Timotheum, Cononis præstantissimi imperatoris filium, summum ipsum imperatorem hominemque doctissimum? ¿Aut aliis Pythagorius ille Lysis Thebanum Epaminondam, haud scio an summum virum unum omnis Græciæ? ¿Aut Xenophon Agesilaum? ¿Aut Philolaus Archytan Tarentinum? ¿Aut ipse Pythagoras totam illam veterem Italiæ Græciam, quæ quondam Magna vocitata est? |
XXXIV. [137] “But to direct my remarks to the Greeks, (whom we cannot omit in a dissertation of this nature; for as examples of virtue are to be sought among our own countrymen, so examples of learning are to be derived from them;) seven are said to have lived at one time, who were esteemed and denominated wise men. All these, except Thales of Miletus, had the government of their respective cities. Whose learning is reported, at the same period, to have been greater, or whose eloquence to have received more ornament from literature, than that of Pisistratus? who is said to have been the first that arranged the books of Homer as we now have them, when they were previously confused. He was not indeed of any great service to the community, but was eminent for eloquence, at the same time that he excelled in erudition and liberal knowledge. [138] What was the character of Pericles? of whose power in speaking we have heard, that when he spoke for the good of his country against the inclinations of the Athenians, that very severity with which he contradicted the favorites of the people, became popular and agreeable to all men; and on whose lips the old comic poets declared, (even when they satirized him, as was then lawful to be done at Athens,) that the graces of persuasion dwelt, and that there was such mighty energy in him that he left, as it were, certain stings in the minds of those who listened to him. Yet no declaimer had taught him to bawl for hours by the water-clock, but, as we have it from tradition, the famous Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, a man eminent in all the most valuable sciences, had instructed him. He, accordingly, excelling as he did in learning, judgment, and eloquence, presided at Athens forty years together over civil and military affairs. [139] What was the character of Critias, or of Alcibiades? They were not indeed useful members of the state in which they lived, but were certainly men of learning and eloquence; and were they not improved by conversation with Socrates? Who instructed Dion of Syracuse in every branch of learning? Wan it not Plato? The same illustrious philosopher, too, who formed him not to oratory only, but to courage and virtue, impelled, equipped, and armed him to deliver his country. Did Plato, then, instruct Dion in sciences different from those in which Isocrates formed the renowned Timotheus the son of Conon the eminent general, and himself a most excellent commander, and a man of extensive learning? Or from those in which Lysis the Pythagorean trained Epaminondas of Thebes, who perhaps was the most remarkable man of all Greece? Or from those which Xenophon taught Agesilaus, or Archytas of Tarentum Philolaus, or Pythagoras himself all that old province of Italy which was formerly called Great Greece? |
[XXXV] [140] Equidem non arbitror. Sic video unam quandam omnium rerum quæ essent homine erudito dignæ atque eo qui in republica vellet excellere, fuisse doctrinam ; quam qui accepissent, si iidem ingenio ad pronuntiandum valuissent, et se ad dicendum quoque, non repugnante natura, dedissent, eloquentia præstitisse. [141] Itaque ipse Aristoteles, quum florere Isocraten nobilitate discipulorum videret, quod ille suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad inanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinæ suæ, versumque quendam de ‘Philocteta’ paulo secus dixit. Ille enim turpe sibi ait esse tacere, quum barbaros — hic autem, quum Isocraten — pateretur dicere. Itaque ornavit et illustravit doctrinam illam omnem, rerumque cognitionem cum orationis exercitatione conjunxit. Neque vero hoc fugit sapientissimum regem Philippum, qui hunc Alexandro filio doctorem accierit, a quo eodem ille et agendi acciperet præcepta et eloquendi. [142] Nunc sive qui volet, eum philosophum qui copiam nobis rerum orationisque tradat, per me appellet oratorem licet, sive hunc oratorem quem ego dico sapientiam junctam habere eloquentiæ, philosophum appellare malet ; non impediam — dummodo hoc constet, neque infantiam ejus qui rem norit sed eam explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscitiam illius cui res non suppetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam ; quorum si alterum sit optandum, malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultitiam loquacem ; [143] sin quærimus quid unum excellat ex omnibus, docto oratori palma danda est ; quem si patiuntur eundem esse philosophum, sublata controversia est. Sin eos dijungent, hoc erunt inferiores, quod in oratore perfecto inest illorum omnis scientia, in philosophorum autem cognitione non continuo inest eloquentia ; quæ quamquam contemnatur ab eis, necesse est tamen aliquem cumulum illorum artibus afferre videatur.” Hæc quum Crassus dixisset, parumper et ipse conticuit et a ceteris silentium fuit. |
XXXV. [140] I do not imagine that they were different; for I see that one and the same course of study comprised all those branches of knowledge which were esteemed necessary for a man of learning, and one who wished to become eminent in civil administration; and that they who had received this knowledge, if they had sufficient powers for speaking in public, and devoted themselves, without any impediment from nature, to oratory, became distinguished for eloquence. [141] Aristotle himself, accordingly, when he saw Isocrates grow remarkable for the number and quality of his scholars, [because he himself had diverted his lectures from forensic and civil causes to mere elegance of language,52] changed on a sudden almost his whole system of teaching, and quoted a verse from the tragedy of Philoctetes53 with a little alteration; for the hero said, that It was disgraceful for him to be silent while he allowed barbarians to speak; but Aristotle said that it was disgraceful for him to be silent while he allowed Isocrates to speak. He therefore adorned and illustrated all philosophical learning, and associated the knowledge of things with practice in speaking. Nor did this escape the knowledge of that very sagacious monarch Philip, who sent for him as a tutor for his son Alexander, that he might acquire from the same teacher instructions at once in conduct and in language. [142] Now, if any one desires either to call that philosopher, who instructs us fully in things and words, an orator, he may do so without opposition from me; or if he prefer to call that orator, of whom I speak as having wisdom united with eloquence, a philosopher, I shall make no objection, provided it be allowed that neither his inability to speak, who understands his subject but cannot set it forth in words, nor his ignorance, to whom matter is wanting though words abound, can merit commendation; and if I had to choose one of the two, I should prefer uneloquent good sense to loquacious folly. [143] But if it be inquired which is the more eminent excellence, the palm is to be given to the learned orator; and if they allow the same person to be a philosopher, there is an end of controversy; but if they distinguish them, they will acknowledge their inferiority in this respect, that all their knowledge is inherent in the complete orator; but in the knowledge of the philosophers eloquence is not necessarily inherent; which, though it may be undervalued by them, must of necessity be thought to give a finishing grace to their sciences.” When Crassus had spoken thus, he made a pause for a while, and the rest kept silence. |
[XXXVI] [144] Tum Cotta, “Equidem,” inquit, “Crasse, non possum queri, quod mihi videare aliud quiddam, et non id quod susceperis, disputasse ; plus enim aliquanto attulisti, quam tibi erat tributum a nobis ac denuntiatum ; sed certe tuæ partes fuerant, de illustranda oratione ut diceres, et eras ipse jam ingressus atque in quattuor partes omnem orationis laudem discripseras, quumque de duabus primis {① & ②} nobis quidem satis, sed, ut ipse dicebas, celeriter exigueque dixisses, duas tibi reliquas feceras, quemadmodum primum ornate {③}, dein etiam apte {④} diceremus. [145] Quo, quum ingressus esses, repente te quasi quidam æstus ingenii tui procul a terra abripuit atque in altum a conspectu pæne omnium abstraxit. Omnem enim rerum scientiam complexus non tu quidem eam nobis tradidisti — neque enim fuit tam exigui temporis. Sed apud hos quid profeceris nescio ; me quidem in Academiam totum compulisti. In qua velim sit illud quod sæpe posuisti, ut non necesse sit consumere ætatem, atque ut possit is illa omnia cernere qui tantummodo aspexerit ; sed etiamsi est aliquando spissius aut si ego sum tardior, profecto nunquam conquiescam neque defetigabor antequam illorum ancipites vias rationesque et pro omnibus et contra omnia disputandi percepero.” [146] Tum Cæsar, “Unum,” inquit, “me ex tuo sermone maxime, Crasse, commovit, quod eum negasti qui non cito quid didicisset, unquam omnino posse perdiscere ; ☺ ut mihi non sit difficile periclitari et aut statim percipere ista quæ tu verbis ad cælum extulisti, aut, si non potuerim, tempus non perdere, quum tamen his nostris possim esse contentus. ☺” [147] Hic Sulpicius, “Ego vero,” inquit, “Crasse, neque Aristotelem istum neque Carneadem nec philosophorum quemquam desidero. Vel me licet existimes desperare ista posse perdiscere, vel — id quod facio — contemnere. Mihi rerum forensium et communium vulgaris hæc cognitio satis magna est ad eam quam specto eloquentiam ; ex qua ipsa tamen permulta nescio — quæ tum denique quum causa aliqua quæ a me dicenda est desiderat, quæro. Quamobrem, nisi forte es jam defessus, et si tibi non graves sumus, refer ad illa te quæ ad ipsius orationis laudem splendoremque pertinent ; quæ ego ex te audire volui, non ut desperarem me eloquentiam consequi posse, sed ut aliquid addiscerem.” |
XXXVI. [144] Cotta then observed, “I cannot indeed complain, Crassus, that you seem to me to have given a dissertation upon a different subject from that on which you had undertaken to speak; for you have contributed to our conversation more than was either laid upon you by us, or given notice of by yourself. But certainly it was the part that belonged to you, to speak upon the embellishments of language, and you had already entered upon it, and distributed the whole excellence of eloquence into four parts; and, when you had spoken upon the first two, as we indeed thought sufficiently, but, as you said yourself, cursorily and slightly, you had two others left: how we should speak, first, elegantly, and next, aptly. [145] But when you were proceeding to these particulars, the tide, as it were, of your genius suddenly hurried you to a distance from land, and carried you out into the deep, almost beyond the view of us all; for, embracing all knowledge of everything, you did not indeed teach it us, (for that was impossible in so short a space of time,) but, I know not what improvement you may have made in the rest of the company, as for myself, you have carried me altogether into the heart of the academy, in regard to which I could wish that that were true which you have often asserted, that it is not necessary to consume our lives in it, but that he may see everything in it who only turns his eyes towards it: but even if the view be somewhat obscure, or I should be extraordinarily dull, I shall assuredly never rest, or yield to fatigue, until I understand their doubtful ways and arts of disputing for and against every question.” [146] Caesar then said, “One thing in your remarks, Crassus, struck me very much, that you said that he who did not learn anything soon, could never thoroughly learn it at all; so that I can have no difficulty in making the trial, and either immediately understanding what you extolled to the skies in your observations, or, if I cannot do so, losing no time, as I may remain content with what I have already acquired.” [147] Here Sulpicius observed, “I, indeed, Crassus, neither desire any acquaintance with your Aristotle, nor Carneades, nor any of the philosophers; you may either imagine that I despair of being able to acquire their knowledge, or that, as is really the case, I despise it. The ordinary knowledge of common affairs, and such as are litigated in the forum, is great enough for me, for attaining that degree of eloquence which is my object; and even in that narrow circle of science I am ignorant of a multitude of things, which I begin to study, whenever any cause in which I am to speak requires them. If, therefore, you are not now fatigued, and if we are not troublesome to you, revert to those particulars which contribute to the merit and splendor of language; particulars which I desired to hear from you, not to make me despair that I can ever possibly attain eloquence, but to make some addition to my stock of learning.” |
[XXXVII] [148] Tum Crassus, “Pervulgatas res requiris,” inquit, “et tibi non incognitas, Sulpici. ¿Quis enim de isto genere non docuit, non instituit, non scriptum etiam reliquit? Sed geram morem et ea, dumtaxat quæ mihi nota sunt, breviter exponam tibi ; censebo tamen ad eos qui auctores et inventores sunt harum sane minutarum rerum revertendum. [149] {③} Omnis igitur oratio conficitur ex verbis — quorum primum nobis ratio simpliciter videnda est, deinde conjuncte. Nam est quidam ornatus orationis qui ex singulis verbis est, alius qui ex continuatis conjunctisque constat. Ergo utimur verbis, aut eis quæ propria sunt et certa quasi vocabula rerum, pæne una nata cum rebus ipsis, aut eis quæ transferuntur et quasi alieno in loco collocantur, aut eis quæ novamus et facimus ipsi. [150] In propriis igitur est verbis illa laus oratoris, ut abjecta atque obsoleta fugiat, lectis atque illustribus utatur in quibus plenum quiddam et sonans inesse videatur. Sed <…> in hoc verborum genere propriorum, dilectus est habendus quidam, atque is aurium quodam judicio ponderandus ; in quo consuetudo etiam bene loquendi valet plurimum. [151] Etenim hoc quod vulgo de oratoribus ab imperitis dici solet “bonis hic verbis,” aut aliquis “non bonis utitur,” non arte aliqua perpenditur, sed quodam quasi naturali sensu judicatur ; in quo non magna laus est vitare vitium (quanquam id est magnum) — verumtamen hoc quasi solum quoddam atque fundamentum est verborum usus et copia bonorum. [152] Sed quid ipse ædificet orator et in quo adjungat artem, id esse nobis quærendum atque explicandum videtur. |
XXXVII. [148] “You require of me,” said Crassus, “to speak on matters which are very well known, and with which you, Sulpicius, are not unacquainted; for what rhetorician has not treated of this subject, has not given instructions on it, has not even left something about it in writing? But I will comply with your request, and briefly explain to you at least such points as are known to me; but I shall still think that you ought to refer to those who are the authors and inventors of these minute precepts. [149] All speech, then, is formed of words, which we must first consider singly, then in composition; for there is one merit of language which lies in single words, another which is produced by words joined and compounded. We shall therefore either use such words as are the proper and fixed names as it were of things, and apparently almost born at the same time with the things themselves; or such as are metaphorical, and placed as it were in a situation foreign to them; or such as we invent and make ourselves. [150] In regard then to words taken in their own proper sense, it is a merit in the orator to avoid mean and obsolete ones, and to use such as are choice and ornamental; such as have in them some fulness and force of sound. But in this kind of proper words, selection is necessary, which must be decided in some measure by the judgment of the ear; in which point the mere habit of speaking well is of great effect. [151] Even what is vulgarly said of orators by the illiterate multitude, He uses proper words, or Such a one uses improper words, is not the result of any acquired skill, but is a judgment arising from a natural sense of what is right; in which respect it is no great merit to avoid a fault, (though it is of great importance to do so,). yet this is the groundwork, as it were and foundation of the whole, namely, the use and command of proper words. [152] But the superstructure which the orator himself is to raise upon this, and in which he is to display his art, appears to be a matter for us to examine and illustrate. |
[XXXVIII] Tria sunt igitur in verbo simplici quæ orator afferat ad illustrandam atque exornandam orationem : aut inusitatum verbum aut novatum aut translatum.
|
XXXVIII. “There are three qualities, then, in a simple word, which the orator may employ to illustrate and adorn his language; he may choose either an unusual word, or one that is new or metaphorical. [153] Unusual words are generally of ancient date and fashion, and such as have been long out of use in daily conversation; these are allowed more freely to poetical licence than to ours; yet a poetical word gives occasionally dignity also to oratory; nor would I shrink from saying, with Coelius, Qua tempestate Poenus in Italiam venit, ‘At the season when the Carthaginian came into Italy:’ nor proles, ‘progeny;’ nor suboles, ‘offspring;’ nor effari, ‘to utter;’ nor nuncupari, ‘to declare;’ nor, as you are in the habit of saying, Catulus, non rebar, ‘I did not deem;’ nor non opinabar, ‘I did not opine;’ nor many others, from which, if properly introduced, a speech assumes an air of greater grandeur. [154] New words are such as are produced and formed by the speaker; either by joining words together, as these. Tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat, Then fear expels all wisdom from the breast Of me astonished; or, Num non vis huius me versutiloquas malitias? Would you not have me dread his cunning malice? for you see that versutiloquas and expectorat are words not newly produced, but merely formed by composition. But words are often invented, without composition, as the expression of Ennius,54 Dii genitales, ‘the genial gods; ‘or baccarum ubertate incurviscere, ‘to bend down with the fertile crop of berries.’ [155] “The third mode, that of using words in a metaphorical sense, is widely prevalent, a mode of which necessity was the parent, compelled by the sterility and narrowness of language; but afterwards delight and pleasure made it frequent; for as a dress was first adopted for the sake of keeping off the cold, but in process of time began to be made an ornament of the body, and an emblem of dignity, so the metaphorical use of words was originally invented on account of their paucity, but became common from the delight which it afforded. For even the countrymen say, gemmare vites, that ‘the vines are budding;’ luxuriem esse in herbis, that ‘there is a luxuriancy in the grass;’ and laetas segetes, that ‘there is a bountiful crop;’ for when that which can scarcely be signified by its proper word is expressed by one used in a metaphorical sense, the similitude taken from that which we indicate by a foreign term gives clearness to that which we wish to be understood. [156] These metaphors, therefore, are a species of borrowing, as you take from something else that which you have not of your own. Those have a greater degree of boldness which do not show poverty, but bring some accession of splendor to our language. But why should I specify to you either the modes of their production or their various kinds? |
[XXXIX] [157] Sed ea transferri oportet quæ aut clariorem faciunt rem, ut illa omnia :
|
XXXIX. [157] “A metaphor is a brief similitude contracted into a single word; which word being put in the place of another, as if it were in its own place, conveys, if the resemblance be acknowledged, delight; if there is no resemblance, it is condemned. But such words should be metaphorically used as may make the subject clearer; as all these:55 Inhorrescit mare, Tenebrae conduplicantur, noctisque et nimbum occaecat nigror, Flamma inter nubes coruscat, caelum tonitru contremit, Grando mixta imbri largifluo subita pracipitans cadit; Undique omnes venti erumpunt, saevi existunt turbines; Fervit aestu pelagus. The sea begins to shudder, Darkness is doubled; and the black of night And of the tempest thickens; fire gleams vivid Amid the clouds; the heavens with thunder shake; Hail mixed with copious rain sudden descends Precipitate; from all sides every blast Breaks forth; fierce whirlwinds gather, and the flood Boils with fresh tumult. Here almost everything is expressed in words metaphorically adapted from something similar, that the description may be heightened. [158] Or metaphors are employed that the whole nature of any action or design may be more significantly expressed; as in the case of him who indicates, by two metaphorical words, that another person was designedly obscure, in order that what he intended might not be understood, Quandoquidem is se circumvestit dictis, saepit sedulo, Since thus he clothes himself around with words, And hedges constantly. “Sometimes, also, brevity is the object attained by metaphor; as, Si telum manu fugit, ‘If from his hand the javelin fled.’ The throwing of a missile weapon unawares could not be described with more brevity in the proper words than it is signified by one used metaphorically. [159] On this head, it often appears to me wonderful why all men are more delighted with words used in a metaphorical or foreign sense than in their own proper and natural signification. |
[XL] Nam si res suum nomen et vocabulum proprium non habet, ut ‘pes’ in navi, ut ‘nexum’ quod per libram agitur, ut in uxore ‘divortium,’ necessitas cogit quod non habeas aliunde sumere ; sed in suorum verborum maxima copia tamen, homines aliena multo magis, si sunt ratione translata, delectant. [160] Id accidere credo,
|
XL. For if a thing has not a name of its own, and a term peculiar to it, as the pes, or ‘hawser,’ in a ship; nexum, a ‘bond,’ which is a ceremony performed with scales;56 divortium, a ‘divorce,’ with reference to a wife,57 necessity compels you to borrow from another what you have not yourself; but, even in the greatest abundance of proper words, men are much more charmed with such as are uncommon, if they are used metaphorically with judgment. [160] This happens, I imagine, either because it is some manifestation of wit to jump over such expressions as lie before you, and catch at others from a greater distance; or because he who listens is led another way in thought, and yet does not wander from the subject, which ia a very great pleasure; or because a subject, and entire comparison, is despatched in a single word; or because every metaphor that is adopted with judgment is directed immediately to our senses, and principally to the sense of sight, which is the keenest of them all. [161] For such expressions as the odour of urbanity, the softness of humanity, the murmur of the sea, and sweetness of language, are derived from the other senses; but those which relate to the sight are much more striking, for they place almost in the eye of the mind such objects as we cannot see and discern by the natural eyes. There is, indeed, nothing in universal nature, the proper name and term of which we may not use with regard to other matters; for whencesoever a simile may be drawn (and it may be drawn from anything), from thence a single word, which contains the resemblance, metaphorically applied, may give illustration to our language. [162] In such metaphorical expressions, dissimilitude is principally to be avoided; as, Caeli ingentes fornices, The arch immense of heaven; for though Ennius58 is said to have brought a globe upon the stage, yet the semblance of an arch can never be inherent in the form of a globe. Vive, Ulixes, dum licet: Oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape.59 Live, live, Ulysses, while you may, and snatch, Snatch with thine eyes the last light shining on them. He did not say, cape, ‘take,’ nor pete, ‘seek.’ for such expressions might have implied delay, as of one hoping to live longer; but rape, ‘snatch,’ a word which was peculiarly suitable to what he had said before, dum licet, ‘while you may.’ |
[XLI] [163] Deinde videndum est ne longe simile sit ductum : ‘Syrtim patrimonii’, ‘scopulum’ libentius fixerim ; ‘Charybdim’ bonorum, ‘voraginem’ potius. Facilius enim ad ea quæ visa quam ad illa quæ audita sunt, mentis oculi feruntur. Et quoniam hæc vel summa laus est in verbis transferendis, ut sensum feriat id quod translatum sit, fugienda est omnis turpitudo earum rerum ad quas eorum animos qui audient trahet similitudo. [164] Nolo dici morte Africani ‘castratam’ esse rempublicam ; nolo ‘stercus curiæ’ dici Glauciam ; quamvis sit simile, tamen est in utroque deformis cogitatio similitudinis. Nolo esse aut majus quam res postulet : ‘tempestas comissationis’ ; aut minus : ‘comissatio tempestatis.’ Nolo esse verbum angustius id quod translatum sit quam fuisset illud proprium ac suum :
validæ legum habenæ atque imperii sistent jugo. |
XLI. [163] “Care is next to be taken that the simile be not too far-fetched; as, for ‘the Syrtis of his patrimony,’ I should rather have said, ‘the rock;’ for ‘the Charybdis of his possessions,’ rather ‘the gulf:’ for the eyes of the mind are more easily directed to those objects which we have seen, than to those of which we have only heard. And since it is the greatest merit in a metaphorical word, that what is metaphorical should strike the senses, all offensiveness is to be avoided in those objects to which the comparison must naturally draw the minds of the audience. [164] I would not have it said that the republic was ‘castrated’ by the death of Africanus; I would not have Glaucia called ‘the excrement of the senate;’ for though there may be a resemblance, yet it is a depraved imagination in both cases that gives rise to such a comparison. I would not have the metaphor grander than the subject requires, as ‘a tempest of revelling;’ nor meaner, as ‘the revelling of the tempest.’ I would not have the metaphorical be of a more confined sense than the proper and peculiar term would have been; as, &nbnbsp; Quidnam est, obsecro, quid te adiri abnutas?60 Why is it, prythee, that thou nodd’st us back From coming to thee? Vetas, prohibes, absterres, ‘forbid,’ ‘hinder,’ ‘terrify,’ had been better, because he had before said, Fly quickly hence,61 Lest my contagion or my shadow fall On men of worth. [165] Also, if you apprehend that the metaphor may appear too harsh, it may frequently be softened by prefixing a word or words to it; as if, in old times, on the death of Marcus Cato, any one had said that the senate was left ‘an orphan,’ the expression had been rather bold; but, ‘so to speak, an orphan,’ is somewhat milder; for a metaphor ought not to be too daring, but of such a nature that it may appear to have been introduced into the place of another expression, not to have sprung into it; to have come in by entreaty, and not by violence. [166] And there is no mode of embellishment more effective as regards single words, nor any that throws a greater lustre upon language; for the ornament that flows from this figure does not consist merely in a single metaphorical word, but may be connected by a continuation of many, so that one thing may be expressed and another understood; as, Nor will I allow Myself again to strike the Grecian fleet On the same rock and instrument of ruin.62 And this, You err, you err, for the strong reins of law Shall hold you back, exulting and confiding Too much in your own self, and make you bow Beneath the yoke of empire. [167] Something being assumed as similar, the words which are proper to it are metaphorically transferred (as I termed it before) to another subject. |
[XLII] Est hoc magnum ornamentum orationis, in quo obscuritas fugienda est ; etenim hoc fere genere fiunt ea quæ dicuntur ‘ænigmata.’ Non est autem in verbo modus hic, sed in oratione, id est, in continuatione verborum. Illa quidem traductio atque immutatio in verbo quandam fabricationem habet : Testes sunt Campi Magni …
|
XLII. “This is a great ornament to language, but obscurity is to be avoided in it; for from this figure arise what are called aenigmas. Nor is this rule to be observed in single words only, but in phrases, that is, in a continuation of words. Nor have metonymy and hypallage63 their form from a single word, but from a phrase or sentence; as, Grim Afric trembles with an awful tumult;64 where for the Africans is used Afric; not a word newly impounded, as in Mare saxifragis undis, ‘The sea with its rock-breaking waves;’ nor a metaphorical one, as, Mollitur mare, ‘The sea is softened;’ but one proper name exchanged for another, for the sake of embellishment. Thus, ‘Cease, Rome, thy foes to cherish,’ and, ‘The spacious plains are witnesses. This figure contributes exceedingly to the ornament of style, and is frequently to be used; of which kind of expression these are examples: that the Mars, or fortune, of war is common; and to say Ceres, for corn; Bacchus, for wine; Neptune, for the sea; the curia, or house, for the senate; the campus, for the comitia or elections; the gown, for peace; arms or weapons for war. [168] Under this figure, the virtues and vices are used for the persons in whom they are inherent: ‘Luxury has broken into that house;’ or, ‘whither avarice has penetrated;’ or, ‘honesty has prevailed;’ or, ‘justice has triumphed.’ You perceive the whole force of this kind of figure, when, by the variation or change of a word, a thing is expressed more elegantly; and to this figure is closely allied another,65 which, though less ornamental, ought not to be unknown; as when we would have the whole of a thing understood from a part; as we say walls or roof for a whole building; or a part from the whole, as when we call one troop the cavalry of the Roman people; or when we signify the plural by the singular, as, But still the Roman, though the affair has been Conducted well, is anxious in his heart;66 or when the singular is understood from the plural, We that were Rudians once are Romans now; or in whatever way, by this figure, the sense is to be understood, not as it is expressed, but as it is meant. |
[XLIII] [169] Abutimur sæpe etiam verbo non tam eleganter quam in transferendo, sed etiamsi licentius, tamen interdum non impudenter ; ut quum ‘grandem’ orationem pro ‘longa,’ ‘minutum animum’ pro ‘parvo’ dicimus. ¿Verum illa videtisne esse non verbi, sed orationis, quæ ex pluribus, ut exposui, translationibus connexa sunt? Hæc autem quæ aut immutata esse dixi aut aliter intellegenda ac dicerentur, sunt translata quodammodo. [170] Ita fit, ut omnis singulorum verborum virtus atque laus tribus exsistat ex rebus :
|
XLIII. [169] “We often also put one word catachrestically for another, not with that elegance, indeed, which there is in a metaphor; but, though this is done licentiously, it is sometimes done inoffensively; as when we say a great speech for a long one, a minute soul for a little one. “But have you perceived that those elegances which arise from the connexion of several metaphors, do not, as I observed,67 lie in one word, but in a series of words? But all those modes of expression which, I said, lay in the change of a word, or are to be understood differently from what is expressed, are in some measure metaphorical. [170] Hence it happens, that all the virtue and merit of single words consists in three particulars: if a word be antique, but such, however, as usage will tolerate; if it be formed by composition, or newly invented, where regard is to be paid to the judgment of the ear and to custom; or if it be used metaphorically; peculiarities which eminently distinguish and brighten language, as with so many stars. |
[171] Sequitur continuatio verborum, quæ duas res maxime — collocationem primum, deinde modum quendam formamque — desiderat. Collocationis est componere et struere verba sic ut neve asper eorum concursus neve hiulcus sit, sed quodam modo coagmentatus et lēvis. In quo lepide soceri mei persona lusit is qui elegantissime id facere potuit, Lucilius : Arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato. |
[171] “The composition of words follows next, which principally requires attention to two things; first, collocation, and, next, a certain modulation and form. To collocation it belongs to compose and arrange the words in such a way that their junction may not be rough or gaping, but compact, as it were, and smooth; in reference to which qualities of style, the poet Lucilius, who could do so most elegantly, has expressed himself wittily and sportively in the character of my father-in-law:68 How elegantly are his words arranged! All like square stones inserted skilfully In pavements, with vermiculated emblems! And after saying this in ridicule of Albucius, he does not refrain from touching on me: I’ve Crassus for a son-in-law, nor think Yourself more of an orator. What then? this Crassus, of whose name you, Lucilius, make such free use, what does he attempt? The very same thing indeed as Scaevola wished, and as I would wish, but with somewhat better effect than Albucius. But Lucilius spoke jestingly with regard to me, according to his custom. [172] However, such an arrangement of words is to be observed, as that of which I was speaking; such a one as may give a compactness and coherence to the language, and a smooth and equal flow; this you will attain if you join the extremities of the antecedent words to the commencements of those that follow in such a manner that there be no rough clashing in the consonants, nor wide hiatus in the vowels. |
[XLIV] [173] Hanc diligentiam subsequitur modus etiam et forma verborum — quod jam vereor ne huic Catulo videatur esse puerile. Versus enim, veteres illi in hac soluta oratione propemodum — hoc est, numeros quosdam — nobis esse adhibendos putaverunt. Interspirationis enim — non defetigationis nostræ (neque librariorum notis) sed verborum et sententiarum — modo interpunctas clausulas in orationibus esse voluerunt ; idque princeps Isocrates instituisse fertur, ut inconditam antiquorum dicendi consuetudinem delectationis atque aurium causa, quemadmodum scribit discipulus ejus Naucrates, numeris astringeret. [174] Namque hæc duo, musici (qui erant quondam iidem poëtæ) machinati ad voluptatem sunt — versum atque cantum —, ut et verborum numero et vocum modo vincerent aurium satietatem. Hæc igitur duo, vocis dico moderationem et verborum conclusionem, quoad orationis severitas pati posset, a poëtica ad eloquentiam traducenda duxerunt. [175] In quo illud est vel maximum, quod versus in oratione, si efficitur conjunctione verborum, vitium est — et tamen eam conjunctionem sicuti versum numerose cadere et quadrare et perfici volumus. Neque est ex multis res una quæ magis oratorem ab imperito dicendi ignaroque distinguat, quam quod ille rudis incondite fundit quantum potest et id quod dicit spiritu, non arte, determinat, orator autem sic illigat sententiam verbis, ut eam numero quodam complectatur et astricto et soluto. [176] Nam quum vinxit modis et forma, relaxat et liberat immutatione ordinis, ut verba neque alligata sint quasi certa aliqua lege versus, neque ita soluta, ut vagentur. |
XLIV. [173] “Next to diligent attention to this particular, follows modulation and harmonious structure of the words; a point, I fear, that may seem puerile to our friend Catulus here. The ancients, however, imagined in prose a harmony almost like that of poetry; that is, they thought that we ought to adopt a sort of numbers; for they wished that there should be short phrases in speeches, to allow us to recover, and not loss our breath; and that they should be distinguished, not by the marks of transcribers, but according to the modulation of the words and sentences;69 and this practice Isocrates is said to have been the first to introduce, that he might (as his scholar Naucrates writes) ‘confine the rude manner of speaking among those of antiquity within certain numbers, to give pleasure and captivate the ear.’ [174] For musicians, who were also the poets of former ages, contrived these two things as the ministers of pleasure, verse, and song; that they might banish satiety from the sense of hearing by gratification, arising from the numbers of language and the modulation, of notes. These two things, therefore, (I mean the musical management of the voice, and the harmonious structure of words,) should be transferred, they thought, as far as the strictness of prose will admit, from poetry to oratory. [175] On this head it is remarkable, that if a verse is formed by the composition of words in prose, it is a fault; and yet we wish such composition to have a harmonious cadence, roundness, and finish, like verse; nor is there any single quality, out of many, that more distinguishes a true orator from an unskilful and ignorant speaker, than that he who is unpractised pours forth all he can without discrimination, and measures out the periods of his speech, not with art, but by the power of his breath; but the orator clothes his thoughts in such a manner as to comprise them in a flow of numbers, at once confined to measure, yet free from restraint; [176] for, after restricting it to proper modulation and structure, he gives it an ease and freedom by a variety in the flow, so that the words are neither bound by strict laws, as those of verse, nor yet have such a degree of liberty as to wander without control. |
[XLV] ¿Quonam igitur modo tantum munus insistemus ut arbitremur nos hanc vim numerose dicendi consequi posse? Non est res tam difficilis quam necessaria. Nihil est enim tam tenerum neque tam flexibile neque quod tam facile sequatur quocunque ducas quam oratio. [177] Ex hac versus, ex eadem dispares numeri conficiuntur ; ex hac hæc etiam soluta variis modis multorumque generum oratio. Non enim sunt alia sermonis, alia contentionis verba ; neque ex alio genere ad usum quotidianum, alio ad scænam pompamque sumuntur ; sed ea nos quum jacentia sustulimus e medio, sicut mollissimam ceram ad nostrum arbitrium formamus et fingimus. Itaque ut tum graves sumus, tum subtiles, tum medium quiddam tenemus ; sic institutam nostram sententiam sequitur orationis genus, idque ad omnem aurium voluptatem et animorum motum mutatur et vertitur. [178] Sed ut in plerisque rebus incredibiliter hoc natura est ipsa fabricata, sic in oratione — ut ea quæ maximam utilitatem in se continerent, plurimum eadem haberent vel dignitatis vel sæpe etiam venustatis. Incolumitatis enim ac salutis omnium causa, videmus hunc statum esse hujus totius mundi atque naturæ, rotundum ut cælum, terraque ut media sit, eaque sua vi nutuque teneatur, sol ut eam circum ita feratur, ut accedat ad brumale signum et inde sensim ascendat in diversam partem, ut luna accessu et recessu suo solis lumen accipiat, ut eadem spatia quinque stellæ dispari motu cursuque conficiant. [179] Hæc tantam habent vim, paulum ut immutata cohærere non possint, tantam pulchritudinem, ut nulla species ne cogitari quidem possit ornatior. Referte nunc animum ad hominum vel etiam ceterarum animantium formam et figuram. Nullam partem corporis sine aliqua necessitate affictam totamque formam quasi perfectam reperietis arte, non casu. |
XLV. “In what manner, then, shall we pursue so important an object, so as to entertain hopes of being able to acquire this talent of speaking in harmonious numbers? It is not a matter of so much difficulty as it is of necessity; for there is nothing so pliant, nothing so flexible, nothing which will so easily follow whithersoever you incline to lead it, as language; [177] out of which verses are composed; out of which all the variety of poetical numbers; out of which also prose of various modulation and of many different kinds; for there is not one set of words for common discourse, and another for oratorical debate; nor are they taken from one class for daily conversation, and from another for the stage and for display; but, when we have made our selection from those that lie Before us, we form and fashion them at our pleasure like the softest wax. According, therefore, as we ourselves are grave, or subtle, or hold a middle course between both, so the form of our language follows the nature of our thoughts, and is changed and varied to suit every method by which we delight the ear or move the passions of mankind. [178] But as in most things, so in language, Nature herself has wonderfully contrived, that what carries in it the greatest utility, should have at the same time either the most dignity, or, as it often happens, the most beauty. We perceive the very system of the universe and of nature to be constituted with a view to the safety and preservation of the whole; so that the firmament should be round, and the earth in the middle, and that it should be held in its place by its own nature and tendency;70 that the sun should go round, that it should approach to the winter sign,71 and thence gradually ascend to the opposite region; that the moon, by her advance and retreat, should receive the light of the sun; and that the five planets should perform the same revolutions by different motions and courses. [179] This order of things has such force, that, if there were the least alteration in it, they could not possibly subsist together; and such beauty, that no fairer appearance of nature could even be imagined. Turn your thoughts now to the shape and figure of man, or even that of other animals; you will find no part of the body fashioned without some necessary use, and the whole frame perfected as it were by art, not by chance. |
[XLVI] ¿Quid in his arboribus? In quibus non truncus, non rami, non folia sunt denique, nisi ad suam retinendam conservandamque naturam ; nusquam tamen est ulla pars nisi venusta. ¡Linquamus naturam artesque videamus! [180] ¿Quid tam in navigio necessarium quam latera, quam cavernæ, quam prora, quam puppis, quam antennæ, quam vela, quam mali? Quæ tamen hanc habent in specie venustatem, ut non solum salutis, sed etiam voluptatis causa inventa esse videantur. Columnæ templa et porticus sustinent ; tamen habent non plus utilitatis quam dignitatis. Capitolii fastigium illud, et ceterarum ædium, non venustas, sed necessitas ipsa fabricata est. At quum esset habita ratio, quemadmodum ex utraque tecti parte aqua delaberetur, utilitatem fastigii templi dignitas consecuta est — ut, etiamsi in cælo Capitolium statueretur ubi imber esse non posset, nullam sine fastigio dignitatem habiturum fuisse videatur. [181] Hoc in omnibus item partibus orationis evenit, ut utilitatem ac prope necessitatem suavitas quædam et lepos consequatur ; clausulas enim atque interpuncta verborum animæ interclusio atque angustiæ spiritus attulerunt ; id autem ita est suave ut, si cui sit infinitus spiritus datus, tamen eum perpetuare verba nolimus. Id enim auribus nostris gratum est inventum, quod hominum lateribus non tolerabile solum, sed etiam facile esse possit. |
XLVI. How is it with regard to trees, of which neither the trunk, nor the boughs, nor even the leaves, are formed otherwise than to maintain and preserve their own nature, yet in which there is no part that is not beautiful? [180] Or let us turn from natural objects, and cast our eyes on those of art; what is so necessary in a ship as the sides, the hold,72 the prow, the stern, the yards, the sails, the masts? which yet have so much beauty in their appearance, that they seem to have been invented not for safety only, but also for the delight afforded by the spectacle. Pillars support temples and porticoes, and yet have not more of utility than of dignity. It was not regard to beauty, but necessity, that contrived the cupola of the Capitol, and other buildings; for when a plan was contemplated by which the water might run off from each side of the roof, the dignity of the cupola was added to the utility of the temple; but in such a manner, that should the Capitol be built in heaven, where no rain can fall, it would appear to have no dignity without the cupola. [181] It happens likewise in all parts of language, that a certain agreeableness and grace are attendant on utility, and, I may say, on necessity; for the stoppage of the breath, and the confined play of the lungs, introduced periods and the pointing of words. This invention gives such gratification, that, if unlimited powers of breath were granted to a person, yet we could not wish him to speak without stopping; for the invention of stops is pleasing to the ears ot mankind, and not only tolerable, but easy, to the lungs. |
[XLVII] [182] Longissima est igitur complexio verborum quæ volvi uno spiritu potest. Sed hic naturæ modus est, artis alius. Nam quum sint numeri plures, iambum { ♪♩} et trochæum { ♪♪♪ } frequentem segregat ab oratore Aristoteles, Catule, vester, qui natura tamen incurrunt ipsi in orationem sermonemque nostrum ; sed sunt insignes percussiones eorum numerorum et minuti, pedes. Quare primum ad heroum nos {[ dactylici (♩♪♪) et anapæsti (♪♪♩) spondi (♩♩) ]} pedem invitat ; in quo impune progredi licet duo dumtaxat pedes aut paulo plus, ne plane in versum aut similitudinem versus incidamus : |
XLVII. [182] “The largest compass of a period, then, is that which can be rounded forth in one breath. This is the bound set by nature; art has other limits; for as there is a great variety of numbers, your favorite Aristotle, Catulus, inclines to banish from oratorical language the frequent use of the iambus and the trochee; which, however, fall of themselves naturally into our common discourse and conversation; but the strokes of time73 in those numbers are remarkable, and the feet short. He therefore principally invites us to the heroic measure, [of the dactyl, the anapaest, and the spondee;]74 in which we may proceed with impunity two feet only, or a little more, lest we plainly fall into verse, or the resemblance of verse; Altae | sunt gemi | nae quibus These three heroic feet fall in gracefully enough with the beginnings of continuations of words. [183] But the paeon is most of all approved by Aristotle; it is of two kinds;75 for it either begins with a long syllable which three short syllables follow, as in these words, desinite, incipite, comprimite; or with a succession of three short syllables, the last being produced and made long, as in these words, domuerant, sonipedes; and it is agreeable to the notions of that philosopher to commence with the former paeon, and to conclude with the latter; and this latter paeon is almost equal, not indeed in the number of the syllables, but by the measure of the ear, which is a more acute and certain method of judgment, to the cretic, which consists of a long, a short, and a long syllable; as in this verse, Quid petam praesidi, aut exsequar? Quove nunc?76 With which kind of foot Fannius77 began, Si, Quirites, Minas illius. This Aristotle thinks better adapted to conclusions of periods, which he wishes to be terminated generally by a syllable that is long. |
[XLVIII] [184] Neque vero hæc tam acrem curam diligentiamque desiderant, quam est illa poëtarum, quos necessitas cogit et ipsi numeri ac modi sic verba versu includere, ut nihil sit ne spiritu quidem minimo brevius aut longius quam necesse est. Liberior est oratio et plane, ut dicitur, sic est vere ‘soluta,’ non ut fugiat tamen aut erret, sed ut sine vinculis sibi ipsa moderetur. Namque ego illud assentior Theophrasto qui putat orationem quæ quidem sit polita atque facta quodammodo, non astricte, sed remissius numerosam esse oportere. [185] Etenim, sicut ille suspicatur, ex istis modis quibus hic usitatus versus efficitur, post anapæstus { ♪♪♩}, procerior quidam numerus, effloruit ; inde ille licentior et divitior fluxit dithyrambus cujus membra et pedes, ut ait idem, sunt in omni locupleti oratione diffusa ; et, si numerosum est in omnibus sonis atque vocibus quod habet quasdam impressiones et quod metiri possumus intervallis æqualibus, recte genus hoc numerorum, dummodo ne continui sint, in orationis laude ponetur. Nam si rudis et indocta putanda est illa sine intervallis loquacitas perennis et profluens, ¿quid est aliud causæ cur repudietur, nisi quod hominum aures vocem natura modulantur ipsæ? Quod fieri, nisi inest numerus in voce, non potest. [186] Numerus autem in continuatione nullus est ; distinctio et æqualium aut sæpe variorum intervallorum percussio numerum conficit ; quem in cadentibus guttis, quod intervallis distinguuntur, notare possumus, in amni præcipitante non possumus. Quod si continuatio verborum hæc soluta multo est aptior ac jucundior, si est articulis membrisque distincta, quam si continuata ac producta, membra illa modificata esse debebunt ; quæ si in extremo breviora sunt, infringitur ille quasi verborum ‘ambitus’ (sic enim has orationis conversiones Græci nominant). Quare aut paria esse debent posteriora superioribus, et extrema primis aut, quod etiam est melius et jucundius, longiora.” |
XLVIII. [184] “But these numbers in oratory do not require such sharp-sighted care and diligence as that which must be used by poets, whom necessity compels, as do the very numbers and measures, so to include the words in versification, as that no part may be, even by the least breath,78 shorter or longer than the metre absolutely demands. Prose has a more free scope, and is plainly, as it is called, soluta, unconfined, yet not so that it may fly off or wander without control, but may regulate itself without being absolutely in fetters; for I agree in this particular with Theophrastus, who thinks that style, at least such as is to a certain degree polished and well constructed,79 ought to be numerous, yet not as in confinement, but at ease. [185] For, as he suspects, from those feet of which the common hexameter verse is formed, grew forth afterwards the anapaestic, a longer kind of measure; thence flowed the still more free and rich dithyramb, the members and feet of which, as the same writer observes, are diffused through all style, that is enriched with the distinguishing ornaments of eloquence. And if that is numerous in all sounds and words, which gives certain strokes as it were, and which we can measure by equal intervals, this harmony of numbers, if it be free from sameness, will be justly considered a merit in the oratorical style. Since if perpetual and ever-flowing loquacity, without any pauses, is to be thought rude and unpolished, what other reason is there why it should be disliked, except that Nature herself modulates the voice for the human ear? and this could not be the case unless numbers were inherent in the human voice. [186] But in an uninterrupted continuation of sound there are no numbers; distinction, and strokes at equal or often varied intervals, constitute numbers; which we may remark in the falling of drops of water, because they are distinguished by intervals, but which we cannot observe in the rolling stream of a river. But as this unrestrained composition of words80 is more eligible and harmonious, if it be distinguished into parts and members, than if it be carried on without intermission, those members ought to be measured by a certain rule of proportion; for if those at the end are shorter, the compass as it were of the words is made irregular; the compass,81 I say, for so the Greeks denominate these rounded divisions of style; the subsequent clauses in a sentence, therefore, ought to be equal to the antecedent, the last to the first; or, which has a better and more pleasing effect, of a greater length. |
[XLIX] [187] “Atque hæc quidem ab his philosophis quos tu maxime diligis, Catule, dicta sunt ; quod eo sæpius testificor, ut auctoribus laudandis ineptiarum crimen effugiam.” “Quarum tandem?” inquit Catulus, “¿Aut quid disputatione ista afferri potest elegantius aut omnino dici subtilius?” [188] “At vereor,” inquit Crassus, “ne hæc aut difficiliora istis ad persequendum esse videantur aut, quia non traduntur in vulgari ista disciplina, nos ea majora ac difficiliora videri velle videamur.” Tum Catulus, “Erras,” inquit, “Crasse, si aut me aut horum quemquam putas a te hæc opera quotidiana et pervagata exspectare. Ista, ista quæ dicis, dici volumus, neque tam dici quam isto dici modo ; neque tibi hoc pro me solum, sed pro his omnibus sine ulla dubitatione respondeo.” [189] “Ego vero,” inquit Antonius, “inveni jam quem negaram in eo quem scripsi libello me invenisse eloquentem. Sed eo te ne laudandi quidem causa interpellavi, ne quid de hoc tam exiguo sermonis tui tempore verbo uno meo deminueretur.” [190] “Hanc igitur,” inquit Crassus, “ad legem, quum exercitatione tum stilo qui et alia et hoc maxime ornat ac limat, formanda nobis oratio est. Neque tamen hoc tanti laboris est quanti videtur, neque sunt hæc rhythmicorum ac musicorum acerrima norma dirigenda ; efficiendum est illud modo nobis ne fluat oratio, ne vagetur, ne insistat citerius, ne excurrat longius, ut membris distinguatur, ut conversiones habeat absolutas. Neque semper utendum est perpetuitate et quasi connexione verborum, sed sæpe carpenda membris minutioribus oratio est. Quæ tamen ipsa membra sunt numeris vincienda. [191] Neque vos pæan aut herous ille conturbet. Ipsi occurrent orationi ; ipsi, inquam, se offerent et respondebunt non vocati — consuetudo modo illa sit scribendi atque dicendi, ut sententiæ verbis finiantur eorumque verborum junctio nascatur a proceris numeris ac liberis (maxime heroo aut pæane priore aut cretico), sed varie distincteque considat. Notatur enim maxime similitudo in conquiescendo. Et, si primi et postremi illi pedes sunt hac ratione servati, medii possunt latere, modo ne circumitus ipse verborum sit aut brevior quam aures exspectent, aut longior quam vires atque anima patiatur. |
XLIX. [187] “These precepts are given by those philosophers to whom you, Catulus, have the greatest attachment; a remark which I the oftener make, that by referring to my authors, I may avoid the charge of impertinence.” “Of what sort of impertinence?” said Catulus; “or what could be brought before us more elegant than this discussion of yours, or expressed more judiciously?” [188] “But still I am afraid,” said Crassus, “lest these matters should either appear to these youths82 too difficult for study, or lest, as they are not given in the common rules of instruction, I should appear to have an inclination that they should seem of more importance and difficulty than they really are.” Catulus replied, “You are mistaken, Crassus, if you imagine that either I or any of the company expected from you those ordinary or vulgar precepts; what you say is what we wished to be said; and not so much indeed to be said, as to be said in the very manner in which you have said it; nor do I answer for myself only, but for all the rest, without the least hesitation.” [189] “And I,” said Antonius, “have at length discovered such a one as, in the book which I wrote, I said that I had never found, a person of eloquence; but I never interrupted you, not even to pay you a compliment, for this reason, that no part of the short time allotted for your discourse might be diminished by a single word of mine.” [190] “To this standard, then,” proceeded Crassus, “is your style to be formed, as well by the practice of speaking, as by writing, which contributes a grace and refinement to other excellences, but to this in a more peculiar manner. Nor is this a matter of so much labor as it appears to be; nor are our phrases to be governed by the rigid laws of the cultivators of numbers and music; and the only object for our endeavours is, that our sentences may not be loose or rambling, that they neither stop within too narrow a compass, nor run out too far; that they be distinguished into clauses, and have well-rounded periods. Nor are you to use perpetually this fulness and as it were roundness of language, but a sentence is often to be interrupted by minuter clauses, which very clauses are still to be modulated by numbers. [191] Nor let the paeon or heroic foot give you any alarm; they will naturally come into your phrases; they will, I say, offer themselves, and will answer without being called; only let it be your care and practice, both in writing and speaking, that your sentences be concluded with verbs, and that the junction of those verbs with other words proceed with numbers that are long and free, especially the heroic feet, the first paeon, or the cretic; but let the cadence be varied and diversified; for it is in the conclusion that sameness is chiefly remarked. And if these measures are observed at the beginning and at the conclusion of sentences, the intermediate numbers may be disregarded; only let the compass of your sentence not be shorter than the ear expects, nor longer than your strength and breath will allow. |
[L] [192] Clausulas autem diligentius etiam servandas esse arbitror quam superiora, quod in eis maxime perfectio atque absolutio judicatur. Nam versus æque prima et media et extrema pars attenditur, qui debilitatur, in quacunque est parte titubatum ; in oratione autem pauci prima cernunt, postrema plerique : quæ quoniam apparent et intelleguntur, varianda sunt, ne aut animorum judiciis repudientur aut aurium satietate. [193] Duo enim aut tres fere sunt extremi servandi et notandi pedes, si modo non breviora et præcisa erunt superiora, quos aut choreos {♩♪ } aut heroos {♩♪♪ } aut alternos esse oportebit, insequente aut pæane illo posteriore { ♪♪♪♩} quem Aristoteles probat, aut ei pari cretico {♩♪♩}. Horum vicissitudines efficient, ut neque ii satientur qui audient fastidio similitudinis, nec nos id quod faciemus opera dedita facere videamur.[194] Quod si Antipater ille Sidonius, ille quem tu probe, Catule, meministi, solitus est versus hexametros aliosque variis modis atque numeris fundere ex tempore, tantumque hominis ingeniosi ac memoris valuit exercitatio ut, quum se mente ac voluntate conjecisset in versum, verba sequerentur, quanto id facilius in oratione — exercitatione et consuetudine adhibita — consequemur! |
L. [192] “But I think that the conclusions of periods ought to be studied more carefully than the former parts; because it is chiefly from these that the finish of style is judged; for in a verse, the commencement of it, the middle, and the extremity are equally regarded; and in whatever part it fails, it loses its force; but in a speech, few notice the beginnings, but almost all the closes, of the periods, which, as they are observable and best understood, should be varied, lest they be disapproved, either by the judgment of the understanding or by the satiety of the ear. [193] For the two or three feet towards the conclusion are to be marked and noted, if the preceding members of the sentence were not extremely short and concise; and these last feet ought either to be trochees, or heroic feet, or those feet used alternately, or to consist of the latter paeon, of which Aristotle approves, or, what is equal to it, the cretic. An interchange of such feet will have these good effects, that the audience will not be tired by an offensive sameness, and that we shall not appear to make similar endings on purpose. [194] But if the famous Antipater of Sidon,83 whom you, Catulus, very well remember, used to pour forth extempore hexameter and other verses, in various numbers and measures, and if practice had so much power in a man of great ability and memory, that whenever he turned his ‘thoughts and inclinations upon verse, the words followed of course, how much more easily shall we attain this facility in oratory, when application and exercise are used! |
[195] Illud autem ne quis admiretur, quonam modo hæc vulgus imperitorum in audiendo notet : quum in omni genere tum in hoc ipso magna quædam est vis incredibilisque naturæ. Omnes enim tacito quodam sensu, sine ulla arte aut ratione, quæ sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava dijudicant ; idque quum faciunt in picturis et in signis et in aliis operibus ad quorum intellegentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti, tum multo ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum vocumque judicio, quod ea sunt in communibus infixa sensibus, neque earum rerum quemquam funditus natura esse voluit expertem. [196] Itaque non solum verbis arte positis moventur omnes, verum etiam numeris ac vocibus. ¿¡Quotus enim quisque est qui teneat artem numerorum ac modorum!? At in eis si paulum modo offensum est, ut aut contractione brevius fieret aut productione longius, theatra tota reclamant. ¿Quid, hoc non idem fit in vocibus, ut a multitudine ac populo non modo catervæ atque concentus, sed etiam ipsi sibi singuli discrepantes ejiciantur? |
[195] “Nor let any one wonder how the illiterate part of an audience observe these things when they listen to a speech; since, in all other things, as well as in this, the force of nature ia great and extraordinary; for all men, by a kind of tacit sense, without any art or reasoning, can form a judgment of what is right and wrong in art and reasoning; and as they do this with regard to pictures, statues, and other works, for understanding which they have less assistance from nature, so they display this faculty much more in criticising words, numbers, and sounds of language, because these powers are inherent in our common senses, nor has nature intended that any person should be utterly destitute of judgment in these particulars. [196] All people are accordingly moved, not only by words artfully arranged, but also by numbers and the sounds of the voice. How few are those that understand the science of numbers and measures! yet if in these the smallest offence be given by an actor, so that any sound is made too short by contraction, or too long by extension, whole theatres burst into exclamations. Does not the same thing also happen with regard to musical notes, that not only whole sets and bands of musicians are turned out by the multitude and the populace for varying one from another, but even single performers for playing out of tune? |
[LI] [197] Mirabile est, quum plurimum in faciendo intersit inter doctum et rudem, quam non multum differat in judicando. Ars enim quum a natura profecta sit, nisi naturā moveat ac delectet, nihil sane egisse videatur. Nihil est autem tam cognatum mentibus nostris quam numeri atque voces, quibus et excitamur et incendimur et lenimur et languescimus et ad hilaritatem et ad tristitiam sæpe deducimur ; quorum illa summa vis carminibus est aptior et cantibus — non neglecta, ut mihi videtur, a Numa rege doctissimo majoribusque nostris, ut epularum sollemnium fides ac tibiæ Saliorumque versus indicant ; maxime autem a Græcia vetere celebrata. ¡Quibus utinam, similibusque de rebus, disputari quam de puerilibus his verborum trajectionibus maluissetis! [198] Verum, ut in versu vulgus, si est peccatum, videt, sic si quid in nostra oratione claudicat, sentit ; sed poëtæ non ignoscit, nobis concedit ; taciti tamen omnes, non esse illud quod diximus aptum perfectumque, cernunt. Itaque illi veteres, sicut hodie etiam nonnullos videmus, quum circumitum et quasi orbem verborum conficere non possent (nam id quidem nuper vel posse vel audere cœpimus), terna aut bina aut nonnulli singula etiam verba dicebant ; qui in illa infantia naturale illud quod aures hominum flagitabant, tenebant tamen, ut et illa essent paria quæ dicerent, et æqualibus interspirationibus uterentur. |
LI. [197] “It is wonderful, when there is a wide interval of distinction betwixt the learned and illiterate in acting, how little difference there is in judging;84 for art, being derived from nature, appears to have effected nothing at all if it does not move and delight nature. And there is nothing which so naturally affects our minds as numbers and the harmony of sounds, by which we are excited, and inflamed, and soothed, and thrown into a state of languor, and often moved to cheerfulness or sorrow; the most exquisite power of which is best suited to poetry and music, and was not, as it seems to me, undervalued by our most learned monarch Numa and our ancestors, (as the stringed and wind instruments at the sacred banquets and the verses of the Salii sufficiently indicate,) but was most cultivated in ancient Greece; [concerning which subjects, and similar ones, I could wish that you had chosen to discourse, rather than about these puerile verbal metaphors!]85 [198] But as the common people notice where there is anything faulty in a verse, so they are sensible of any lameness in our language; but they grant the poet no pardon; to us they show some indulgence; but all tacitly discern that what we have uttered has not its peculiar propriety and finish. The speakers of old, therefore, as we see some do at the present day, when they were unable to complete a circuit and, as it were, roundness of period, (for that is what we have recently begun, indeed, either to effect or attempt,) spoke in clauses consisting of three, or two words, or sometimes uttered only a dingle word at a time; and yet in that infancy of our tongue they understood the natural gratification which the human ears required, and even studied that what they spoke should be expressed in correspondent phrases, and that they should take breath at equal intervals. |
[LII] [199] Exposui fere, ut potui, quæ maxime ad ornatum orationis pertinere arbitrabar. Dixi enim de singulorum laude verborum ; dixi de conjunctione eorum ; dixi de numero atque forma. Sed si habitum etiam orationis et quasi colorem aliquem requiritis : est et plena quædam, sed tamen teres ; et tenuis, sed non sine nervis ac viribus ; et ea quæ particeps utriusque generis quadam mediocritate laudatur. His tribus figuris insidere quidam venustatis, non fuco illitus, sed sanguine diffusus debet color. [200] Tum denique hic nobis orator ita conformandus est et verbis et sententiis ut, quemadmodum qui utuntur armis aut palæstra non solum sibi vitandi aut feriendi rationem esse habendam putant, sed etiam ut cum venustate moveantur, † sic verbis quidem et sententiis non solum ad redarguendum et probandum, sed etiam cum venustate utatur †. [201] Formantur autem et verba et sententiæ pæne innumerabiliter, quod satis scio notum esse vobis ; sed inter conformationem verborum et sententiarum hoc interest, quod verborum tollitur, si verba mutaris, sententiarum permanet, quibuscunque verbis uti velis. Quod quidem vos etsi facitis, tamen admonendos puto, ne quid esse aliud oratoris putetis quod quidem sit egregium atque mirabile, nisi in singulis verbis illa tria tenere : ut translatis utamur frequenter, interdumque factis, raro autem etiam pervetustis. In perpetua autem oratione, quum et conjunctionis lēvitatem et numerorum quam dixi rationem tenuerimus, tum est quasi luminibus distinguenda et frequentanda omnis oratio sententiarum atque verborum. |
LII. [199] “I have now shown, as far as I could, what I deemed most conducive to the embellishment of language; for I have spoken of the merits of single words; I have spoken of them in composition; I have spoken of the harmony of numbers and structure. But if you wish me to speak also of the form and, as it were, complexion of eloquence, there is one sort which has a fulness, but is free from tumour; one which is plain, but not without nerve and vigor; and one which, participating of both these kinds, is commended for a certain middle quality. In each of these three forms there ought to be a peculiar complexion of beauty, not produced by the daubing of paint, but diffused throughout the system by the blood. [200] Then, finally,86 this orator of ours is so to be finished as to his style and thoughts in general, that, as those who study fencing and polite exercises, not only think it necessary to acquire a skill in parrying and striking, but also grace and elegance of motion, so he may use such words as are suited to elegant and graceful composition, and such thoughts as contribute to the impressiveness of language. Words and thoughts are formed in almost innumerable ways; as is, I am sure, well known to you; but betwixt the formation of words and that of thoughts there is this difference, that that of the words is destroyed if you change them, that of the thoughts remains, whatever words you think proper to use. [201] But I think that you ought to be reminded (although, indeed, you act agreeably to what I say) that you should not imagine there is anything else to be done by the orator, at least anything else to produce a striking and admirable effect, than to observe these three rules with regard to single words; to use frequently metaphorical ones, sometimes new ones, and rarely very old ones. “But with regard to continuous composition, when we have acquired that smoothness of junction and harmony of numbers which I have explained, our whole style of oratory is to be distinguished and frequently interspersed with brilliant lights, as it were, of thoughts and of words. |
|
LIII. [202] For the dwelling on a single circumstance has often a considerable effect; and a clear illustration and exhibition of matters to the eye of the audience, almost as if they were transacted before them. This has wonderful influence in giving a representation of any affair, both to illustrate what is represented, and to amplify it, so that the point which we amplify may appear to the audience to be really as great as the powers of our language can represent it. Opposed to this is rapid transition over a thing, which may often be practised. There is also signification that more is to be understood than you have expressed; distinct and concise brevity; and extenuation, and, what borders upon this, ridicule, not very different from that which was the object of Caesar’s instructions; [203] and digression from the subject, and when gratification has thus been afforded, the return to the subject ought to be happy and elegant; proposition of what you are about to say, transition from what has been said, and retrogression; there is repetition; apt conclusion of reasoning; exaggeration, or surpassing of the truth, for the sake of amplification or diminution; interrogation, and, akin to this, as it were, consultation or seeming inquiry, followed by the delivery of your own opinion; and dissimulation, the humor of saying one thing and signifying another, which steals into the minds of men in a peculiar manner, and which is extremely pleasing when it is well managed, not in a vehement strain of language, but if a conversational style; also doubt; and distribution; and correction of yourself, either before or after you have said a thing, or when you repel anything from your self; [204] there is also premunition, with regard to what you are going to prove; there h the transference of Wave to another person; there is communication, or consultation as it were, with the audience before whom you are speaking; imitation of manners and character, either with names of persons or without, which is a great ornament to a speech, and adapted to conciliate the feelings even in the utmost degree, and often also to rouse them; [205] the introduction of fictitious characters, the most heightened figure of exaggeration; there is description; falling into a wilful mistake; excitement of the audience to cheerfulness; anticipation; comparison and example, two figures which have a very great effect; division; interruption; contention;87 suppression; commendation; a certain freedom and even uncontrolledness of language, for the purpose of exaggeration; anger; reproach; promise; deprecation; beseeching; slight deviation from your intended course, but not like digression, which I mentioned before; expurgation; conciliation; attack; wishing; execration. Such are the figures with which thoughts give lustre to a speech. |
[LIV] [206] Orationis autem ipsius tanquam armorum est vel ad usum comminatio et quasi petitio, vel ad venustatem ipsa tractatio. Nam et geminatio verborum habet interdum vim, leporem alias ;
|
LIV. [206] “Of words themselves, as of arms, there is a sort of threatening and attack for use, and also a management for grace. For the reiteration of words has sometimes a peculiar force, and sometimes elegance; as well as the variation or deflexion of a word from its common signification; and the frequent repetition of the same word in the beginning, and recurrence to it at the end, of a period; forcible emphasis on the same words; conjunction;88 adjunction;89 progression,90 a sort of distinction as to some word often used; the recal of a word; the use of words, also, which end similarly, or have similar cadences, or which balance one another, or which correspond to one another. [207] There is also a certain gradation, a conversion,91 an elegant exaggeration of the sense of words; there is antithesis, asyndeton, declination92 reprehension,93 exclamation, diminution; the use of the same word in different cases; the referring of what is derived from many particulars to each particular singly; reasoning subservient to jour proposition, and reasoning suited to the order of distribution; concession; and agein another kind of doubt;94 the introduction of something unexpected; enumeration; another correction;95 division; continuation; interruption; imagery; answering your own questions; immutation;96 disjunction; order; relation; digression;97 and circumscription. [208] These are the figures, and others like these, or there may even be more, which adorn language by peculiarities in thought or structure of style.” |
[LV] “Quæ quidem te, Crasse, video,” inquit Cotta, “quum nota esse nobis putes, sine definitionibus et sine exemplis effudisse.” “Ego vero,” inquit Crassus, “ne illa quidem quæ supra dixi nova vobis esse arbitrabar, sed voluntati vestrum omnium parui. [209] His autem de rebus sol me ille admonuit, ut brevior essem, qui ipse jam præcipitans me quoque hæc præcipitem pæne evolvere coëgit. Sed tamen hujus generis demonstratio est et doctrina ipsa vulgaris ; usus autem gravissimus et in hoc toto dicendi studio difficillimus. [210] {④} Quamobrem quoniam de ornatu omni orationis sunt omnes, si non patefacti, at certe commonstrati loci, ¡nunc quid aptum sit — hoc est, quid maxime deceat in oratione — videamus! Quanquam id quidem perspicuum est, non omni causæ { 1 }, nec auditori { 2 }, nec personæ { 3 }, neque tempori { 4 } congruere orationis unum genus.
|
LV. “These remarks, Crassus,” said Cotta, “I perceive that you have poured forth to us without any definitions or examples, because you imagined us acquainted with them.” “I did not, indeed,” said Crassus, “suppose that any of the things which I previously mentioned were new to you, but acted merely in obedience to the inclinations of the whole company. [209] But in these particulars the sun yonder admonished me to use brevity, which, hastening to set, compelled me also to throw out these observations almost too hastily. But explanations, and even rules on this head, are common, though the application of them is most important, and the most difficult of anything in the whole study of eloquence. [210] “Since, then, all the points which relate to all the ornamental parts of oratory are, if not illustrated, at least pointed out, let us now consider what is meant by propriety, that is, what is most becoming, in oratory. It is, however, clear that no single kind of style can be adapted to every cause, or every audience, or every person, or every occasion. [211] For capital causes require one style of speaking, private and inferior causes another; deliberations require one kind of oratory, panegyric another, judicial proceedings another, common conversation another, consolation another, reproof another, disputation another, historical narrative another. It is of consequence also to consider who form the audience, whether the senate, or the people, or the judges; whether it is a large or a small assembly, or a single person, and of what character; it ought to be taken into account, too, who the speakers themselves are, of what age, rank, and authority; and the time also, whether it be one of peace or war, of hurry or leisure. [212] On this head, therefore, no direction seems possible to be given but this, that we adopt a character of style, fuller, plainer, or middling,98 suited to the subject on which we are to speak; the same ornaments we may use almost constantly, but sometimes in a higher, sometimes in a lower strain; and it is the part of art and nature to be able to do what is becoming on every occasion; to know what is becoming, and when, is an affair of judgment. |
[LVI] [213] Sed hæc omnia perinde sunt, ut aguntur. Actio, inquam, in dicendo una dominatur. Sine hac summus orator esse in numero nullo potest, mediocris hac instructus summos sæpe superare. Huic primas dedisse Demosthenes dicitur, quum rogaretur quid in dicendo esset primum, huic secundas, huic tertias. Quo mihi melius etiam illud ab Æschine dictum videri solet ; qui quum propter ignominiam judicii cessisset Athenis et se Rhodum contulisset, rogatus a Rhodiis, legisse fertur orationem illam egregiam quam in Ctesiphontem contra Demosthenen dixerat ; qua perlecta petitum ab eo est postridie, ut legeret illam etiam quæ erat contra a Demosthene pro Ctesiphonte edita : quam quum suavissima et maxima voce legisset, admirantibus omnibus, ‘¡Quanto,’ inquit, ‘magis miraremini, si audissetis ipsum!’ Ex quo satis significavit, quantum esset in actione qui orationem eandem aliam fore putarit, actore mutato. [214] ¿Quid fuit in Graccho, quem tu melius, Catule, meministi, quod me puero tantopere ferretur? ‘¿Quo me miser conferam? ¿Quo vertam? ¿In Capitoliumne? At fratris sanguine redundat. ¿An domum? ¿Matremne ut miseram lamentantem videam et abjectam?’ Quæ sic ab illo esse acta constabat oculis, voce, gestu, inimici ut lacrimas tenere non possent. Hæc ideo dico pluribus, quod genus hoc totum oratores, qui sunt veritatis ipsius actores, reliquerunt, imitatores autem veritatis, histriones, occupaverunt. |
LVI. [213] “But all these parts of oratory succeed according as they are delivered. Delivery, I say, has the sole and supreme power in oratory; without it, a speaker of the highest mental capacity can be held in no esteem; while one of moderate abilities, with this qualification, may surpass even those of the highest talent. To this Demosthenes is said to have assigned the first place, when he was asked what was the chief requisite in eloquence; to this the second, and to this the third. For this reason, I am wont the more to admire what was said by Aeschiues, who, when he had retired from Athens, on account of the disgrace of having lost his cause, and betaken himself to Rhodes, is reported to have read, at the entreaty of the Rhodians, that excellent oration which he had spoken against Ctesiphon, in opposition to Demosthenes; and when he had concluded it, he was asked to read, next day that also which had been published by Demosthenes on the other side in favor of Ctesiphon; and when he had read this too in a most pleasing and powerful tone of voice, and all expressed their admiration, How much more would you have admired it, said he, if you had heard him deliver it himself! By this remark, he sufficiently indicated how much depends on delivery, as he thought the same speech would appear different if the speaker were changed. [214] What was it in Gracchus, whom you, Catulus, remember better, that was so highly extolled when I was a boy? Whither shall I, unhappy wretch, betake myself? Whither shall I turn? To the Capitol? But that is drenched with the blood of my brother! Or to my home, that I may see my distressed and afflicted mother in all the agony of lamentation? These words, it was allowed, were uttered by him with such delivery, as to countenance, voice, and gesture, that his very enemies could not restrain their tears. I dwell the longer on these particulars, because the orators, who are the deliverers of truth itself, have neglected this whole department, and the players, who are only the imitators of truth, have taken possession of it. |
[LVII] [215] Ac sine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas ; sed ea si satis in actione efficeret ipsa per sese, arte profecto non egeremus. Verum, quia animi permotio — quæ maxime aut declaranda aut imitanda est actione — perturbata sæpe ita est ut obscuretur ac pæne obruatur, discutienda sunt ea quæ obscurant, et ea quæ sunt eminentia et prompta sumenda. [216] Omnis enim motus animi suum quendam a natura habet vultum et sonum et gestum ; corpusque totum hominis et ejus omnes vultus omnesque voces, ut nervi in fidibus, ita sonant ut motu animi quoque sunt pulsæ. Nam voces ut chordæ sunt intentæ quæ ad quemque tactum respondeant, acuta gravis, cita tarda, magna parva ; quas tamen inter omnes, est suo quæque in genere mediocris. Atque etiam illa sunt ab his delapsa plura genera ; lēve asperum, contractum diffusum, continenti spiritu intermisso, fractum scissum, flexo sono extenuatum inflatum. [217] Nullum est enim horum et similium generum quod non arte ac moderatione tractetur. Hi sunt actori, ut pictori expositi ad variandum colores. |
LVII. [215] “In everything, without doubt, truth has the advantage over imitation; and if truth were efficient enough in delivery of itself, we should certainly have no need for the aid of art. But as that emotion of mind, which ought to be chiefly expressed or imitated in delivery, is often so confused as to be obscured and almost overwhelmed, the peculiarities which throw that veil over it are to be set aside, and such as are eminent and conspicuous to be selected. [216] For every emotion of the mind has from nature its own peculiar look, tone, and gesture; and the whole frame of a man, and his whole countenance, and the variations of his voice, sound99 like strings in a musical instrument, just as they are moved by the affections of the mind. For the tones of the voice, like musical chords, are so wound up as to be responsive to every touch, sharp, flat, quick, slow, loud, gentle; and yet, among all these, each in its kind has its own middle tone. From these tones, too, are derived many other sorts, as the rough, the smooth, the contracted, the broad, the protracted, and interrupted; the broken and divided, the attenuated and inflated, with varieties of modulation; [217] for there is none of these, or those that resemble them, which may not be influenced by art and management; and they are presented to the orator, as colors to the painter, to produce variety. |
|
LVIII. “Anger, for instance, assumes a particular tone of voice, acute, vehement, and with frequent breaks: My impious brother drives me on, ah wretched! To tear my children with my teeth!100 and in those lines which you, Antonius, cited awhile ago:101 Have you, then, dared to separate him from you? and, Does any one perceive this? Bind him and almost the whole tragedy of Atreus. But lamentation and bewailing assumes another tone, flexible, full, interrupted, in a voice of sorrow: as, Whither shall I now turn myself? what road Shall I attempt to tread? Home to my father, Or go to Pelias’ daughters?102 and this, O father, my country, House of Priam! and that which follows, All these did I behold enwrapt in flames, And life from Priam torn by violence.103 [218] Fear has another tone, desponding, hesitating, abject: In many ways am I encompass’d round! By sickness, exile, want. And terror drives All judgment from my breast, deprived of sense! One threats my life with torture and destruction, And no man has so firm a soul, such boldness, But that his blood shrinks backward, and his look Grows pale with timid fear.104 [219] Violence has another tone, strained, vehement, impetuous, with a kind of forcible excitement: Again Thyestes comes to drag on Atreus: Again attacks me, and disturbs my quiet: Some greater storm, some greater ill by me Must be excited, that I may confound And crush his cruel heart.105 Pleasure another, unconstrained, mild, tender, cheerful, languid: But when she brought for me the crown design’ d To celebrate the nuptials, ‘twas to thee She offer’d it, pretending that she gave it To grace another; then on thee she placed it Sportive, and graceful, and with delicacy.106 Trouble has another tone; a sort of gravity without lamentation; oppressed, as it were, with one heavy uniform sound: ‘Twas at the time when Paris wedded Helen In lawless nuptials, and when I was pregnant, My months being nearly ended for delivery, Then, at that very time, did Hecuba Bring forth her latest offspring, Polydore. |
[LIX] [220] Omnes autem hos motus subsequi debet gestus, non hic verba exprimens scænicus, sed universam rem et sententiam non demonstratione, sed significatione declarans, laterum inflexione hac forti ac virili, non ab scæna et histrionibus, sed ab armis aut etiam a palæstra. Manus autem minus arguta, digitis subsequens verba, non exprimens ; bracchium procerius projectum quasi quoddam telum orationis ; supplosio pedis in contentionibus aut incipiendis aut finiendis. [221] Sed in ore sunt omnia. In eo autem ipso dominatus est omnis oculorum ; quo melius nostri illi senes qui personatum ne Roscium quidem magnopere laudabant. Animi est enim omnis actio, et imago animi vultus, indices oculi. Nam hæc est una pars corporis quæ, quot animi motus sunt, tot significationes et commutationes possit efficere. Neque vero est quisquam qui eadem conivens efficiat. Theophrastus quidem Tauriscum quendam dicit ‘actorem aversum’ solitum esse dicere, qui in agendo contuens aliquid pronuntiaret. [222] Quare oculorum est magna moderatio. Nam oris non est nimium mutanda species, ne aut ad ineptias aut ad pravitatem aliquam deferamur. Oculi sunt quorum tum intentione, tum remissione, tum conjectu, tum hilaritate motus animorum significemus apte cum genere ipso orationis. Est enim actio quasi sermo corporis, quo magis menti congruens esse debet. Oculos autem natura nobis, ut equo aut leoni sætas, caudam, aures, ad motus animorum declarandos dedit. [223] Quare in hac nostra actione secundum vocem vultus valet ; is autem oculis gubernatur. Atque in eis omnibus quæ sunt actionis inest quædam vis a natura data, quare etiam hac imperiti, hac vulgus, hac denique barbari maxime commoventur. Verba enim neminem movent nisi eum qui ejusdem linguæ societate conjunctus est, sententiæque sæpe acutæ non-acutorum hominum sensus prætervolant : actio quæ præ se motum animi fert, omnes movet ; eisdem enim omnium animi motibus concitantur, et eos eisdem notis et in aliis agnoscunt et in se ipsi indicant. |
LIX. [220] “On all those emotions a proper gesture ought to attend; not the gesture of the stage, expressive of mere words, but one showing the whole force and meaning of a passage, not by gesticulation, but by emphatic delivery, by a strong and manly exertion of the lungs, not imitated from the theatre and the players, but rather from the camp and the palaestra. The action of the hand should not be too affected,107 but following the words rather than, as it were, expressing them by mimicry; the arm should be considerably extended, as one of the weapons of oratory; the stamping of the foot should be used only in the most vehement efforts, at their commencement or conclusion. [221] But all depends on the countenance; and even in that the eyes bear sovereign sway; and therefore the oldest of our countrymen showed the more judgment in not applauding even Roscius himself to any great degree when he performed in a mask; for all the powers of action proceed from the mind, and the countenance is the image of the mind, and the eyes are its interpreters. This, indeed, is the only part of the body that can effectually display as infinite a number of significations and changes, as there is of emotions in the soul; nor can any speaker produce the same effect with his eyes shut,108 as with them open. Theophrastus indeed has told us, that a certain Tauriscus used to say, that a player who pronounced his part gazing on any particular object was like one who turned his back on the audience.109 [222] Great care in managing the eyes is therefore necessary; for the appearance of the features is not to be too much varied, lest we fall into some absurdity or distortion. It is the eyes, by whose intense or languid gaze, as well as by their quick glances and gaiety, we indicate the workings of our mind with a peculiar aptitude to the tenor of our discourse; for action is, as it were, the speech of the body, and ought therefore the more to accord with that of the soul. And Nature has given eyes to us, to declare our internal emotions, as she has bestowed a mane, tail, and ears on the horse and the lion. [223] For these reasons, in our oratorical action, the countenance is next in power to the voice, and is influenced by the motion of the eyes. But in everything appertaining to action there is a certain force bestowed by Nature herself; and it is by action accordingly that the illiterate, the vulgar, and even barbarians themselves, are principally moved. For words move none but those who are associated in a participation of the same language; and sensible thoughts often escape the understandings of senseless men; but action, which by its own powers displays the movements of the soul, affects all mankind; for the minds of all men are excited by the same emotions, which they recognise in others, and indicate in themselves, by the same tokens. |
[LX] [224] Ad actionis autem usum atque laudem, maximam sine dubio partem vox obtinet ; quæ primum est optanda nobis ; deinde, quæcunque erit, ea tuenda. De quo illud jam nihil ad hoc præcipiendi genus, quemadmodum voci serviatur ; equidem tamen magnopere censeo serviendum ; sed illud videtur ab hujus nostri sermonis officio non abhorrere, quod (ut dixi paulo ante), plurimis in rebus quod maxime est utile, id nescio quo pacto etiam decet maxime. Nam ad vocem obtinendam nihil est utilius quam crebra mutatio, nihil perniciosius quam effusa sine intermissione contentio. [225] ¿Quid?, ¿Ad aures nostras et actionis suavitatem, quid est vicissitudine et varietate et commutatione aptius? Itaque idem Gracchus (quod potes audire, Catule, ex Licinio Erycino cliente tuo, litterato homine quem servum sibi ille habuit ad manum) cum eburneola solitus est habere fistula qui staret occulte post ipsum quum contionaretur peritum hominem, qui inflaret celeriter eum sonum quo illum aut remissum excitaret aut a contentione revocaret.” “Audivi mehercule,” inquit Catulus, “et sæpe sum admiratus hominis quum diligentiam tum etiam doctrinam et scientiam.” [226] “Ego vero,” inquit Crassus, “ac doleo quidem illos viros in eam fraudem in republica esse delapsos ; quanquam ea tela texitur — et ea incitatur in civitate ratio vivendi — ac posteritati ostenditur, ut eorum civium quos nostri patres non tulerunt jam similes habere cupiamus.” “Mitte, obsecro,” inquit “Crasse,” Julius, “sermonem istum et te ad Gracchi fistulam refer, cujus ego nondum plane rationem intellego.” |
LX. [224] “To effectiveness and excellence in delivery the voice doubtless contributes most; the voice, I say, which, in its full strength, must be the chief object of our wishes; and next, whatever strength of voice we have, to cherish it. On this point, how we are to assist the voice has nothing to do with precepts of this kind, though, for my part, I think that we should assist it to the utmost. But it seems not unsuitable to the pin-port of my present remarks, to observe, as I observed a little while ago, ‘that in most things what ia most useful is, I know not how, the most becoming;’ for nothing is more useful for securing power of voice, than the frequent variation of it; nothing more pernicious than an immoderate straining of it without intermission. [225] And what is more adapted to delight the ear, and produce agreeableness of delivery, than change, variety, and alteration of tone? Caius Gracchus, accordingly, (as you may hear, Catulus, from your client Licinius, a man of letters, whom Gracchus formerly had for his amanuensis,) used to have a skilful person with an ivory pitch-pipe, to stand concealed behind him when he made a speech, and who was in an instant to sound such a note as might either excite him from too languid a tone, or recal him from one too elevated.” “I have heard this before,” said Catulus, “and have often admired the diligence of that great man, as well as his learning and knowledge.” [226] “And I, too,” said Crassus; “and am grieved that men of such talents should fall into such miscarriages with regard to the commonwealth; although the same web is still being woven;110 and such a state of manners is advancing in the country, and held out to posterity, that we now desire to have citizens such as our fathers would not tolerate.” “Forbear, Crassus, I entreat you,” interposed Caesar, “from this sort of conversation, and go back to Gracchus’s pitch-pipe, of which I do not yet clearly understand the object.” |
[LXI] [227] “In omni voce” inquit Crassus, “est quiddam medium, sed suum cuique voci. Hinc gradatim ascendere vocem utile et suave est. Nam a principio clamare agreste quiddam est, et idem illud ad firmandam est vocem salutare ; deinde est quiddam contentionis extremum (quod tamen interius est quam acutissimus clamor), quo te fistula progredi non sinet, et jam ab ipsa contentione revocabit. Est item contra quiddam in remissione gravissimum, quōque tanquam sonorum gradibus descenditur. Hæc varietas et hic per omnes sonos vocis cursus et se tuebitur et actioni afferet suavitatem. Et fistulatorem domi relinquetis, sensum hujus consuetudinis vobiscum ad forum deferetis. [228] Edidi quæ potui — non ut volui, sed ut me temporis angustiæ coëgerunt. ☺ Scitum est enim causam conferre in tempus, quum afferre plura si cupias non queas. ☺” “Tu vero,” inquit Catulus, “collegisti omnia, quantum ego possum judicare, ita divinitus, ut non a Græcis sumpsisse, sed eos ipsos hæc docere posse videare. Me quidem istius sermonis participem factum esse gaudeo ; ac vellem ut meus gener, sodalis tuus, Hortensius, affuisset ; quem quidem, ego confido, omnibus istis laudibus quas tu oratione complexus es excellentem fore.” [229] Et Crassus, “¿‘Fore’ dicis?" inquit, “Ego vero esse jam judico et tum judicavi, quum me consule in Senatu causam defendit Africæ — nuperque etiam magis, quum pro Bithyniæ rege dixit. Quamobrem recte vides, Catule. Nihil enim isti adulescenti neque a natura neque a doctrina deesse sentio. [230] Quo magis est tibi, Cotta, et tibi, Sulpici, vigilandum ac laborandum. Non enim ille mediocris orator vestræ quasi succrescit ætati, sed et ingenio peracri et studio flagranti et doctrina eximia et memoria singulari. Cui quanquam faveo, tamen illum ætati suæ præstare cupio ; vobis vero illum tanto minorem præcurrere vix honestum est.” “Sed jam surgamus,” inquit, “nosque curemus et aliquando ab hac contentione disputationis animos nostros curaque laxemus." |
LXI. [227] “There is in every voice,” continued Crassus, “a certain middle key; but in each particular voice that key is peculiar. For the voice to ascend gradually from this key is advantageous and pleasing; since to bawl at the beginning of a speech is boorish, and gradation is salutary in strengthening the voice. There is also a certain extreme in the highest pitch, (which, however, is lower than the shrillest cry,) to which the pipe will not allow you to ascend, but will recal you from too strained an effort of voice. There is also, on the other hand, an extreme in the lowest notes, to which, as being of a full sound, we by degrees descend. This variety and this gradual progression of the voice throughout all the notes, will preserve its powers, and add agreeableness to delivery. But you will leave the piper at home, and carry with you into the forum merely the intention of the custom. [228] “I have said what I could, though not as I wished, but as the shortness of the time obliged me; for it is wise to lay the blame upon the time, when you cannot add more even if you desired.” “But,” said Catulus, “you have, as far as I can judge, brought together everything upon the subject, and that in so excellent a manner, that you seem not to have received instructions in the art from the Greeks, but to be able to instruct the Greeks themselves. I rejoice that I have been present at your conversation; and could wish that my son-in-law, your friend Hortensius,111 had also been present; who, I trust, will excel in all those good qualities of which you have treated in this dissertation.” [229] “Will excel!” exclaimed Crassus; “I consider that he already excels. I had that opinion of him when he pleaded, in my consulship, the cause of Africa112 in the senate; and I found myself still more confirmed in it lately, when he spoke for the king of Bithynia. You judge rightly, therefore, Catulus; for I am convinced that nothing is wanting to that young man, on the part either of nature or of learning. [230] You, therefore, Cotta, and you, Sulpicius, must exert the greater vigilance and industry; for he is no ordinary orator, who is springing up to rival those of your age; but one of a penetrating genius, and an ardent attachment to study, of eminent learning, and of singular powers of memory; but, though he is a favorite of mine, I only wish him to excel those of his own standing; for to desire that he, who is so much younger,113 should outstrip you, is hardly fair. But let us now arise, and refresh ourselves, and at length relieve our minds and attention from this fatiguing discussion.” |
Notes to Book 31 Which accompanied the public games. Compare i. 7. 2 Pignoribus ablatis. The senators and others were obliged to attend the senate when they were summoned, and to be submissive to the superior magistrates, or they might be punished by fine and distraint of their property. See Livy, iii. 38; xliii. 16; Plin. Ep. iv. 29; Cic. Phil. i. 5; Suet. Jul. c. 17; Adam’s Roman Antiquities, p. 2. 3 His daughter Licinia was married to Publius Scipio, the grandson of Serapion, who was instrumental in the death of Tiberius Gracchus. Cic. Brut 58. Ellendt. 4 Perspicuity. 5 This seems to be speaking rather too lightly of the merit of perspicuity, which Quintilian pronounces the chief virtue of language. 6 The Asiatic Greeks. 7 Those who are born at Rome apply themselves to the liberal sciences leas than the rest of the people of Latium. Proust. 8 See Brut. c. 46. 9 The daughter of Cajus Laclius Sapiens, who was married to Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the augur. See Brut. c. 58; Quint, i. 1. 6. Ellendt. 10 See ii. 21; Brut. c. 55. 11 See ii. 22. 12 See i. 39; Brut. c. 57, 62, 90. Ellndt. 13 Antonius and Catulus. 14 Odiosiora. Auditoribus odiosiora. Schutz. 15 Ironically. 16 Qui illum a se adolescente Athenis iam affectum senectute multos dies auditum esse dicebat. “Who said that he had been heard by him when a young man for many days at Athens (where he was) now affected with old age.” 17 Ex communi sapientium iugo. I read sapientiae with Ellendt. It is a comparison, as he observes, of Socrates to a hill. 18 See Liv. xxxiii. 42. 19 Carbo. See note on i. 10. 20 The same that speaks, in the dialogue De Natura Devrum, on the tenets of the Epicureans. 21 One Balbus is a speaker in the De Nat. Deorum, on the doctrines of the Stoics. The other, says Ellendt, is supposed to be the lawyer who is mentioned by Cicero, Brut. c. 42, and who was the master of Servius Sulpicius. Of Vigellius nothing is known. 22 See i. 20. He jokes on the name of Corax, which signifies a crow. 23 Pamphilum nescio quem. Some suppose him to be the painter that is mentioned as the instructor of Apelles by Pliny, H. N”. xxxv. 36. 8. He seems, whoever he was, to have given some fanciful map-like view of the rules of rhetoric. But it is not intimated by Pliny that the Pamphilus of whom he speaks was, though a learned painter, anything more than a painter. A Pamphilus is mentioned by Quintilian, iii. 6. 34; xii. 10. 6; and by Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 23. By infulae in the text, which I have rendered “flags,” Ellendt supposes that something similar to our printed cotton handkerchiefs, or flags hung out at booths at fairs, is meant. Talaeus thinks that the tables of rules might have been called infulae in ridicule, from their shape. 24 Such “disagreeable and troublesome bawlers,” as those from the nest of Corax just mentioned. Ernesti. 25 See note on ii. 80. 26 This name was introduced on the conjecture of Victorias. Previously the passage was unintelligible. 27 Of Valerius and Furius nothing is known. Ellendt. 28 Cic. Tusc. Quaest. iv. 2; Fin. iv. 9. 29 See ii. 37. 30 Titius is mentioned ii. 62. Of Brulla nothing is known. Ellendt. 31 Apparatu. In allusion, says Petavius, to the shows given by the aediles. 32 Ad annum. That of his aedileship. Ernesti. 33 The Greek rhetoricians. Pearce. 34 Quintilian refers to this passage, ii. 4. 42. [...] The edict of the censors Crassus and Ahenobarbus, which was marked by all the ancient severity, is preserved in Aul. Gell. xv. 11; and Suetonius, De Clar. Rhet. proeem. Crassus intimates that that class of men sprung up again after his edict; for the censors had not such power that their mere prohibitions could continue in force after their term of office was expired. Ellendt. 35 In ornatu. The arrangement of such ornaments as were displayed at games and festivals. 36 Falsae. Fractae et molliores. Ernesti. 37 Aesopus, as I suppose. Ellendt; who observes that the verses art from the Andromache of Ennius. See c. 47, 58; Tusc. Disp. iii. 19. 38 B. ii. c. 84. 39 B ii. c. 10. 40 The Academic and Peripatetic; see iii. 17, 18. Proust. 41 Those who taught forensic eloquence. Proust. 42 The philosophers. 43 From the Academy, and the gymnasia in the suburbs of Athens. Ellendt. 44 Consultatio. See Cic. Part. Orat. i. 18, 20. 45 A ceremony by which a claim to a possession was made. See Gajus, iv. 17. 46 Lacinia. Like persons who scarcely keep their hold of a thing. Ellendt. 47 Philo of Larissa, called by some the founder of a fourth Academy, was a hearer of Clitomachus, Acad. ii. 6. He fled to Rome, with many of the chief men of Athens, in the Mithridatic war, when Cicero, then a young man, attended diligently to his instructions. Brut. 89; Plut. Cic. c. 3. He sometimes gave instructions in rhetoric, sometimes in philosophy, as appears from Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. Henrichsen. 48 See Plato, Hipp. Min. p. 231 G. 49 Gorgias, in the Dialogue of Plato, undertakes the defence of oratory against Socrates, whom Plato represents as maintaining the dignity of philosophy. Gorgias is vanquished by Socrates. Proust. 50 For, except Metellus Numidicus and Marius, no one in those days had gained any great reputation by his conduct in the field. 51 Quod est coniunctum. That is, “conjunctum cum jure civili.” Proust. What Cicero says here is somewhat at variance with what he says, DeLegg. ii. 19, where he shows, at some length, that only a small part of the civil law is necessary to be combined with the knowledge of the pontifical law. Ellendt. 52 The words in brackets, says Ellendt, are certainly spurious, for they could not possibly have been written by Cicero. In the original, quod ipse, &c., ipse necessarily refers to Aristotle, of whom what is here said could, never have been true. 53 The Philoctetes of Euripides, as is generally supposed. 54 All the editions retain ille senius, though universally acknowledged to be corrupt. The conjecture of Turnebus, ille Ennius, has found most favor; that of Orellius, ullud Ennii, is approved by Ellendt. That the words di genitales were used by Ennius appears from Servius on Virg Aen . vi. 764. 55 From Pacuvius. See Cic. Divin. i. 14. 56 See Smith’s Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant., art. Nexum. 57 Divortium, in its proper sense, denoted the separation of roads or waters. 58 In his tragedy of Hecuba, as is supposed by Hermann, ad Eurip. Hec. p. 167. See Varro, L. L. v. p. 8. 59 Supposed by Bothe, Trag. Lat. Fragm. p. 278, to be from the Niptra of Pacuvius. See Cic. Quaest. Acad. ii. 28. 60 From the Thyestes of Ennius. Cic. Tusc. iii. 12. 61 Orellius’s text has istim, which is considered to be the same as istinc. See Victorius ad Cic. Ep. ad Div. vi. 6. 62 Whence this and the following quotation are taken is uncertain. 63 Traductio atque immutatio. See Cic. Orat. 27; Quint, viii. 6. ix. 3; infra, c. 43, 54. 64 Prom the Annals of Ennius. See Cic. Ep. ad Div. ix. 7; Orat. 27 Fostus v. metonymia. 65 Synecdoche. 66 This quotation and the following are from the Annals of Ennius. 67 C.41. 68 Mucius Scaevola. He accused Albucius of extortion. 69 Ellendt aptly refers to Cic. Orat. c. 68; Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 8. 6. 70 Nutu. Compare Cic. De Nat. Deor. ii. 39. Ellendt thinks that by nut us is meant something similar to our centripetal force. 71 Brumae signum. The tropic of Capricorn. De Nat. Deor. iii. 14. 72 Cavernae. Some editions have carinae, and Lambinus reads carina. If we retain cavernae, it is not easy to say exactly in what sense it should be taken. Servius, on Virgil, Aen. ii. 19, observes that the fustes curvos navium, quibus extrinsecus fabulae affiguntur, were called cavernae; but in this sense, as Ellendt observes, it is much the same with latera, which precedes. Ellendt himself, therefore, inclines to take it in the sense of cavitas alvei, “hold “or “keel,” which, as it is divided into parts, may, he thinks, be expressed in the plural number. 73 Percussiones. The ictus metrici; so called, because the musician, in beating time, struck the ground with his foot. In a senarius he struck the ground three times, once for every two feet; whence there were said to be in such a verse three ictus or percussiones. But on pronouncing those syllables, at which the musician struck the ground, the actor raised his voice; and hence percussio was in Greek &pais, and the raised or accented syllables were said to be en arsei, the others being said to be in thesei. See Bentley de Metr. Terentian iAiit. Ernesti. 74 Madvig and Ellendt justly regard the words in brackets as spurious. I follow those critics also in reading Altae sunt geminae quibus, though, as Ellendt observes, Atlae ought very likely to be Arae. Alice, which is in most editions, made the passage utterly inexplicable, though Ernesti, Strebaeus, and others did what they could to put some meaning into it. 75 The first and fourth only are meant. 76 C. 26; where Pearce observes that they are the words of Andromache in Ennius, according to Bentley on Tusc. Disp. iii. 19. 77 Cajus Fannius Strabo, who was consul A.U.C. 632. He left one speech against Cajus Gracchus: Cic. Brut. c. 26. 78 Ne spiritu quidem minimo. 79 Facta. That is, carefully labored. See Brut. o. 8. Ellendt. 80 Continuatio verborum soluta. See above, near the beginning of this chapter, oratio vere soluta. 81 Ambitus. The Greek word is periodos. See Orat. c. 61. 82 Cotta and Sulpicius. 83 Some of whose epigrams are to be seen in the Greek Anthology He flourished about 100 B.C. 84 See Cic. Brut. c. 49. 85 The words in brackets are condemned is spurious by all the recent editors. 86 Tum denique. Ellendt incloses tum in brackets, and thinks that much of the language of the rest of the chapter is confused and incorrect. The words ut ii, qui in armorum tractatione versantur, which occur a little below, and which are generally condemned, are not translated. 87 Contentio. This is doubtless some species of comparison; there is no allusion to it in the Orator. See ad Herenn. iv. 45. Ellendt. 88 Concursio. The writer ad Herenn. iv. 14, calls this figure traductio; the Greeks sumploke. Ellendt. 89 Adiunctio. It appears to be that which Quintilian (ix. 3) calls sunezeugmenon, where several words are connected with the same verb. Ellendt. 90 What progressio is, no critic has been able to inform us, nor is there any notice of it in any other writer on rhetoric. I see no mode of explaining the passage, unless we take adiunctio and progressio together, and suppose them to signify that the speech proceeds with several words in conjunction. Ellendt. 91 An antithetic position of words, as esse ut vivas, non vivere ut edas. Ellendt. 92 Declinatio. Called antimetabole by Quintilian, ix. 3. 85. 93 Reprehensio. Aphorismos or diorismos. Jul. Rufin. p. 207. Compare Quintil. ix. 2. 18; Ern. p. 332. Ellendt. 94 How this kind of doubt differs from that which is mentioned in the preceding chapter, among the figures of thought, it is not easy to say. Ellendt. 95 Correctio verbi. Different from that which is mentioned above, in tho middle of c. 53. Ellendt. 96 Called alloiosis by Quintilian, ix. 3. 92. Ellendt. 97 Digression has been twice mentioned before. Strebaeus supposes it to be similar to metabasis or apostrophe. I have no doubt that the word ought to be ejected. Circumscription Quintilian himself could not understand, and has excluded it from his catalogue of figures (ix. 3. 91). Ellendt. Most of the figures enumerated in this chapter are illustrated by the writer ad Herennium, b. iv., and by Quintilian, b. ix. 98 Compare c. 52 init. 99 Sonant. As this word does not properly apply to vultus, the countenance, Schutz would make some alteration in the text. But Mueller and others observe that such a zeugma is not uncommon. 100 From the Atreus of Accius, whence also the next quotation but one is taken. See Tusc. Quaest. iv. 36. 101 See ii. 46. 102 From the Medea of Ennius. 103 From the Andromache of Ennius. See Tusc. Quaest. i. 35; iii. 19. 104 From the Alcmaeon of Ennius. 105 Prom the Atreus of Accius. See Tusc. Quaest, iii. 36; De Nat Deor. iii. 20. 106 Whence this and the next quotation are taken is unknown. 107 Arguta. Argutiae digitorum. Orat. c. 18. Manus inter agendum argutae admodum et gestuosae. Aul. Gell. i. 5. 108 I follow Ellendt in reading connivens, instead of contuens, the common reading, which Orellius retains. 109 Aversum. “Qui stet aversus a theatro. et spectatoribus tergum obvertat.” Schutz. Of Tauriscus nothing is known. 110 As to the state of the republic at that time, see i. 7 Ellendt, 111 The orator afterwards so famous. 112 He pleaded this cause, observes Ellendt, at the age of nineteen; but the nature of it, as well as that of the king of Bithynia, is unknown. 113 He was ten years younger than Cotta and Sulpicius. Brut. c. 88 Ellendt. |
Finis
->> >> >>⇈⇑⇈<< << <<-
| Deus vult ! | — Brian Regan ( Inscriptio electronica : Brennus@brennus.bluedomino.com ) |
| Dies immutationis recentissimæ : die Veneris, 2020 Jan 31 |